

Contemporary German Philosophy, 1926–1937

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CONTEMPORARY METAPHYSICS IN GERMANY¹

I. THE TURN TO METAPHYSICS

I. As regards the attitude and endeavors of contemporary German philosophy, nothing is more characteristic or illuminating than its turn to metaphysics. This metaphysical interest is very pronounced and full of promise. There is a very wide-spread demand that the richly-adorned temple of the sciences be again given its holy of holies, if we may borrow the figure by which Hegel referred to metaphysics in the preface to his *Logic* of 1912.

Only a few decades ago this turn to metaphysics represented little more than blind groping and sporadic efforts characterized by uncertainty and indecisiveness. Not infrequently, indeed, writers on metaphysics entertained certain apprehensions and sought to justify themselves as though they feared to be treading forbidden paths. At the present time, however, the invasion of metaphysics is complete. Not as though we in Germany were as yet in possession of a new and original system of metaphysics, fully elaborated and widely accepted, or capable of affording complete satisfaction to the metaphysical needs and demands and to the requirements set by recent science. What one may affirm, however, is that the various metaphysical efforts which are current converge upon a clearly discernible point, and that they concentrate upon a comprehensive metaphysical achievement. For this reason neither the possibility nor the justification of metaphysics is any longer seriously questioned. Even the neo-Kantian schools are engaging in the effort to develop a metaphysics. In part, this is due to a recognition of the fact that epistem-

¹ Translated from the German by Edward L. Schaub.

ology by itself does not exhaust the tasks of philosophy—that systematic completeness makes unavoidable the step to metaphysics. In part, it springs from the insight that a critical epistemology presupposes a critical metaphysics and ontology. Particularly instructive as regards this point is the development of a former student and follower of the Marburg neo-Kantianism, Nicolai Hartmann. In his widely noticed work, *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*, he has traversed the way from epistemology to ontology. And the present writer also, in his book *Wie ist kritische Philosophie überhaupt möglich?* has sought to exhibit the close relation between critical epistemology and speculative metaphysics within philosophy as a whole. Closely connected herewith are various tendencies to describe Kant himself as a metaphysician, as one of the greatest and keenest, one of the most constructive and fruitful metaphysicians of all time. We might refer, for example, to the *Kant-Festheft* published by the *Kant-Studien* during the commemoration year of 1924. Among its essays are one by Heinz Heimsoeth on *Metaphysische Motive in der Ausbildung des kritischen Idealismus* and another by Nicolai Hartmann on *Diesseits von Idealismus und Realismus*. We might further mention the work of Max Wundt, *Kant als Metaphysiker*. The earlier tendency of neo-Kantianism to regard Immanuel Kant as primarily or exclusively a critical epistemologist is everywhere on the decline. To exhibit the metaphysical foundations of Kantianism and to bring to light the metaphysics immanent within the critical philosophy is clearly justified on the basis of systematic as well as present historical interests. Even more than this may be claimed: Failure to participate in the prevailing movement towards metaphysics tends even today to be judged as an indication of philosophical backwardness and of an antiquated point of view. If definite coöperation is not extended, one at least expects explicit approval.

It was in 1904 that Wilhelm Windelband, in association with a number of leading philosophers such as Wilhelm Wundt, Rickert, Troeltsch, Bauch and others, published an admirable *Festschrift* on the occasion of the eightieth birthday of Kuno Fischer. It presented a general survey entitled *Die Philosophie im Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts*. Included within it were comprehensive portrayals, in large outlines, of the contemporary psychology, ethics, logic, æsthetics, philosophy of law and philosophy of history. But it omitted metaphysics. This is not surprising if one realizes that this fundamental philosophical discipline was as yet still somewhat under the cloud of disrespect and of academic distrust. Moreover, would not the established conclusions of metaphysics at that time have been very meager—indeed, altogether paltry? Apart from the last echoes of the philosophy of the epigones, as Windelband has referred to the systems of Fechner, Lotze and Eduard von Hartmann, one could at most have pointed to that form of metaphysical idealism which, at the turn of the century, had already been given wide currency through the efforts of Rudolph Eucken; or also to some of the followers of the classic exponents of constructive idealism—to Adolf Lasson and Paul Deussen. The teaching and studies of these scholars were metaphysical in character. Yet these thinkers were entirely dependent upon either Hegel or Schopenhauer and developed no systems of their own. In the wider circles of the uncritical public, a certain homage was paid to a number of shallow naturalistic writers who found their departure in Ernst Haeckel and Wilhelm Ostwald. That these naturalistic world views, unsecurely grounded as they were, and without any appreciation of the great complexity of the problems under discussion, should very soon be overtaken by fate and succumb to an early death is not at all strange. In connection with their breakdown one must always bear in mind how com-

pletely helpless they were, and had to be, in the matter of interpreting historical life and social phenomena.

2. What were the underlying causes of this turn to metaphysics? Why did it enjoy a revival after long decades of quiescence? As early as September, 1919, I was able to speak of a "duty to metaphysics" in an essay published in *Der Spiegel*. Earlier still indeed, in a paper appearing in the *Kant-Studien* of 1916, I had discussed the "Psychological Presuppositions of Metaphysics." In 1915 I wrote a work entitled *Geltungswert der Metaphysik*. (Cf. also Peter Wust, *Die Auferstehung der Metaphysik*, 1920). For the change thus indicated three distinct lines of determining influences should be distinguished and considered.

In the first place, we would point to the development of the concrete sciences, the natural and the social sciences alike. The tree of the sciences had developed a tremendous wealth of branches. But the wider its expanse the more urgent became the question concerning its presuppositions and roots, and concerning the viewpoints and the principles involved in its magnificent growth. This presented a philosophical question, the problem of the Kantian epistemology. The theoretical and critical spirit that was so successful in the individual sciences inevitably turned to reflect on the bases and conditions of its achievements. But this epistemological orientation did not of itself suffice. For the results of the individual sciences were so extensive that they created a need for philosophical synthesis. It became necessary to exhibit the interconnection of the objects of knowledge by synthesizing the results of the individual sciences into an harmonious system. This gigantic task was undertaken more particularly by Wilhelm Wundt, in his *System der Philosophie*. That the result was not much more than an encyclopedia lies in the very nature of the case. The metaphysical task should not and cannot

be deferred until the sciences have produced their fruits. Otherwise when could it be undertaken? And what philosophical mind is sufficiently vast and informed really to encompass the results of the individual sciences? Nevertheless, the luxuriant development of the positive sciences led to the two tasks just indicated, namely, those of laying the epistemological foundations and of effecting the systematic unification of knowledge. It is clear that this cleared the way for a renaissance of metaphysics. The central task, as we shall presently see, was set not so much by metaphysics and the natural sciences—for in this field Kantianism had already achieved exhaustive and decisive results—as by the social sciences. A very large part of the metaphysical endeavor of today is concerned with the methodology of historical knowledge. And this indeed presents an extraordinary number of the most urgent and fruitful problems. It is necessary, for example, to establish a genuinely critical conception of the nature of the social sciences and to delimit them from the natural sciences. Moreover, one must seek an understanding of the methods by which one may attain to a scientific knowledge of mental phenomena and must ascertain the fundamental categories of such knowledge. Still again one must determine the method by which a theory of knowledge may establish the bases of the social sciences. For it is still a matter of dispute whether one should follow the critical method of Kantianism or adopt a psychological procedure. And there are numerous other problems of a related nature.

We pass to a second line of influences, those arising from the development of philosophy and its inevitable nisus toward systematic completion. If we disregard the systems of the above-mentioned epigones, we may say that in the period of scientific positivism, that is, from about 1850 to the end of the century, philosophical endeavor had

likewise split up into a number of special investigations. These related to logic, ethics, æsthetics, and psychology, but especially to the history of philosophy. It was these decades that likewise mark the birth and the early development of so-called neo-Kantianism. Hence it is altogether natural that the early interest of this movement was exclusively epistemological. After the horrible abortion called philosophical materialism had come to the light of day, in about the middle of the past century, and had for a time indulged in its excesses, there was need for a scientific philosophy that would forcefully terminate the nefarious career of the pseudo-philosophy. And thus the construction of philosophy was begun anew from the very foundations. Investigation again turned to the bases of any philosophy that might lay claim to being scientific, and to the validity and the possible scope of such a philosophy. The result was an extraordinarily widespread epistemological movement. Representative of it are a succession of brilliant men of whom we would mention Otto Liebmann and Alois Riehl.

But it was, of course, impossible to stop simply with epistemology. Once the latter had laid the foundations of philosophy and disclosed its immanent presuppositions (as was done so brilliantly by one who fell a sacrifice to the war, the highly-gifted Emil Lask, in his *Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre*), thought was bound to turn to the construction and elaboration of a philosophical system. Otherwise epistemology would have achieved a task that was but partial and to a certain extent superfluous. Conditions were precisely as they were in the time of Kant. The founder of the critical philosophy was similarly impelled beyond his epistemology (supplied in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*) to a *system* of critical philosophy, created in his later works. But it was not he alone who felt this urge. Every one of his successors saw in the

achievement of Kant only a beginning, that is, the basis from which one must proceed to develop a system of philosophy. Fichte, Schelling, Hegel—each regarded himself, with more or less justification, as the one who continued and carried to completion the task of Kant. Windelband has declared that to understand Kant one must go beyond him. This well-known saying is true also in the sense that every preoccupation with Kant impels one beyond the *Kritik der Vernunft* to the *System der Vernunft*. Confirmation hereof is furnished by the history of neo-Kantianism. This exhibits the irrepressible fruitfulness of the Kantian doctrine and presents a close similarity to the original development from Kant to Fichte and thence to Schelling and Hegel. Epistemological investigation extended its sweep so as to include not merely the natural sciences but also the historical disciplines, and it was thus embarked upon the task of systematization. In view of the enormous wealth of presuppositions and motives involved in the critical philosophy of Kant, it is not unnatural that the development just indicated assumed a variety of forms and adopted divergent paths. Yet while there are, to be sure, very marked differences between the Marburger and the Southwest German schools of neo-Kantianism, both schools aspired to a system—the former in the case of Cohen and Natorp, and the latter in the case particularly of Rickert.

Thus we were indeed justified in contending that the development of philosophy itself tended toward the elaboration of systems. The decisive influences were, on the one hand, the splitting up of philosophy into a number of very fruitful special investigations whose conclusions required synthesis, and, on the other hand, the fact that the particular interest of neo-Kantianism in its early stages was epistemological and led to results that likewise made necessary the advance to a system. The revival of meta-

physical systematization was indeed due in part to movements within philosophy itself.

Thirdly, we would stress influences connected with the demand for a philosophy of life and with religious experience. For these two forces made irresistibly for the discovery of a metaphysical orientation and a system of thought capable of affording satisfaction more especially to the human spirit. In this connection, one thinks first of all, among the technical philosophers, of Rudolph Eucken; for this was the task to which he devoted himself. Among his numerous widely known and favorably received works are: *Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt*, *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*, *Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung*, *Mensch und Welt*, *Sinn und Wert des Lebens*, *Zur Sammlung der Geister*. Graf Hermann Keyserling, though scarcely to be counted in the ranks of technical philosophers, should be mentioned as an energetic and successful exponent of a metaphysics growing out of the need for a world view. Among his more important works are: *Unsterblichkeit*, *Philosophie als Kunst*, *Das Reisetagebuch eines Philosophen*, *Schöpferische Erkenntnis*—the last mentioned of which also indicates the purpose of the *Schule der Weisheit*. Keyserling does not seek to create a scientific and logically established philosophy, capable of formulation in terms of concepts. He aims at the development of a fundamental attitude toward life and reality, or, as he is fond of saying, toward the realization of values. In none of his numerous publications and addresses is he really concerned with intellectual goals or the enrichment of knowledge; he does not attempt to express the nature of things in conceptual formulæ. His primary concern is rather that the excessively busy and intellectual European again acquire wisdom. This also explains his commendations of the Orient. For in the Orient one may find precisely that "wisdom," that poise and repose, that inner

self-control and simplicity which we Europeans have lost because of the disintegrating influence of an extreme intellectualism. Philosophy, in his judgment, should therefore not be an academic discipline concerned with concepts and the attainment of scientific knowledge, but a matter of practical import yielding a world-view. And thus philosophy is for Keyserling an art. It is a form of the art of life, and can be exemplified by him alone who, through self-cultivation, has become a complete, a "wise", man.

The philosophies resulting from these influences throughout have the character of a practical ethics or of a certain religious orientation. The need in Germany today parallels that of other epochs of serious spiritual and moral cataclysms and religious crises. What is required of a new metaphysics is not so much strictly theoretical enlightenment concerning the nature of the world as, much rather, religious edification and inner peace, an indubitable basis for the faith that, despite all horrible disillusion, the world nevertheless has a rational meaning and a rational goal. Out of the depths of need there has arisen among us the demand and the search for a teleology and a theodicy of history and of human life. And not infrequently academic and scientific philosophy is reproached for its inadequate recognition of this need and for its too exclusive preoccupation with epistemological or other specialized theoretical investigations. For among the general public, the justification and the value of philosophy are very commonly found in its contribution to the amelioration of the worries and troubles of existence. One demands that it shall give to life a clearly discernible value. It enjoys greater confidence than the preachments representing a confession or a church, for the reason that it is supposed to express more than mere faith. Because of its relation to science and of its own scientific character, it is respected even among those who, for some inner or exter-

nal causes or reasons, feel themselves alienated from the official church and religious life, and who place no confidence in doctrines based on faith. And it is because they satisfy these wide-spread yearnings for a world-view that the writings of Eucken and Keyserling, for example, meet with respect and approbation.

3. The particular characteristics of the three lines of influence above described are reflected in the specific metaphysical syntheses to which they give rise. They thus afford a basis for an illuminating classification of the most important and noteworthy attempts on the part of contemporary German scholars to develop a metaphysics.

First—From the side of the natural sciences, particularly biology, has come the neo-vitalism of Hans Driesch.²

Second—Psychology has led to the personalism of William Stern.³

Third—The social sciences, particularly theology and history, have furnished the basis of the so-called *Lebensphilosophie*. It counts many followers. Its real founder and trail-blazer in contemporary life may be said to be Friedrich Nietzsche, if we disregard certain predecessors. The fact that Nietzsche's fame has risen and is now acknowledged even in the strictly scientific world is due fundamentally to the fact that he was one of the founders and promoters of this *Lebensphilosophie*, which is at the present time enjoying an increasing esteem also in scientific circles. In scientific and academic philosophy, the chief representative of this general movement is Wilhelm Dilthey, with his book *Die geistige Welt* and his two-volume work, *Einleitung in die Philosophie des Lebens*. These writings give an historical and psychological portrayal of the philosophy of life which is no less ingenuous than it

² *Der Vitalismus als Geschichte und Lehre; Philosophie des Organischen; Ordnungslehre; Wirklichkeitslehre.*

³ *Person und Sache*, three volumes; *Die Psychologie und der Personalismus; Grundgedanken der personalistischen Philosophie.*

is penetrating. Among the philosophers influenced by Dilthey and particularly versed with the details of historical and social life are Georg Simmel,⁴ Ernst Troeltsch⁵ and Eduard Spranger.⁶

Fourth—Out of the immanent development of philosophy from epistemology to philosophical systematization have emerged the Kantian-Hegelian constructions of the Marburger School. Here we would cite Hermann Cohen's *System der Philosophie*, comprising several volumes. Cohen's renowned exposition of the Kantian system of philosophy itself exhibits a systematic and a systematizing spirit, and to this its great philosophical value is undoubtedly due. Under the present head belongs also the value-metaphysics of the school of Southwest Germany. Heinrich Rickert, its outstanding spokesman, is at present preparing a systematic formulation of his doctrines in his *System der Philosophie*, the first volume of which has appeared under the title, *Allgemeine Grundlegung der Philosophie*. In this connection should be mentioned also Hugo Münsterberg's *Philosophie der Werte, Grundzüge einer Weltanschauung*.

Fifth—The problems and needs connected with the demand for a general world-view have given rise to the metaphysically oriented works of Rudolph Eucken and Graf Hermann Keyserling, as already mentioned.

Sixth—In addition to these metaphysical tendencies one finds in Germany also neo-Thomism. It draws sustenance from several sources. To be sure it lacks genuine originality and is only a revival, with the fewest possible changes, of mediæval dogmatism. Nevertheless, it is a characteristic feature of the present metaphysical situa-

⁴ *Philosophische Kultur; Hauptprobleme der Philosophie*. Penetrating essays relating to the metaphysics of life are to be found in his last work, *Lebensanschauung; vier metaphysische Kapitel*.

⁵ *Zur religiösen Lage, Religionsphilosophie und Ethik; Der Historismus und seine Probleme; Der Historismus und seine Ueberwindung*.

⁶ *Lebensformen; Psychologie des Jugendalters*.

tion. It is bound up with the fact that there is an unmistakable strengthening of the Roman Catholic spirit, whose intellectual aspect, as it were, it represents. This philosophy is the creation of a period scientifically remote from ours; yet, whatever our attitude towards it, its revival is logically intelligible. For the entire history of the human spirit probably presents not another system of thought that develops such a closed world-view and establishes with such radical one-sidedness and energy an imposing unity of the mental life. It asserts an inviolable harmony between the needs of the spirit and the results of knowledge and of science. It denies that cleavage between knowledge and faith from which modern mankind suffers. Through its alleged removal of this conflict neo-Thomism believes that it offers our age spiritual health and frees it in large measure from its afflictions. It is this fiction, primarily, that accounts for the growing influence of this dogmatic world-view. It is a philosophy that rejects the validity and the value of that differentiation between faith and knowledge which had become inevitable as a fateful characteristic of modern Europe. Thereby it at bottom disallows the autonomy of science, though yielding the attractive and welcome illusion of a harmony between that which we can know and that which we can believe and await with hope. The presupposition of this harmony is the basis upon which the metaphysics of neo-Thomism rests. The system is one of harmonization and, as every harmony, it also is pleasing to all who prefer rest and the feeling of security to movement and the restless but fruitful play of dialectic. But because dialectic is lacking to neo-Thomism, the latter stands somewhat aside from that vital and dynamic metaphysics to whose development German philosophers are zealously devoting themselves. Neo-Thomism does not exemplify the fundamental traits characteristic of the metaphysics of Germany.

II. THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF GERMAN METAPHYSICS

We shall not enter upon a detailed consideration of the metaphysical movements thus briefly indicated. Rather would we point out that the turn to metaphysics, taken as a whole, is a development as necessary as it is obvious. Underlying it are factors of a thoroughly objective character. It cannot be ascribed entirely or primarily to subjective needs. To be sure, as we have already pointed out, subjective and emotional influences are in play. It is true that without such needs no metaphysical systems ever arise. But these needs are nevertheless only, as it were, the personal and private presuppositions of metaphysics. Ultimately they neither account for nor explain its origin or its specific character. Really to understand the creation of a metaphysical system one must always turn to the objective presuppositions and developmental forces involved, and not consider merely psychical and subjective longings. What we mean by this will shortly appear.

By disclosing the universal factors that underlie metaphysics, we shall understand not merely the inevitability of the present turn to it but also the general character and the essential nature of the metaphysics which is in process of development. For, numerous and diverse as are the contemporary metaphysical tendencies and constructive attempts, they nevertheless have one trait in common. And this common trait is at once obvious. Negatively, each of them is characterized by the rejection of the mechanistic standpoint and mode of interpretation. None of them attempts to define the structure and the meaning of reality in the terms of the concepts of the natural sciences. None of them conceives the real after the pattern of mathemati-

cal physics; none of them regards it as mathematically calculable or formulable; none of them thinks that phenomena are exhausted by mathematical concepts or dominated by mathematical-physical laws.

Hence none of the metaphysical constructions now under discussion may be regarded as strictly rationalistic, if we take this term in its customary, that is, in its mathematical, connotation. Of the older metaphysical systems none shows slighter evidences of revival than that of Descartes. The fundamental reason for this will soon appear. What we today find is a revival of those older systems that reject the viewpoint of a mechanistic rationalism and set themselves in opposition to it. The survival or the renewal—as the case may be—of the Kantian philosophy is often objected to because of the misunderstanding that Kant's mode of thought is mechanistic and rationalistic—a misconception that appears even in Oswald Spengler's widely-known work, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*. This mode of thought is now regarded as antiquated and as inadequate for the acquisition of a comprehensive world-view.

The universal rejection of the mathematical-mechanistic point of view within metaphysics is associated with a departure from those interpretations which place the entire emphasis, in the case of metaphysical knowledge, upon formal, fixed, limited, logically unequivocal and determinate features. Our thought is turning away from the static toward the dynamic. This anti-mechanistic and dynamic trait of contemporary metaphysics, as it seems to me, mirrors, intellectually and theoretically, a general feature characteristic of our spiritual culture and of its leading representatives. Life itself has discarded the traits of fixity and changelessness and has again assumed its original nature as dynamic. This dynamic character, and the knowledge of it, receives its glorification from no less a thinker than Friedrich Nietzsche. In his dynamic philoso-

phy of life, it acquires its most powerful expression. At the present time we are unquestionably in an era marked by the unlimbering or at least by a certain depreciation and neglect of that which is formal. This holds true no matter whether we have reference to established political constitutions, the maintenance of tradition, feelings of piety and faith in authority, modes of intercourse, social convention and rule, the economic order, theological and ecclesiastical dogma, artistic style, absolute scientific knowledge, philosophical systematization, or any other avenues along which form may manifest itself. The salvation for which we long is today no longer found in the acquisition and preservation of a strictly formalistic attitude of mind and mode of knowledge.

This now brings us face to face with the positive trait common to all the numerous world-views of our day. These are much less shut off from life than was mathematical, formalistic rationalism. They are all touched and influenced by the agitation and by the dialectic of life. Insofar they are all dialectical. This does not mean merely that the richly developed philosophy of life which we now possess has a theoretical interest in life, seeking to master its problematic and irrational details; it means also, and conversely, that life with all its problematic and irrational details impinges upon the rationality of knowledge and thus contributes to the gradual development of a strictly dialectical metaphysics. We now pay more faithful and receptive attention to the intricate complications of reality; we are more mindful of the alluring multiplicity of its forms than was the constructive rationalism and idealism of former times. Our metaphysical interest is directed not to the creation of new connections and forms but to fathoming and illuminating new depths and movements, new structural relations and strata of life. We seek new revelations of content, enrichments of content. Our concern is

not with laws but with that which first receives its form by and in law. We are eager to immerse ourselves in the *life* of problems and are not primarily interested in discovering either conceptual forms or logically justifying categories. Not as though we were in general indifferent to all form or depreciated it. On the contrary, the most serious effort of our metaphysics, as it appears to me, is engaged in gaining and developing a conception of form which, in distinction from the earlier and different notion, makes some provision in its structure for the problematic and dialectical features of life—a conception which, without entirely sacrificing relatively formal determinateness, nevertheless appropriately incorporates the irrepressible dialectic and the luxuriantly problematic features typical of life.

Hence the emerging metaphysics does not neglect expressly and emphatically to set forth its relation to traditional rationalism. We have said that the former is anti-mechanistic. This does not mean, however, that it is thorough-going and anti-rationalistic. No philosophy, no metaphysics, can dispense with rationalism. The modern philosophy of life may not place itself in complete antithesis to rationalism if it is not entirely to renounce the hope of knowledge. What it seeks is simply such a notion of philosophical knowledge as can give adequate expression to the dialectic of life without destroying the guarantees and forms of conception.

The turn to metaphysics and the entire development of metaphysical investigation are therefore without doubt to be regarded as a redirection and a development of rationalism. What is required is an energetic attempt to develop or reconstruct formal and constructive rationalism into a dialectic rationalism. One must advance far beyond even the dialectical interpretation of the concept and the thoroughly dialectic mode of procedure espoused by Hegel.

The Hegelian philosophy is enjoying a renaissance not simply because Hegel was the greatest thinker concerned with the philosophy and metaphysics of history but because he disclosed the dialectic of the concept, because he was the most nearly modern representative of a logic of dialectic and of the dialectic of logic. Nevertheless, the Hegelian dialectic and doctrine of dialectic as yet represented a logic that is altogether too formal and one-sided. In consequence, concepts, in this philosophy, could not take adequate cognizance of the problematic character of reality. Hegel came to his view of dialectic from the side of logic. To be sure, it was a magnificent and a dynamic logic. Nevertheless the approach was too exclusively from logic. Hegel failed to import into his logic, from the beginning and as a matter of principle, the dialectic of history and of historical flux. In his dialectic, this powerful philosopher of history thought in logical, constructive terms. This was indeed an advance, for it disclosed a new aspect of the concept not known to the old formal logic. And yet Hegel had not separated himself widely enough from the latter. If one would adequately understand and do justice to the nature of dialectic, must he not think of it itself in dialectical terms and apply it in a thoroughly dialectical manner? Hegel extracted too little from the endless fertility of the idea of dialectic. As a very natural result of his logistic point of view, he was too impatient an opponent of the Kantian idea of an eternal antinomies, and of the splendid and praiseworthy revival and championship by Kant of the notion of antinomies. However great may have been its dynamic tendency, Hegel's dialectic was nevertheless too static. To show why this was the case does not fall within our present plan. But it seemed fitting, in our general survey of contemporary metaphysics in Germany, to refer to the renaissance of Hegel and briefly to indicate both its justification and also the limits thereof.

It is evident that the revival of metaphysics in general derives not a little strength from this renaissance of Hegel.

Now, however, we confront the important question as to what gave rise to and maintained the anti-mechanistic and dialectical character of the German metaphysics of today. For the turn to metaphysics is a very general feature of present-day philosophy, and this turn has as its clearly-defined and specific trait the character just mentioned.

III. THE TURN TO THE METAPHYSICS OF HISTORY

The anti-mechanistic and dialectical character of contemporary metaphysics results of necessity from the object of its primary concern. The latter relates, in the main, not to inorganic, physical nature but to organic nature and life—primarily, indeed, to that form of life which we call history. The central tendency of our metaphysics is not in the direction of a mechanistic philosophy of inorganic nature. It aims rather to develop a philosophy of the organic, whether this be biological in character (neo-vitalism), personal (personalism), or historical (metaphysics of history).

It is chiefly attracted, however, by life in the sense of history. If we would not simply lump together diverse tendencies with an excessive disregard of their differences, we must distinguish clearly between two types of the philosophy of life, represented, on the one hand, by vitalism and neo-vitalism, and, on the other, by the metaphysics of history. Though both movements are metaphysical, they are radically distinct in character. Vitalism centers about the biological life, whereas the metaphysics of history concerns itself with historical life.

Now it is the latter that unquestionably enjoys the

ascendency as regards both the interest manifested and its achievements. This is due to circumstances which we will now briefly describe. The rapid development, during the nineteenth century, of the so-called social sciences has made it increasingly clear that man is not alone a living being in the sense of the natural sciences, inclusive of biology, but likewise a member of an historical order, and that the laws of history are no less truly the laws of his being and development than are the laws of so-called nature. This insight, which originated in the social sciences, served in turn constantly to increase both the attention devoted to the latter and the esteem which they acquired. In consequence, there developed an extraordinarily fruitful relation between the social sciences and philosophy. The situation was analogous to that of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the outstanding position of mathematics and of the mathematical sciences led to a philosophy that was based on mathematics and the natural sciences and that was oriented accordingly. The results of the social sciences during the nineteenth century, as regards both form and content, could impossibly be disregarded by philosophy once the latter again became conscious of its metaphysical task and sought to gain a comprehensive interpretation of the world. Scientific philosophy and metaphysics have always maintained a close relation with the concrete sciences. Indeed, it is more especially by virtue of this relation that they may be distinguished as scientific and thus be demarcated from all mere dilettantism in the way of metaphysics and the formulation of world-views. So long as mathematics and the natural sciences were in the ascendency as regards both their stage of development and the respect they enjoyed, it was only natural and imperative that metaphysics should primarily base itself upon them and take them into account. But since the first third of the past century the social sciences

have enjoyed an increasingly flourishing growth, and this has made it necessary for philosophy to give the most careful consideration to their formal structure and to their conclusions.

The formal structure of the social sciences raises problems that fall to epistemology and the methodology of the social sciences. To them German scholars have been devoting themselves most assiduously during the last decades. Insofar our philosophy is a theory and methodology of history. This is a field of investigation cultivated by a large number of thinkers. As a matter of fact, it is at present the central concern of scientific philosophy, and to it almost the majority of our best minds have turned. The interpretation of the conclusions of the social sciences is the task of the metaphysics of life and of history. The latter aims at a metaphysical interpretation and systematization of the empirical facts which the social sciences have disclosed concerning the play of historical life and the genesis and the fall of political, legal, economic, ethical, artistic, and religious institutions. Thus our philosophy maintains intimate connections with the social sciences. Whether as epistemology and methodology, on the one hand, or as metaphysics, on the other, it is distinctly a philosophy of history.

It is both obvious and incontestable that in this field philosophy still faces important tasks. If, taking our cue from speculative philosophy, we designate the unitary principle at the basis of historical reality as *reason*, the main task of the philosophy of history becomes what Wilhelm Dilthey called a "critique of historical reason." This would be the continuation and perhaps the completion of the critical philosophy of Kant. For it would supplement Kant's investigations of the foundations of mathematics, the mathematical sciences and biology, with similar investigations relating to the sciences of the historical order. Upon these

epistemological and critical foundations would arise the system of the social sciences. As the continuation of the critical investigations, the latter leads to knowledge of the historical and social world, and may thus be called a developed metaphysics of history. To be sure, neither the critical bases nor the systematic superstructure as yet appear in their finished form in the philosophy of history of any German writer. Considered as a whole, however, the various endeavors and tendencies of our present day philosophy of history appear to center upon the two tasks just described, namely, laying the epistemological foundations of the historical sciences and supplying a metaphysical and systematic interpretation of historical life through an appeal to and a utilization of the facts established by the historical sciences.

Just as there is unity in respect to the tasks of philosophy, so likewise may we discern a high degree of unity in respect to the points of view and methods utilized in their accomplishment. By thus bringing together and unifying the object and the form of all of these activities we shall obtain a clear view of what the metaphysics in Germany aims at and what it has already in part achieved.

IV. THE NEW DIALECTIC

Contemporary German metaphysics, as has already been indicated, tends to adopt an anti-mechanical and dialectical procedure. Closely connected as this is with the entire spirit and culture of our times, it prevails very especially in the metaphysics of history. The reason is easy to understand. For in the case of the metaphysics of history, the viewpoint and method of dialectic—thinking in terms of and with antinomies—is unavoidable and indispensable. A real

philosophy of life that would be faithful to the object and the meaning of its task could have no other character.

Not that there is the slightest intention or tendency to condone any form of skepticism or relativism. Practically all of the metaphysical efforts are at one in expressly steering clear of every skeptical and relativistic mode of interpretation as one that eventually always leads to an untenable historicism. Precisely because of its relativistic tendencies, historicism is condensed. It is regarded as unsatisfactory from the standpoint of knowledge and is recognized as a psychological peril—a force undermining that moral spirit which is so indispensable for strict philosophical inquiry. It would be an extremely tempting task to investigate the characteristic ethos of our metaphysics, for it exhibits very clearly the change of temper that has come over our philosophical thinking.

Relativism and historicism are regarded as manifestations of a mental disease, a spiritual crisis. From it one seeks to become free. This I have set forth in some detail in my book, *Die geistige Krisis der Gegenwart*, where the overcoming of relativism is presented as a theoretical and as a moral and practical requirement.

The nineteenth century had acquired a most extraordinarily keen consciousness of the irrationalities and antinomies of existence. The more deeply one penetrated into historical and social life—that is, the greater the advances made by the social sciences—the more clearly one realized the impossibility of formulating in the inflexible forms of abstract conceptions, the many different contradictions of historical life, or the diversity and multiplicity of its mental, moral, artistic, religious, economic and political, of its impulsive and erotic, relations and objectivizations. And yet this metaphysics of history could not permanently and deliberately rely solely upon irrational intuitions and direct experiences of life. For thus the doors would be opened

to an uncontrollable mysticism involving the destruction of all serious and scientific philosophy. However hospitable the metaphysics of history may be to the irrationalities of life, it must nevertheless exhibit their connection with the world of concepts, forms, and categories, for it claims to be knowledge and seeks to be recognized and valued as such. No mere experiencing of life, however deep or overpowering, and no intuitive or impressionistic grasp of historical culture, however rich, can suffice as a foundation for metaphysics. Hence irrationalism itself requires a rationalism that shall provide the form for the vision and give to experience a clear and universally valid methodical structure. Only thus may one acquire conceptually organized knowledge. No metaphysics of history can possibly be constructed without the express employment of critically validated categories and sharply defined concepts.

That such a rationalism differs from the older form whose character was determined by mathematics and natural science has already been indicated. The indisputably dialectical character of all knowledge relating to historical and social life exhibits itself in the fact that rational elements are combined with others that are thoroughly irrational, intuitive, and neither reducible to nor expressible in conceptual terms. The manner of this combination is fundamentally antinomical and paradoxical. Thus the metaphysics of history recognizes and utilizes that particular form of rationalism which may be designated dialectical. It was brilliantly exemplified by Georg Simmel in his book, *Lebensanschauung*. It was employed likewise by Theodor Litt in establishing the metaphysical foundations of pedagogy, as he has presented them in his work, *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart und ihr Einfluss auf das Bildungsideal*. That it offers the most suitable and the most promising method for a systematic metaphysics of history is perhaps beyond all question. It recognizes the reciprocal

relations between life and knowledge. It realizes that constructions proceeding solely from life become unscientific and degenerate into romantic mysticism, whereas, on the other hand, all constructions operating exclusively with formal and logical principles remain suspended in the sphere of high and dry rationalism, abstract and remote from life. It knows well that rationalizing and systematizing processes cannot yield a thoroughly satisfactory or ultimate comprehension or mastery of any phenomenon of life.

The rationalism we are describing at every point admits the possibility of further question; it leaves the way open for a continuation and a deepening of the discussion. Thoroughly alive to the problematical character of life, it does not deaden but it rather strengthens the consciousness that all knowledge is problematical. It thinks of knowledge as endless, not merely in respect to its range—this was recognized even by formal rationalism—but likewise in respect to its depth. At every point it discloses a new profundity, a new intellectual challenge; and thus it generates the necessity for constant reinterpretation.

The task confronting this dialectical rationalism is that of elaborating a doctrine of the categories of historical reason. The unique character of these categories must consist in the fact that they establish the significant yet antinomical interrelation between rationality as the form and the irrationality of life as the content of the metaphysics of history. This means that the principles for a comprehensive and systematic interpretation of the phenomena of historical life must be dialectical and antinomical. Thus an extensive, temptingly beautiful, and extraordinarily fertile field of investigation lies within the horizon of the German metaphysician of history.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

CONTEMPORARY GERMAN PHILOSOPHY.¹

I.

IT is a familiar fact that the development of philosophy is determined as much by historical motives and interests and by consideration of the past as by purely systematic motives and factors. This duality of tendencies is expressed in contemporary German philosophy, which is comparable in vigor and character to the philosophy of the pre-war period.

We shall speak first of a series of impressive works of historical character. Here we may mention, in the first place, the so-called *Überweg*. This work has, rightly, been highly regarded by us for decades as a handbook of the history of philosophy. The first part, the *Philosophie des Alterthums* (Karl Prächter), the third part, the *Philosophie der Neuzeit bis zum Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts* (Willi Moog), and the fourth part, *Deutsche Philosophie des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts und der Gegenwart* (Konstantin Oesterreich) have been worked over in an admirable manner. All of these new editions² have been made in the spirit of historical criticism and critical history. They offer no real history of ideas after the fashion of Wilhelm Dilthey and Windelband, but their merit consists in their great exactness and factuality in the reproduction of the doctrines of

¹ *Aus der deutschen Philosophie der Gegenwart*. Translated by W. C. Swabey, New York University. [These articles on "Contemporary German Philosophy" were discontinued in 1914. With this number the series is resumed.—Ed.]

² E. S. Mittler und Sohn, Berlin, 1923, 1924.

individual philosophers. This work is truly a classical example from the golden age of the philological-critical writing of history.

As a complete history the *Überweg* seeks to reproduce the historical evolution of philosophy. *Grosse Denker*, edited by Ernst von Aster and a series of eminent colleagues, follows the more morphological method of the individual monograph.³ The reader gains a concrete and living picture which brings before him the richness of the individuality of the great systematic thinkers. Many of these expositions rise to the level of little masterpieces. Out of the wealth of contributions, from which one is sorry to miss a treatment of Hermann Lotze, let us mention the following without intending to express any value-judgment with regard to the essays not named: A. Fischer, *Die Grundlehren der vorsokratischen Philosophie*; M. Baumgartner, *Thomas von Aquin*; M. Frischeisen-Köhler (†), *Descartes*; E. von Aster, *Locke-Hume*; H. Falkenheim, *Hegel*; R. Lehmann, *Schopenhauer*.

The historical development of a special philosophical discipline, namely, ethics, is being portrayed in the five-volume *Geschichte der Ethik* by the Leipzig philosopher, Ottmar Dittrich. The first three volumes of this work, which claims highest consideration, have appeared: *Altertum bis zum Hellenismus*, *Vom Hellenismus bis zum Ausgang des Mittelalters*, *Mittelalter bis zum Kirchenreformation*.⁴ In this outstanding work, historical and philosophical points of view are connected with each other in an ideal fashion. An essential feature of the work consists in the fact that it does not present the ethics of the philosophical systems merely. For with regard to the structure of the general spiritual life, ethical attitudes and convictions which are not to be found in the writings of philosophers but are embodied in the life-relations and life-views of an age, are also important. From this point of view, Ottmar Dittrich deals in detail with the ethical views of the Greek epic poets (Homer, Hesiod), with Greek tragedy and comedy, with the medieval church and with the ethical principles on which were founded the state and the orders and the sects of the middle ages. The author makes clear the historical position and influence of the ethical systems, but he never

³ Quelle und Meyer, Leipzig, 1923.

⁴ Felix Meiner, Leipzig, 1923, 1926.

fails to bring out their trans-historical and purely philosophical meaning.

An excellent survey of the determining tendencies of the philosophy of the nineteenth century is offered by Jonas Cohn, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Freiburg in Baden, in his *Die Philosophie im Zeitalter des Spezialismus*.⁵ In this admirably instructive account Cohn deals with philosophical activity in Germany as well as in France and England from the appearance of French positivism and English utilitarianism down to the most recent past: Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Bergson, Simmel.

The historical research of the present is turning with special interest to the philosophy of Spinoza. Not only was the Spinoza-celebration which we held on February 21, 1927, in commemoration of the death of Spinoza, influential in this direction, but there are also reasons of philosophical principle which result from the tendency to metaphysics which we are now experiencing in Germany. I have published an essay concerning this tendency in the *Monist* for April, 1926, under the title: "Contemporary Metaphysics in Germany." It would seem that we are facing a Spinoza-renaissance. Constantin Brunner struggles with zeal to bring this about in his somewhat temperamental books: *Die Lehre von den Geistigen und vom Volke* (two volumes) and *Spinoza gegen Kant und die Sache der geistigen Wahrheit*.⁶ Brunner is a typical metaphysical dogmatist who fights for his cause with impressive devotion. What a wealth of ideas is in him is seen in his latest work, *Unser Christus oder das Wesen des Genies*.⁷ For him Christ and Spinoza are the two possessors and evangelists of the highest knowledge and the highest love. Ernst Alt-kirch, who died recently, followed Brunner as a respectful disciple. In his book, *Spinoza im Porträt*,⁸ published several years ago, he dealt with the external appearance of the philosopher. He then published a beautiful book entitled *Maledictus und Benedictus*⁹ which recounts the varied history of the Spinozistic philosophy by

⁵ B. G. Teubner, Leipzig, 1925.

⁶ Karl Schnabel, Berlin.

⁷ Oesterheld und Co., Berlin, 1921.

⁸ Eugen Diderichs, Jena.

⁹ Felix Meiner, Leipzig, 1924.

means of a collection, made with love and care, of many opinions concerning the great thinker. At the Hague in Holland, there has been formed an international Spinoza Society, which has, for several years, published an interesting and full yearbook under the title *Chronicon Spinozanum*. At present four volumes have appeared, which discuss the philosophy, personality, and historical fate of Spinoza in instructive contributions.

High consideration is due the informing and acute work, *Die Ethik Spinozas*¹⁰ by the Berlin Rabbi Benzion Kellermann, whose fruitful activity was interrupted by death in 1923. This book subjects all the fundamental concepts of the Spinozistic system to a penetrating and almost uniformly destructive criticism from a Neo-Kantian standpoint. The valuable work of the eminent and also lately deceased Copenhagen Professor of Philosophy, C. N. Starcke, *Baruch de Spinoza*,¹¹ is likewise on a strictly scientific plane. For Starcke, as for Constantin Brunner, Spinoza is primarily a religious thinker; he is a Hebrew prophet in modern form, characterized by the fine and strong feeling of justice which is found to such a striking extent in the best representatives of the Jewish people. In this connection we may mention also the elegant and complete edition of Spinoza's works, which Carl Gebhardt has prepared for the Heidelberg Academy of Science.¹²

But the other heroes of the history of philosophy have also received in recent years intensive study and treatment. It is the same whether they belong to antiquity, to the middle ages, or to modern times. I must here be satisfied with a summary enumeration. It is with real pleasure that one greets the biographies, *Lao-tse und der Taoismus* and *Kung-tse, Leben und Werk*,¹³ which we owe to the extraordinary knowledge of Richard Wilhelm. Wilhelm was active for many years in the Far East. Through him we learn to know sublime masters of wisdom; the suffix *tse* in the original names means nothing but 'master.' But who in the realm of mind has a purer and more conclusive claim

¹⁰ A. C. Schwetschke & Sohn, Berlin, 1922.

¹¹ Translated into German by Dr. Karl Hellwig, Gyldendalske Boghandel, Berlin, 1921.

¹² Four volumes, Karl Winter, Heidelberg, 1925 to 1927.

¹³ Frommann, Stuttgart, 1925.

to that title than Plato? Ernst von Aster gives an excellent account in his *Platon*¹⁴ of that blessed spirit, as Goethe called the Athenian who was so closely akin to him. The tragedy of the intellectual history of Plato is unfolded in the subtle psychological analyses made by the representative of classical philology in the University of Zürich, Ernst Howald. In his striking little book *Platons Leben*¹⁵ he enters into the soul of the great man, whose originally so rectilinear development suffered a fateful interruption through Socrates.

Plato's philosophy was of immeasurable effect. At the end of ancient culture there rose the strange form of Plotinus, the Alexandrian follower of Plato, a true romanticist. Georg Mehlis has erected a memorial to him in his *Plotin*.¹⁶ Through Plotinus Platonism reached into the middle ages. Here Platonic idealism produced its most significant disciple in the great father of the church, Augustine, whose dæmonic personality has been impressively portrayed by Dr. Johannes Hessen, of the University of Cologne, in his: *Augustinus und seine Bedeutung für die Gegenwart*.¹⁷ Hessen enables us to understand the intellectual world of Augustine from the living principle of the personality of that volcanic man. At the same time he discloses the significance of his ideas for our time in an instructive manner.

Interest in modern philosophy and its chief representatives is not less intense. Here I can merely mention the work of our famous sociologist and philosopher of the University of Kiel, Ferdinand Tönnies, *Thomas Hobbes Leben und Lehre*¹⁸ which evidences a high degree of scientific knowledge. Rudolph Metz has given an excellent account of the talented English bishop in his *George Berkeley, Leben und Lehre*.¹⁹ There are in the German language only a few special works devoted to Berkeley. This work of Metz, who has admirably succeeded in presenting a clear picture resting on painstaking study, undoubtedly stands at the head of the list. Berkeley's *Commonplace Book* has been trans-

¹⁴ Strecker und Schröder, Stuttgart, 1925.

¹⁵ Verlag Seldwyla, Zürich.

¹⁶ Frommanns Klassiker der Philosophie, Stuttgart, 1924.

¹⁷ Strecker und Schröder, Stuttgart, 1924.

¹⁸ Frommann, Stuttgart, 1925.

¹⁹ Frommann, Stuttgart, 1925.

lated by Andreas Hecht²⁰ so that now we possess in the German language also this highly interesting document, which gives us an intimate glance into the intellectual world of the philosopher.

The renewal of the philosophy of history, which is now taking place in Germany, and of which the well-known work of Oswald Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*²¹ gives evidence, is also expressed in interest in Hegel's philosophy. For Hegel is the greatest philosopher of history who has hitherto appeared among us. We owe an extraordinarily careful and instructive work on Hegel to Paul Vogel: *Hegels Gesellschaftsbegriff und seine geschichtliche Fortbildung durch Lorenz von Stein, Marx, Engels und Lasalle*.²² This significant work shows by detailed investigation that the frequently asserted collapse of the Hegelian philosophy after the death of its founder is untenable. Hegel has continued to be influential in theology and in the moral sciences, especially in sociology, down to the present moment. Vogel's contribution was honored with a prize. In contrast to the interest in Hegel, the interest in Schopenhauer appears to be on the decline. An important factor is an effort to be free of Schopenhauer's pessimism, which is no longer in harmony with the prevalent attitude toward life. To this is to be added the fact that Schopenhauer accomplished nothing in the philosophy of history, which now engages many of our best minds. That the classical pessimist, however, still possesses a loyal congregation is seen in the publication of the magnificent *Gesamtausgabe der Werke Schopenhauers*. At the present time ten volumes have appeared in lexicon format.²³ A definitive monograph concerning Schopenhauer has been supplied by Heinrich Hasse, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Frankfurt a.M. This monograph rests upon a complete mastery of the material and deals with all phases of Schopenhauer's philosophy. Concerning Wilhelm Wundt, who is especially well-known in the United States as a pioneer in experimental psychology, we now possess two comprehensive accounts of high scientific value: Willi Nef,

²⁰ Felix Meiner, Leipzig, 1926.

²¹ Two volumes, Beck, München, 1920 ff.

²² *Kant-studien, Ergänzungsheft der Kant-Gesellschaft, Nr. 59.*

²³ R. Piper & Co., München.

*Die Philosophie Wilhelm Wundts*²⁴ and Peter Petersen: *Wilhelm Wundt und seine Zeit*.²⁵ Both works not merely describe Wundt as a psychologist but give a total picture of his whole doctrine and life-work, which was marvelous even with regard to its external scope.

But while we are speaking of works concerning the history of philosophy we must mention the man who without doubt stands first among all historians of philosophy and whom we also honor most highly as a historian of modern intellectual life in general, namely, Wilhelm Dilthey. After long preparations there is now appearing an edition of his *Gesammelten Schriften*.²⁶ This edition will make known in the widest circles the unique significance of Dilthey's work. During his lifetime he influenced only a relatively narrow circle of disciples. For this quiet and fine personality, directed upon contemplation and inner understanding of the historical world, was far removed from any desire to make an effect upon the public. In their historical parts his works portray in the main the evolution of philosophy and of the general European spirit, since the Renaissance and the rise of modern science, down to the Enlightenment and the end of the eighteenth century. Dilthey's vision is directed immediately to life itself and he possesses an inimitable gift of reproducing reality so vividly that the reader has the feeling of living with the figures involved and in the time in question. His account often has a dramatic character. He was an incomparable master of the instrument of 'understanding' (*Verstehen*) which he calls, in his systematic works and in his now universally recognized *Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie*, the most important instrument of historical knowledge. How many hitherto undiscovered connections did he discover! With perfect plastic distinctness the great men step forth so that one almost seems bodily to see them. We should need a whole essay were we to seek to characterize Dilthey's greatness and individuality as an historian of philosophy and of general European culture. He is the most talented and productive representative of the standpoint which we are accustomed

²⁴ Felix Meiner, Leipzig, 1923.

²⁵ Frommanns Verlag, Stuttgart, 1924.

²⁶ At present seven volumes have appeared, B. G. Teubner, 1914 ff.

to designate as historicism or historical relativism. This standpoint, which has exercised wide influence on systematic philosophy, recognizes no absolute concepts and values, and in contrast to Hegel, it derives the history of philosophy and culture, not from the relations of abstract concepts amongst themselves, but from changes in man in his full life and individuality. Ernst Troeltsch among others was greatly influenced by Dilthey, as his two works, *Der Historismus und seine Probleme*²⁷ and *Der Historismus und seine Ueberwindung*²⁸ clearly show. The second of these contains lectures which Troeltsch was to have delivered in London, Oxford, and Edinburgh at the invitation of the universities of those cities. Troeltsch was one of the first German scholars who, at the end of the terrible war, received invitations from foreign countries. These he would gladly have accepted had not a sudden death snatched him away shortly before he was to commence the journey.

The mention of these two thinkers gives us an opportunity to pass to our second part which is to deal with works of a systematic character. For both Dilthey and Troeltsch were not merely historians who devoted themselves to the evolution of the intellectual life; they were also philosophers who raised themselves above history to a systematic philosophy of history.

II

In considering such works of systematic philosophy we must first give our attention to the tendency which, in the last years, has strongly influenced and in part dominated philosophy, namely Neo-Kantianism. This extraordinarily comprehensive and important movement has now in a certain sense come to a conclusion, owing to the death of its leader, Alois Riehl, who died in November, 1924. Riehl was the creator of the great three-volume work *Der Philosophische Kritizismus, Geschichte und System*.²⁹ All three volumes are now in new editions, which have received important changes and extensions. The first volume contains the

²⁷ J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1922.

²⁸ Pan-Verlag Rolf Heise, Berlin, 1924.

²⁹ Alfred Kroner, Leipzig, 1924 to 1926.

Geschichte des Philosophischen Kritizismus in which the philosophical systems of the empirical predecessors of Kant in England, Locke and Hume, as well as that of Kant, are expounded. While the other great Neo-Kantian, Hermann Cohen, in, for example, his classical work *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung*,³⁰ connects the philosophy of Kant with the rationalism of Descartes and Leibniz and in general strongly emphasizes the rationalistic features of the Kantian philosophy, Riehl seeks to prove that the criticism of Kant is more closely connected with English empiricism and that it developed out of this latter. In the second and third volumes the foundations and chief forms of scientific knowledge are treated,—a favorite subject of Riehl's thought. He is nevertheless primarily concerned with the natural-science forms of knowledge, while questions which have to do with the philosophy of history are not taken into account. This interest in natural science is characteristic of the stage of Neo-Kantianism which we are now striving to pass beyond.

But as we are now more interested in questions as to the nature of historical knowledge, so the tendency in general is to go beyond the purely epistemological way of putting questions to an ontology, that is, to a philosophy which does not limit itself to the investigations of the forms through which we *know* reality but which seeks rather to grasp the ontological forms of reality itself. In this there is a kind of radical transcending of Neo-Kantianism, since for this new ontology it is not so much knowledge as reality which is the goal of investigation. In other words, the problem and system of 'truth' are not now isolated from the problem and system of 'reality,' but the two are brought into the closest possible relation by proceeding from the conviction that they are inseparably correlated. This correlation is revealed in truly brilliant fashion by the well-known *Ordinarius* of philosophy in the University of Berlin, Heinrich Maier, in his *Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit*,³¹ the first part of a system which calls itself "Philosophy of Reality" and will soon be before us in completed form. But Heinrich Maier is still too much a criticist to undertake a philosophy of being, directly, without investigation of the

³⁰ Bruno Cassirer, Berlin, fourth edition, 1925.

³¹ J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1926.

forms of knowledge and of judgment. He finds a solid starting-point in his study, from new points of view, of the essence of judgment. This theory of judgment is a masterpiece. It shows that the problem of reality is not to be treated before the concept of truth has been critically grounded and clarified. But our acts and forms of judgment seek to approximate to, and adjust themselves to, the real state of affairs. They refer in principle to a reality placed before them. And this reality and the purpose of apprehending it play a determining rôle in judgment. This is true, even if for no other reason, because in all knowledge will and emotion are involved. Thus Heinrich Maier propounds an important 'emotionalistic' theory of judgment which emphasizes emotional factors in the act of judgment along with the rational. But in this theory of judgment itself, Maier, as a strictly scientific mind, is opposed to all emotionalism and irrationalism. The severity and high standard of his scientific philosophizing is also seen in his excellent new edition of the classical *Logik*³² of Christoph Sigwart, of which I have published a detailed review in the *Kant-studien*, Heft 2-3, 1926.

A very comprehensive explanation of the concept of reality is furnished by the work of Günther Jacoby: *Allgemeine Ontologie der Wirklichkeit*,³³ which investigates with highest subtlety the involved structural relations lying at the basis of our every-day and scientific concepts of reality. It deals with an important problem in so far as it is directed neither upon epistemological nor metaphysical reality but merely on what we mean in general when we speak of reality.—With uncommon energy and uncommon success Hans Driesch has endeavored to develop his doctrine of reality. His *Wirklichkeitslehre* appeared in 1917 and has gone through a series of editions. Driesch is well-known to the English-speaking world on account of his numerous lectures and visits in England and the United States. Several of his works have been developed from lectures given in English; thus, for example, his *Philosophie des Organischen* is based upon his Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Aberdeen and has appeared in many editions. Almost every American university has known Driesch

³² Fifth ed., 1924, J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen.

³³ Max Niemeyer, Halle a.S., 1925.

as a guest. He is, as is known, the leader of what is called neo-vitalism, which treats the principle of the entelechy or life-force as a real ontological factor. I may assume that readers of this REVIEW are familiar with the larger features of the philosophy of Driesch, so that I can here merely refer to the fact that neo-vitalism is not, in general, concerned with historico-social reality but only with that form of reality which we call organic nature. An attractive introduction to this philosophy is furnished by the little book of Otto Heinichen: *Driesch's Philosophie*.³⁴

In general, however, the present trend toward ontology is concerned less with nature than with the reality of the spiritual-historical-social world. Rudolph Eucken, who was taken from us by death in September, 1926, after an extraordinarily rich and significant life, belongs among the most influential and deepest interpreters of this spiritual reality and among the chief founders of the new idealistic metaphysics. Eucken was imbued, up to the last hours of his life, with creative activity. One of his last works is entitled, *Mensch und Welt: Eine Philosophie des Lebens*, which was first published in 1918 and appeared in new editions in the following years. Eucken does not proceed from the abstract understanding but from life: this life, however, is not regarded by him as a biological or natural process but as the all-creating, all-bearing, all-realizing potentiality. Eucken is thus a representative of a metaphysics of life in a double sense. In the first place, for him life itself, on which he founds his philosophy, is an ultimate phenomenon, it is the kernel and completion of all reality. In the second place, Eucken seeks to gain this life, not by an empirical, but by a metaphysical attitude, by an inner act and appropriation, which is more than an act of the understanding and also more than an expression of feeling. Eucken is also in this book, which represents to a certain degree the high point of his work, an opponent both of rationalism and of irrationalism and romanticism. His 'noölogical' method is the expression of an absolute procedure in the appropriation of the absolute life. The chief lack of present culture consists, for Eucken, in the fact that we have lost this absolute relation to the Absolute. We shall only become full and complete men, who

³⁴ Emanuel Reinicke, Leipzig, 1924.

mutually understand each other and feel with each other, when we permit the action of the absolute life to appear in us unrestrained and when we are activated by this eternal and absolute spirit. If we look for a philosophical predecessor, with whom we can connect Eucken, we naturally think of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. But Eucken is also a Fichtean in so far as for him this absolute life is no dead neutral being but is rather a supreme value. Eucken's philosophy is in the real sense of the words a value-philosophy, which does not take the spiritual life as a fact, but as a value and a demand.

And with this we have determined the character of the new philosophy of reality more exactly. This philosophy of reality is a philosophy of value. The concept of value has become a chief and favorite concept in contemporary philosophy. A highly systematic *Wertphilosophie* has been furnished by William Stern, the philosopher and psychologist of the University of Hamburg. The third volume is now before us⁸⁵ bringing to a conclusion Stern's value-doctrine, which he calls "critical personalism." According to Stern value is not a subjective construct, but an absolute objective magnitude which, in its highest form, takes on the character of a person. We have in the personalism of Stern, undoubtedly, the deepest metaphysical and ethical interpretation of the concepts of 'person' and 'value' to be found in German philosophy of the last few years. A study of the content of the ethical values in particular is offered by the well-known philosopher of the University of Cologne, Dr. Nicolai Hartmann, in his comprehensive *Ethik*.⁸⁶ While Kant, in his immortal critical ethics, only worked out the form and the formal unconditionedness of the moral law, Hartmann seeks, as does Max Scheler, who is intellectually closely akin to him, a completion of so-called Kantian formalism by a material value-ethics. He seeks thus to grasp the rich content of the ethical values and at the same time their inner meaning for life. He investigates the value of value, the problem of the hierarchy of values, and the essence of the fundamental ethical values and moral virtues with as much acuteness as depth. He treats, *e.g.*, the problem of the value of life,

⁸⁵ Johann Ambrosius Barth, Leipzig, 1924.

⁸⁶ Walter de Gruyter und Co., 1926.

the virtues of justice, wisdom, bravery, veracity, sincerity, love of neighbor, confidence and faith, the problem of the freedom of the will, the oppositions between the individual virtues and duties, and the antinomies in the ought. Here no dry recorder speaks of moral phenomena in a dull academic tone; one feels rather a philosophical creativeness at work which makes intelligible the fateful values of all culture in their depths and in their immeasurable scope. What is lacking in this striking work is a real systematic metaphysics of values, that is to say, the deduction of all individual values from a final and highest value. Yet one sees in Hartmann the beginnings of such a metaphysics. They result from his attachment to Aristotle, as in general the whole ontological value-philosophy is either preparing a renaissance of the philosophy of Aristotle or already standing upon the shoulders of the Stagirite. So this ontology goes hand in hand with Neo-Thomism, that significant philosophical tendency which, now in Germany also, shows an increasing number of adherents, not only in the clerical world, but also among professional philosophers.

What now is the field of values and realm of reality that in addition to general ontology arouses special interest? It is the field of values which we call religion. There is, perhaps, no branch of the new ontology and metaphysics so much cultivated as the philosophy of religion, which has become a favorite subject of our philosophers and of those theologians who are more philosophical than historical in attitude and who wish to elaborate, not so much the historical development, as the meaning in principle and the metaphysical significance of religion. A turning away from the dominant historical type of consideration and a tendency to deduction from principles is noticeable in all fields of the moral sciences. The representatives of contemporary theology have recognized the great dangers into which the religious consciousness and theological interpretation have been thrown by an exclusively historical investigation of religious phenomena. This danger consists chiefly in the relativization of religion and its phenomena and in the rendering relative and historical of our knowledge of these phenomena. It is only too comprehensible that an effort is being made to escape these dangers. To this end theologians are interested in a metaphysical grounding and

interpretation of religion. In this way, it is thought, religion will escape being drawn into the whirlpool of relativism which is characteristic of the present cultural crisis. How can religion be guaranteed against this relativism? This is the task which the Heidelberg theologian, Willy Lüttge, sets himself in his book *Das Christentum in unserer Kultur*.³⁷ Not in the cold forms of abstract proof but in a spirit of religious fervor, Lüttge seeks to show that it is precisely the fruitful unrest and extreme contrasts of our time which make necessary an inner appropriation of the living God as a saving refuge in the confusion of life. Just as David Friedrich Strauss once proposed the question whether we are still Christians, Georg Wobbermin, the respected representative of systematic theology and philosophy of religion at the University of Göttingen, in his penetrating work *Wesen und Wahrheit des Christentums* asks whether and to what degree we are still Christians and whether we seriously wish to be or become Christians.³⁸ From his account, which is impressive methodologically, we learn that on the decision of this question depends the spiritual and ethical well-being of humanity. Wobbermin is an energetic opponent of all relativization of the Christian religion. He rightfully regards religious experience, not merely as an experience alongside other forms of experience, such as daily and hourly arise within us, but as the absolute force by which finite man gains a hoped-for saving relation to the eternal God.

The work of Giovanni Papini, *Lebensgeschichte Christi*,³⁹ which in Italy also has called forth tremendous attention, is permeated with burning religious zeal. The book was written by a fiery Florentine enthusiast and it does not consist of the usual watery and tedious accounts, which are so often served up to us. The splendor of the delineation is overpowering, its concreteness unsurpassable. In it a man deeply filled with the primeval power of religion causes to rise before us the life and earthly death of Jesus in its immortal meaning. With artistic *élan* and glowing eloquence Papini brings out the eternal symbolic value and absolute religious and metaphysical significance of the events which are recounted in the Gospels.

³⁷ Quelle und Meyer, Leipzig, 1925.

³⁸ J. C. Hinrichssche Buchhandlung, Leipzig, 1925.

³⁹ Allgemeine Verlagsanstalt, München, 1925.

As in the case of philosophy itself, so in the case of theological systems, the personalities of their creators determine the systems to no slight degree. For this reason we have a more than personal interest in the personalities of theologians. A highly impressive series of leading representatives of modern Protestant theology is portrayed in the work *Die Religionswissenschaft der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen*.⁴⁰ This work is planned to include a whole series of volumes of which the first volume alone has been published. In it striking personalities give us stirring accounts of their work. Each is in his way an ideally moved spiritual leader in the service of the highest values. I would name from among them the profound American theologian, William Adams Brown, of New York, Adolf Deissmann, of Berlin, and Reinhold Seeberg of Berlin. The struggle of these men has a typical meaning, for the stages of this struggle are milestones on that path of destiny which we must all traverse.

In spite of the tendency to the philosophy of religion and the metaphysics of religion it is natural that the historical treatment of religion should also be carried on. In this field we possess, in the Professor of Theology of Leipzig, Alfred Jeremias, an investigator who is as productive as he is thorough. In his *Allgemeine Religionsgeschichte*⁴¹ Jeremias spreads before us the whole wealth of the historical forms of religious life. He gives masterly descriptions of the religion of primitive peoples, religion in Babylon, Egypt, Syria, Arabia, Asia Minor, the religion of Buddha, of Zarathustra, and of Islam. He recounts the religion of the American Indians, of China and Japan, of the Greeks and Romans, of the Celts, Slavs and Romans. The variety of individual pictures is held together by the thought that waves of borrowing have passed over the whole world, that these waves have their source in an original religious attitude and world-view, the origin of which is for us pre-historic and which we first meet in a complete form in southern Babylonia. One of the most mysterious special problems of the history of religion is formed by the doctrine of the Trinity. Many students of religion have vainly sought its historical derivation, which is naturally not

⁴⁰ Felix Meiner, Leipzig, 1925.

⁴¹ R. Piper & Co., München, 1924.

the same as its religious and metaphysical interpretation. Dr. Paul Sarasin, in his excellent study *Helios und Keraunos oder Gott und Geist: Zugleich Versuch einer Erklärung der Trias in der vergleichenden Religionsgeschichte*,⁴² offers an explanation, based upon history, and on the history of art in particular. From many points of view his theory is worthy of attention. With conscientious evaluation of important sources not hitherto used (old texts, coins, vases, reliefs, textiles, weapons, magic wands, etc., from all cultures) Sarasin explains the idea of the trinity from the worship of the sun, which has played in the thought of mankind an almost omnipotent rôle. His explanations have without doubt many very attractive features. They do not seem to me to solve the ultimate mystery of the trinity. For inexhaustible as are the historical and psychical manifestations of religious belief, equally inexhaustible are the mysterious springs from which this life flows in continually new depth and primeval power into ever new and higher forms.

The decisive reason for setting up and systematically applying the concept of value, with which the concept of meaning, now much used, is identical, consists in the necessity of finally overcoming the positivistic and naturalistic standpoint in philosophy. The gaining or regaining of the standpoint of philosophical idealism is assured by the recognition and the methodic use of the concept of meaning. Since we in Germany are again seeking an idealistic metaphysics, this recognition of the concept of meaning is simply unavoidable. Of the philosophers who work with this concept in a thorough-going systematic fashion we need mention only Count Hermann Keyserling. In all his writings he shows himself a philosopher of meaning. Naturally for him the concept is no empirical category but a metaphysical power and an ontological essence. Quite in the same spirit as Rudolph Eucken, Keyserling uses the concept of life, not in a biological or natural-science sense, but as a metaphysical meaning-concept. Of the relevant writings of Keyserling I need name only his *Philosophie als Kunst*⁴³ and *Schöpferische Erkenntnis*.⁴⁴ He explains that

⁴² Verlag der Wagnerschen Universitätsbuchhandlung, Innsbruck, 1924.

⁴³ Otto Reichl, Darmstadt, 1920.

⁴⁴ Otto Reichl, Darmstadt, 1922.

the "realm of meaning" lies outside the forming of the intellect and that science has never concerned itself with this meaning nor does it need to concern itself with it. Meaning is the ultimate creator of all appearance. He who has reached, in his spiritual development, the "apprehension of meaning" has won the power of influencing all phenomena; he can be regarded as their master and has a claim to the title of Sage. It is the purpose of the "School of Wisdom," which Keyserling founded several years ago in Darmstadt, and which is indicative of the present inclination to a metaphysical attitude, to educate those who are capable of it to this "apprehension of meaning" and thus to "Wisdom." The possibility, however, of grasping meaning and 'wisdom' is granted only to a few men. Keyserling's School is only for these few and is thus not meant to be a general educational institution but has an individualistic-aristocratic character. It is of course to be understood that the terms 'individualistic' and 'aristocratic' are not to be taken in a political sense. One is reminded of Plato's Academy and of the selection of the 'best' as leaders and kings.

How necessary and consistent is the introduction of the concept of meaning is seen most distinctly in the change which has taken place in psychology since Dilthey's first steps in the new direction. We spoke above of the new edition of Dilthey's collected writings. In this collection is to be found also his famous essay of the year 1894, *Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie*. With this essay, which in its critical parts is directed against the then dominant natural-science and experimental treatment of psychical phenomena, and which attracted great attention, Dilthey became the creator of what is called descriptive psychology. He also calls it structural psychology and combats a double error in so-called analytic psychology. This analytic psychology cherished the untenable opinion that mental life consists of ultimate simple 'elements' out of which it is compounded as bodily unities are compounded. As if there were such ultimate fixed mental atoms! and as if a living whole could be built up and understood from such imaginary elements! For the second error of this psychology consisted in a mechanical interpretation of the mental life. Just as there are no complete

and finished mental elements, so the law of this mental life is not a mechanical but a living unity and totality. It is an "effective connection" or as Dilthey preferred to say, a structural form. The production of such structures is in the nature of life. Such structures are, for example, poetry, religion, right, morality, philosophy, and within these structures are found particular and subordinated structures. Thus rationalism in philosophy is such a structure or type, or classicism in poetry, or friendship and loyalty in morality. The apprehension and description and understanding of such structural unities are central in Dilthey's investigation. And this structural psychology furnishes, according to Dilthey, the basis for the grounding, erection, and understanding of the so-called mental sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*). For these mental sciences are related to the psychic life, give it an objective representation, and seek to understand it. For this reason Dilthey and his numerous followers, to whom the author of the present essay also belongs to a certain extent, are accustomed to call this psychology the psychology of the mental sciences (*geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie*). It is also called form-psychology (*Gestalt-Psychologie*). It is finding a rapidly progressing recognition and acceptance.

Of the representatives of this mental-science psychology we need mention here only Theodor Litt and Eduard Spranger. We may cite Litt's *Erkenntnis und Leben*,⁴⁵ *Individuum und Gemeinschaft*, *Grundlegung der Kulturphilosophie*⁴⁶ and Spranger's *Lebensformen*, *Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie und Ethik der Persönlichkeit*,⁴⁷ *Der gegenwärtige Stand der Geisteswissenschaften und die Schule*,⁴⁸ *Psychologie des Jugendalters*,⁴⁹ *Zur Theorie des Verstehens und zur geisteswissenschaftlichen Psychologie*⁵⁰ and *Die Frage nach der Einheit der Psychologie*.⁵¹ Spranger shows convincingly that in the old and traditional psy-

⁴⁵ Teubner, Leipzig, 1923.

⁴⁶ Teubner, Leipzig, 3d ed., 1926.

⁴⁷ Max Niemeyer, Halle, 1921.

⁴⁸ 2d ed., Teubner, Leipzig, 1925.

⁴⁹ Quelle und Meyer, Leipzig, 1924.

⁵⁰ *Festschrift für Johannes Volkelt*, München, 1918.

⁵¹ *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, XXIV, 1926.

chology of sensation and presentation a kind of atomism of the mental life is found, while in the psychology of association and reproduction we have a mechanistic theory of the psychical. According to him, values cannot be separated from the mental life-structures of the human world. He holds that we can only speak of a truly human life in so far as the experience of meaning is added to psychical processes. Psychical processes are only psychical in nature when they are related to an objective meaning. This objective meaning is more than the subjective experience. And the "psychology of the mental sciences" (*geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie*) is concerned with the working out of these meaning-contents and structures which are not uncommonly called life-forms. For example, we may note that Spranger sees such structures, such ideal types, in "the theoretical man," in the "aesthetic man," the "social man," the "man of power," and the "religious man."

Intellectually close to this tendency of psychology, although not coming directly from the school of Dilthey, stands the philosopher and psychologist of the University of Marburg, Erich Jaensch, in his *Über den Aufbau der Wahrnehmungswelt und ihre Struktur im Jugendalter*,⁵² *Die Eidetik und die typologische Forschungsmethode in ihrer Bedeutung für die Jugendpsychologie und Pädagogik, für die allgemeine Psychologie und die Psycho-physiologie der menschlichen Persönlichkeit, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der grundlegenden Fragen und der Untersuchungsmethodik*.⁵³ Jaensch reached his "structural psychology," for which he also uses the name "eidetic psychology," by the discovery of so-called 'images' (*Anschaungsbilder*). By 'images' he understands a peculiar, hitherto not sufficiently observed, psychical phenomenon, namely, really seen images, which are between after-images and presentations. He distinguishes the types of such 'images,' which are different according to the kind of personality or of child involved. He believes that the discovery of such image-types can be applied to ascertain the type to which the personality in question belongs. This type is a living psychical totality, or, as we may also say, a *character*.

⁵² Johann Ambrosius Barth, Leipzig, 1923.

⁵³ Verlag von Quelle und Meyer, Leipzig, 1925.

With this term 'character' we touch upon a form of psychology, which is fundamentally opposed to the old atomistic, mechanistic psychology, and which is related both to structural psychology and to eidetic psychology. This third form of psychology is now commonly called "characterology." To it are devoted several periodicals, collections, and monographs. As the most important, fullest, and best known collection I would name with special emphasis the *Jahrbuch der Charakterologie*, which Emil Utitz, Professor of Philosophy and Aesthetics in the University of Halle, together with a large number of collaborators from very different fields, has published with great effect since 1924.⁵⁴ The promise of this undertaking justifies us in devoting to it a few lines in conclusion.

Characterology rests on the conviction, which is undoubtedly well-justified, that the human soul and character represent a unity and totality and that all the individual features of our thought and conduct can be explained from this totality, because they possess in this unity the basis of their meaning. This unity, which may be compared to a great stream, may be called the life-form, that is, the type or character. We are not concerned here with a petty analysis of psychical phenomena but rather with an immediate grasping and synthetic interpretation of the meaning and content of a character, based on an inner sympathy.

With this we have touched upon the highly significant practical side of this new psychology. We all know from daily and thousandfold experience what an extraordinarily important problem is that of the character of a man. When we understand our character and that of other men in its total meaning, we gain in mastery over ourselves and over life. If the well-known proposition that knowledge is power is true, it is certainly true of the knowledge of human character. Thus characterological psychology is not a learned investigation, turned away from life, and pursued only in the psychological institute. It is based upon an open mind for what takes place in the world and what it is necessary to know in the struggle for existence. Real discoveries in it can

⁵⁴ At present four handsomely bound volumes have appeared, Pan-Verlag Rolf Heise, Berlin-Charlottenburg.

be made only by investigators who possess understanding of real life and openmindedness.

Thus, in the *Jahrbuch der Charakterologie*, not only do recognized theorists express themselves, but wholly concrete questions, which immediately touch our being, characterological problems from art, industry, insurance, philosophy, law, criminology, morality, and religion are treated. It will suffice to indicate a few contributions. Thus, for example, the well-known Jesuit Father of Cologne, Professor Lindworsky, describes the character-forming value of a receptive reading of the world-famous exercises of St. Ignatius Loyola. He considers chiefly the characterological meaning of prayer and the spiritual attitude which is at the basis of real prayer. The striking essay of Franziska Baumgarten brings us down to earth and back to daily life. It is concerned with the characteristics of the officials of insurance companies, who are charged with detecting fraud in the case of statements which are otherwise credible, and with influencing the insured to make an arrangement to the advantage of the insurance company. In a long article, entitled *Immanuel Kants geistige Gestalt* I myself have attempted to bring out those more than personal features of the character and philosophy of Kant by which the creator of the critical philosophy has acquired the significance of a power of destiny in our thought. The contribution of Robert Heindl, one of our leading criminologists, *Strafrechtstheorie und Praxis*, makes an absolutely astounding impression. I know of no account which shows us so openly and honestly, so unreservedly and recklessly, the depths of human nature and the almost universal failure of the state and justice with regard to crimes breaking out of these primeval depths. Heindl had occasion to visit the Anglo-Indian, French, and Spanish penal colonies. In his article he refers, using statistical material, to his literally frightful experiences. He asks the question whether and to what extent criminal punishment brings about an improvement in the character of the condemned. His answer is astounding: Never, and under no method whatsoever, does there take place such an improvement, that is, any real change of character. Not even when the criminal is offered the opportunity of regular work in the country as a farmer. Heindl's article attracted so much attention that a more

extensive treatment of this important problem was necessary and was demanded from all sides, even from official posts. In this way he came to write his extensive book, *Der Berufsverbrecher: Ein Beitrag zur Strafrechtsreform*.⁵⁵ How great is the impression made by this work, which makes its material even more concrete by use of a great number of police photographs, can be seen from the fact that every few months a new edition is necessary. I have heard that an English translation is being prepared in the United States. This is more than intelligible. And there is no doubt that in America also Heindl's work will gain adherents not only intellectually but will exercise a determining influence on the practice of justice, on the manner of imposing sentences and of carrying out sentences. The book contains more than scientific instruction and enlightenment; it is a stirring warning and a significant event.

The new characterological method does not stand aside from the tragedies and tensions of life, but places us in the midst of them. Through it modern psychology gains direct relation to the tremendous questions which are continually presented to us by the Sphinx-like nature of life.

In the heightening of philosophical work and philosophical life in Germany, the *Kant-Gesellschaft*, as I cannot refrain from mentioning, is concerned to an important extent. It is by no means a one-sided and orthodox Kant congregation; it is not representative of any particular Kantian school. It bears the name of Kant on its shield for the purpose of emphasizing the serious and strictly scientific character of its effort. It has, in the course of time, by its numerous publications, its periodical, and its prizes, developed into a very inclusive organization with local groups, national groups, and daughter societies in all parts of the world and among all civilized nations. This development corresponds to the humane and humanistic spirit of Kant in whom mankind possesses one of its leaders in the spirit of humanity. I am very glad to be able to state that in the fall of last year, thanks to the initiative of our colleague, Edgar S. Brightman, a local group of the *Kant-Gesellschaft* has come into existence at Boston University. Thus it is to be hoped that with the expansion and renewal

⁵⁵ Pan-Verlag Rolf Heise, Berlin-Charlottenburg, 1925.

of philosophical studies, the reconciling power of philosophy will prove itself. We do not labor together in it merely from intellectual motives, but also from a longing to participate in the realization of the peace-producing cultural tasks of philosophy.

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CONTEMPORARY GERMAN PHILOSOPHY.*

OUTSTANDINGLY characteristic of contemporary German intellectual activity is a marked increase of interest in philosophy. Indeed, to trace the reasons which gave rise to this trend would be at once decidedly attractive and profitable. We may actually speak of a *renaissance of philosophy* which is, in itself, of pre-war origin; of a renaissance which, in a certain sense, may be considered a renewal of interest in metaphysics; yet it by no means purports to limit itself in this regard, rather, it aims to embrace and influence all other philosophical disciplines. However, as regards the fundamental intellectual standpoint, method and goal, the recent contributions reach to such proportions that it is difficult, if not altogether impossible, to discover a thoroughgoing unity in this development. A community of understanding among the exponents of this movement is not at present to be expected, as things both old and new contend for recognition. Moreover, besides the efforts to maintain or regain for the classical philosophers their old importance, various movements are in process which tend to free themselves from philosophical tradition and to set out upon new paths. In one direction only does there appear to be a certain agreement, *i.e.*, in the effort to secure a foundation of philosophy independent of the natural sciences. But on this point there is an evident disagreement as to the standpoint and method by which the new philosophy is to lay its foundation and construct its system. Specifically, the pivotal point is whether one should proceed from an anthropologico-psychological point of view, or resolutely attempt the desired construction of philosophy on a metaphysico-absolutistic basis. It is unnecessary to point out that adherence to an anthropologico-psychological method involves the dangers of relativism; whereas a metaphysical standpoint is open to the objection either of an untenable dogmatism or an untenable transcendence of the human mind. In any case, the present profound longing for a reconstructed philosophy finds no adequate satisfaction in the solutions

* Translated by Professor Marvin Farber, University of Buffalo.

offered in the current literature. For this reason we cannot include in this survey a review of any contribution that completely embodies the philosophical striving of Germany. Rather, we must turn our attention to a group of works important and worthy of consideration which are devoted to special fields of philosophy, and which mark advances in these fields.

I.

In beginning my survey I shall mention works of the type of *Handbücher* and 'Introductions to Philosophy.' I mention first the two-volume work edited by Max Dessoir, representative of philosophy at the University of Berlin, *Lehrbuch der Philosophie*.¹ The first volume affords a magnificent survey of the *History of Philosophy* and contains brilliant essays by Ernst Cassirer and Ernst Hoffmann on *Ancient Philosophy*, by Josef Geyser on *Medieval Philosophy*, by Ernst von Aster on *Modern Philosophy*, and by Max Frischeisen-Köhler, whom our science unfortunately has prematurely lost, on *Contemporary Philosophy*. The second volume treats of special fields of philosophy in an excellent group of essays, *e.g.*, by Erich Becher on *Epistemology and Metaphysics*, by Paul Tillich on the *Philosophy of Religion*, and by Emil Utitz on *Æsthetics and the Philosophy of Art*. Thus the work realizes in a masterful manner its basic purpose, namely, to present the essence of that which can be taught and learned in philosophy. To the high rank of this work correspond the *Jahrbücher der Philosophie*.^{1a} A group of distinguished colleagues who met for their publication realized their purpose by conveying valuable instruction with unqualified success. Positively brilliant are the contributions of Erich Jaensch on *Die Psychologie in Deutschland und die inneren Richtlinien ihrer Forschungsarbeit*, and by Theodor Ziehen on *Naturphilosophie*. The reappearance of the *Jahrbücher* after an intermission of twelve years caused by the world war and its sad consequences corresponds to the general revival of philosophical investigation, of which mention was made in the opening of this report. The *Wörterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe*² is an encyclopedia in the fullest sense of the

¹ Berlin, Ullstein.

^{1a} Berlin, E. S. Mittler & Sohn.

² Berlin, E. S. Mittler & Sohn.

term. The author of this completely revised edition is Rudolf Eisler, who was called away from his indefatigable efforts by sickness toward the end of 1926. The history of philosophical concepts and expressions constitutes the subject of this dictionary, many thousands of them being considered. With comprehensive and careful citation of the sources every concept is defined with genuine philosophical clarity. One admiringly recognizes Eisler's farsightedness, accuracy and skill in the ordering of this material. The most recent tendencies of philosophy have also received unbiased consideration. It is with sorrow that one reflects that the eminent Rudolf Eisler was not permitted to reap the harvest of his labours.

Among the new introductions to philosophy I cite in the first place the excellent book by Professor Erich Becher of Munich, *Einführung in die Philosophie*.³ With great pedagogical skill he avoids the usually perplexing abundance of philosophical stand-points. His book is mainly concerned with the introduction to the two fundamental domains of philosophy, namely, epistemology and metaphysics. In the former the nature of truth and knowledge is discussed; in the latter the nature of reality. Particularly the ever-interesting problems of the connection between mind and matter and the place of spirit in the realm of reality are ably handled. Every line of the book gives evidence of the reliability of the sources, mastery of the material and remarkable acumen. Not quite so high ranks the *Einführung in die Philosophie* by Hellmuth Falkenfeld.⁴ Nevertheless, his work also is distinguished by clarity of expression and distinctness of exposition. He is devoted to Socrates and Plato, but above all to Kant, and to that thinker whom he regards as responsible for the revival of Kant's critical philosophy, Leonhard Nelson, who also was lost to our science some time ago. Nelson established an entire school, the so-called Neo-Friesian School, to which distinguished mathematicians belong. Falkenfeld's lively support of Nelson may be regarded as a merit. One disadvantage of the book consists in the frequent use of quite subjective value-judgments, and further in the circumstance that such a thinker

³ München, Duncker & Humblot.

⁴ Berlin, Deutsche Buchgemeinschaft.

as Dilthey receives no consideration—at the very time when Dilthey's works are rapidly coming to the fore.

II.

Of the works which belong more to the history of philosophy the following books may now be cited. Kurt Singer has given us an impressive work on Plato.⁵ He does not regard Plato as the world-detached author of a transcendental theory; in the Platonic Dialogues, according to Singer, no real science expressed in concepts and proofs, no theory of the state, no ethics, no metaphysics, are pursued. Plato's entire thought and purpose is rather concerned with the harmonious education of man, with the creation and reverent observance of fine spiritual-bodily form, with the teaching of ideal moderation. The "realm of ideas" discovered by him is the realm of those determinative realities, which give to the irresolute mortal a secure support and help him in the attainment of the beatific harmony of his moral-spiritual being. His philosophy tells us of the vision of eternal and noble standards and of regulative harmonies. In the delineation of Socrates, Plato places before our eyes a picture of order and spiritual symmetry. With what intimacy and persuasive power Singer knows how to illuminate the fundamental meaning of this most noble philosophy, whose chief and primary purpose it was to discover the educational forces which guard human life from disorganization and intemperance! Since philosophy answers to this truly holy task, it will be possible for it to "found" life on the eternal laws and primal forms, and these are the ideas of Plato. In the fulfillment of this loftiest task the philosopher reveals himself a "founder."

This interpretation of Plato's doctrine—that it is concerned less with the advancement of science than with the beatification and welfare of the soul, that it signifies the reveille to the development of ideally temperate men, expresses in my opinion the meaning of the theory of ideas much more deeply than do all those views which make the Greek philosopher a debater and partisan of social theories, which perceive in him the advocate of a conservative view, or the supporter of a communistic program.

⁵ München, C. H. Beck, 1927.

Singer sees and understands Plato in the Platonic spirit, hence he does not introduce modern features in his portrayal, and he detracts nothing of the uniqueness and immortality of the incomparable philosopher. There is scarcely a more complete testimony to the 'humanistic' character of Singer's interpretation than the fact that his conception of Plato allies itself with that of one of the most illustrious 'humanists' of history, Goethe, of whom his interpretation reminded me again and again. And so his book on Plato should be gladly greeted as a far-reaching and profound contribution to the establishment of that humanistic conception of the world and of man which had in Plato its foremost exponent.

I shall now refer to a whole series of works belonging to the Schopenhauer literature. Arthur Schopenhauer's outward life and activity were mainly taken up by the—alas! so unphilosophical and unphilosophically conducted—controversy regarding the publication and announcement of his life-work, *The World as Will and Idea*. The complete correspondence between the classical philosopher of pessimism and his publisher, *Schopenhauer und Brockhaus*,⁶ which has just appeared, is a record of his business struggle for consideration and recognition, and is extraordinarily interesting for the light it throws on psychology and character as well as on contemporary history. The capable editor successfully attempted in his valuable introductions to interpret the principal work of Schopenhauer in relation to contemporary and intellectual history, whose fundamental tendencies he depicts by means of attractive illustrations. In this way he succeeds in solving an essential problem of his introductions, by throwing light upon the reasons for the long-standing indifference of the scientific and philosophical world to the work of Schopenhauer, an indifference which seems so unjust and cruel to the uninitiated. From the letters themselves, of which many have remained until now buried in publisher's archives, arises distinctly the unhappy picture of the habitually vexed philosopher, accusing everybody and not shrinking from insinuations. What a rich source for fruitful psychological research! For that reason alone the publication of this correspondence is of great value. Mistrust, discontent, com-

⁶ *Schopenhauer und Brockhaus. Zur Zeitgeschichte der "Welt als Wille und Vorstellung."* Herausgegeben von Carl Gebhardt. Leipzig, F. A. Brockhaus, 1926.

plaints, misconstruction of objective conditions; all this can be studied here, as it were, in the greatest clarity. How sympathetic, on the other hand, is the impression which radiates from the fine personality and high-mindedness of the publisher!

To the *Monumentalausgabe der Werke Schopenhauers*⁷ there has now been added a large thirteenth volume, which contains *Arthur Schopenhauers Randbemerkungen zu den Hauptwerken Kants*. Dr. Robert Gruber (Vienna) is the editor. Schopenhauer often vigorously stressed his contention that he was the real and true continuator of the Kantian philosophy, and that this philosophy was one of the fundamental factors of his own system. To-day we can say that this too insistent assertion has little justification. The new volume of the edition furnishes the most accurate insight into the manner and extent of Schopenhauer's Kantian studies. The *Randbemerkungen* do not possess the value of real expositions of Kant and of material discussions with the author of the critical philosophy; rather, they are noteworthy and instructive because of the light they shed upon the peculiarity and wilfulness of the interpreter and upon his often astonishing misunderstandings and misinterpretations of Kant's ideas. These facts may easily be determined, because the publishers were liberal enough to print the full Kantian texts to which Schopenhauer's notes refer.

Heinrich Hasse, professor in the University of Frankfurt am Main, in his fine book, *Schopenhauer*,⁸ has given us a new, well-rounded account of the man Schopenhauer and his philosophy, evidencing the greatest familiarity with the subject. Hasse is excellently prepared for his undertaking. Some years ago he gave special attention to a particular aspect of that philosophy in a book, *Schopenhauer's Erkenntnislehre*. He has now succeeded in the new book in discussing the entire personality and character of Schopenhauer, all aspects of the doctrine and its influence in an equally farsighted and pleasing presentation. The structure of the work conforms in the main to the arrangement which the philosopher himself had given to his system. Perhaps, however, Hasse overestimates somewhat the philosophical significance and

⁷ München, R. Pieper & Co.

⁸ München, Ernst Reinhardt, 1926.

historical position of Schopenhauer, concerning whose work doubts have now begun to appear. What these limitations of Schopenhauer are, and where they lie, is clear from the excellent summary, which, under the title "Zur Würdigung Schopenhauers," marks the close of Hasse's book.

How the philosophers themselves are constituted and appear from the purely human side, what course of education they pursued, what influences acted upon them, how they came to their problems and answers, what are the decisive experiences connected with the parental home, with religious association, school, and university education, and with life in general, are described in a series of essays entitled *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen*, works which cannot be too highly valued. The firm of Felix Meiner (Leipzig) has already published six volumes under the careful direction of Raymund Schmidt. Many a reader of this survey may desire to consult these volumes in order to learn about the personal and human side of this or that thinker, whose educational influence he has experienced in lectures or books. These 'Personal Statements,' each of which is adorned with a portrait of the philosopher in question, have a great charm. Among others, let us here name only those by Troeltsch, Vaihinger, Natorp, Joël, Volkelt, Driesch, Rehmke, Benedetto Croce, Höffding, Graf Keyserling, Theodor Ziehen, Karl Groos, Fritz Mauthner and William Stern. They are most valuable cultural documents in an individual and historical sense; they illuminate the development and nature of the most important educational currents of the last decades. They show us men who are not merely dependent upon the general tendencies of education and civilization, but who in turn influence their development in no small measure.

III.

As is known, every philosophical work, even when it carries in itself the tendency to a decided renaissance, is obliged to take into consideration the philosophical past and to hold sacred the philosophical tradition. In this way the numerous and valuable reprints of philosophical classics are accounted for.

The edition of *Hegels Werke*, which Georg Lasson has published with untiring diligence and with the most conscientious

evaluation of the original manuscripts and as yet unprinted material,⁹ presents a model example of philological exactness and criticism as well as of philosophical understanding. This edition shows in ideal fashion how new editions should be made. The gratitude of the scientific world for this accomplishment found expression in the granting of an honorary doctorate to Lasson by the University of Kiel. Preparation for the Hegel centennial celebration in 1931 is marked by the anniversary edition of Hegel's complete works in twenty volumes, which is excellently done by the Heidelberg instructor, Dr. Hermann Glockner.¹⁰ It will undoubtedly be a welcome and considerable furtherance of the Hegel renaissance, which at present is growing with inner and understandable necessity, and has already led to the rise of a vigorously spreading neo-Hegelian tendency and school. The reprint is made by so perfect a facsimile process, that any difference between this and the old edition may only be noticed by most exacting scrutiny. Likewise the advantages of the photochemical autotype enormously lessen the production costs and for that reason allow a low price scale, as shown by the reprint of the *complete works of Schelling*. This was accomplished by the energy and far-sightedness of Manfred Schröter, whose eminently expert direction is guaranty of the successful continuation of the undertaking, which represents a joint arrangement of the two Munich publishing houses, C. H. Beck and R. Oldenbourg. More than one of the representative movements of our time supports and justifies the interest to which Schelling, the real and greatest philosopher of romanticism, as a whole, not merely in the first third of the last century, may lay claim with perfectly valid title. It is an attractive combination of far-sighted conceptual acumen and profundity that lies behind Schelling's lofty interpretation of the imaginative world.

The deeper reason for that renaissance of Hegel's philosophy lies not merely in the turning to metaphysics in general, but connected with it is also the increasing interest in the philosophy of history in particular. Since the attempt was made in the most diverse places and from many sides to develop a philosophy of

⁹ Leipzig, Felix Meiner.

¹⁰ Stuttgart, Fr. Frommann.

history, philosophical participation had to turn again to Hegel. A very instructive and excellently executed survey of those tendencies and ideas in contemporary German philosophy which are indirectly or directly connected with Hegel, is offered by Heinrich Levy's *Die Hegel-Renaissance in der deutschen Philosophie*.¹¹ Among the books which are devoted to the presentation of Hegel's philosophy, highest praise must be given the work of the late Betty Heimann, *System und Methode in Hegels Philosophie*.¹² The unity of the system and method of Hegel are here brilliantly revealed, just as this book as a whole, since it is based on a real understanding of the philosopher, also conveys a real understanding. It shows in a convincing manner that everyone who has applied himself with intelligent devotion to the study of Hegel, experiences within himself the influence of his procedure.

Nor has interest in Kant declined. The anniversary year of 1924 has given us a great abundance of important works on the author of the critical philosophy. In order not to overextend the range of this account, I must be content with a brief statement. I strongly recommend the works of a number of investigators who also have a distinguished reputation in the United States: Erich Adickes, *Kant und das Ding an sich*; ¹³ Erich Adickes, *Kant als Naturforscher*; ¹⁴ Heinrich Rickert, *Kant als Philosoph der modernen Kultur*; ¹⁵ Eugen Kühnemann, *Kant*.¹⁶ The pithy work by Josef Heller, *Kants Persönlichkeit und Leben*,¹⁷ offers a fine and profound attempt at a characterology of Kant. The noted Kantian, Karl Vorländer, gives us a complete presentation of the life of Kant in his two-volume work, *Immanuel Kant, der Mann und das Werk*.¹⁸ All sides and traits of Kant's character as seen in the course of his historical existence are depicted by Vorländer with admirable mastery of the entire material. Here Kant vividly confronts us with the attractive simplicity of his nature, and it would be difficult to state anything of importance

¹¹ Philosophische Vorträge der Kant-Gesellschaft.

¹² Leipzig, F. Meiner.

¹³ Berlin, Rolf Heise.

¹⁴ Berlin, Walter de Gruyter & Co.

¹⁵ Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr.

¹⁶ München, C. H. Beck.

¹⁷ Berlin, Rolf Heise.

¹⁸ Leipzig, Felix Meiner.

concerning the life of the philosopher that could be added to the work of Vorländer. Kant's relationship to his hereditary religion, namely, Protestantism, is illuminated in a far-sighted manner in a work by Hans Rust, *Kant und das Erbe des Protestantismus*.¹⁹ The author investigates the numerous traces left by Protestantism on the philosophy of religion as well as on the personality of Kant, and he gives instructive proof of Kant's theological knowledge. He demolishes the view, often expressed, that the founder of the critical philosophy had occupied himself with theology in merely a superficial manner. But recent years have brought us new information, not only about, but from Kant himself, to which I wish to refer here with particular emphasis. One of our best Kant experts, Paul Menzer of the University of Halle, has edited for the Kant-Gesellschaft a newly discovered *Vorlesung Kants über Ethik*.²⁰ This valuable discovery reveals the detailed preliminary studies which Kant pursued in the field of moral philosophy before he undertook his system of critical ethics. The questions which Kant considers are for the most part quite concrete. The mass of Kant-literature was enormous, particularly in the anniversary year of 1924. But certainly the finest sheaf of this harvest comes from none other than the celebrated philosopher himself. Our knowledge of the development of Kant's æsthetics was also notably advanced by Gerhard Lehmann's edition of the *Erste Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilstkraft*.²¹ Just as the *Critique of Pure Reason* serves for the critical foundation of the realm of nature, of empirical reality, and the *Critique of Practical Reason* provides the critical foundation of the moral world of freedom and of obligation, so the *Critique of Judgment* shows that the æsthetic faculty and the realm of art effect a mediation between those realms of nature and freedom. The work of connecting both realms is the intellectual achievement of Judgment, whose function is sketched "in large and imposing outlines" in the "First Introduction." That introduction also treats the question concerning the unity of the critical system and as to just what position æsthetics occupies within the system.

¹⁹ Gotha, Leopold Klotz.

²⁰ Berlin-Charlottenburg, Pan-Verlag.

²¹ Leipzig, Felix Meiner.

IV.

Since we have just considered Kant's æsthetics, a few more significant works which are generally concerned with the field of æsthetics as a whole may be submitted to the readers of this REVIEW. Johannes Volkelt, one of the leaders and past-masters of æsthetics in Germany, has given us a three-volume *System der Æsthetik*.²² Volkelt held the professorship of philosophy and æsthetics for many years in the University of Leipzig. His æsthetic refinement and artistic understanding have kept him clear of the rationalistic dogma, which consists in the effort to transform the content of a work of art into conceptual forms. On the other hand, however, he knows as an investigator that philosophy is compelled to employ concepts, that feelings and intuitions, no matter how deep they may be as such, do not suffice for scientific æsthetics. He therefore adopted a conception of art which was neither rationalistic nor intuitionistic in character. Volkelt is a psychologist of art in one respect. He advocates the doctrine of empathy with regard to a work of art and the personality of its creator. The theory of empathy is beautifully elaborated and affords instructive insight into the nature of fantasy and the part played by feeling in the realization of a work of art. But Volkelt recognizes that the consideration of the personal and subjective side is not sufficient to secure the value of a work of art. For a work of art is more than an expression of feeling. It is formed, it is shaped experience. For that reason it is also important to investigate those objective factors through which its actual existence as a picture, as a building, as a lyric poem, as a drama, etc., is realized. We have therewith entered the realm of 'objectivistic' æsthetics. Such objective principles of form are, *e.g.*, form and color or surface and depth in painting and plastic art, rhythm and the construction of sequence in a drama and novel, as well as all questions related to the problem of 'style.' But the investigation of this æsthetic form is still not the final task which Volkelt set himself. For upon what are these forms themselves, upon what is the concrete actuality of a work of art founded? In other words, we are confronted with a metaphysical question. Volkelt has also devoted profound and fruitful thought

²² München, C. H. Beck.

to this question. He gives us a "metaphysics of æsthetics," which attempts to determine those highest and absolute values that constitute the basis of all æsthetic activity and production. According to Volkelt, these absolute values have the character of moral demands, of demands for the Good. Thus in his view æsthetics passes over into ethics, as had already been the case with Kant. Æsthetics has its metaphysical foundation in ethics as the theory of absolute values. But we must be mindful of another step which Volkelt takes, which carries him further than Kant. Over and beyond the ethical foundation of æsthetics he seeks to build a bridge to religion. The effect is like that of a stirring confession when Volkelt declares at the close of the entire work, that the appearance of artistic genius and the existence of artistically responsive human beings are to be interpreted as a self-realization of God. A system of æsthetics must conceive the world of art as a unity. Volkelt conceives it as a unity, for he maintains that the world of art is a significantly necessary stage in the unity of the divine world-reason.

Neither the way to ethics nor that to metaphysics and to a metaphysical philosophy is adopted by Emil Utitz, one of the younger æstheticians of Germany. In his two-volume work, *Grundlegung der allgemeinen Kunstwissenschaft*,²³ he adheres clearly and firmly to the sensuous presence of the work of art itself. Along with Max Dessoir, Emil Utitz is one of the leading advocates of that recent æsthetic point of view which is now known as the 'general science of æsthetics.' This science is based upon the following thought. The old æsthetics was concerned with the problem of 'beauty' and concerned itself almost exclusively with the category of beauty. But therewith it limited its domain of investigation so greatly that it was unable to do justice to the extensive field of art. The formation and existence of a work of art are furthermore dependent upon other factors, which one must regard as extra-æsthetic, though not extra-artistic. Sociological questions, questions which refer to the relationship of art to the other cultural domains, questions which quite generally touch upon the position of art in the realm of reality, and particularly questions which refer to the nature of

²³ Stuttgart, Ferdinand Enke.

the material of a work of art, how this material, *e.g.*, wood or marble or language, is elaborated into a work of art, constitute the subject of this general science of æsthetics, for the understanding of which Utitz has furnished crucial investigations. The problem of form is naturally in the foreground of the presentation. For artistic objectivity depends upon the impression of form, just as the individuality of a work of art depends upon the character of its form. The constant aim of our author is therefore to find those objective laws and principles of form which are operative in all artistic experience and which condition the objectivity of æsthetic experience. The work of Utitz is of a high order, both externally and internally. As contrasted with the investigations of many systematizers, it is distinguished by its free and unbiased view, which makes possible a fruitful discussion of divergent æsthetic theories.

Closely related to the work of Utitz in respect to intellectual attitude and method is the spirited book of Fritz Strich, *Deutsche Klassik und Romantik, oder Vollendung und Unendlichkeit*.²⁴ For Utitz and Strich maintain an æsthetic point of view which may perhaps be said to belong to the Munich School. Conrad Fiedler, an acute art-investigator of Munich, the sculptor Hildebrandt, and the famous historian of art Heinrich Wölfflin, who taught for a long time at the University of Munich, represent this point of view. Fritz Strich himself is also a professor in the University of Munich. According to him, classicism and romanticism are not revealed and established as merely two particular artistic modes of experience and forms of composition, but are rather primal experiences, metaphysically unconditioned fundamental modes of all human being and volition. It is Strich's aim, in which he is, moreover, eminently successful, to present this eternal human polarity of intellectual attitudes and accomplishments as displayed in German classicism and romanticism at the turning of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For this fundamental antithesis attained at those periods a degree of prominence which has never been equalled, no matter how often it has otherwise appeared in the realm of art. Classical man has the power to experience completion and to fashion it æsthetically.

²⁴ München, Meyer & Jessen.

Therefore Goethe is also the truly 'classical' personality, for he was able to enjoy and form the present moment in its content of eternity. The romanticist, on the other hand, remains entangled in the tragic contradiction between the flux of time and the sublimity of completion. He is only able to view and understand time and earthly appearance in their transitory nature. For that reason he is impelled by insatiable longing beyond finite time, beyond all forms and ties. But he is never able to satisfy his longing, either as a man or as an artist.

V.

Disregarding the literature referring to special fields of philosophy, I shall now turn to books that are concerned with the historico-social field as a whole and mention a few works from the pen of Wilhelm Dilthey. To his hitherto published *Gesammelte Schriften* have been added two more equally significant volumes. These are the third and seventh volumes of the complete edition.²⁵ The third volume contains studies of the intellectual history of the Enlightenment, to which Dilthey had paid particular attention during the last years of his life (he died in 1912 while professor of philosophy in the University of Berlin). This volume clearly proves anew that Dilthey was the greatest historian of intellectual history since Hegel. The essays of this volume—(1) Leibniz and his Age; (2) Frederick the Great and the German Enlightenment; (3) The Eighteenth Century and the Historical World; (4) The Beginnings of the Historical World-View of Niebuhr—are admirable contributions because of their combination of a wealth of concrete historical insight with a masterful elaboration of the underlying general connections. Each essay is a thoroughly successful unification of the biographical and the universal historical point of view. Central importance is accorded the significant individual, who is "not only the fundamental unit of history, but is in a certain sense its highest reality." However, the greatest individual is also a historical entity and must be understood, not only in isolation, but also in the light of the general conditions in which he lives and upon which he acts. In this manner the well-known but superficial opposition between an individualistic

²⁵ Leipzig, B. G. Teubner.

and a collectivistic view of history was overcome by Dilthey long ago, and it seems strange that there are still historians who maintain either the one or the other standpoint.

The seventh volume bears the title *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften*. It is a searching continuation of Dilthey's *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*, in which he set up as almost the foremost function of philosophy the task of furnishing a theory of historical science. His systematic efforts were intended in the main for the critical foundation of those sciences dealing with the historical world. He liked to set up as the goal of these systematic endeavors what he characterized as the "critique of historical Reason." It is true that he did not carry out this critique completely from a systematic point of view. But he strove indefatigably for the explanation of the characteristic features of the spiritual sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) as distinguished from the natural sciences. In the course of his investigations he came to the conclusion that the spiritual sciences have full right to autonomy with respect to their conditions, fundamental categories and method, and not least with respect to the value which is peculiar to them. The four comprehensive essays of the present seventh volume show how Dilthey set about the epistemological foundation of the spiritual sciences, and in what sense and to what extent he fulfilled his purpose. His point of departure for the critique of the spiritual sciences was a descriptive and interpretative psychology, which has a large number of adherents in German universities. Not only professional philosophers, but also historians of literature, art and politics are numbered among the advocates of this psychology, the main purpose of which is to understand the historical world. In this way a highly developed structural psychology has been worked out, which has not only made a place for itself alongside of the older natural science of psychology, but also demonstrates its preëminence when the understanding of historical personalities enters into consideration.

Dilthey was associated during his life with a man whom we may well call a great historical personality, and who because of his extraordinary energy and prominent position exercised for many years an almost unparalleled influence on German intellec-

tual life, particularly on the administration of university instruction. I mean Friedrich Althoff. What the Prussian educational administration possessed in this original and unique man, what permanent changes were caused by him, are described in an interesting book by one who had been intimately associated with him for many years, Arnold Sachse. This book bears the title, *Friedrich Althoff und sein Werk*.²⁶ Althoff was one of the line of creative reformers of our system of higher education, which he dominated from about 1880 to 1907. Innumerable scientific institutes, countless scientific undertakings, are due to Althoff. That more than one university has at its disposal a splendidly built clinic, is due to him. In this book by Sachse a glorious period of German educational history is reviewed for us.

The fate of Germany, in its intellectual development and its material welfare, has for centuries been largely determined by its relationship to France. Like a terrible storm the ancient rivalry between Germany and France hangs over the culture of Europe and over our spiritual and moral development. The removal of this rivalry is not only a political or a social concern, but is also a question of morals and of world-view. And the reconciliation of this terrible opposition, which represents an evil historical heritage, has engrossed many of the best minds in Germany and France. Numbered among them is Eduard Wechssler, professor of Romance philology in the University of Berlin. In a deeply stirring work, *Esprit und Geist, Versuch einer Wesenskunde des Deutschen und des Franzosen*,²⁷ he asks: "How long shall one people of Europe continue to contrast the glorified vision of its own nature with the distorted image of another, and bring up its children in such prejudice? How long shall the citizens of one state continue to instil hate and hostility and to imagine that this is the fulfillment of patriotic duty?" Thus his book is an attempt which should be greeted with enthusiasm to build a bridge of mutual understanding between both peoples.

While characterizing the creative and fundamental principle of the German character as '*Geist*,' and that of the French character as '*Esprit*,' Wechssler recognizes of course that such generalities

²⁶ Berlin, E. S. Mittler & Sohn.

²⁷ Bielefeld, Velhagen und Klasing.

do not accomplish very much. The pith of his impressive book lies in the fact that such an astonishing abundance of achievements on the part of both peoples are derived from that fundamental principle. One domain of culture after the other is reviewed and discussed in the most spirited manner. Wechsler everywhere points out and gives reasons for the differences in the civilization of each country. The insight into the underlying reasons for this opposition, which is so intelligently conveyed by him, is perhaps one of the most effective means for reëstablishing worthy human relations between the German and French peoples. Wechsler's work is not merely an intellectual achievement of scholarship; it is also the courageous expression of a moral responsibility which consists in utilizing the knowledge of the spiritual relationship between the Germans and the French for the foundation of ultimate concord. Finally, it is also a contribution to the philosophy of history, and since it belongs as such to philosophy, its consideration in the present survey is justified. It is a part of the concrete philosophy of history, one may say, and it has therefore been warmly received here. The renaissance of philosophy stressed by me at the beginning of this paper relates in the main to the renaissance of the philosophy of history, as I have already stated in referring to the recent Hegel literature. The book of Wechsler has the advantage of being written by a brilliant and philosophically trained representative of a positive spiritual science. Consequently we have here lofty speculative interpretations based upon positive knowledge and concrete research.

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CONTEMPORARY GERMAN PHILOSOPHY.*

I.

THE division of the whole field of philosophy into (1) the philosophy of nature and (2) the philosophy of culture is, owing to its convenience, continually growing in popularity. If we survey the latest philosophical research from this point of view, we find proof of the statement that I made in my last annual article in the *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*,¹ namely that the greater part of this work belongs to the field of the philosophy of culture or the philosophy of history (in Germany we use these two expressions interchangeably). I should like to repeat that this does not mean that the field of the philosophy of nature does not demand and receive the same interest as the other. On the contrary, philosophy is challenged in two ways by the undeniable crisis in mathematics and theoretical physics, by the newly-won insights into the problems of the concepts of number and space, of continuity and natural law, and by the difficult question, connected therewith, about the character and value of the above-mentioned sciences as sciences. In the first place, as regards theory of knowledge, what we need to examine is the change in the conceptual framework and in the categories on which mathematics and theoretical physics rest. In other words, we have to answer the well known Kantian questions, "How is mathematics possible?" and "How is natural science possible?". If there is truth in the widespread assertion that these sciences are undergoing a process of thorough revision, from which they will come forth in an altered form, then philosophy is under the inevitable obligation of taking the answering of those questions as its task. In general the attention given to the movement by philosophers is for the present not excessively great. There seems to be a tendency to await the result of the revision.

The second philosophical task arising out of the development of

* Translated by Richard Robinson.

¹ *THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, Vol. XXXVII, p. 564.

the natural sciences belongs rather to the sphere of metaphysics and *Weltanschauung*. For if it is true, as asserted, that the foundations of the natural sciences are being remodelled, this must give rise to the demand for a new philosophical representation of the universe. The traditional scientific picture of the world, whether of a mechanico-statical or of a dynamico-biological kind, will have to give way to a new view whose peculiarity lies in the fact that the well known traditional conception of necessity, and the assumption that it is possible to assign unequivocal numerical values to natural events, can no longer be used without criticism in its construction. The remarkable notion of 'vitalistic causality' is coming more and more into prominence. Its chief supporter is Hans Driesch, for example in his *Philosophie des Organischen*, which is known in the United States of America as well as in Germany. This book grew out of the Gifford lectures that he gave in English at the University of Aberdeen in 1907-8, and the first edition of it also appeared in English.

It cannot be denied that the notion of 'vitalistic causality', and 'vitalistic philosophy' in general, give rise to some misgivings. Heinrich Maier, Professor Ordinarius of Philosophy at Berlin, has expressed these misgivings, among other matters, in a solid and penetrating paper called *The Mechanical View of Nature and Vitalistic Causation*.² He shows with impressive definiteness that the abandonment of the principle of the conservation of energy, which can be expressed in a mechanical way, must lead to a breakdown of strict science; especially if the notion of the 'life-force' is taken over from the life of the soul to the realm of natural occurrences in the physicist's sense of the phrase. The category of 'personal causation' can be used to explain the life of the soul, but it must not be taken out of that sphere and used with regard to physical occurrences. Vitalism leads, according to Heinrich Maier, to the dubious theory of interaction between the physical and the spiritual, and, without expressly stating them, he suggests the dangerous consequences of that theory, which favour the invasion of spiritism and occultism. "The sphere of consciousness and the sphere of spatiality are and remain two wholly dif-

² *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, January,

ferent regions. . . . Perhaps there will come a time when thinkers will be unable to conceive how anyone could try to correlate psychical-subjective and physical terms into a single causal nexus. Such a procedure undoubtedly prejudices in the gravest manner the peculiarity of the essence even of subjective reality. And how physico-spatial things are supposed to be able to act on the subjects, which are entirely different from them, and *vice versa*, it is impossible to see."

But in spite of the urgency of philosophical consideration of the changes in the natural sciences, the prevalent tendency is to get philosophically clear about the numerous problems that arise from the world of historical culture. Let us first consider what the deeper motives can be that suggest or condition this lively work in the *philosophy of history*. In my opinion two are chiefly concerned. One is an epistemological motive that arises out of the great development of the so-called *Geisteswissenschaften*, while the other is more concerned with *Weltanschauung*. The development of the *Geisteswissenschaften* necessarily led to the philosophical examination of their principles and presuppositions. The peculiarity that constitutes their character had to be made clear by epistemological and psychological analyses. As is well known, *Wilhelm Dilthey* was the pioneer who showed the necessity of, and the justification for, such analyses. The study of the fundamentals of the sciences whose objects are society and history is indebted to him for the greatest stimulation. His *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*, which appeared in 1883, had a very great influence, and the work of Heinrich Rickert and Wilhelm Windelband, of Eduard Spranger and Theodor Litt, of Erich Rothacker and myself, is unthinkable without his decisive example. Erich Rothacker has lately published a *Logik und Systematik der Geisteswissenschaften*,³ a work of comprehensive and penetrating spirit. But, apart from this epistemological preoccupation with *Geisteswissenschaften*, Dilthey's example has also had the greatest influence on the origin of the so-called historical view of the world. This view, which has its scientific foundation in the historical sciences, and whose method lies in the historical point of view, we are accustomed to call *Historismus*. And we are accustomed to

³ Munich, R. Oldenbourg.

distinguish it sharply from the so-called naturalistic view of the world. Our insight into the nature, and also into the weaknesses, of this way of looking at things has received unusual advancement from the book of Theodor Litt, philosopher of history at the university of Leipzig. Its title is *Wissenschaft, Bildung, Weltanschauung*.⁴

In mentioning the view of the world that belongs to the *Geisteswissenschaften*, and the metaphysical employment of them, we have already touched on the second motive that is influential in the present inclination towards the philosophy of history. This consists of the violent experience of spiritual and moral convulsions caused by the severe crisis in the life of the mind, and not least by the stirring experience of the world war. A lively doubt as to 'the meaning in history', the power of 'reason', and the justification of faith in humanity and even in God, crept over the spirits of our best and deepest. Anxious questions were asked about the validity of justice, which seemed to have become a mere playing-ball in the hands of might. There naturally arose one of the most important of the problems of the philosophy of history, indeed history itself became a problem, and with the renewal of the philosophy of history was bound up a renewal of interest in the philosophy of religion. Let us first take a look at some important publications in the first-named field.

II.

The closeness of the relation between the problem of the spirit of religion and that of the nature and meaning of history is shown by the magnificent book *Der Sinn der Geschichte; Versuch einer Philosophie des Menschengeschickes*⁵ by the Russian philosopher Nikolaus Berdjajew. It is written with moving sincerity. History for him is not a mere outward occurrence but rather a myth. It must be conceived above all as tragic destiny, as a mysterious and mystical linking of man with the eternal, as communion. Here is an example, a picture that is more than a mere picture: "When you wander in the Roman Campagna, where the mysterious blending of the world living beyond the grave with the

⁴ Leipzig, G. B. Teubner.

⁵ Darmstadt, Otto Reichl.

historical world took place, you enter into union with another life, with the mysteries of the past; you commune beyond the grave with the mysteries of the world, in which eternity overcomes corruption and death." Berdjajew's mind is undoubtedly full of romantic and irrational tendencies connected with the ideas of catholic mysticism. In general an irrationalist trait is characteristic of Russian philosophy. The Russian thinkers not merely are accustomed to philosophize by preference about the irrational, but philosophize in irrationalist manner and use an irrationalist method. A highly informative picture of the Russian way of philosophizing is given by Simon Frank's learned book *Die russische Weltanschauung*.⁶ Berdjajew himself rises in his philosophy of history to impressive greatness; one must compare him with the most important German philosophers of history, such as Fichte and Hegel, to get worthy counterparts to this Russian thinker's stirring conception of his subject.

Another work on the philosophy of history has also attracted attention here in Germany recently. It is called *Geschichte als Sinngebung des Sinnlosen*,⁷ and comes from the pen of Theodor Lessing. But what a difference between Berdjajew's quiet seriousness and simplicity, and Lessing's slight originality and exaggerated opinion of himself! It is really no new or overwhelming piece of information when Lessing asserts that the vehicle of historical life is nothing else than the reflected repetition of our own picture. He lays down as one of the fundamental truths of his doctrine the statement: The historical subject must always be such that it can be identified with my personal love or hate. This statement is a triviality. And when he asserts that the course of history is only in appearance a victorious advance of the spirit, while in reality the way will soon lead to chaos, it must be replied that this condemnation of the development of culture is a fashionable whim. Certainly there creeps over all of us at some time, in weak and tired moments, a sentimental vexation, an anger at what we see around us; but such moods must not be made the foundation of a philosophical interpretation of history. The philosopher of history must, like the philosopher of nature, strive to

⁶ *Philosophische Vorträge der Kant-Gesellschaft Nr. 29*, Pan-Verlag, Kurt Metzner, Berlin.

⁷ Leipzig, Verlag Emanuel Reinicke, Fourth edition, completely revised.

be a pure receptive intelligence and an unprejudiced observer of historical personalities and events, and to put his own personality as far as possible into the background.

There is also another interpreter of historical life whose work is impaired by his putting his own personality and achievement in the foreground, and that is Count Hermann Keyserling. A man should leave the measurement of his own importance to others. But Keyserling's insistence on his own value is at least so far justified, that we are fascinated by the agility of his mind, the wealth and remarkableness of his ideas, and the almost regularly unorthodox nature of his philosophical interpretations of history. He embodies in his mental attitude an individual combination of science and romance, of knowledge and imagination, of rationalism and irrationalism; and it is presumably this individual mixture that is chiefly responsible for bringing him such a great company of readers. These advantages make up for his lack of creative system. His latest books, *Menschen als Sinnbilder* and *Wiedergeburt*,⁸ bring them to light in a remarkable way. It is true that practically every line of these two books bespeaks a subjectivity conscious of itself and somewhat too insistently emphasized, but behind this subjectivity there lies a great culture; and besides, he always knows how to interpret the phenomena of life in a stimulating fashion, and to arrange them in new relations.

The little book *Hauptprobleme der Geschichtsphilosophie*,⁹ by Theodor L. Haering, philosopher at the University of Tübingen, offers an informative, unprejudiced, and thoroughly objective introduction to the main problems of history and its philosophy, and to the solutions that have so far been put forward. It is clear, full of matter, and illuminating; and it shows where the questions of historical life have their roots, what methods of treatment have been used to master them, where the limits of the philosophical solutions lie, and what puzzles remain beyond these limits. Another book devoted to the understanding of history is a collective work, attractive and opportune, edited by the well-known philosopher of religion Paul Tillich under the title *Kairos, Zur Geisteslage und Geisteswendung*.¹⁰ This collective work is not

⁸ Darmstadt, Otto Reichl.

⁹ Carlsruhe, G. Braun.

¹⁰ Darmstadt, Otto Reichl.

concerned with the general problems of historical existence, but rather with the interpretation of the peculiarities of the modern spirit. The interpretation is made from the highest philosophical point of view, that is from the point of view of the Eternal. It is moreover imbued with the longing for a thoroughgoing formulation of the nature of modern life. Tillich and the circle of his fellow-workers want to practise creative philosophy. They are filled with the determination to do constructive work in common. They are not interested in the abstract and unpractical analysis of life and the development of a pure theory. They wish rather to influence and lead the spirit of the present day by means of their religious basis, and to heal, or at least to alleviate, the miseries of our time by the establishment of a religious view of the world.

Another lively picture of the struggles of our philosophy to obtain an abiding view of the world is given by the latest volume of the *Philosophischer Almanach, Probleme der Weltanschauungslehre*,¹¹ published by the above-mentioned Erich Rothacker, professor of philosophy in the university of Bonn. To influence events in an intelligent and successful manner one must understand them, and most of the studies in this book are devoted to the attainment of such an understanding. Bernhard Groethuysen shows the origin and nature of the bourgeois view of the world. He reveals the main features of the bourgeois with characteristic subtlety, and explains him as a historical and relative phenomenon, as a historically conditioned, temporary result of a particular development of history. Other articles examine the main forms of views of the world in general; this is what is done, for example, by Hans Pichler, professor of philosophy at Greifswald. The contribution of the American philosopher Hans Slochower deserves special emphasis; it sketches the character of philosophy in the United States. In this connexion we may also mention admiringly the well-informed book that Hans Slochower has given us about the great German poet *Richard Dehmel*.¹²

The life of the mind in America has become for us in Europe also an important problem of philosophy and of the general history of the mind. We are trying to get clear about it from more

¹¹ Darmstadt, Otto Reichl.

¹² Dresden, Carl Reissner.

than an economic or industrial or technical point of view. We see and understand that in the United States a mentality is being developed that differs in many essential respects from that of old Europe, and for various reasons must differ. Utterances and opinions on what is given the catchname '*Amerikanismus*' are still remarkably divergent, and many statements imply both obscurity and indecision in the writer's attitude towards it. Along with expressions of great and even enthusiastic approval one hears serious warnings, which are inspired by the conviction that we should sacrifice much of our old and traditional characteristics if we gave ourselves up to '*Amerikanismus*' without reserve. Such an outlook appears in Adolf Halfeld's *Amerika und der Amerikanismus*,¹³ which is fresh and interesting but somewhat onesided. It seems to me that when a new type of life and thought arises the first and most important thing is to examine it without prejudice, to understand its laws, and to explain its historical necessity. Historical events do not ask us whether what they bring is pleasing to us or not. I am convinced that there is being revealed, in what we here call '*Amerikanismus*', a unique and extremely important form of mind, a form apparently not yet ripened or complete, but undoubtedly one of the most important factors in the historico-social development; and one of our biggest tasks is to bring the characteristic nature of this new form of life into a connexion with our tradition that has meaning and is acceptable to us. Without question a new type of man is striving towards the light. The 'American' style is helping to form it, and one of the great cultural missions of America is to help in the production of this new type that is coming because it must come.

In order for us to understand the American nature it would be important to have an insight into the place occupied by religion in America, and to know what character and forms religious belief takes there. For without detailed examination of the religious life of a land no knowledge in scientific history and in the philosophy of history is certain. The philosophy of history and that of religion are very closely connected. And for that reason we will now in this review go on to describe a list of striking works in the scientific and the philosophic study of religion.

¹³ Jena, Eugen Diederichs.

III.

The chief interest nowadays both in the history and in the philosophy of religion is devoted to mysticism and the main representatives thereof. The tendency towards mysticism rushes widely and mightily through present-day spiritual life. Magnificently got-up editions of old and the oldest mystical writings appear in great quantity in our book-market. We may note first the attractive edition of some writings of the Flemish mystic Jan Van Ruysbroeck, born about 1293: *Die Zierde der geistlichen Hochzeit* and smaller writings, edited by Friedrich Markus Heubner in the fine collection *Die Dom-Bücher deutscher Mystik*.¹⁴ In Ruysbroeck we find a sort of controlled and manly mysticism, which with all its inwardness does not despise the form of thought and the system of the philosophical search for truth. Hence a favourite phrase of his is 'So it is ordered'; he is always looking for order. One of his contemporaries was the godly Dominican Heinrich Seuse (Suso), whose writings were in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the most widely read German books of edification. The new edition has been given a thoroughly scientific introduction by the excellent Nikolaus Heller: *Des Mystikers Heinrich Seuse O. Pr. Deutsche Schriften*.¹⁵ In Seuse the spirit of mysticism whirls in unrestrained frenzy and streams with incomparable strength of feeling. He knows no half measures or hesitation. He is a hot, wild heart that gives itself unreservedly to its God in intoxicated willingness. He does not draw back an instant before the most painful mortifications, if only they help him to raise himself to "the light of the Eternal Wisdom".

A few decades before Ruysbroeck and Seuse, Berthold of Regensburg, the preacher of repentance, was gripping his countrymen in a powerful manner. He spoke of himself as a "Calling voice", and his calling voice penetrated deep into the conscience of his gigantic crowds of hearers and even reaches through the centuries down to us. We owe the edition of his *Deutsche Predigten* to the indefatigability of the publisher Eugen Diederichs of Jena, who got Otto H. Brandt to translate these sermons and

¹⁴ Leipzig, Insel-Verlag.

¹⁵ Regensburg, Verlagsanstalt vormals G. J. Manz. Complete edition based on the manuscripts, with 15 illustrations and an art appendix.

write an introduction to them. The perfect flower and strength of German mysticism, however, is incorporated more strongly and more convincingly than in any other mystic in Jakob Böhme, the remarkable shoemaker of Görlitz (1575-1624). Will-Erich Peukert has devoted a lively and attractive biography to him, *Das Leben Jakob Böhmes*.¹⁶ His dramatic life is there sketched with powerful strokes; the picture is the outcome of a genuinely artistic sympathy, and the book reads like a bulky novel. Böhme's style and method of exposition are difficult in themselves both on account of their depth and on account of the slightness of their author's education, and he writes moreover in the baroque manner. Interpretation is therefore often hard, but Peukert has accomplished the task excellently. And now for Emanuel Swedenborg. There has been much strife over this figure. Some exalt him almost to heaven, others brand him as a subtle swindler. He has lately found a defender in the well known poet Walter T. Hasenclever. Hasenclever has published in German verse a translation of a selection from the Latin text, *Himmel, Hölle, Geisterwelt*.¹⁷ We can understand that a poet might declare himself, sympathetically and eloquently, in favour of a visionary such as Swedenborg certainly was; but it is nevertheless strange that he does not notice the strong vein of charlatanry in Swedenborg's nature. He makes play with the Swedish mystic against rationalism and its representatives. But if a man is really in earnest about science and philosophy he will sympathize with the mistrust felt for Swedenborg, and he will not agree with the poet in his somewhat rash assertion that intellectualism and rationalism have made us spiritually into the poorest of beings. It is possible to commend mysticism whole-heartedly without thereby at once condemning the understanding and its achievements. Contempt for rationalism has unfortunately become rather fashionable among us now. The man who really knows the nature of scientific work and has himself taken part in it will not allow himself to be converted to Swedenborg.

How pure and great in comparison is the form of the Silesian mystic Angelus Silesius (1624-1677), whose name before his con-

¹⁶ Jena, Eugen Diederichs. With a portrait.

¹⁷ Berlin, Die Schmiede.

version to catholicism was Johannes Scheffler. Georg Ellinger gives an exemplary biography of this attractive man, written with all the scientific trustworthiness that could be desired: *Angelus Silesius; ein Lebensbild*.¹⁸ With great skill he gives the figure of Silesius its place in the whole movement towards mysticism and catholicism that arose at the end of the Thirty Years' War—the so-called Counter-Reformation. This movement was directed against the dryness and stiffness of the old Lutheranism. Angelus Silesius is the creator of the delightful *Cherubinischer Wandersmann*, an incomparable collection of lyrico-religious utterances, many of which have become the universal possession of our people and are quoted innumerable times.

The renewal of the interest in mysticism has also been to the advantage of that man who can be called the Jakob Böhme of the nineteenth century, Franz von Baader (1755–1841). His name in spite of all its one-time glory had fallen into undeserved oblivion. Now interest is beginning to be taken in him in several quarters. New editions of his writings are being undertaken. I mention here the magnificently got-up selection edited by Max Pulver in the collection *Die Dom-Bücher*.¹⁹ Furthermore, Baader is being made the subject of intensive scientific enquiries. Thus we have *Franz Baaders Jugendgeschichte*,²⁰ a book that gives evidence of solid learning, in which Fritz Lieb, Dozent in theology at the university of Basel, has portrayed Baader's whole development up to his entry into Germany's romantic movement in the year 1796. The chief work on Baader, however, is *Franz von Baader und die philosophische Romantik*,²¹ by my Berlin colleague David Baumgardt, an enquiry as illuminating as it is voluminous. This work shows us why men like Schelling, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Jean Paul, and Görres, why Goethe and Hegel and the Humboldt brothers, expressed themselves in enthusiastic judgments on Baader's teaching. Baumgardt has raised an enduring monument to the memory of an important personality.

With the tendency to mysticism is connected the campaign, now being carried on in many quarters in Germany, against the

¹⁸ Breslau, Wilhelm Gottlieb Korn. Six illustrations.

¹⁹ Leipzig, Insel-Verlag.

²⁰ Munich, Chr. Kaiser.

²¹ Halle a. d. Saale, Max Niemeyer.

mechanistic view of nature, which I have already mentioned. We are experiencing at the present time the renaissance of the romantic philosophy of nature. A compilation by Christoph Bernoulli and Hans Kern has appeared under the title *Romantische Naturphilosophie*;²² it gives instructive examples of a symbolistic interpretation of nature. Besides Baader the most important romantic philosopher of nature and romantically-inclined psychologist is surely Carl Gustav Carus. Ludwig Klages has put together a clever selection from the works of this romantic: *Psyche*.²³ Carus was from the psychological point of view a seer, one of the acutest spirits among those who saw in consciousness and in the life of the human mind more than a mere apparatus for the mechanical production of representations and conceptions. The peculiarity of his psychology may be seen from the sentence with which he introduces his work, which forms the theme for his expositions: "The key to the knowledge of the nature of the conscious life of the mind lies in the region of the unconscious." We have here a way of looking at the mind that is diametrically opposed to that of experimental psychology. A valuable account of Carus's irrationalist and romantic view and interpretation of the life of the mind is given by Christopher Bernoulli's *Die Psychologie von Carl Gustav Carus*.²⁴ It is only a small step from these romantic psychologists and students of nature to the man who was romantic and irrationalist in his view and valuation of law, of religion, of art, and of all historical development in general, that is, Johann Jakob Bachofen. He also is, naturally and properly, celebrating his resurrection at the present. Bachofen, the now classical creator of the so-called *Mutterrecht* (the book with this title appeared in 1861), is the profoundest thinker of all these irrationalists.

IV.

I may now add to my discussion of the recent literature of the philosophy of religion an account of the more important works in the field of its history. This procedure may be justified by the fact that these works also deal with the philosophy of religion,

²² Jena, Eugen Diederichs.

²³ Jena, Eugen Diederichs.

²⁴ Jena, Eugen Diederichs.

or that they follow in part its method. A standard book in this field is the magnificent collective work *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Handwörterbuch für Theologie und Religionswissenschaft*.²⁵ The editors are two highly regarded representatives of the history of religion and of the churches, Professor Hermann Gunkel of the University of Halle and Professor Leopold Zscharnack of the University of Königsberg. Almost all the leading theologians, and historians, psychologists, ethnologists, and philosophers, of religion, have joined in producing this monumental work. Two very large volumes of it have already appeared. Its aim is to give information about every side of the historical development and present situation of all religions. Account is to be taken of the extraordinary extension of theological research by means of the improved methods of modern philology and the modern study of religion. The main sections sketch the general system of a large field; they are supported by numerous subsidiary sections. All the contributions deserve admiring recognition, and the fulfilment of the plan is being carried out in a masterly way. Here we may content ourselves with a glance at the inner systematic arrangement of the sections. For example, in the division "The Religious Situation and the Study of the Churches at the Present Day" are discussed among other things the questions "Politics and Religion", "Science and Religion", "Theosophy", "Christian Science", "Islamic Propaganda", and "Present-Day Sects". We learn moreover about all the forms of Jewish piety and Jewish temple-ordinances, as well as about the most remarkable movements among contemporary Jews, such as "Zionism" and "Chasidism". An immense number of biographies of leading men and women out of all the camps of religion, and a copious series of portraits of founders, teachers, students, enemies, etc., of religion, give us a vivid impression of the untiring strife for and against its ancient power.

One of the most individual figures among contemporary students of religion is undoubtedly Arthur Drews. Not only has his work *Christusmythe*²⁶ made him unusually well known, but about it and its author a violent controversy has arisen, in which

²⁵ Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr.

²⁶ Jena, Eugen Diederichs.

not only professed theologians, but also teachers, clergymen, politicians, and so on, have joined. His thesis has been discussed in stormy popular meetings, and interest has been kindled by attacks often of unmeasured violence. All that is no doubt a clear sign that interest in religion and its figures, which was believed to be extinct, had remained alive deep down in the hearts of men. It is thoroughly understandable that Drews should have felt the need for an account of those students who must be considered as his predecessors and partisans, and this is the explanation of his book *Die Leugnung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*.²⁷ This book collects together in an unusually informative way those critics of the gospels who, like Drews, do not regard the evangelists' accounts and the letters of the apostles as historically relevant and useful sources. There passes before our eyes, clearly and sharply characterized, the crowd of Bible critics who deny that the biblical stories allow us to infer back to the existence of Jesus as an historical personality. Drews begins with the French *Aufklärung*, with Volney and Dupuis, and carries his account down to our days. It must be admitted that he has done service to Bible criticism. By careful devotion extending through many years he has made himself familiar with the sources that he now uses, in combination with an outstanding gift for linking things up, to establish his thesis. His assertion is that the origin of Christianity is mainly connected with the Gnostic movement and with certain astrological myths. In asserting this he makes use of a rationalism that is inadequate to the complexity of the situation. He undertakes to prove too much, and to give an altogether too lucid and simple explanation of such an extremely complicated phenomenon as Christianity. It seems to me impossible to see perfectly 'clearly' in this matter. That influences from the side of the Gnostics and from that of astrology played their part in the origin of Christianity is not impossible (on the contrary, it seems to correspond to the facts), but it is hopeless to expect to explain Christianity and its first representatives by means of these factors alone. Moreover, the meaning of Christianity, in the real religious and metaphysical sense, is entirely independent of the question whether a person called Jesus really

²⁷ Carlsruhe, G. Braun.

lived precisely in the way that the synoptic evangelists picture for us. An historical examination of Christianity and the Christian faith, using a rationalist method, cannot by any means grasp 'religious truth', but only its historical and rational form, its empirical deposit, that is, something merely outward. Truths of faith have a source, a structure, and a validity, other than those of the truths of the understanding. In the inwardness of prayer the pious believer is absolutely indifferent to the doubts that are raised about the origin of Christianity by an historical criticism of this or that point of ecclesiastical dogma and teaching.

The same objection holds against Arthur Drews latest book *Die Marien-Mythe*.²⁸ The Mother of Jesus is also, according to him, nothing but a mythical figure, and the reverence paid to her is only a bit of paganism in Christianity. In particular, he explains, the Christian Mother of God and Virgin Mary owes her essential traits to the heavenly constellation of the Virgin. This constellation has also been the pattern for the creation of other pagan Godheads of the mother type, such as Istar, Rhea, Cybele, Artemis, Aphrodite, Isis, etc., and there is therefore no fundamental difference between them and the Virgin Mary. The worship of Mary is according to Drews the same as the worship of the stars. He emphasizes in the strongest fashion that the Catholic believer is only praying to an originally pagan Godhead when he kneels before the Mother of God and the Queen of Heaven. The church "will have obvious fairy-tales, which she herself once explained and rejected as such . . ., looked on as historical facts; but in doing this she falsifies not only religion but also history; she makes a mock of science".

We may praise this book also for philological acuteness and intensive research into the sources. Drews does not shy at any consequences, and fights energetically for his point. Nevertheless it is questionable whether he proceeds with the disinterestedness of the true historian. His historical criticism is entangled in a spirit of rationalism that does not do justice to the real meaning of religious figures. A metaphysical and religious reality lies hidden in the figures of Jesus and Mary, and its essence remains untouched by historical criticism. For this reason such a criticism

²⁸ Jena, Eugen Diederichs.

cannot, as Drews thinks, break up and do away with a religious myth.

For some years now we have had in Germany a new form and method in the study of the questions of religion and theology. This form distinguishes itself sharply and decidedly from the historical point of view, which it attacks and condemns, and favours a theological method based on the thought that God absolutely transcends the world and cannot be comprehended from historical and psychological points of view. The relation obtaining between Him and the world is thus that of dialectic, so that this form of theology is prone to call itself "dialectical theology". It is also known as "the theology of the crisis", because it represents the view that access to God can only be obtained by means of a complete break with everything this-worldly, by means of an absolute leap into the mystical depth of the Beyond. This theology, of which much notice is being taken, took its origin in Karl Barth's *Der Römerbrief*. This book, which has already gone through several editions, has been followed up by his *Die christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf*, the first volume of which, *Prolegomena*, appeared in 1927. Emil Brunner, Friedrich Gogarten, and Ed. Thurneysen, belong to this theological movement. One of its ancestors is the great Danish philosopher of religion, Søren Kierkegaard, whose writings are now much read among us, and also discussed in the philosophical and theological seminars of the universities. Whether one agrees with this dialectical theology or not, it deserves the tribute that it does not bring psychological or historical categories into the study of religious phenomena, and that it makes the attempt to show the autonomy of theology by making it clear that its subject-matter, namely religion, is an autonomous structure plainly distinct in its individuality from the relativity of history and the subjectivity of experience.

The point of view of this theology of the crisis is represented with especial vigour by the above-mentioned Friedrich Gogarten, who is both a practising minister, and professor of theology in the University, at Jena. He has lately expressed his views again in two impressive books, which are at the same time in the nature of confessions of faith: *Ich glaube an den dreieinigen Gott. Eine Untersuchung über Glauben und Geschichte*, and *Glaube und*

Wirklichkeit.²⁹ The dialectic of the idea of God consists in making Him absolutely transcendent and consequently the absolute opposite of all culture and temporality. All time and all that is relative falls to pieces in relation to God. Hence a very strong tension is at work in religious faith. This colossal dialectic finds expression in the assertion that the existence of the Creator can only be recognised in the absolute denial of the creature. Upon this harsh destruction, however, of the link between the finite and the Eternal depends the presupposition and the guarantee of our redemption from the frightful crisis of modern life. The complete salvation and sanctification of our existence can only be obtained by the passionate rejection of our own weakness and of all historical nature. Thus Barth and his school are determined opponents of pantheism, which they accuse of an obscure and dangerous confusion of God and the world, Creator and creature.

Opposition to this theology has not been lacking. Among the writings against it I mention Willi Lüttge's *Die Dialektik der Gottesidee in der Theologie der Gegenwart*.³⁰ Lüttge, who was professor of theology in the University of Heidelberg, died a few years ago. He denies the claim that we must abolish the whole earthly world in order to get a clear view of the infinite horizon of God. The living creative force of God reveals itself in and through His creation, in and through the world. And in and through the world we can recognize and experience the mystery and the marvel of God. *Kritik der Theologie der Krisis: eine Auseinandersetzung mit Karl Barth, Friedrich Gogarten, Emil Brunner und Ed. Thurneysen*³¹ is a small and excellent work by Pastor Rudolf Köhler that moves on the same lines of thought as Lüttge's book. Köhler praises this theology for rightly refusing to start from subjective religious experience; it teaches that theology is concerned not with the states of the pious consciousness but with the revelation of the absolute word of God. This idea of the Absolute is in general what Barth and his fellow-workers make the foundation of their new theology, and it is the idea of the Absolute taken in all its strictness. It is from it that they reach their pessimistic condemnation of the whole worldly and earthly

²⁹ Jena, Eugen Diederichs.

³⁰ Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr.

³¹ Berlin, Hutten-Verlag.

culture. But Köhler denies the dualism that follows from this theology, for it leads to an intolerable cleavage between man and God. He mentions many excellences of culture, which are according to him convincing refutations of this pessimism about it and which show that God's reason is at work in the course of history also. He refers to Goethe's *Faust*, to Beethoven's *Ninth Symphony*, to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, and to Hegel's *Logic*. Hegel in his *Phenomenology* had, he says, already accomplished logically the bridging of the gulf between the absolute and the relative.

I do not intend to throw myself wholeheartedly on the side of dialectical theology, but I doubt whether it is refuted by such objections and references as Köhler and Lüttge, for example, have brought forward. The antinomies between God and the world, the Holy and the temporal, are deep and difficult, difficult to the point of moral and intellectual tragedy. The idea of God and the Absolute is paradoxical and dialectical. These paradoxes can no longer be overcome by the harmonizing and harmonistic monism that was developed by the upholders of speculative idealism, with Hegel and Schleiermacher at their head. The idea of 'dialectic' is not merely, it seems to me, a principle of knowledge; it is also a principle constitutive of the structure of reality, an epistemological and metaphysico-ontological category, quite indispensable both for the positive sciences and for philosophy and theology. Hence it must be used as a fundamental conception of philosophy. In this way we reach a 'dialectical philosophy'. There is now in Germany a *revival of dialectic*, proceeding from many sides and uncommonly strong. This philosophy of dialectic is positively the most powerful and most hopeful movement in our renaissance of metaphysics. Thinkers like Jonas Cohn, Paul Tillich, Peter Wust, are concerned in it. And I should like to be allowed to mention in conclusion that there has lately appeared the first volume of a work in several volumes by myself, which is called *Geist und Welt der Dialektik: Erster Band, Grundlegung der Dialektik*.³² I am convinced that work on the system of dialectic is one of the most necessary and most promising tasks of our time and of the near future.

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³² Berlin, Pan-Verlag Kurt Metzner G. m. b. H.

CONTEMPORARY GERMAN PHILOSOPHY*

IT is well known that to make a just and illuminating division of philosophy is one of the most difficult problems in philosophical systematizing. This difficulty naturally reappears as soon as we undertake to make a clear division of philosophical literature. It does not merely reappear, however, but grows in proportion as the number of these works grows;—which is what is happening here in Germany to an unusually great extent. It would need a special and comprehensive enquiry to determine the reasons for this striking richness of our philosophical production. For some time the need for philosophy has been felt here with special force; and practically innumerable persons, experts and incompetents, outstanding specialists and hopeless dilettanti and laymen, systematizers and men of mood, rationalists and irrationalists, are at work to satisfy it. At the same time our publishers universally complain of the smallness of sales. This indicates, however, not so much indifference on the part of the public as an excessively large supply, a superabundant mass of philosophical literature, which makes one book a rival of the other for a place in the sun.

Not merely the discovery of a proper division, but also the selection of material, is a difficult thing in this welter of literature. It is inevitable that some valuable book may fail to receive the consideration it deserves. Even the best will has its limits, and the individual's powers of comprehension are unfortunately not always adequate to the mass of the matter that is actually offered. The researcher and scholar often has a bad conscience, because in many cases it is impossible to become accurately acquainted with the contemporary literature even of a single field, so great is the rush of new works. Thus every review will inevitably suffer from incompleteness and from a certain onesidedness.

For the purposes of this article we shall follow a simple and more or less traditional division, collecting together in one group the *historical* and in another the *systematic* works.

* Translated by Richard Robinson.

I

Before considering some *historical* works, we must notice an important fact. Although our interest in the history of culture and of philosophy has not grown less (as it might have been expected to do, owing to the increase of the interest in system), the *method* of the historical research of our time has changed in a fundamental way. And it is the increasing tendency towards system that has had the greatest influence in this respect, for even books whose contents are *historical* are now being written, not from an evolutionary or biographical, but from a *systematic*, point of view. This is in fact the formal characteristic of German historical research in its entirety. Uniformity in the choice and application of a suitable system is naturally not attained. On the contrary, research follows a considerable number of directions differing according to the numerous systems that are now reappearing in Germany. In other words, it is being prosecuted from the standpoint of a particular school of philosophy or of a particular *Weltanschauung* or view of life.

This is most interestingly illustrated by the treatment of ancient classical philosophy, remarkable influence on which has been exercised by the so-called school of Stefan George. Stefan George is one of our greatest lyric poets. His lyric is one of *Weltanschauung* rather than of mood. He is inspired by the formative power of the Greek spirit, and especially of the Platonic, so that a humanistic and classical air breathes through his poems. By his emphatic demand for *form, metron, norm*, he becomes one of the revivers of humanism. This has made it possible for a large group of passionately enthusiastic followers to gather around him, for a Stefan-George circle to arise, and for him with his circle to become a power in all the realms of the mind. This movement combines artistic traits with others of a philosophical and religious nature. It is no wonder that George and his admirers have found their symbol in that person of antiquity in whom all these tendencies are embodied in unique perfection, namely Plato, who was also, as we know, philosopher, artist, priest and teacher in one. His importance as a symbol is forcibly brought out in *Platon und der George-Kreis*, a little book of fine feeling by Franz Josef Brecht.¹ The justification of his picture of Plato does not

¹ Leipzig, Dieterichsche Verlagsbuchhandlung.

lie in philological accuracy, but rather primarily in its worth as a *Weltanschauung* and as an educative influence. He seeks to help in the creation of a new form of life, the necessity of which we in Germany feel very keenly. We experience once again the need for spiritual leadership; and Plato's greatness as a spiritual leader has shown itself convincingly not merely in the present but also on a hundred occasions in the history of civilization. Would the West be anything at all without him? Karl Gronau, professor of philosophy at the Technische Hochschule in Braunschweig, has examined this immense influence in his little book, *Platons Ideenlehre im Wandel der Zeit*.² He depicts the part that the doctrine of forms played in shaping the thought of the middle ages and of the Renaissance. He shows Plato's influence on Kant and Fichte, on Schiller and Goethe, on Schopenhauer and the romantic movement.

The revival of Plato that is taking place among us arises out of the need for a change in *Weltanschauung*. We want a new humanism, and we realise the decisive share that Plato had in the humanistic formation of ancient culture. Werner Jaeger, the representative of classical philology at the university of Berlin, is among those who call for the creation of a new humanism capable of giving the needed spiritual shape to our formless age. In his fascinating book, *Platos Stellung im Aufbau der griechischen Bildung*,³ he depicts Plato as the founder of such a humanism and its permanent representative. It was he whose great pedagogical work revealed the ideal of humanity, and who gave us the feeling for that true education through which the Greeks have become the teachers of the western world. A similar interpretation of the Platonic philosophy is given by Paul Friedländer, the philologist at the university of Marburg, in his profound and penetrating work, *Platon*.⁴ At first man merely exists. He does not ripen to real manhood until the beauty of the Form has been impressed on his soul; for only from and through the Form does the soul obtain her education. Plato reveals to us the world of the eternal Forms, in order to fulfil his pedagogical purpose thereby. The

² Braunschweig, Verlag Georg Westermann.

³ Berlin, Walter de Gruyter & Co.

⁴ Berlin, Walter de Gruyter & Co.

necessity and holiness of such exemplary Forms of existence was made clear to him by the life and death of his master Socrates. Friedländer indicates the path of spiritual purification which according to Plato the soul traverses in her ascent from the sensible to the ethical, and which the Greek thinker describes in his doctrine of Forms. Another impressive account of Plato's importance as leader and teacher is the excellent book, *Platon der Erzieher*, by the Kiel philosopher Julius Stenzel.⁵ Plato did not develop his philosophy in order to present a grey theory far removed from life. On the contrary, he combines intellectual depth with resolute educative power. Thus the wise man of Greece became the leader not merely of his people but of the whole of European humanity, and of all who share in western culture. There are two distinct respects, Stenzel tells us, in which we can still learn from Plato to-day. His example and his philosophy are a repudiation of the onesidedness both of intellectualism and of the individualism that seeks to deny or to remove the bonds of community. Stenzel unfolds the mighty picture of the Platonic philosophy from this point of view, and his book illuminates the incomparable educative power of Platonism and the ancient classical idealism.

Without Greek idealism the great movement of German idealism is inconceivable. Hence along with the revival of the Greek spirit there goes a revival of German idealism, which, in view of our modern philosophical aims, necessarily links up with Hegel. In his magnificent book, *Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus*, 2. Teil, *Hegel*,⁶ Nicolai Hartmann, professor of philosophy in the University of Cologne, shows that at the present time we are confronted with the same problems as was Hegel. He devotes himself with complete success to the understanding of one of the deepest minds of all time, whose ideas are now inevitably returning to currency one after the other. He teaches us to know Hegel as the originator of all true comprehension and evaluation of the general history of culture and philosophy; and so the great philosopher of history is himself understood from the point of view of the philosophy of history. While this work of Hart-

⁵ Leipzig, Felix Meiner.

⁶ Berlin, Walter de Gruyter & Co.

mann's leads us directly into Hegel's philosophical speculation, another work on the same thinker begins by clearing up the historical conditions of his system, whether philosophical or general. This is *Hegel, 1. Band, Die Voraussetzungen der Hegelschen Philosophie*, a very full presentation. The author is Hermann Glockner, Privatdozent in philosophy in the University of Heidelberg.⁷ He shows that all European thought and the whole *Weltanschauung* of Germanic Christendom must be reckoned as such conditions. He paints Hegel's personality at full length, including his manner of speech and writing, and the outer and inner circumstances that determined his thought. We learn that even in concrete studies he was one of the most cultivated men of a time that did not lack richly cultivated personalities. Not merely was he an outstanding student of history; he also embraced the realms of mathematics and natural science, and indeed the whole breadth of human culture. Glockner convinces us that our philosopher was both a very great mind and a man of deep feeling, with an intimate understanding of art.

One of his most important forerunners was the Italian philosopher Vico, to whom we owe the first inspired steps towards the philosophical study of history and, so, towards the philosophy thereof. His tranquil monument stands in the Public Garden at Naples, surrounded by the roar of the huge traffic of a modern city. Which of the hurrying passers-by is aware of the pioneer learning of the Neapolitan thinker commemorated there? Nevertheless, we have a new treatment of his philosophy from such an outstanding representative of contemporary Italian intellectual life as Benedetto Croce.⁸ Vico's attention is mainly directed to the historical development of mankind, which he seeks to recognize in its peculiarity, rejecting entirely the scientific point of view. Living from 1668 to 1744, he is naturally not free from theological and medieval conceptions; nevertheless he strives to get such an understanding of man's historical existence as criticism and experience can confirm, and hence he directs his attention to the foundations of human society. We ought to be very grateful to Benedetto Croce for giving us such a clear and instructive picture of the lifework of his great countryman.

⁷ Stuttgart, Fr. Frommann.

⁸ *Die Philosophie Giambattista Vicos*, Tübingen, J. C. G. Mohr.

Almost all the philosophers of the past are benefiting by the breadth of our historical enquiries. Among those who are enjoying an increasing measure of study is Spinoza. This interest in the solitary Dutch thinker is no accident; it is connected with the general rise of interest in the new realism that is now beginning to develop. Spinoza's life and philosophical achievement are described in detail in two outstanding works, J. Freudenthal's *Spinoza, Leben und Lehre*,⁹ and Wilhelm Bolin's *Spinoza, Zeit-Leben-Werk*.¹⁰ Both of these works have been revised by Carl Gebhardt. Bolin gives a delightfully vivid picture of Spinoza's existence and of the whole environment in which it was framed. Freudenthal's book is the standard work among all the newer expositions of Spinoza. The terribly worn-out expression 'standard work' is here fully justifiable. It is matter for satisfaction that the new edition has been entrusted to Carl Gebhardt, because he has proved his scholarship as editor of the Heidelberg Academy's edition of Spinoza, which is now the sole authoritative one.

One of the most important moments in the development of the newer philosophy and the intellectual life of the west is the step from Spinoza to Leibniz. The tremendous wealth of the latter's philosophy is systematically depicted in *Leibniz*, by Alfred Brunswig, late professor of philosophy at the University of Münster.¹¹ Brunswig depicts Leibniz's activity with attractive vividness. He was wholly immersed in public affairs, and influenced all the schemes of the time. He differs very decidedly from the quiet and somewhat static Spinoza, both in his life and in the astonishing mobility of his mind.

Leibniz was the chief representative of the rationalist philosophy, which characterized the whole of the so-called Enlightenment. Against this spirit there arose in the second half of the eighteenth century an opposition that reached its most powerful expression in the movement called the "Storm and Stress". One of its characteristic advocates was Lavater (1741-1801), who was entirely imbued with the irrationalist spirit. His personality, which was completely anchored in the religious life, is described

⁹ Heidelberg, Karl Winter.

¹⁰ Wittenberg, Bezirk Halle, A. Ziemsen.

¹¹ Vienna and Leipzig, Verlag Karl König.

in Christian Janentsky's fine little book, *Johann Caspar Lavater*.¹² His best-known work, *Physiognomische Fragmente*, makes it clear that his habit of thought was wholly theological and emotional. He lost himself almost entirely in the mysticism of emotion, and for that reason never attained to a truly philosophical clarification and fixation of his ideas. It was quite otherwise with Schleiermacher, who was not merely a great philosopher of religion, but also closely related to real, concrete, historical life, which he strongly influenced. This appears from the study, *Schleiermacher in der Geschichte der Staatsidee und des Nationalbewusstseins*,¹³ by Ernest Müsebeck, director of our national record-office at Potsdam, who has often come forward with excellent historical enquiries. Müsebeck emphasizes the strong political interest that led the famous author of the *Reden über die Religion* to a permanent concern with the problem of the state. As a teacher at the University of Berlin Schleiermacher lectured on the theory of the state before large audiences. Thus he is one of the founders of the consciousness of nationalism in Germany, a nationalism, however, free from chauvinistic narrowness.

The so-called wars of liberation against Napoleon were marked in Germany by a series of far-reaching reforms in politics and law. On the originators and promoters of these movements a particularly strong influence was exerted by Kant's doctrine of the state. In his valuable book, *Kant als Politiker, Zur Staats- und Gesellschaftslehre des Kritizismus*,¹⁴ Kurt Borries shows that this doctrine arose out of the Kantian philosophy by an inherent necessity. Holding that it is the duty of every educated man "to make public use of his reason in every particular", Kant turned his attention to the state and its rights, and developed a decidedly normative doctrine. Especially worth notice are Borries's remarks on "Nationalism, reasons of state, and the ideal of the league of nations".

To followers of the Kantian philosophy it is a very great pleasure to note how strong the interest in its creator still is, in spite of all assertions to the contrary. Even from the merely quantitative point of view, the number of books devoted to Kant out-

¹² Frauenfeld and Leipzig, Huber & Co.

¹³ Berlin, Reimar Hobbing.

¹⁴ Leipzig, Felix Meiner.

weighs those devoted to any other philosopher. Moreover, the direction of our development continually leads us to new interpretations of him. Such is Martin Heidegger's powerful book, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*.¹⁵ By his work *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger entered the front rank of the thinkers of our time. This book on Kant is certain to arouse an equally lively discussion, for he emphatically denies the usual view, according to which the great critical thinker was fundamentally nothing more than an epistemologist of genius. On his view the central point of Kantian thought really lies in the problem of the nature of man, and especially of the man who tries to break through the limits of human knowledge. For, as Kant continually felt and taught according to Heidegger, it is the essence of man to extend his questioning beyond the finite, and enquire with a unique boldness into the nature of the Absolute. On the other hand, however, Kant insists on the fact that this question cannot be answered. Then how is metaphysics possible? This problem is very closely connected with the deepest problem of philosophy, namely, What is man? It is precisely because we are only finite beings and possess only a finite reason that we long for the Absolute and cannot be satisfied. An infinite intuition, such as we ascribe to God, does not have to put questions. Thus Kant comes to have a tragical and problematical relation to metaphysics. But his aim is, according to Heidegger, precisely to work out this relation. He wishes to exhibit the problems of metaphysics *as* problems, and he always considers this task higher than any search for solutions. Metaphysics for him is just one great dialectic, and hence his relation to it is also dialectical.

Through this dialectical conception of metaphysics Kant belongs to the dialectical philosophy of our day, and in it his importance for us becomes clear. How great that is, is shown by Reinhard Kynast's *Kant, sein System als Theorie des Kulturbewusstseins*.¹⁶ He makes it plain that the world of history is the world of values, and he then goes on to show that Kant's system was the first to unite this world of values into a complete whole. He achieved this unification by exhibiting the ethical power of

¹⁵ Bonn, Friedrich Cohen.

¹⁶ Munich, Ernst Reinhardt.

reason as at once the foundation and the culmination of culture. The ethical reason is the most fundamental of all values, and the philosopher, using it as an absolute starting-point, constructs and interprets the totality of the phenomena of life therefrom. Now the problem of value is central to the philosophical work of the present day, and according to Kynast this whole present-day philosophy of values has its starting-point and foundation in that of Kant. His stimulating book shows convincingly that Kant was not a mere critic of knowledge, but also gave us a philosophy of culture and of life that is still of undiminished importance.

Kant shows traits of close kinship with Socrates, who also had an unusual influence after his death. This influence is discussed in Benno Böhm's remarkably interesting book, *Sokrates im 18. Jahrhundert*.¹⁷ Socrates lived and worked not merely in the streets of Athens. He still walks to-day through the streets of our souls. No one who has once made his acquaintance ever succeeds in forgetting him. His influence on the Enlightenment was of decisive importance; and since we are to-day still most deeply indebted to that age Socrates is still a living force. Böhm depicts him as the representative of the eighteenth-century attitude towards life, as opposed to the earlier culture, which was built on the church. There is an irreconcilable contradiction between Christianity and modern scientific rationalism. In the contest resulting from this contradiction the decisive rôle falls to Socrates, as the classic rationalist. Without this rationalism there can be no free science and no independent philosophy and thought. The *Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften* was fully justified in giving Böhm a considerable prize for his work.

The range of our interest in historical research includes also foreign philosophy, to which we should pay attention, if for no other reason, merely in order to become acquainted with the intellectual traits of other peoples and lands. We have an outstanding foundation for the satisfaction of this interest in *Die Philosophie des Auslandes*, which has been brought out by Traugott Konstantin Oesterreich with the aid of a number of eminent scholars in foreign countries.¹⁸ This is the fifth volume of the

¹⁷ Leipzig, Quelle und Meyer.

¹⁸ Berlin, E. S. Mittler & Sohn.

excellent *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, which we call "Ueberweg" for short, after the name of its original editor. The present volume gives a glimpse of the reciprocation that everlastingly obtains between all nations with any pretensions to culture. We hear of the large part played by German philosophy, and especially that of Kant and Hegel, in this intellectual web. But in his Introduction Oesterreich also traces and emphasizes the growing process of national secession, which since the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century has been gaining more and more ground in the realm of philosophy as elsewhere. Those, however, who believe in the community of nations and the necessity for solidarity between them, will see a comforting sign in the fact that the fulfilment of national secessions does not impair the connexion of minds with each other. It is true that within these national cultures there have formed characteristically national systems of philosophy and nationally tinged views of the world. Nevertheless, the differences are not so great that the inner unity of the general philosophical attitude of mind has been lost thereby. And perhaps not the least important lesson that we receive from this *Philosophie des Auslandes* is that all of us together are serving the one eternal truth, and can only serve it in and by means of the overruling unity of the mind and the community of minds.

We may bring this review of historical literature to a close with a notice of a German philosopher who has set the scene of his activity in foreign lands, namely Albert Schweitzer. Oskar Kraus, professor of philosophy at the University of Prague, has raised an important and worthy memorial to him in his book, *Albert Schweitzer, Sein Werk und seine Weltanschauung*.¹⁹ Schweitzer is a positively entrancing personality, whose intellectual interests and practical activities extend to the most various sides of human culture. By training he is a theologian and a philosopher; but he is also a musician, for he has written a magnificent work on Bach, which has appeared in three languages, and he gives organ-concerts with great success. He used the money that he obtained in this way to help the sick negroes on the equator

¹⁹ Berlin, Pan-Verlag G.m.b.H. Kurt Metzner.

by building them a hospital in the forest. Thus he did not stop at theory, but fulfilled the ethical obligation to let the helpless negroes have as much share as possible in our huge wealth of curative devices. At the risk of his life he has given himself to the service of his neighbors. He has answered the call that he expresses in the words: "Physicians must go out as commissioners of the nations of culture to bring about among the unfortunate in far countries that which must be brought about in the name of the culture of man". Kraus's book tells us, in the most engrossing way, not merely about the life and character of this unusual man, but also about his philosophy, and his ethical and metaphysical optimism.

II

Those contemporary works whose character is *systematic* may justifiably be classed either as idealist or as realist. The idealist ones naturally continue the tradition of the Platonic philosophy and the classical German idealism, while our realism is a sort of renewal of Aristotelianism and the philosophy of St. Thomas. It seems that we have in these two standpoints two great opposing groups or parties, so that in Germany, as in other places, contemporary philosophy is repeating the classical dualism that stretches throughout philosophy's history.

Among the works of idealist tendency is Hermann Friedmann's *Die Welt der Formen: System eines morphologischen Idealismus*.²⁰ Closely connected with this, as its commentary and continuation, is *Der morphologische Idealismus, seine Grundlage und seine Bedeutung*, by Friedrich Kuntze, formerly professor at the University of Berlin.²¹ The idealist interpretation that Friedmann and Kuntze give of the world has its ancestors in Plato and Goethe—the philosopher who looked at the world with the eyes of a poet, and the poet who so often looked at it with the eyes of a philosopher—for what they are concerned with is an idealistic *Wesensschau* or contemplation of reality. Now what is the meaning of this idealist theory? Friedmann depicts two fundamental attitudes of man to reality, and two corresponding ways of regarding the

²⁰ Munich, C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. Second edition, revised and enlarged.

²¹ Munich, C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung.

world of appearances, which he expresses by the contrasted pair "haptic-optic". A haptic thinker (the word comes from the Greek ἅπτειν, to touch) is mechanical and limited. He moves predominantly in the sphere of measurement and calculation. Only that which can be counted is real for him, and only in so far as it can be counted. This specifically 'scientific' or mathematical and rationalist attitude gives rise to certain general ways of acting, views of life, and institutions; gives rise, in other words, to a comparatively restricted or mechanical mode of conduct, to a more commonsense way of dealing with and evaluating man and the world. Wholly different is the optic attitude, whose cause Friedmann espouses with the consciousness of fundamental kinship thereto. Optic is the *Weltanschauung* that is not conceptually limited and does not convert itself into conceptions, but uses the eye, the insight, and the freedom of the mind. In the pregnant experience of contemplation it creates the great forms of unity. It does not work with a footrule; it does not cling to the details with cautious and painstaking pettiness, but considers them unimportant. It starts from the highest general intuitions, which he calls "*Grundgebilde*" or "fundamental shapes". For a good example we may mention Wölfflin's magnificent book, *Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, which rests entirely upon optic contemplation. Friedmann's view is related to Bergson's doctrine of intuition and to Spengler's morphological interpretation of history. His synthetical habit of mind is a welcome contribution to the much needed revival of our classical philosophy, especially that of Schelling and Hegel, which is already beginning to make headway. At the same time it will favor the new interest in Goethe's philosophy of nature, which as we know is also of a 'morphological' character. Perhaps the best evidence of the importance of Friedmann's work lies in its power to encourage a definitely philosophical and 'synthetical' way of thinking, which is so necessary to our time, and to strengthen and justify it. Coming as it does from a genuinely philosophical mind, capable of constructive and speculative views, it will have a propitious influence on the new philosophical movement that is arising on all sides.

We may now give a brief glance at what is perhaps the most

brilliant representation of the idealist view of reality, namely *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*, by the outstanding philosopher Ernst Cassirer. Up to the present time three volumes of this work have appeared: Part I, Speech; Part II, Mythical Thought; Part III, Phenomenology of Knowledge.²² The plan of this magnificent undertaking calls for a general theory of the forms of spiritual expression. One by one all the fundamental forms of the spirit are being drawn into the sphere of the enquiry, which is gradually becoming a general phenomenology of the spirit. It already invites comparison with Hegel's work on the same subject. A difference, however, naturally appears at once. The development of knowledge in the time since Hegel has put us in possession of a tremendous wealth of detailed information, so that to-day we have an insight into the mass of the particular realms of culture quite different from what he could have. Cassirer is working over this new-won profusion with astonishing sureness. In method he follows his master Kant. That is to say, he aims at discovering the fundamental conditions, the "transcendental principles", that have constitutive importance in each realm of culture. By thus following the critical or transcendental method in his researches, and convincingly displaying its fruitfulness in the study of the most varied departments of culture, he confirms our previous assertion that Kant's philosophy is still thoroughly alive to-day. His book is so impressive that I should like to spend longer on it. I am afraid, however, that this would make my article too extensive; to avoid which, let us turn to some works belonging to realistic philosophy.

The *realist* treatment is being applied to two great groups of problems, theology and anthropology. In each sphere men seek either to get their hands on the particular reality concerned, or to give it a philosophical basis. Through a misunderstanding of idealism they suppose that it fails to recognize, or inclines to destroy, the reality of the faith and of man. The strictest upholder of theological and philosophical realism is Friedrich Gogarten, three of whose works may be mentioned here: *Ich glaube an den dreieinigen Gott*, *Eine Untersuchung über Glauben und Geschichte*; *Glaube und Wirklichkeit*; and *Die Schuld der Kirche*

²² Berlin, Bruno Cassirer.

gegen die Welt.²³ He fears and passionately rejects the intellectualization of religion into a theoretical attitude of mind. According to him religion rests on an unshakable faith in divine revelation, which in turn involves a particular temporal occurrence; and this occurrence forms the content of the Christian doctrine of redemption. Religious truth cannot be grasped by the understanding, or by any philosophical reflexion whatever, but only through faithful listening and obeying. Philosophical idealism, he declares, makes the ego or selfconsciousness of man the centre of the universe. Unless we abandon this godless self-glorification we shall come to spiritual and religious ruin. The idealistic explanation of the autonomy of freedom and of consciousness is a typical example of disbelief and overweening pride. The church, he goes on, has just as little to do with the actual regulation of men's relations as it has with philosophy. What makes the church the church is the Protestant faith and obedience to the word of God. Nothing but the recovery of that faith can lead to the reconsecration of life.

Gogarten often sounds like a preacher preaching repentance in order to bring back the uncompromising Christian faith to a world that has become all too worldly. But the man who has been especially influential in restoring the Eros for religion to life among us is the great Dane Søren Kierkegaard. In the present trend towards religious revival, it is natural and right that this profound and passionately upright fighter should come forward out of the oblivion in which he was, that his name should be on thousands of lips, and that his writings should obtain a great following. In *Søren Kierkegaard, der christliche Denker und sein Werk*,²⁴ Walter Ruttenbeck gives us an account, supported by ripe science, of the man and the historical relations of his thought. He is extremely instructive in his exposition of Kierkegaard's powerful influence on the theology of the nineteenth century and the present. Kierkegaard himself speaks to us as a preacher in *Christliche Reden*.²⁵ He is a believer of fiery zeal, a warm opponent of all intellectualism, a religious romantic, a man with no peace but

²³ All three published in Jena by Eugen Diederichs.

²⁴ Berlin, Trowitsch & Sohn.

²⁵ Jena, Eugen Diederichs.

with an infinite longing for it, and a spiritual relative of the great Swede Strindberg.

Along this road of opposition to rationalism proceeds the philosophical anthropology and anthropological philosophy of history that is now arising among us. A number of thinkers consider that the present mental crisis is mostly due to this intellectualization of our hearts and minds. I myself have called attention to the connexion here both in my *Die geistige Krisis der Gegenwart*,²⁶ which appeared several years ago, and in *Zur Kritik der Gegenwart*.²⁷ In his book, *Der europäische Geist*,²⁸ the gifted Leopold Ziegler sketches with impressive candor the origin and significance of this acute intensification of our intellectual life. Through increasing rationalization, he says, we have arrived at an ominous godlessness and unchristianity. This intellectualization cannot be stopped, but on the other hand we need not and ought not to stifle in ourselves the mystical and mythical forces of primeval times. He asks whether, if Europe became godly again, it would become Christian again at the same time, and this is a very serious question. He entertains grave doubt whether we still have sufficient force left to return to the religious springs of existence.

We in Europe have become confused about the notion of man and humanity, and we hardly know any longer what our place and purpose in the world may be. The only thing that we are certain of is that we are going through a profound intellectual crisis. In order to overcome it we must risk the attempt to know ourselves. 'What is man, and what is his place in the world?' These are the questions that occupied the many-sided and wide-ranging Max Scheler during the last years of his fruitful work. Of this work we may mention the following: *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos*,²⁹ *Mensch und Geschichte*,³⁰ and *Philosophische Weltanschauung*.³¹ He finds the main direction of human evolution in the enormous intensification of man's self-consciousness. Man appears to himself as a little God. Scheler goes on

²⁶ Berlin, Pan-Verlag Kurt Metzner G.m.b.H. Now in its third edition.

²⁷ Langensalza, Hermann Beyer & Söhne.

²⁸ Darmstadt, Otto Reichl.

²⁹ Darmstadt, Otto Reichl.

³⁰ Zürich, die Neue Schweizer Rundschau.

³¹ Bonn, Friedrich Cohen.

to describe the stages and types of this evolution. In the course of time these types have hardened into fixed ideologies. It is by means of them that we study history, orient ourselves in life, and judge man and his creations. They are the objectification of man's belief in himself, and he uses them as theoretical and technical means of orienting himself in life and for life.

Let us glance over the whole of our philosophical literature for an instant. Undoubtedly we detect a strong new life in it. What is the fundamental reason for that? The times when philosophy is inspired with a new spirit are always the times when man has again become a problem to himself, and human life in its totality has entered the field of enquiry. It is because we are once more asking about man and his nature and meaning that this new life has come into philosophy. The modern philosophical anthropology draws its strength from ^ethis _arevival of interest in the problem of man.

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CONTEMPORARY GERMAN PHILOSOPHY *

I

OF all the ways in which it is possible to write the history of philosophy the two most outstanding are the biographical and that which concerns itself solely with ideas. While the latter stands in the forefront of research, there is naturally no lack of interest in the former, since in philosophy personal peculiarities play much more of a part than they do in other studies. In philosophy achievement depends to a large extent, whether for good or for evil, on the creativity of the man himself, and hence we are always eager to learn about the philosopher as a human being. A long list of biographies has recently appeared in Germany, some of the best of which I will now describe.

Those who study the history of philosophy are continually being fascinated anew by the great figure of Immanuel Kant. In spite of the most penetrating and devoted research, his character keeps on presenting us with new problems. It is not too much to say that he is still a practically unknown personality. In *Kant's Religion*,¹ by Hermann Schmalenbach of Göttingen, we are shown in the most convincing manner that a fresh study of him, free from the usual prejudices, can reveal new sides of the man and new features in his work. This is a fair and much-needed book. Schmalenbach maintains that the traditional picture of Kant, as a thoroughly pedantic partisan of Enlightenment and of Rationalism, is simply untrue. Kant was not a mere intellectual, and his philosophy is not the product of a predominantly intellectualist attitude to life. On the contrary, in the deepest recesses of his mind, where his creative work was done, there burned a hot and by no means always docile flame, an 'enthusiasm' kindled originally by two things, the infinity of the starry heavens, and the uniqueness and infinity of man's moral force. Now to experience infinity is to experience sublimity, something that bursts all the bounds of the intellect and its con-

* Translated from the German by Richard Robinson.

¹ Berlin, Junker and Dünhaupt.

ceptions. The problem of infinity is one of the oldest in philosophy, and is still constantly giving fresh impetus to the philosopher's musings. It continually preoccupied Kant, to such an extent that even in the most abstract and conceptual parts of his work we can still trace an undertone of profound emotion. His view of religion was not dictated by a sober and sobering Enlightenment, nor by a morality rendered sickly by thought. He knew that it rests upon uncomfortable experiences, upon a terror, awe, and fear, that often have no name. And out of these experiences he gave us impressive reports of religion's unearthly hinterland. Hence he stands very close—and the fact is well worth remark—to Rudolf Otto's famous interpretation of religion. Otto's book *Das Heilige* has had a wide circulation and gained the attention of many persons who have no intellectual interest in religion. Schmalenbach shows its close relation to Kant's thought, which is one of the most informative portions of his keen and valuable work. But if Kant held the 'numinous' view of religion, that proves, as Schmalenbach rightly urges, that even in the philosopher of reason himself an irrational mood held sway, and only with difficulty did he control his religious temperament.

We have an entirely different picture of Kant as man and as thinker in Theodor Litt's *Kant und Herder als Denker der geistigen Welt*,² a picture obtained by contrasting him sharply with Herder. Many philosophers and historians have been eager to discover the meaning of the violent antagonism between these two men, and to determine how far each of them was in the right. Litt makes them appear as the representatives of two diametrically opposite attitudes towards life and the universe, as typical opponents in western philosophy's heroic struggle to attain to the self-knowledge of mind, as the fortuitous embodiments of a fated and inevitable contrast. They exhibit two irreconcilable attitudes of mind. They express a certain division within the whole realm of thought which must lead to permanent misunderstandings and personal enmities. Following Litt, we can most simply describe this contrast as follows. Kant strives with all the force of his intellect to conceive and explain every kind of reality by

² Leipzig, Quelle und Meyer.

means of its highest logical principle. He sees only the "universal", and he refuses to recognize as a valid basis of life and events anything except the universality of the "law". Thus he cuts himself off from the pleasant and refreshing fullness of life's actual variety. Herder on the other hand remains always in the concrete and individual, for the grasping and depicting of which his talent was admirably adapted, and struggles to prevent its destruction by conceptual analysis. With insight, caution, and an obvious desire to be objective, Litt pursues this contrast through the whole realm of thought, revealing its presence both in attempts to grasp the nature of man and his knowledge, and in inquiries into the meaning of the state and of history, and into the possibility of progress. His investigations, profound as they are, nevertheless sometimes give the impression of being a little unfair to Kant.

If we turn now to other general accounts of leaders of thought, our eye falls on a large book devoted to the life and work of Karl Marx. The creator of modern socialism had felt the power of Hegel; and it is the natural dialectic of Hegel's influence that among his disciples should be the originator of the 'materialist' view of history. The tremendous effect of Marx's work has hidden the personality that thus entwined itself inseparably with humanity's development. In *Karl Marx, sein Leben und sein Werk*,³ Karl Vorländer gives us a picture of the man, free from partisan favor or hate, and supported by the most careful use of all available sources. Using a somewhat oldfashioned method, he follows his hero step by step from his earliest childhood, through all stages and along all paths and by-paths, down to his last breath. He has collected every letter that could throw light on this or that situation. His biography has an unmistakable air of reality. We learn to know Karl Marx's life as a heroic fight in the service of the ideal that afterwards forced its way into history as *Sozialismus der Tat*. We learn to know the man himself as a true hero, whose sociological interpretation of life became an actual living force.

In Eduard von Hartmann we have a development of the Hegelian philosophy quite other than the 'materialist'. During the

³ Leipzig, Felix Meiner. Fifteen illustrations.

years from 1870 to 1880 his views were of fundamental importance in our development. After that they lost much of their prestige through the rise of Neo-Kantianism and of general interest in the theory of knowledge. It is to be hoped that now, in view of the present renewal of interest in metaphysics, his star will emerge from its eclipse. If so we shall be making good in our time a sin of omission committed by earlier decades—a definite sin, not a mere error of stupidity and shortness of mental sight, as von Hartmann's followers so often complain. Von Schnehen's pleasant and persuasive monograph, *Eduard von Hartmann*,⁴ is the work of one of these followers. It shows the most profound admiration for von Hartmann. Every page evinces a perfect knowledge of him, gained during decades of devotion to his works, and also a remarkable aptitude for really simple exposition. This book justifies the "lively desire", expressed by von Hartmann, that Wilhelm von Schnehen would undertake the expression of his views for Frommann's "Klassiker der Philosophie", von Schnehen possessing complete command of the huge mass of material.

We observe in von Hartmann a tendency towards 'the philosophy of life'; he accorded, in fact, a decisive share in reality to the irrational. From his time on the philosophy of life has flourished more and more in Germany and in France. In the latter country one of its most acute and productive representatives was Jean-Marie Guyau, whose pen was early snatched from his hand by an incurable disease. He died in 1888 at the age of thirty-three. *Jean-Marie Guyau und die Philosophie des Lebens*,⁵ by Hans Pfeil, is put forward in order to make his work known in Germany. It is a well-informed rendering of a view that has many traits in common with Nietzsche—Guyau has been called "the French Nietzsche". Pfeil gives a careful and penetrating account of the main principles of that philosophy of life, without however according them his own unconditional approval.

In the much-read series of *Selbstdarstellungen*,⁶ of which the seventh volume has now appeared, we have 'philosophies of life' in the most natural and unqualified sense of the term. For

⁴ Stuttgart, Fr. Frommanns Verlag. With a portrait.

⁵ Augsburg, Dr. Benno-Filser Verlag, G.m.b.H.

⁶ *Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen*, 7. Band, Leipzig, Felix Meiner.

here we find characteristic philosophers of our time recounting their growth and careers, as men and as thinkers, their homes, their teachers, their university studies, the various turns and fortunes of their lives. The seventh volume contains Bauch, Gemelli, Hägerström, Kraus, and Schweitzer. Albert Schweitzer is a man who stands full in the midst of life and seeks for more life. Undoubtedly his *Selbstdarstellung* will be read by many admirers of his universal personality. He is a tangible example of a 'full nature', everywhere bursting the bounds of mere theory and plunging into practice with magnificent daring; a theologian in word and deed; a philosopher; a physician; a theoretical musician, to whom we owe profound studies of Bach; a practical musician, especially devoted to the construction and the playing of the organ; a lover of mankind whose goodness is felt far and wide, and whose will to help his neighbor is indomitable, as he showed to the negroes suffering terrible illnesses in equatorial Africa. There is a peculiar pleasure in being able to follow in the same book the highly spiritualized existence of Oskar Kraus, who, however, has given us a detailed and splendidly executed picture of Schweitzer.⁷ These *Selbstdarstellungen* are memoirs of great worth—as is natural in view of the great worth of their authors.

Friedrich Nietzsche, however, is still the most impressive and most influential of all 'philosophers of life' in Germany. Fortunately he is no longer universally fashionable; but his influence on serious study is greater than before. From very various angles men are attempting to penetrate to the essence of his philosophy and throw light on its principles. He was fond of representing himself, in his own emphatic manner, as absolutely independent of previous thinkers and of his own age; but actually he was not independent of either so much as he asserts. He was both influenced by other philosophers and movements of thought, and also a link in the development of knowledge in the nineteenth century. Close acquaintance with his subject has enabled Hans Vaihinger, the well-known author of the "As-If" philosophy, to reveal one form of Nietzsche's indebtedness and relatedness in *Nietzsche als Philosoph*.⁸ His thesis is that Nietzsche's view is Schopenhauer's

⁷ Berlin, Pan-Verlag Kurt Metzner, G.m.b.H.

⁸ Fifth edition, enlarged, 1930. Langensalza, Hermann Beyer und Söhne.

theory of the will given a positive turn through the influence of Darwin's doctrine of the struggle for existence. The change consists in this, that wherever Schopenhauer preaches the renunciation of life Nietzsche converts this into a powerful affirmation of it and a glorification of might. But it may be questioned whether Nietzsche really stands so near to Schopenhauer as Vaihinger and most of his exponents assume, or whether Nietzsche's doctrine of will has not a fundamentally and absolutely different meaning from Schopenhauer's, and was shaped by impressions and reflections in which Schopenhauer played no part. It is not possible to regard Schopenhauer as the father of Nietzsche's doctrine of will. It is not even possible to say that Nietzsche was the son who in the course of his development reached a view that was the exact opposite of his father's. It may well be doubted even whether Vaihinger's account detects some of the deepest currents in Nietzsche's dark spirit—whether it does not actually pass over some of the new ideas that we owe to this philosopher, for example in the sphere of history and the psychological interpretation of it.

Naturally there are also a great many works that do not give a complete picture of a philosophical personality, but bring out some aspect of it, the understanding of which however is essential to the understanding of the whole. We have such a book, specialized, and yet written with an eye on the system, in Seth Demel's *Platons Verhältnis zur Mathematik*.⁹ This excellent work advances our knowledge in several respects. In the first place, it is a contribution to the history of Greek mathematics; secondly, it reveals the important part played by mathematics in the life and work of Plato's Academy; thirdly, it throws light on the remarkable significance of mathematics not merely as a subject-matter but also as an example of method, as the ideal of science in the theory of Ideas. We see Plato gradually advancing towards an understanding of its importance. The first signs of it appear in the *Gorgias*. It becomes profounder in the *Meno*. It receives powerful impetus from his studies with Theodorus of Cyrene, and is fruitfully affected by congenial friends in the Academy, by Theaetetus of Athens, and by Eudoxus of Cnidus.

⁹ Leipzig, Felix Meiner, 1929.

Demel is well aware that other factors besides mathematics were fundamental in the construction of Plato's dialectic, but he quite justifiably confines himself to the part played by this study in the origin of the complicated pattern of the theory of Ideas. If we now ask what precisely was the service that mathematics did for Plato, the answer according to Demel is as follows. In mathematics he became acquainted with a perfect example of strict method in science. This enabled him to give to the conception of knowledge, when he took up that problem, a definite content and a fixed form. He was able to orientate his notion of knowledge on the pattern of mathematics. He also perceived the great and peculiar ability of this science to attain, in spite of the purely formal character of its conceptions, to knowledge of the perceptible world. This it does through its objectification in the mathematical sciences of nature, while at the same time, by means of this enormously important achievement, it bridges the gap between the intellectual and the perceptible worlds. By his insight into this mediating function of mathematics Plato escapes the suspicion of being a dualist. He is a monist, though a critical and not a dogmatic one; his monism rests on a sound epistemology. And in reaching an epistemology on which he could base his theory of Ideas he got decisive assistance from his insight into the nature of mathematics. Demel's work constitutes an important defence of the view of Plato that was put forward especially by the Marburg school, to which he acknowledges himself indebted.

It is being said in Germany that for some time philosophy here has been going through a period of renewed vigor. The justification of this assertion is the intensive work now being done on the philosophy of Plato. The increase of research about him has given rise to numerous and various interpretations. In *Die Platondeutung der Gegenwart*¹⁰ Hans Leisegang, who recently became a full professor at Jena, undertakes to sift and evaluate this new and very extensive literature. He shows that it falls into two distinct groups. One of these is purely scientific in intention, and seeks only to illuminate Plato's mind. The other is impelled by an interest in the present, and seeks to discover how Plato

¹⁰ Carlsruhe, G. Braun. (In the collection "Wissen und Wirken".)

can help us to understand and overcome the troubles of our own day. What Leisegang gives us is not merely an instructive view of the manifold work now being done on Plato, but also a picture of the main intellectual tendencies of our own time. We learn that "Plato to-day is being brought into connection with communism and socialism; and democrats with a Neo-Kantian philosophy, neo-mystics, neo-romantics, neo-conservative sociologists, and German racial theorists, all go back to him somehow or other and seek for his companionship". Leisegang also shows clearly what manifold uses a philosophical system has! Many of these interpretations are nothing but the abuse of a great name!

II

Turning now to the *systematic* treatment of philosophy in Germany, we find all branches equally concerned in its development. This development depends upon the fact that philosophy recognizes the necessity of attempting to understand its own nature and to give an account of itself. One of the first thinkers to take this road was Wilhelm Dilthey. With perfect justice he has been compared with Ranke, and his descriptions of the development of mind and of philosophy in Europe have been declared equal to Ranke's account of European political history. But his attitude towards this development was philosophical as well as historical, and, having absorbed it with a peculiar receptiveness and a wide range of vision, he sought to discover the general *Weltanschauung* implied in its rich variety. This was the origin of his great attempt to delineate certain comprehensive types into which European humanity, led by philosophy, had poured its beliefs about the world. We have an important part of this undertaking in his *Weltanschauungslehre: Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*,¹¹ volume seven of his collected works. This book reveals the motives that go to the formation of a *Weltanschauung*. It shows the inner unity and relatedness of philosophical systems often centuries apart. It brings clearly and convincingly before us the fact that in the main there are only three fundamental forms by means of which Europe has tried to explain the mysterious variety of things: naturalism,

¹¹ Leipzig and Berlin, B. G. Teubner.

which looks on reality as a system of material forces; the idealism of freedom, which interprets reality by means of man's moral power; and objective idealism, which understands reality as spirit. The roots of these *Weltanschauungen* lie, according to Dilthey, not in abstract thought but in life. In seeking to uncover their origin and nature he is therefore necessarily led to reflect on the secret of life, and his doctrine of *Weltanschauungen* is at the same time a 'philosophy of life', and one of the profoundest that we possess.

Philosophy has not, however, confined this systematic examination to itself, but extended it to the whole of culture; and thus it has become in fact what its conception demands that it always shall be, a criticism of culture in the highest sense. Now for many years our culture has reflected the views, valuations, and desires, of the so-called 'bourgeois'. Hence philosophy's criticism of culture has become a criticism of the bourgeois, especially a criticism of his ethics and a campaign against it. And the very years that saw the peak of that ethics and culture, roughly the time from the second third to the end of the nineteenth century, also produced the most violent opponents of the bourgeois, of his attitudes and beliefs. In the form of poetry the fight was carried on by Hölderlin, Heine, and Strindberg; in that of religion by Kierkegaard. The scholars in it were Bachofen, Nietzsche's friend and colleague at Basel, and Nietzsche himself. The fundamental reason for this movement, in the course of which the bourgeois ideal was partly vanquished, at any rate in the realm of thought, was the disquieting perception that the whole of modern culture rests on a deepseated discord. What pure and honorable way is there out of the incurable contradiction between antiquity and Christianity? What are we really, Nietzsche asks, Greeks or Christians? How can we find a pattern of living in classical antiquity, when we base ourselves on the so-called Christian culture? As Nietzsche complains, we reach reconciliation only by lying compromises and ignoble deceptions. Upright natures refuse to join in this doublefacedness and halfheartedness, this patchwork of antiquity and Christianity. Alfred Bäumler of Dresden has written a book explaining the feelings and points of view that led Bachofen and Nietzsche

to attack this optimistic harmonization of cultures. His *Bachofen und Nietzsche*¹² gives a brief but brilliant picture of one of the most important struggles about culture in the recent past. According to him the heroic purity of Nietzsche's solution lies in the fact that he decided without reservation in favor of Greece, the untamed force of which he refused to reduce, by a harmonizing and classicist interpretation, to Apolline mildness and motionless simplicity. What he valued most highly was not the Christian's humility and devotion, but the Greek struggle and victory—or even disaster, which the turmoil of life itself seemed to justify and approve. Life does not humble and deny itself; it fights and conquers. Bäumler rightly maintains that Nietzsche's great achievement was to make the conception of athletic competition the cardinal point of Greek culture.

How then does Bachofen explain the antagonism that undeniably exists among the driving forces of European culture? He employs the fruitful means of representing antiquity as a symbol, and especially as a symbol through which to understand the relation between man and woman. The whole history of humanity is a development of the struggle between the female material and the pure immaterial paternal principle. Ancient culture arises out of the eternally fruitful Mother-Earth and the religion connected therewith. It is overcome by the appearance and victory of the paternal principle, which is represented by Christianity. The final healing and redemption lies with the male and father; the mother henceforth plays only a mediating and subordinate part. Bäumler well says that Bachofen, inspired by the symbolic meaning of the relation between the sexes, gave an entirely new picture of the history of mankind (p. 24). The man who looks at history symbolically is no longer a bourgeois; the bourgeois spirit is inimical to symbols (p. 46), because it is too rationalistic, unimaginative, and confined. Bäumler's work shows that Bachofen and Nietzsche helped to produce a new form of life, a form that restores to myth and symbol their ancient and sacred dignity.

By criticizing culture the philosopher at the same time necessarily helps to build it up. He does this most effectively when

¹² Zurich, Neue Schweizer Rundschau, 1929.

he gives us a philosophy of value, and uses it in order to solve the problems of education. A knowledge of values is the first requisite for intelligent pedagogy, and for the establishment of objective pedagogical standards. In his book *Philosophie der Werte als Grundwissenschaft der pädagogischen Zieltheorie*¹³ Siegfried Behn expresses this idea by saying that the real preamble of pedagogy is the metaphysics of value, and carries it out in detail with much caution and persuasiveness. He describes the origin of values and the way in which we come to grasp them. He constructs the world of values and goods for us in a most illuminating manner, sketches its main divisions, which support and affect both the individual and the community, and gives an instructive account of the dependence of particular educational systems on particular views about values and the world in general. In this excellent thinker we may observe that the Catholic point of view is absolutely no bar to an unprejudiced estimate of human life. His own estimate is full of the optimistic faith without which effective pedagogy is impossible. His optimism arises from a Christian religion and philosophy that convince him that only in the name of the Christian doctrines of faith and salvation can we realize our educational ideals and attain to the highest ethical ends.

Pedagogy is the most important of the ways in which philosophy influences culture. But what is the condition of this study? We often hear the complaint that it has not yet reached the status of a science. And, in fact, the number of pedagogical writings that leave the reader with a feeling of dissatisfaction is very great. We may comfort ourselves with the following apt statement: "In our view the study of education now stands about where philosophy stood at the time of Bacon and Descartes" (p. 274). This comes from *Die Pädagogik des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, ein kritischer Rückblick und programmatischer Ausblick*.¹⁴ The author, Georg Grünwald, who is well known for many noteworthy pedagogical writings, here attempts to correct this unfortunate state of affairs. He first gives us an instructive account, in a cautious and objective manner, of the main tendencies in the

¹³ Munich, Kösel und Pustet, 1930.

¹⁴ Freiburg i.B., Herder and Co., 1927.

contemporary theory of education. This leads to a critical appreciation of those tendencies, which in turn brings him to his main subject. In view of his Catholicism, and his insistence on the necessity of a philosophical and a theological pedagogy, it is interesting to note what a relatively high place he gives to the experimental study of education. The chapters on philosophical and theological theories of pedagogy contain copious valuable references to Catholic thinkers. The reader makes several new and useful acquaintances of a personal nature, and he also learns of many actual problems that are treated in Catholic works on teaching and catechism, but commonly neglected by the Protestants and the purely secular writers.

But does not every attempt to construct a philosophical ethics or system of pedagogy rest on a philosophical knowledge of the nature of man? Insight into this fact is constantly growing among our students of these two subjects. Hence a philosophical anthropology is beginning to appear, partly suggested also by the general needs that have lately led to questions about the nature of man. One of its pioneers was Max Scheler. It already possesses a large number of workers and a goodly variety of types. We obtain an instructive picture of this new anthropology, with its historical and philosophical presuppositions and the main branches of its development, in *Die Wissenschaft vom Menschen in der Gegenwart*,¹⁵ by Friedrich Seifert, professor of philosophy in the Technische Hochschule at Munich. He shows that the new study arose in reaction against the exaggerations of a purely intellectualist view of man. At the same time he issues an impressive warning against the excessive cultivation of the irrational element, a fault that recent work is already falling into. The manysidedness of man's nature demands an anthropology itself constructed out of a dialectical manifold of factors. Seifert gives valuable suggestions for such a science, a science that must overcome not merely the onesidedness of intellectualism, but also the fashionable psycho-analytical point of view, while using both of these methods, before it can develop a truly comprehensive picture of that Proteus—Man.

In order to understand the nature of man it is essential to

¹⁵ Berlin and Leipzig, Pan-Bücherei, Pan-Verlag Kurt Metzner, G.m.b.H.

consider the myths, Utopias, and flights of fancy, with the help of which he carries on his struggles, constructs the actual world, and reveals and realizes his nature and will. The deeper comprehension of actual life demands a study and an interpretation of the great Utopias, the "wish-dreams that perpetually accompany human history". Professor Karl Mannheim, from whom this quotation is taken, has accordingly studied them in his clever and penetrating work, *Ideologie und Utopie*.¹⁶ He reveals their inner essence and describes their main forms, with copious illustrations from particular examples. He distinguishes four types or levels of Utopian thought and of its development in modern times: the orgiastic millenarianism of the anabaptists, the liberal and humanitarian ideal, the conservative ideal, and the socialist or communist Utopia. He reaches this illuminating classification by confining himself to political life. Under his guidance we obtain a sympathetic insight into the conflicts between different Utopias, their continual approximations to 'reality', and their origin in the desire to look into the future, a desire that science leaves unsatisfied. He also shows us the obscure hinterland out of which human history is emerging, and the equally obscure futures towards which it stumbles.

In the creation of Utopian ideals a fundamental part is played by *aesthetic* considerations. It would perhaps be true to say that such constructions actually arise out of artistic needs, and constitute an artistic mode of treating reality. Until recently the study of art in Germany was essentially psychological in character. Now, however, things have changed to the extent that we no longer look first for the psychological conditions of artistic creation, but seek to grasp the work of art itself as an objective manifestation of mind. In this effort we are turning back to our classical aesthetic speculation, that of Schiller, Schelling, Solger, and Hegel. The achievements of that movement are now appearing in new editions. We are indebted to Hermann Glockner, professor at Heidelberg, for an edition of Kuno Fischer's *Diotima, Die Idee des Schönen, Philosophische Briefe*.¹⁷ We have here a whole system of aesthetics, a whole metaphysics of the beautiful,

¹⁶ Bonn, Friedrich Cohen. (Schriften zur Philosophie und Soziologie.)

¹⁷ Leipzig, Philipp Reclam jun., 1928.

developed with amazing maturity by an author only twenty-five years old. The first edition appeared in 1849. Almost every line reveals the influence of Schiller. Like Schiller, Kuno Fischer regards beauty as being from the highest point of view the genius of the world. He does not, however, separate it from the forces of the moral and the religious spirit, but depicts it in its connections therewith. It is easy to see how deeply he was affected by the noble classicism of Schiller's style. These letters show the important place that Kuno Fischer holds among the Epigoni of classical idealism, as one of its most characteristic, impressive, and successful representatives.

If Kuno Fischer represents the old speculative and metaphysical way of looking at art, we are altogether in the modern viewpoint, and in the immediate proximity of art itself, when we come to Max Dessoir. His work has three outstanding characteristics: an extremely close relationship to the actual world of art, based on an intimate knowledge of it; an unusually developed capacity to analyze artistic creations without—as so often happens—desecrating and destroying the secret illusion that surrounds every real work of art; and a talent, softened by a fine dislike of grandiloquent language, for the philosophical interpretation of the subject. All these qualities appear in his *Beiträge zur allgemeinen Kunstwissenschaft*.¹⁸ Although his discussion is concerned with first principles, although he seeks to clarify the 'conception' of art, although he states his own philosophical convictions, he never for a moment loses touch with the actual aesthetic objects. They are for him something sacred, to be protected from violent reduction to the grey uniformity of a system. His fundamental attitude is that "the intensive and extensive variety of the phenomena forbids the application of any single method and renders it difficult to construct a system". If this be pronounced scepticism, Dessoir accepts the name, as appears from his clever introduction "Scepticism in Aesthetics". He has numerous acquaintances among poets and musicians, and is as much at home in the studio as in the theatre. His love of the facts, which in his hands never become the playthings of mere theoretical ratiocination, leads him to pay most careful attention to

¹⁸ Stuttgart, Ferdinand Enke. Three illustrations.

the real nature of artistic objects. The work of art has its own peculiar laws, through which it is assured of its own peculiar way of being. To work out these objective laws and these special forms of being is the chief purpose of that branch of inquiry which Dessoir has helped to create and to advance, and which, in accordance with his proposal and practice, is known as "Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft". From the standpoint of this objectivism he has produced fruitful discussions concerning practically all branches of art, the verbal as well as the visual and the auditory. The first is dealt with in "Goethe's Faust", "The Play within a Play", and "The Artforms of Philosophy". Visual art is finely discussed in "On Describing Statues", and auditory art in the moving speech over the coffin of Ferruccio Busoni.

We may conclude our survey of new publications devoted to particular philosophical disciplines by noticing some remarkable works in *theology* and *the philosophy of religion*. We observe that the older study of religion, which was pre-eminently historical, is giving place to a purely philosophical and systematic method. This is true even of books whose purpose appears to be specifically historical; they too arise out of a philosophical impulse and present their subject in a philosophical light. The modern developments of theology, and especially the so-called dialectical school of Barth, Gogarten, Brunner, etc., have made the figure of Luther once more the centre of interest. For this by no means superficial reason, if for no other, the following work demands careful attention: *Luthers Ethik in ihren Grundzüge dargestellt*,¹⁹ by Ottmar Dittrich, the wellknown historian of ethics, who has already given us several important and illuminating books on the history of western views about morality. It is a work of amazing thoroughness and solidity. He shows that the fundamental religious source of Luther's reformation lay in a reformation of faith. He thought of faith in general not as a subjective activity, nor as a personal quality of the individual, but as an "active and mighty thing". To him it was a tremendous reality, a metaphysical truth of the first rank; "faith", he says, "is the substance of God". That is why he refuses to hear of philosophical speculations and learned abstract discussions about the essence of God;

¹⁹ Leipzig, Felix Meiner.

that is why reason seems to him a "whore" who violates God's majesty. The presupposition of his ethics is therefore not philosophy but a theology of faith. Himself wholly anchored in God, he makes all ethical commandments find their root in God's will and word. His ethics like his theology is not anthropocentric but theocentric or Christocentric. Hence the positiveness of his ethical injunctions, unimpeded by any compromises, and grounded in the unconditioned as he himself was grounded in the unconditioned. Dittrich draws this thoroughly absolutist, theonomic ethics with a sure hand. He enables us to see into the innermost being of one of those really great men who determined and still uninterruptedly determine our modern destiny.

We saw above that German aesthetics has received important stimulation from speculative idealism. The same is true of our philosophy of religion. Hence our keen interest in Hegel. The present revival of Hegel-studies favors Georg Lasson's excellent new editions of his works, and these new editions in turn are furthering the revival.²⁰ Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes* probably form one of the high points of the philosophy of religion, and those who can estimate the place of religion in the development of the spirit will know why the greatest systematic student of the philosophy of spirit had to give such intimate attention to that subject. As a philosopher and a metaphysician he could not echo the banal assertion that religion rests solely on faith and is essentially the expression and witness of that. "However much religion rests on feeling, thought remains necessary to it." Naturally this does not mean thought of the primitive kind exemplified by ordinary rationalism and by the demonstrations of the mere understanding. Hegel agrees with Kant, the great destroyer of the traditional proofs of God's existence, that, when it is proposed to justify faith by knowledge, the excogitations of the mere understanding must fail on principle. He has thrown light into the farthest depths of the relation between faith and knowledge, between immediate and mediate apprehension, between feeling, heart, and head (Lectures 2, 3 and 4). "The proofs of God's existence arose from the desire

²⁰ *Vorlesungen über die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes*, by G. F. W. Hegel, edited by Georg Lasson; and *Einführung in Hegels Religionsphilosophie*, by Georg Lasson. Vols. 64 and 65 of the "Philosophische Bibliothek". Leipzig, Felix Meiner.

to satisfy thought and reason." Lasson's *Einführung in Hegels Religionsphilosophie* succeeds brilliantly in its aim of introducing the reader to various points of view from which the approach to Hegel's philosophy of religion is less difficult. It is not indeed light reading. But that is to the good, for if a man wishes to enter into the mind of such a mighty constructor of conceptions as Hegel he must not shun trouble and must not underestimate the difficulties. On the mountain-tops of thought the wind blows icy-keen. The authors of the true classics of philosophy were not easy chatterers. It is a sign of their greatness that they were incapable of descending to a conversational way of writing.

The most determined opponents of the empirical and historical estimate of religion are the representatives of "dialectical" theology. They base religion on the metaphysics of God's word, on religious realism, and on the metaphysical objectivity of faith. The subjectification of religion is, according to them, partly responsible for the present relativization and dissolution of our spiritual life, since it has endangered all objective and ontological values, including those of authority and piety. Gogarten asserts ²¹ that the disappearance of piety and of respect for authority is one of the cancers of our time, and a great number of voices echo him. If we once admitted that we were living in an age which had taken for its banner the proscription of all authority—a charge that cannot be proved in such a universal form—we should have to assent without reserve to our author's conviction that human life is impossible apart from authority and obedience and the restraint that goes with them. But what precisely are authority and restraint, and how are they to be strengthened and restored? That is the question. Gogarten calls for the renewal of the reign of God. All true being comes from God, and unless He determines it life becomes a prey to the devil and his lies. But with this article of faith Gogarten sails too fast over the profound problems of our life. He strains towards a (theological) decision of the question, based on the cry of 'back to God'. But is it even possible for modern man to obey this cry? And if not, must he be condemned out of hand? Gogarten's demand is good

²¹ *Wider die Ächtung der Autorität*, by Friedrich Gogarten. Jena, Eugen Diederichs.

in principle, and agrees with man's highest ethical needs. But the means by which he hopes to see it realized are unacceptable to a humanity that is striving for new ways of satisfying its longing for God and the Infinite.

The "dialectical" theologians are natural fighters, and Gogarten is so more than all. His unusual and striking personality has aroused interest even outside theological circles, and so made a literary account of him worth while. In *Friedrich Gogarten*²² Gottlob Wieser has given a clear picture of his fundamental attitude, his passionate rejection of the philosophical idealism descended from Kant and Fichte, his unshakable acceptance of the Christian and Lutheran way of thinking, based wholly on faith in the word of God as revealed in the Bible, and his powerful fight for a theology cleared of all philosophy and speculation. Gogarten finds the cause of the impending collapse of our morality in the illusion, taught and cherished by idealism, that man is the foundation and measure of all things. He holds this doctrine to be intolerably far from reality and utterly incapable of helping us; it dangles before us the lying dream that man is free and creative. By calling upon us to recognize once more that we are not confident creators, but simple and helpless creatures of God, Gogarten expresses a general tendency of present spiritual life. We are living amidst an almost universal reaction against intellectualism, of which he is one of the most energetic representatives. It has gripped the realm of theology, and its intention is that man's relation to the church shall once again be regulated as Luther would ordain.

There is another school that seeks to avoid the onesidedness of the "dialectical" theology. While not abandoning the metaphysical foundations of religion, it tries to take account also of its historical side. Erich Seeberg takes this comprehensive point of view in his *Ideen zur Theologie der Geschichte des Christentums*.²³ On the one hand, Christianity is, as the manifestation of the 'spirit', above time and history, an eternal reality; on the other hand it has a particular existence and exercises an actual historical influence. Seeberg holds that the eternal and the tem-

²² Jena, Eugen Diederichs.

²³ Leipzig, Quelle und Meyer.

poral aspects must not be torn asunder. His conviction finds expression in the fundamental Christian view that the Spirit must become Word, that the eternal God must receive concrete historical form, and that He has done so in the person of Jesus Christ. This is what is meant by 'incarnation', the fundamental conception of Christianity. The continuous incarnation of God gives the meaning of history; it is to be understood as the revelation of God, and it enables us to understand the special forms that Christianity has taken at various times and places. Seeberg depicts the two main types of this religion, the eastern and the western. As a theologian he never forgets that Christianity cannot be comprehended by any conceptual abstractions, nor by any conceptual theory, but only through its historical reality, its revelation as an actual force, its 'being', with which it fulfills the development of man.

However much attention we may give to the metaphysical side of Christianity and of religion in general, we must not lose sight of its historical origins and conditions. Its great paradox is that it is at once the greatest metaphysical and the greatest historical fact. Hence it is essential to take account of its growth. Long and thorough researches have led Rudolf Kittel to the conviction that the absolutely fixed point from which we can understand Post-Mosaic religion, and perhaps even the oldest religion that Israel ever had, is the religion of Canaan.²⁴ This great historian shows that Israel's religion took shape within historical times, in Palestine, and in the course of violent conflict with the old heathen myths which it found in possession. We have another important addition to the history of religion in *Die Religion der Erde in Einzeldarstellungen*, volume two of the series "Wissenschaft und Kultur".²⁵ This consists of lectures given by some of the leading professors at the university of Vienna during the winter of 1927-28. Thus Karl Beth spoke on "The Religions of the Primitives", Robert Reininger on "The Religion of the Indians", Fritz Wilke on "The Judaeo-Israelitish Religion", and so on. It is becoming continually clearer how much the heathens have bequeathed to the Jewish and the Christian religions. We have a new and out-

²⁴ *Die Religion des Volkes Israel*, 2d ed., 1929. Leipzig, Quelle und Meyer.

²⁵ Leipzig and Vienna, Franz Deuticke, 1929.

standing illustration of it in *Der Messiasglaube in Indien und Iran auf Grund der Quellen dargestellt*,²⁶ by the Swiss scholar Emil Abegg. We learn that Hinduism, Buddhism, and Parseeism, already had their widely spread beliefs in a Messiah, beliefs rooted in eternal psychological needs. In order that he may hope to see his desire realized, and may expect to share in Paradise, man needs a solid visible surety, someone who has as it were guaranteed the fulfilment of this longing by his personal oath. In his dual position, as both man and God, the Messiah is a very typical religious symbol.

In *Selbstdarstellungen: Die Religionswissenschaft der Gegenwart*,²⁷ edited by Erich Stange, we have a vivid picture of the study of religion in Germany. Here we learn to know such important Protestant and Catholic students as Friedrich Loofs and Karl Beth, Hans Lietzmann and Paul Wernle, Hartmann Grisar, S. J. and Josef Mausbach. The development of these men plunges us right into the decisive questions of theology. This book gives striking pictures of Catholic and of Protestant minds, of Catholic and of Protestant modes of education, of study, and of viewing the world; and through these men we learn to understand the peculiar nature of their subject.

III

Like the Christian, heathen Rome is continually claiming our closest attention afresh. Nowadays the question that most especially troubles us is why the old, glorious imperial Rome declined and fell. Since many of us feel that our own civilization is heading towards an inevitable fall, we look for historical parallels by which to understand our situation. All centuries have inquired into the reasons for Rome's collapse. In his unusually interesting book *Der Untergang Roms im abendländischen Denken: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichtsschreibung und zum Dekadenzproblem*,²⁸ Walter Rehm shows that down the ages of Europe there runs a discussion of this tragic spectacle, the fall of the Roman republic and of the whole ancient culture. Among the participants are Polybius the Greek, Augustine the Church Father, Dante and

²⁶ Berlin, Walter de Gruyter & Co. Eight photographs.

²⁷ Leipzig, Felix Meiner.

²⁸ Leipzig, Dietrich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung.

Petrarch, Machiavelli and Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau, Gibbon, the great English historian, and Nietzsche, who devoted much attention to the problem of decadence in general. Some thinkers trace the collapse to the hidden will of God, others to the disappearance of the old virtues and moral forces that had once produced Rome's greatness. Supporters of naturalism see in it the consequence of the laws of organic nature, which govern death as well as growth and maturity. In view of present events we cannot help smiling as we read in Rehm how the Romans accused the Christians and the Christians the Romans of causing the fall. To the universalist the nationalist seemed responsible, and to the nationalist the universalist; it is always the other man who is to blame. Gibbon and Nietzsche close the discussion with what is perhaps the true view: the real cause of the inner dissolution of Rome, and of the whole ancient world, was Christianity; Christian slave-morality dug Rome's grave.

We obtain an unusually important picture of an element in present culture from Friedrich Wolters' Book *Stefan George und die Blätter für die Kunst: Deutsche Geistesgeschichte seit 1890*.²⁹ The importance of Stefan George and his great crowd of followers is not confined to their mastery of lyric and epic. Wolters shows that Stefan George is not merely a great poet but also a priest, determined to teach and improve his age and people. Indignant at the ill-omened developments of the last few decades, he proclaims the necessity of a new humanism. He and his companions are struggling devotedly to build a new humanity. They desire not merely to write poems and novels perfect in form, but also to lead men towards a new way of living, more noble in spirit and more elevated in moral tone. Their instrument is art; in it they claim to detect, or hope to create, the power to accomplish this high mission.

The influence of the Jesuits has made itself felt in almost every sphere of human activity throughout the last four centuries. Yet what false and inadequate judgments we are always passing on this order. It takes unusual ripeness of knowledge and calmness of mind to make an unprejudiced estimate of the personality and achievements of St. Ignatius Loyola and his followers; but

²⁹ Berlin, Georg Bondi.

we now have a book that most admirably enables us to reach a just and unhampered opinion, namely René Fülöp-Miller's *Macht und Geheimnis der Jesuiten: Kultur-historische Monographie*.³⁰ In no less than 576 pages the author gives an exemplary account of that mighty creation which has placed itself with passionate devotion and with military discipline at the service of the Catholic faith. It is a vivid and realistic picture, while at the same time the scholarship is thoroughly trustworthy. Fülöp-Miller takes us through the salons of Parisian society, up the Jesuit observatories, out to the wild country of South America, into the ceremonial halls of China. We go to the court of Ivan the Terrible and to that of the Polish Jagiellos. Everywhere we see that the brothers of the order played a decisive part. There is a specially interesting chapter on "The Ethics of the Jesuits", where the author discusses the meaning and value of the maxim that the end sanctifies the means. We become familiar with Jesuit psychology, ethics, theology, and metaphysics. We see the extreme cleverness that the order displays in dealing with the advances of modern science and in adapting itself to newly gained knowledge. In fine, we perceive how largely the Jesuits have shared in the growth and formation of our whole modern culture.

We may close this report by pointing to a German scholar whose work has been done in the United States, namely the late Kuno Francke, who was professor of the history of German culture at Harvard University. His *Deutsche Arbeit in Amerika: Erinnerungen* ³¹ is an interesting book. He was responsible for the founding of the Germanisches Museum at that university, and he tells us how this important work arose, what purposes lay behind it, and what influence it has had on scholarship and history. He mentions with grateful warmth the magnificent support that he received from his American colleagues and from many German-Americans. He also describes, with touching honesty, the painful estrangements brought about by the world-war. When the war was over he set himself once more to the

³⁰ Leipzig and Zürich, Grethlein u. Co.

³¹ Leipzig, Felix Meiner.

task of mending the broken relations. His lifework is an inspiring demonstration of the power of science and philosophy to reconcile peoples and bind them together, a power that every true scientist and every true philosopher must serve.

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CONTEMPORARY GERMAN PHILOSOPHY¹

IN recent years German philosophy has shown a steadily increasing tendency of opposition to the traditional idealism and of polemic against it. This may be described in general as the tendency toward realism, and it has now developed to the point of producing a kind of 'crisis of idealism'. In the line of this tendency are now to be found not only the most numerous but also perhaps the most important of the recent publications. Accordingly, it is the purpose of this review to examine substantially either those works which describe this tendency toward realism and try to make its purposes intelligible, or else those which contribute directly to it. The objection made against idealism—whether justly or unjustly we need not now inquire—is that it undervalues real life. Those who share the tendency toward realism accuse idealism of not keeping philosophy and its component disciplines in sufficiently close relation to the reality of nature or of history. Since reality in this usage is often identified with 'life', or 'reality for man', the realistic philosophy issues usually in a philosophy of life, as it is called, or a philosophical anthropology.

An exceedingly acute and penetrating account of this defect in idealism is to be found in the significant work of Eduard Spranger, *Der Kampf gegen den Idealismus*.² Spranger, the well-known philosopher and educationist in the University of Berlin, reviews the numerous attempts, made particularly by modern theologians, to show that German idealism is out of line with the development of Christianity and to interpret the whole idealist movement as a sort of labyrinth and a menace to the Christian religion. As the chief representatives of this polemic, with which Spranger does not at all agree, he chooses Helmuth Groos (*Der deutsche Idealismus und das Christentum*), Wilhelm Lütgert, Professor of Systematic Theology in the University of Berlin (*Die Religion des deutschen Idealismus und ihr Ende*), and Emil Brunner, an ex-

¹ Translated by George H. Sabine.

² Berlin, 1931, Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften, Walter de Gruyter and Company.

ponent of the so-called dialectical theology (*Die Grenzen der Humanität* and *Die Mystik und das Wort*). Spranger does not care to offer a complete vindication of idealism but merely presents a number of counterarguments against the criticisms of the theologians. He shows that no theology would be possible without some philosophy and conversely that idealism cannot be excluded from the development of religion or from Christianity, because religious and Christian factors have themselves been exceedingly influential in idealism and have contributed greatly to its systematic form. When the proponents of dialectical theology in particular (the "theology of the crisis" as it is often called) attack Fichte or Hegel, they should reflect, Spranger argues, that their theology is merely an outgrowth of idealism and is defectively intelligible without it. This theology takes sides against idealism and for 'existentialism', in other words, for a philosophy which makes being its starting-point. But in the idealists there are already highly significant elements of existentialism, as Spranger convincingly urges.

It is true that the tendency toward realism and existentialism evokes a great variety of doubts and scruples. Nevertheless, it is necessary to understand the motives and purposes of the movement and to familiarize oneself with this notable 'philosophy of life'.

I

Undoubtedly a tendency toward realism is implicit in the nature of philosophy in so far as the latter aims to influence life and to contribute to the instruction of mankind. To this end August Messer devotes himself with energy and purpose, as is clearly shown by his new book *Lebensphilosophie*.³ Messer stresses that intimate relation of philosophy to life which is so often misunderstood. He brings to light the springs from which a really personal *Weltanschauung* is nourished and sets forth the spiritual needs which lead even the plain man to concern himself with the riddles of the universe. How close to life are Messer's purposes and results—by profession he is professor of philosophy at Giessen—is shown by the large number of letters which he prints and in which quite simple folk have asked his counsel in their religious,

³ Leipzig, Verlag Felix Meiner.

moral, political, and philosophic difficulties. He stands not for a primitive realism but for a realism grounded in idealism and ethics, which gives him a practical opportunity to follow the promptings of his profound sense of responsibility toward the people, and to act as a guide and true philosopher of life for many persons. Another book by Messer also is designed to realize this obligation which he feels so strongly, "to bring philosophy into touch with life and its problems", the volume entitled *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Deutschland*.⁴ The exposition is characterized by naturalness and intimacy with reality, and Messer always takes pains to show both that, and how, the thinkers discussed have rooted their philosophies in the difficulties of life. His realistic disposition appears also in the obvious arrangement of his material. He divides present-day philosophical productions into those, first, which are controlled by ecclesiastical authority or at least by religious faith; second, those which move in the medium of independent, purely scientific thought; and third, those which seek to solve the riddles of life by feeling and intuitive experience. His exposition is an all-inclusive reflection of the movements of the day and for this reason it deals with such out-of-the-way phenomena as theosophy and Christian Science.

Albert Schweitzer has now become a 'philosopher of life' in the fullest and most extreme sense of the term. In his book, *Aus meinem Leben und Denken*,⁵ he gives a simple and impressive account of his theological, musical, and philosophical studies. The focus of his theological studies is his fruitful investigations of the history of research upon the life of Jesus; that of his philosophical work is his books upon Kant and ethics. We learn the reasons that led him to become a physician in the primeval forests of equatorial Africa. His resolution to bring medical aid to negroes stricken with terrible diseases and his philosophical work were both alike the outcome of humanitarianism and devotion to mankind. His philosophy of civilization, which has made a great sensation in Germany, is not merely a learned scientific investigation but is first and foremost a labor of love and service for human life. It undertakes a critique of civilization solely because it aims to make

⁴ Leipzig, Verlag von Quelle und Meyer. Sammlung Wissenschaft und Bildung.

⁵ Leipzig, Verlag Felix Meiner.

this the starting-point for a contribution to the moral perfection of the race. The fundamental principle of this philosophy of civilization consists in an ethical affirmation of the world and of life. Its strength lies less in the sharpness of its scientific analysis or its strictly systematic development than in the ardent force of its noble-mindedness, expressing itself as "reverence for life". It is from this metaphysical emotion, according to Schweitzer, that philosophy must arise, unless it is to be a clog upon civilization. Accordingly he is averse to all forms of rationalism and exemplifies a tendency toward ethical mysticism. This mode of thought leads him to approximate a philosophy of life or of reality. As he conceives the matter, philosophy has grown out of a genuine community of life and experience, and therefore it must and ought to have an influence upon life.

As Schweitzer's philosophy depends upon a cheerful faith in life and a vigorous optimism, so Oswald Spengler's is informed throughout by a harsh and rigorous pessimism. Spengler is the well-known author of *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, which appeared a few years ago and which made an unprecedented sensation in Germany. This result depended to some extent upon the fact that the work coincided with a dreary mood of pessimism which prevailed in many circles after the close of the War. Such persons saw in Spengler's conclusions the philosophical and historical confirmation of their circumstances and their feelings. He has now published a sort of continuation of the argument in his main work entitled *Der Mensch und die Technik: Beitrag zu einer Philosophie des Lebens*.⁶ He attacks idealism in a most violent fashion which is very far removed from measured understanding or temperate judgment. He condemns it as a dangerous delusion and as a deceptive misrepresentation of realities, while at the same time he lauds his own realism for its adherence to fact. Ideals he describes as acts of cowardice—"Man is a beast of prey", as he says over and over again in phrases long familiar from Nietzsche and the biological philosophers. He tells us that men have created technology and machinery merely to satisfy their rapacity, but these very creations are destined to bring about the cultural downfall of mankind. For the so-called 'evolution of civilization is for

⁶ München, Verlag C. H. Beck.

Spengler nothing except the plunge from one catastrophe into another, from one overthrow to the next. Like a thousand other writers he tells us that the world has fallen into a frightful mechanization, but that brutal egoism and the carrying out of this brutality through technology are the only possible means of furthering life. Moral education is the faith merely of the cloistered idealists; mankind must travel the rough road to its inevitable destiny. There is no contesting the truth of these apocalyptic and eschatological prophecies; they are simply dogmas. The exaggerations, and particularly the injustice to idealism, are too manifest to need refuting. Spengler's philosophy of history is quite lacking in objectivity, but its principal weakness undoubtedly lies in the fact that it makes impossible the proof, or even the assumption, of any really philosophical ethics. Prophecy is cheap, but whether it has any place in philosophy or science is an open question. As a matter of fact, is this realism as plain and as close to life as it claims to be? Or does it not misrepresent critical phases of reality in a wholly exaggerated fashion? Where does it make room for that impartial criticism of man's moral will and of the acceptance of moral values upon which in fact our civilization depends?

II

Realism and the philosophy of life in the most characteristic sense of the words is a tendency which sees in life not merely the source of all philosophical reflection but also the creative force which permeates all being. In particular life is the source of all human existence, producing man's nature and his modes of action. For this reason there has developed in Germany, side by side with the realistic philosophy of life, an anthropological science of human character. Its real founder is Julius Bahnsen, whose work was done several decades ago but is now receiving for the first time a certain recognition. His most important works are being republished in new editions; upon him depends in part the characterology of Ludwig Klages which is now attracting considerable attention in Germany. Of Bahnsen's works there have now appeared the following in new editions: *Wie ich wurde, was ich ward*; *Das Tragische als Weltgesetz und der Humor als ästhetische Gestalt des Metaphysischen*; and *Mosaiken und Silhouetten*.⁷

⁷ All at Leipzig, Verlag Johann Ambrosius Barth.

Julius Bahnsen (1830–1881), in common with Schopenhauer, stands for the view that the misery of an eternally irrational and cupidinous will is the controlling force in nature. Hence result the inappeasability and the dreadful torment which are the fate of every phenomenon. In common with Schopenhauer, whom he honored as his master, Bahnsen held the conviction that all being is burdened with an irredeemable curse. Upon this “dialectic” all doctrines of reconciliation and all optimism suffer shipwreck. Accordingly, he subjects human nature to an extraordinarily penetrating examination and describes in a succession of revealing sketches the “characters” of men—their humors, their temperaments, and other main types of their mental behavior. For a long time this work was overlooked, until it was introduced to a wider public by the characterology of Ludwig Klages.

The characterology which is now developing in Germany aims to free itself from the old idealistic bias and to understand man as he really is. Hans Prinzhorn's valuable *Charakterkunde der Gegenwart*⁸ is a review of this very promising kind of research into human personality. The origin of this sort of characterology is very closely related to the fact that scientific interest has now turned toward human nature as a whole, whereas the older psychology was concerned only with details and with particular traits of human nature and never referred to ‘personality’. It is typical of this characterology, moreover, to start from ‘life’, understanding that term not to mean a metaphysical potentiality but merely a primitive biological force implicit in all human behavior and valuation. Life as a primitive force is embodied in character, in the temperaments and in the actions of men, and Prinzhorn cautiously draws the conclusions of such a characterology. Naturally he draws into the circle of his investigation also the psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud, not however without severe criticism, since he objects that psychoanalysis “rationalizes” the unconscious and therefore gives a false representation of it.

The activity of psychoanalysis has not ceased. Its scope has been extended, however, to include a study of the importance of the impulses in history and in group-life, with the result that it now aims to be a psychoanalysis of society as well as of the in-

⁸ Berlin, Verlag von Junker und Dünnhaupt.

dividual. Several of Freud's publications show a movement in this direction. We may mention first *Die Zukunft einer Illusion*.⁹ Two questions require an answer: Whence come religious ideas, and what is their special value? In a rather superficial and hasty fashion religious ideas are assumed to be merely illusions, without any distinction being made between the beliefs of primitive savages and such doctrines of salvation as those of Buddhism or Christianity. For Freud an illusion becomes a belief if wish-fulfillment takes a prominent part in its motivation. Religious ideas have "arisen out of the same need as all the other achievements of civilization, from the necessity of self-protection against the overmastering power of nature. To this was added a second motive, the pressure to correct painful imperfections in civilization." But religious ideas not only aid and advance man; they also injure him and repress him psychically. Thus it is precisely through these ideas that neuroses occur. At this point the medical problem of psychoanalysis begins; it aims to contribute to the end "that mankind shall subdue this neurotic phase". It believes that, by a scientific explanation of the origin and influence of religious ideas, it can penetrate to the human spirit. Obviously, we have here a thoroughly crude and naturalistic psychology of religion which does not go beyond the views and the expectations raised by Ludwig Feuerbach. Freud asserts that certain phenomena of civilization are merely pathological without any critical inquiry into the correctness of such an assertion.

These views are carried still further in a second work by Freud, *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*.¹⁰ Our whole civilization, according to his theory, is built upon a powerful repression of men's natural impulses. These are directed toward fulfilling our desire for happiness. But the fixed forms of civilization inhibit a natural satisfaction of our desires and fulfillment of our impulses. As a substitute, civilization offers men especially security and order, but the substitute fails to make them happy, and consequently civilization excites in us a profound unrest (*Unbehagen*) which ultimately leads to neurosis. The origin and maintenance of the civilized community induce a pathological frame of mind, and finally a dangerous and morbid satisfaction of those impulses—

⁹ Leipzig, Wien, Zürich, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag.

¹⁰ Leipzig, Wien, Zürich, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag.

mainly sexual—which we cannot satisfy naturally. It is interesting to see how frequently and how regularly such naturalistic interpretations of civilization make their appearance. They are less notable scientifically—for their inadequacy is manifest—than as the symptom of a common state of mind which may be observed in wide circles of the population. Beyond question there prevails in many quarters in Germany a profound spiritual and moral dissatisfaction, and psychoanalysis comes forward with an attempt to explain this. Because it expresses a common mood, the weakness of its presumptions and the exaggeration of its criticism are overlooked.

A far more comprehensive and less one-sided treatment of this sort of psychological phenomena is to be found in the work of Max Dessoir, the well-known psychologist and æstheticist in the University of Berlin. His book, *Vom Jenseits der Seele*,¹¹ has recently reappeared in a new edition, a fine tribute to the favor which his illuminating studies have met. The nature, purpose, and influence of this significant work may perhaps be best indicated by comparing it to a thunderstorm which clears the air. The prevailing psychology of despair has produced many strange phenomena in Germany, phenomena which find scientific expression in the so-called occult sciences. It is scarcely possible to go into society here without becoming involved in a conversation about clairvoyance and telepathy, mediumship and spiritism. Dessoir investigates such phenomena and the claims made for them with exemplary objectivity, nor does he content himself merely with description but attempts also theoretical explanations, such as a theory of hypnosis, telepathy, etc. For this purpose he has a rich experience at his command: he has worked with many mediums; he has taken part in many spiritualist seances; he knows the tricks and dodges used by the operators and their assistants. He concludes that, in the majority of cases, there is either conscious or unconscious deception and imposture and frequently either open or concealed autosuggestion. In many cases, however, an objective test is not feasible, for the reports are often fragmentary and unclear and the methods of experiment are such that exact control is impossible. His work shows a healthy sense of reality

¹¹ Stuttgart, Verlag Ferdinand Enke.

and he attacks all phenomena of this sort with critical judgment. His book also belongs among the contemporary studies of personality, in so far as it offers a clear picture of a whole class of persons who exist in Germany and exert no slight influence upon the times.

Another type of impartial psychology which is committed to no prejudgments is found in the books of the French thinker, Henri Bergson, who enjoys a high esteem in Germany and whose philosophy is sufficiently naturalized here to be included in this review. I refer to his book, *Die seelische Energie: Aufsätze und Vorträge*.¹² This fine collection shows all the characteristics of Bergson's thought. It is true that he is an exponent of intuition and frequently the critic of rationalism, but his intuitionism and irrationalism are in a quite different class from those of the real intuitionists and irrationalists. In him everything is crystal-clear, and though he rejects the methods of exact natural science in the investigation of mental phenomena, his studies are nevertheless remarkable for their perfect clarity. We might almost speak of rational intuition. Though he frequently emphasizes the activity and the vital force which inform all phenomena, he develops these conceptions in a thoroughly systematic and orderly fashion. His psychic research never loses itself in obscurities, but neither does it penetrate to the ultimate profundities. By means of an intuition thus informed by reason he investigates a whole series of psychic phenomena, such as dreams, memory, mental energy, the relation of body to mind and of brain to consciousness. His polemic against idealism is less happy; at least it is not so pertinent as his polemic against a psychology modeled upon the natural sciences. Nevertheless he belongs among the foremost representatives of realistic psychology, of which we had esteemed exponents in Germany even before him, such, for example, as Friedrich Nietzsche and Wilhelm Dilthey.

III

We shall now consider a series of publications which form, so to speak, an application of this realistic psychology of character to a specific subject-matter, viz., to the field of economics. We

¹² Jena, Verlag von Eugen Diederichs.

may mention first the very clever and suggestive work of Franz Eulenberg, enlarged from an address which he delivered as Rector Magnificus of the Handels-Hochschule in Berlin. This work is entitled *Phantasie und Wille des wirtschaftenden Menschen*.¹³ The author advances a variety of illuminating reflections to combat the thesis that the present-day is espoused wholly to the understanding and is pledged to mechanization and rationalization. Imagination and will have their place in contemporary philosophy and signify important creative forces for our present-day scheme of life. He justifies this contention by a graphic description of four chief forms of economic life, the farmer, the mechanic, the merchant, and the industrial *entrepreneur*. He shows that the existence and progress of economic arrangements require not only intelligence but also capacity for imagination and strength of will, and he concludes by showing that even the most highly rationalized economic system, and a planned economy apparently altogether mechanized, will still require the coöperation of emotional forces.

The severe strain to which the existing economic order has been subjected has directed attention anew to the presuppositions of our economic life, sometimes from a philosophical and sometimes from an historical or sociological point of view. Both standpoints are united in an excellent book by Arthur Salz, professor at Heidelberg, called *Macht und Wirtschaft: Ein Beitrag zur Erkenntnis des Wesens der kapitalistischen Wirtschaftsverfassung*.¹⁴ Max Weber stands sponsor for this book, and following the brilliant example set by him, the author exhibits the irrational foundations of a capitalist economic and social system. He discusses the difficulties in the relation between the state and the economic order and goes deeply into the problems that arise from this relation. He examines the philosophical presumptions of capitalism and the discrepancies of a sociological and economic kind in which it issues. Especially noteworthy are the concluding remarks on the relation between economic forces and other cultural values. Salz weighs the possibility of "ennobling" the economic, that is, of reconciling the egoism of commerce with the ethical genius in civilization.

¹³ Tübingen, Verlag J. C. B. Mohr.

¹⁴ Leipzig, Verlag B. G. Teubner.

Certainly the most impressive example of characterology as applied to the economic order and to the whole science of economic life is the valuable work of Werner Sombart, professor in the University of Berlin. Sombart already possesses a great reputation, even in the United States. The book referred to is entitled *Die drei Nationalökonomien: Geschichte und System der Lehre von der Wirtschaft*.¹⁵ A lively controversy is now going on in Germany about the principles of economics, about its procedures, its methods, and its nature and value as a science; we need not go into the reasons for this disagreement here. Sombart is chagrined because opinion is so hazy about the principles of his subject, and his book is designed to do away with this confusion. He classifies the superfluity of economic theories and systems into three main types, which he calls respectively the normative or metaphysical, the systematic or naturalistic, and the interpretative or social. The first two types he rejects with a number of suggestive comments; the principal part of his book falls in its third section, which presents the interpretative economics and supplies the proof that the subject belongs neither to ethics nor to natural science but to the social sciences. The kind of knowledge which economics provides is for the most part interpretation (*Verstehen*), and Sombart points out the service rendered by Dilthey and his school in representing the creation and application of specific forms and types of interpretation as the distinguishing feature of the social sciences. The book has one weakness: it does not provide in the concrete and in detail the specific types of interpretation required for a knowledge of economic arrangements. It is an excellent discussion of the principles of economic science but it lacks the application and elaboration of them in detail.

I may refer here to a book which makes a fruitful use of sociological character-study in the explanation of a particular social phenomenon, viz., the Platonic Academy. This is the work of Paul Ludwig Landsberg, privatdozent at Bonn, *Wesen und Bedeutung der Platonischen Akademie: Eine erkenntnissoziologische Untersuchung*.¹⁶ Landsberg shows that Plato stood in a very

¹⁵ München, Verlag von Dunker and Humblot.

¹⁶ Bonn, Verlag von Friedrich Cohen.

close relation to his native city and consequently to a particular cultural community. He is a lawgiver for Athens, and his legislation is developed under the influence of his aristocratic parentage and as an outgrowth of his personal membership in the puritanical, Doric-conservative sect of the Pythagoreans. He created the Socratic myth for the purpose of founding his Academy and of providing the ideal basis for the educational movement arising from it. The distinguishing feature of the Platonic community, according to Landsberg, is not a coöperative effort at scientific research or philosophical speculation, but the desire to contribute to man's religious well-being and his salvation. Accordingly, he affiliates Plato's Academy to the Greek mystery-cults which had preserved their vitality as part of the popular religion. Plato's philosophy undoubtedly stands in intimate relation with social life; it is by no means a pure theory existing, so to speak, in an exclusively intellectual realm without historical connections. Emphasis upon this relationship of Plato to the life of his time gives vitality to our picture of the Platonic philosophy and shows that it, like all forms of idealism, has characteristically a realistic bent.

IV

It might be supposed that the tendency toward realism would have, or might have had, as its consequence, a preference for Aristotle over Plato. Such an expectation, however, would not be in accord with the facts. So far as activity with Greek philosophy is concerned, that dealing with Plato far exceeds that which has to do with Aristotle. In connection with this there goes naturally the interest in Plato's teacher, Socrates. An attractive and instructive presentation of this revolutionary figure in the history of philosophy is given by Constantin Ritter, professor at Tübingen, in his book entitled, *Sokrates*.¹⁷ This work is the product of a brilliant mastery of material, and what constitutes its chief interest and its chief scholarly value is its encyclopædic assemblage and use of all the sources upon which our knowledge of the noteworthy figure of Socrates in any way depends. Possibly the book might impart somewhat more vividness to the figure of Socrates, but in any case this is a task which belongs more to

¹⁷ Tübingen, Verlag von Laupp.

the poet than to the historian of philosophy. I am thinking of the sublimity of the picture which August Strindberg draws of the character and fate of Socrates in his story, *Der Halbkreis von Athen*.¹⁸ Among philosophers none has understood the world-historic significance embodied in the character and mission of Socrates better or more profoundly than Plato, whose philosophy would be impossible apart from his association with Socrates.

Plato's philosophy continues to exert its influence in the present with undiminished vigor. Its main features have been presented in a comprehensive survey by Constantin Ritter in *Die Kerngedanken der Platonischen Philosophie*.¹⁹ This is an abridgment of the points developed a few years ago in the author's exhaustive two-volume work on *Plato, sein Leben, seine Schriften, seine Lehre*.²⁰ Ritter presents all the essential points and articles of Plato's philosophy both accurately and skillfully. The exposition covers Plato's theory of knowledge and ontology, his logic, his ethics and politics, his æsthetics and his theology; it provides an admirable text-book and offers a reliable, though not a novel, picture of Plato drawn upon the principles of a rigorous philological method. Ritter's method belongs to the older type of philology and diverges characteristically from the newer forms of Platonic interpretation, as these are represented, for example, by Julius Stenzel and Paul Friedländer on the one hand and by the group centering about Stefan George on the other. The figure of Plato in its totality is a continued stimulus to exploration, and similarly particular dialogues continually solicit new commentary. A high type of unexceptionable scholarship, fruitful and long-continued industry, and penetrating interpretation, is exemplified by the work of the Dutch scholar (published in German) B. J. H. Ovink, Professor of philosophy at Utrecht, *Philosophische Erklärung der Platonischen Dialoge Meno und Hippias Minor*.²¹ The problems with whose treatment in these dialogues an interpreter must grapple are at once ancient and modern; that is to say, they are eternal. Ovink has succeeded in clearing up the general course of the argument and in elucidating the meaning of the

¹⁸ In his *Historische Miniaturen*.

¹⁹ München, Verlag von Ernst Reinhardt.

²⁰ München, Verlag C. H. Beck.

²¹ Amsterdam, Verlag H. J. Paris.

dialogues, and by his commentary, which takes up the major part of his space, he has clarified and explained the problems peculiar to the dialogues treated. He makes his readers active collaborators in these discussions, the content of which has lost nothing of its actual validity.

V

How strongly the current sets toward realism is evident from a significant document recently published by the Berlin philosopher Nicolai Hartmann under the title, *Zum Problem der Realitätsgegebenheit*. This book is the outcome of an important address which Hartmann delivered before the general meeting of the Kant-Gesellschaft on May 28, 1931. The address was then enlarged and issued with twenty-three contributions by those who took part in the discussion before the Kant-Gesellschaft.²² Hartmann argues that, from the standpoint of idealism, there can be no convincing proof of reality. Reference to the object and to reality is "imbedded in a multitude of other primary relationships" which wholly transcend the typical act of knowledge. Primary data do not lie in the field of knowledge. This field, within which reality is given and presented, is controlled by a series of "emotional acts", and Hartmann's chief problem is therefore to investigate and define the nature and power of these emotional acts by which we are assured of reality. Even though all data are presented in the form of phenomena, we have to recognize that phenomena refer to something beyond themselves, that is, to something which is not a phenomenon. Accordingly, Hartmann speaks emphatically of a transcendence of phenomena and in such transcendence he finds the basis for the new realism and for the tendency toward ontology. This transcendence forces itself upon us because, and in so far as, we experience persons and things outside and beyond ourselves which affect us, from which we "suffer", which determine us and influence our wills, and in accordance with which we must regulate our conduct. Every man, moreover, stands in a specific situation which he has not himself produced and with which he has to reckon and come to terms. All these influences are immediate and vital in their nature and involve a reference to

²² *Philosophische Vorträge*, No. 32, published by the Kant-Gesellschaft, Berlin, Pan-Verlagsgesellschaft.

reality which is beyond the theoretical. The very active and valuable discussion of Hartmann's address, under the direction of the author of the present article, was shared by a large number of well-known philosophers, both from Germany and other countries, since the attendance at this session of the Kant-Gesellschaft was unusually large.

The tendency in the direction of realism and ontology will doubtless have a strong and a favorable influence upon the general movement toward metaphysics which has been going on in Germany for the last twenty years. Indeed, what would become of philosophy, if it should give up trying to satisfy the urge to metaphysics? An example of the impulse, controlled by rigorous criticism, to venture into the mysterious and alluring land of metaphysics is to be found in a book by Robert Reininger, professor at the University of Vienna, *Metaphysik der Wirklichkeit*.²³ For Reininger metaphysics means a theory of the ultimate and most general principles which are common to all fields. He distinguishes three such fields, that of being, of knowledge, and of value. At the same time he insists that the universality of its problem must not betray metaphysics into an empty conceptual formalism. Philosophy always has its eyes fixed upon the absolutely complete and universal, but it must nevertheless observe the relationship to 'reality'. This reality is given immediately to the philosopher in the experience of the self. Of this he must always be mindful and must make it clear that every sensuous phenomenon, and every intellectual or moral or æsthetic fact, obtains its reality only from its bearing upon the thinking and knowing ego. In particular, the philosopher's relation to this nodal point of the world is different from the psychologist's. In the flux of experience the philosopher is capable of becoming aware of the eternal *now* and of the eternal conformity to law which are manifested in the creative labor of the metaphysical ego. It is this capacity which makes him "a metaphysical man", and this sense for the eternal amid the temporal is the true metaphysical experience. Reininger's work gives a profound and genuinely philosophical interpretation of this "step out of time into eternity", and is therefore itself a real bit of metaphysics.

²³ Wien und Leipzig, Wilhelm Braumüller, Universitäts-Verlagsbuchhandlung.

He does not neglect, however, to develop a critique of those forms of thought by which the human spirit achieves the metaphysical conquest of reality. These forms of thought and the realm in which they belong we are accustomed to describe as the forms and the realm of truth. Very properly, therefore, at the center of this metaphysics there stands a pivotal chapter investigating "The Realm of Truth".

The tendency toward realism frequently manifests itself in Germany as a tendency toward a philosophy of life. For life is taken to signify the essence of all that can possess the true value of reality. But how is this realist philosophy of life related to an idealist philosophy of reason? For in philosophy it is hardly possible to deny idealism altogether or to leave it out of account. The connecting link between these two types of philosophy is the express nature of dialectic, which, when developed as a dialectical philosophy, attempts the mediation of both types and their synthesis in a third and higher type. My own books, if I may mention them here, have this end in view, both the volume on *Geist und Welt der Dialektik*²⁴ and my recently published *Erkenntnistheorie*.²⁵ Especially in the concluding chapter of the latter I have developed the possibility and the propriety of a dialectical theory of truth and a dialectical metaphysics and philosophy. Such a position may be called either an "idealist-realist dialecticism" or a "dialectical ideal-realism". Very close to such a dialectical philosophy stands the welcome work of Kurt Leese, privatdozent in philosophy in the University of Hamburg, *Die Krisis und Wende der christlichen Geistes: Studien zum anthropologischen und theologischen Problem der Lebensphilosophie*.²⁶ Ludwig Klages, to whom we referred above, the well-known metaphysician and exponent of characterology, has described this contrast between two types of philosophy as an opposition between the "logocentric" and the "biocentric". Leese canvasses this contrast and tries to get beyond it by means of dialectic. It is true that he tends to put the stronger emphasis upon the philosophy of life, eulogizing such representatives of this movement as Max Scheler, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Ludwig Klages. He opposes what he calls the

²⁴ Berlin, Pan-Verlag.

²⁵ Berlin, Verlag E. S. Mittler und Sohn; 2 vols.

²⁶ Berlin, Verlag von Junker und Dünnhaupt.

monism of rationalism and biologism and points to a dialectical union of life and spirit. The title of his book is to be explained by the fact that he sees, or fears, hopeless ruin for Christianity because it has delivered itself over one-sidedly and dogmatically to an idealism, spiritualism, and logicism alien to life and reality. Christianity is threatened with downfall unless in its philosophy and metaphysics it finds a point of contact with the creative forces of life. Leese's work is valuable also for its thorough treatment of a whole series of philosophers belonging to the irrationalist and biocentric tendency, such as Jakob Böhme, Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702-1782), Johann Georg Hamann, Ernst Moritz Arndt (1769-1860), Carl Gustav Carus (1789-1869), Joseph Görres (1776-1848), Johann Jakob Bachofen (1815-1887), as well as Nietzsche, Bergson, Simmel, Scheler, Klages, and others.

In recent times the dialectic philosophy has spread so rapidly and has gathered so many adherents that a monograph devoted to it has become possible. This is the acute and judicious work of Siegfried Marck, professor of philosophy at Breslau, entitled *Die Dialektik in der Philosophie der Gegenwart*.²⁷ Marck treats first the critical opponents of dialectic, especially Heinrich Rickert and Emil Lask, but his results show that even these thinkers show strong dialectical tendencies. The current in the direction of dialectic from Hegel on is especially evident from the system of Richard Kroner, whose two-volume book *Von Kant zu Hegel*, as well as the large work on *Selbstverwirklichung des Geistes, Prolegomena zur Kulturphilosophie*,²⁸ is reviewed. Among the representatives of "existential dialectic" we meet especially Martin Heidegger, as well as Kierkegaard, Barth, Tillich, and Grisebach. Marck distinguishes two forms of dialectic, as I did in my *Dialektik*: critical and speculative dialectic and epistemological and metaphysico-ontological dialectic. As representatives of critical dialectic he describes, among others, Jonas Cohn, Richard Höningwald, and Bruno Bauch; as representatives of an ontological and realistic view of dialectic he describes Heidegger again and also Ernst Troeltsch and the Catholic thinkers, Erich Przywara and Peter Wust. As representatives of a twofold view of dialectic—one uniting both a methodological and an ontological meaning

²⁷ Tübingen, Verlag J. C. B. Mohr.

²⁸ Both at Tübingen, Verlag J. C. B. Mohr.

of metaphysics—he describes Georg Simmel, Paul Natorp, Arthur Liebert, and Nicolai Hartmann.

Naturally the whole of our present-day metaphysics is not dialectical. We have other forms of metaphysics, though these have fallen somewhat into the background, which are contrasted with dialectical metaphysics in respect to a certain one-sidedness. To these most divergent forms of present-day metaphysics the professor of philosophy at Halle, Paul Menzer, has devoted an instructive monograph, *Deutsche Metaphysik der Gegenwart*.²⁹ He treats those forms of metaphysics which arise out of a relation to biology (especially Hans Driesch), and follows this up with a discussion of the combination of metaphysics and psychology in Wilhelm Stern's personalism. According to him Nicolai Hartmann and Arthur Liebert are less concerned with the construction of metaphysics than with its critical foundations, while the metaphysics of Max Scheler and Martin Heidegger, like that of Paul Tillich, aims to provide not merely a critical foundation but also a complete and fully elaborated philosophy of existence.

What direction progress will take on the whole cannot of course be precisely foretold. At the same time, the tendency toward ontology, toward existentialism and realism, can run its course successfully only if idealism is taken up into its development. This remark applies to idealism in two aspects, first, as an epistemological foundation for metaphysics which, without such a foundation, would become merely a dogmatism of the pre-Kantian sort; and second, as speculative idealism devoted to exhibiting and confirming the undeniable share that mind has in the structure of reality. Thus we must achieve a synthesis of idealism and realism, and I at least must believe that this synthesis will take the form of dialectic and will lead to a dialectical philosophy. For in a dialectic of this sort the idealist and the realist modes of thought, and the idealist and the realist aspects of reality, will receive their just dues.

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²⁹ Berlin, Verlag von E. S. Mittler und Sohn.

CONTEMPORARY GERMAN PHILOSOPHY*

OUR review of contemporary German philosophy will be arranged this year to present a larger selection of books dealing with the history of philosophy, including the general history of civilization and culture. Among books of this sort may be counted also an important work dealing historically with theories of historical explanation and historiography (hermeneutics).

It has been the custom recently to complain of a decline in historical interest and investigation. This complaint has been only partially justified. In the first place, when historicism was at its height, historical studies, both in philosophy and in other branches of cultural study, encroached altogether too much upon systematic and critical studies. For this reason the importance and the regard attached to purely philosophical and non-historical contributions were underestimated, and no small effort was required to restore metaphysical investigation to the place which it undoubtedly deserves and to repress historicism, which pretended to be the only proper method. It was toward such an effort that the splendid investigations of Ernst Troeltsch moved, who was lost all too soon to philosophy and the history of culture. He died in 1924. In his extensive work, *Der Historismus und seine Probleme*,¹ he made a contribution, equally important both for its inclusiveness and its profundity, to the origin of modern historical studies, and later in his suggestive little book, *Der Historismus und seine Überwindung*,² he tried to point out those possibilities and characteristics of historicism which, he was convinced, must be extirpated, because of the dangerous relativism that is its inevitable result. For Troeltsch very well knew that historicism—the scientific theory which seeks to explain and justify all phenomena only according to their empirical and causal development—necessarily leads not merely to a catastrophe for metaphysical thought but also to the destruction of any definite view of life and to absolute

* Translated from the German by George H. Sabine.

¹ Tübingen, Verlag J. C. B. Mohr.

² Berlin, Pan-Verlagsgesellschaft G. m. b. H.

anarchy with respect to values. He conceived it as a principal part of his life-work to transcend this "anarchy of values" (to use a phrase coined by Wilhelm Dilthey and adopted by Troeltsch) by creating an absolute metaphysics of history and a philosophy of religion. But it was the tragedy of his life and work, and that of his whole generation as well, that he could never achieve such a transcendence, precisely because the presumptions by which he sought to accomplish this great and necessary labor were altogether too relativist in their nature. The complaint over the decline of historical studies, referred to above, was robbed of much of its justification, then, because historicism had attained an exaggerated importance that began to react injuriously upon philosophy itself.

The complaint proved to be exaggerated also because, as a matter of fact, historical interest and historical studies never declined to a point where they can be said to have vanished. So far as the field of philosophy is concerned, it is sufficient to mention the classic contributions of Wilhelm Dilthey and Wilhelm Windelband. These men are so generally known that it would be superfluous to specify here their works in the history of philosophy. In any case reference will be made below at length to a recently published work from Dilthey's posthumous papers.

Finally, that historical interest and historical study have not vanished is proved by a closely allied scientific and philosophical field of work. I refer to hermeneutics, the theory of historical explanation. For by "explanation" we mean in this connection the possibility and the method of historical knowledge. The importance of this subject had already been stressed by the German Romanticists with Schleiermacher at their head. For since the Romanticists were especially interested in all phases of historical life, they raised the question how a knowledge of this historical life is to be attained. In the second place, it was especially Wilhelm Dilthey who, in connection with his own magnificent historical studies, went back to the problem of the forms, the categories, and the limitation, of historical explanation and devoted to this question a series of excellent studies both historical and logical. Of these we can mention here only the following. (*a*) Historical works: "*Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert und die geschichtliche Welt*",

"Archive der Literatur in ihrer Bedeutung für die Geschichte der Philosophie", "Das natürliche System der Geisteswissenschaften im 17. Jahrhundert"; (b) Systematic works: "Die geistige Welt, Einleitung in die Philosophie des Lebens", "Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften".³ These outstanding contributions to the history and theory of hermeneutics serve not only to clarify the problem of explanation but also to further significantly historical study itself, by stating for it certain aids and certain psychological and logically valid presumptions.

Dilthey's labors on behalf of hermeneutics have now been taken up in a thoroughgoing fashion and carried further in the three-volume work of Joachim Wach, *Das Verstehen*,⁴ which carries the subtitle, "Grundzüge einer Geschichte der hermeneutischen Theorien im 19. Jahrhundert". The third volume of Wach's work (he is Professor in the University of Leipzig) is with good reason dedicated to Wilhelm Dilthey. Since our review is to be devoted to important historical works in the field of philosophy, it is fitting to refer to the work of Joachim Wach, since it presents a history of the efforts made by scholars having historical interests and active in historical research to establish and clarify the principles of such research. The importance of the work justifies a fuller discussion of it here.

Hermeneutics is a very old subject. Intelligent beginnings are to be found in the earliest theological writings, because a concern with the problem of God soon leads to questions about the way to a correct and convincing use of relevant texts. Hermeneutics owes a very essential advance also to Greek philosophy, which was obliged, both on the side of theology and metaphysics and also on the side of grammar and rhetoric, to seek for clearness in respect to the forms of correct interpretation. A further significant stage in the history of hermeneutics is found in the studies of the humanists of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, among whom should be mentioned first Italian humanists like Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico. Joachim Wach limits his exposition to the nineteenth century. The first volume deals with the

* All are to be found in Dilthey's collected works, Berlin and Leipzig, Verlag B. G. Teubner.

⁴ Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr.

"Great Systems", especially the pioneering contributions of Schleiermacher, Boeckh, and Wilhelm von Humboldt. The second volume deals with "Theological Hermeneutics from Schleiermacher to Johann Chr. K. Hofmann", and therefore covers the period from about 1830 to 1880. The third volume discusses theories of "Interpretation in History from Ranke to Positivism", and treats therefore of about the same period. Joachim Wach has produced a work which someone had to write. It is true that impulsion to the task was provided by the psychology of the cultural sciences created especially by Dilthey. This important tendency in psychology has directed attention emphatically toward historical explanation as a highly important scientific tool for studies in the history and theory of civilization and has frequently made it an object of investigation. This is shown by the valuable works of Eduard Spranger, which are held in the highest estimation in Germany. Of these I can mention here only two: *Lebensformen: geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie und Ethik der Persönlichkeit*⁵ and *Psychologie des Jugendalters*.⁶ These works are certainly known and valued also in the United States.

Joachim Wach has so arranged his three-volume work that in a sense it contains large chapters of a general history of culture in the nineteenth century. He starts from questions forced upon him in his earlier works, in his *Typen religiöser Anthropologie, ein Vergleich der Lehre vom Menschen im religionsphilosophischen Denken von Orient und Okzident; Die Typenlehre Trendelenburgs und ihr Einfluss auf Dilthey: Eine philosophische und geistesgeschichtliche Studie*; and *Einführung in die Religionssoziologie*.⁷ The examination of the difficult problem of hermeneutics probably starts from the attempt, subjectively and sociologically so important, to interpret divine existence and the commandments of God and religion. For this reason Wach has happily been concerned to review the efforts made by the theologians, as well as those made by the historians, to master their problems. With extraordinary industry and with great success, he has collected from the theologians principles of historical explana-

⁵ Halle a. d. Saale, Verlag von Max Niemeyer.

⁶ Leipzig, Verlag von Quelle und Meyer.

⁷ All published in Tübingen by J. C. B. Mohr.

tion which had passed almost unnoted or had been consigned to a too early and unmerited oblivion, but he gives adequate treatment also to the philologists, archeologists, historians, ethnologists, and social psychologists. For obvious reasons the greater share of his space is devoted to theories of historical interpretation advanced by the historians. The great historians, such as Ranke and Droysen, are treated at length, as is reasonable and proper—but on this point we need not go into details. In brief we have only the following to say: Wach's book throws much light upon the history of the scientific conception of historical research, its eternal and unwearied struggle for knowledge of that most significant division of reality, the field of human life and its history. We perceive from his work how closely all hermeneutic theories are interrelated, how intimately they are bound up with and express the personality of the investigator. For this reason, however, there is a strong tendency in all these theories toward irrationalism. They profess to exhibit the process of historical interpretation but in the end they lead to the conclusion that it has no universally valid logical principles. It is rather a personal act, a gift of genius, comparable to the religious insight of the inspired, who are gifted with vision and intuition.

II

Studies in the general history of philosophy and European and German culture have made important and gratifying progress. We may mention first a small work by Ernst von Aster, *Geschichte der Philosophie*.⁸ It offers a reliable, skillfully arranged, admirably clear survey of the development of philosophy down to the present time. Even Ludwig Klages, Johann Jacob Bachofen, and Oswald Spengler are discussed. It is to be hoped that this book, which has just appeared, will find many friends among German students, for it is admirably adapted to give an introduction to the history of philosophy. Comparable with von Aster's book is Karl Vorländer's *Geschichte der Philosophie*,⁹ an abridgement recently prepared by Johannes Hoffmeister from Vorländer's larger book in three volumes. This book also can be recommended with confidence by college teachers to their students. Karl Vorländer be-

⁸ Leipzig, Verlag Alfred Kröner.

⁹ Berlin-Charlottenburg, Verlag Gustav Kiepenheuer.

longs to the Marburg School of Neo-kantianism, and philosophy is indebted to him for a long series of works at once popular and scientifically accurate. Shortly before his death, on December 6, 1928, he produced as the fruit of many years of careful investigation a biography, *Karl Marx, sein Leben und sein Werk*.¹⁰ His history of philosophy also is written from the point of view of the Marburg School. For this reason the theory of knowledge, its history and its problems, is treated with special care.

A work upon a very high level—even of classic importance—is Wilhelm Dilthey's *Von deutscher Dichtung und Musik*.¹¹ It is a wonderful monument to the extraordinary range and profundity of Dilthey's scholarship, for he was really an historian of the first rank. The present volume contains studies found among his posthumous papers, for the author himself died in 1911. At the foundation of his studies lay the tremendous plan of writing a complete history of German culture in all its branches and tendencies. Obviously, the very magnitude of such a plan was enough to prevent it from being entirely completed. Yet how precious are the parts that were finished! How profoundly penetrating was this prince of observers, this master of unique historical insight into the essence of the German spirit and all its obscurities! In the work before us he pictures, first, the chief traits of ancient Germany and the chivalric poetry and national epic of the Middle Ages. All our great lyric and epic poets are then sketched in sharply individualized portraits. Dilthey possessed an astonishing gift for the interpretation of German music. Just as he was able to identify himself with the rhythm of a poem, so he apprehends the tone of a musical composition. He dwells with special feeling upon his characterization of Johann Sebastian Bach. But his portraiture never stops with a mere description of facts and circumstances; he penetrates to the profoundest traits both of the artist's personality and of the work of art. At the same time, he combines these descriptions with general observations on the nature of the period and the social environment in which the artist and his work were produced. He writes as a philosopher and he is one of the foremost sociologists of culture. The book ends with wonderful

¹⁰ Leipzig, Verlag Felix Meiner.

¹¹ Leipzig, Verlag B. G. Teubner.

characterizations of Friedrich Schiller and the great Romanticist, Jean Paul.

Dilthey belongs admittedly among the chief representatives of what is called the philosophy of life. He interprets phenomena not in terms of abstract reason but in terms of the immediacy of life. The point of view of such a philosophy has been made to serve the purposes of historical investigation also. In this connection I shall mention a penetrating essay by Heinrich Barth, professor in the University of Basel, entitled *Eidos und Psyche in der Lebensphilosophie Platons*.¹² Barth conceives Plato as an educator and holds that his position in Greek and in western culture is determined by the philosopher's contribution to "paideia" or education. But Plato's work as an educator is undertaken in a tragic and pessimistic sense. From the Psyche arises the impulse to educational activity, but this impulse is unable to realize itself fully as form or *Eidos*. Out of this tragic consciousness grows the irony of Socrates. The painful and purely dialectical heroism of Socrates is expressed in the consciousness of the eternal incommensurability of thought and value, of idea and form. The essential significance of the Platonic Socrates is expressed in the tragic opposition of *Eidos* and *Psyche*.

The creator of moral philosophy and of scientific ethics, as everyone knows, was Socrates, whether the historical or the Platonic Socrates. So he is represented in the standard work of Ottmar Dittrich, *Geschichte der Ethik: die Systeme der Moral vom Altertum bis zur Gegenwart*.¹³ The fourth volume of this book has just been published, covering the period from Luther's Reformation to Jacob Böhme. Besides the ethics of Luther and Böhme we find here an account of the ethical thought of Melancthon, Zwingli, Calvin, and of orthodox Lutheranism with all its ramifications in the various sects. The care and thoroughness of this book may be perceived from the fact that it includes well over five thousand citations to the most different authors. In comparison with the history of other philosophical disciplines, such as logic or theory of knowledge or metaphysics, the history of ethics has received so far a somewhat stepmotherly treatment. Ottmar Dit-

¹² Tübingen, Verlag J. C. B. Mohr.

¹³ Leipzig, Verlag von Felix Meiner.

trich's brilliant contribution is well qualified to fill the gap completely. In it we have a truly monumental work on the history of ethics; it will suffice to mention here the number of pages in each volume: Volume I, Antiquity down to the Hellenistic Period, 374 pp.; Volume II, From the Hellenistic Period to the Beginning of the Middle Ages, 311 pp.; Volume III, The Middle Ages to the Reformation, 510 pp.; and Volume IV, referred to above, 570 pp. Professor Dittmar, who is teaching in the University of Leipzig, has produced a work which does the greatest credit both to himself and to philosophy. Undoubtedly the volumes which are yet to come will have a scientific quality equal that of those already published. With the completion of this work we shall have a history of ethics unique for its thoroughness in the examination of sources and for the clarity with which it reflects the ethical thought of the moral philosophers treated.

The study of the Reformation carries over into the study of humanism and the Renaissance which followed it. To the Renaissance belongs the School of Cambridge Platonists which, down to the present time, had received no suitable treatment in Germany. This defect has now been brilliantly corrected by the excellent work of Ernst Cassirer, professor in the University of Hamburg, *Die Platonische Renaissance in England und die Schule von Cambridge*.¹⁴ The representatives of this School, such as Whichcote, Henry More, John Smith, Ralph Cudworth, and Shaftesbury, opposed the explanation of nature established by Galileo and Kepler. The overwhelming success of the mechanistic conception of nature has prevented the Cambridge philosophers from gaining recognition, a consequence in which there is a measure of injustice. For Cassirer shows that the Cambridge School also has a number of important ideas to its credit. In particular it is the opponent of the pantheism in which the mechanistic and mathematical rationalism of the time issued. In common with its predecessors, the Platonists and Neo-Platonists of the Florentine Academy, the Cambridge School possessed a warm enthusiasm for nature, which they conceived less in terms of abstract reasoning than of feeling and sentiment. It was just this phase of their thought which forced them back into a position of second or third rate importance:

¹⁴ Verlag B. G. Teubner, Leipzig.

they were out of accord with both of the main intellectual movements of their time and country, English Empiricism in philosophy and Puritanism in religion. Thus it happened that the Cambridge School, as Cassirer shows in his valuable analysis, was unable to adapt itself to the developments of its age and was pushed into the background. The warmth of imagination characteristic of the Cambridge School stood in the sharpest opposition to the dry intellectualism of the Empirical School and also to the gloomy fatalism which Puritanism had compounded from Augustine and Calvin. From Cassirer we learn to see in the Cambridge Platonists a strain of thought which allies them to the Neo-Platonism of the Renaissance but which goes back also to the origin of Platonism and Neo-Platonism. This makes them the preservers of the ancient tradition in philosophy, which is their chief importance. In them the spirit of humanism finds a kind of amiable middle-class expression. And this makes them the intermediaries of the German form of humanism, the humanism of Winckelmann and Herder, Goethe and Schiller. Their importance for the continuity of European culture may be seen especially in the likable and impressive figure of Shaftesbury, who exercised an influence upon the poetry and philosophy of Friedrich Schiller strong enough to hold its own against the influence of Kant. But since the philosophers of the Cambridge School depended in the last resort only upon Plato, it is owing to them that the spirit of Platonism was brought to bear upon the modern period. For the historical and systematic influence of the Platonic theory of ideas, for the preservation of this most universal form of speculation, the Cambridge School makes a noteworthy point of transition. For this reason Ernst Cassirer's book is a very welcome addition to the history of Platonism.

From his studies in the period of the Renaissance and humanism, Cassirer has turned to an investigation of the age of Rationalism, in his important work on *Die Philosophie der Aufklärung*.¹⁵ The book is related to his work on the Platonic Renaissance in England, mentioned above, not merely in its content but also because it develops the point of view and the method of the earlier volume. From the two it is possible to gather the principles of Cassirer's historiography. He is a genuine admirer of Immanuel

¹⁵ Tübingen, Verlag J. C. B. Mohr.

Kant and carries out the latter's saying that he intends to teach not philosophy but philosophizing. In the spirit of this saying Cassirer in his historical exposition aims not to abstract and describe actual results, but to make evident the informing forces themselves by which the results are inwardly determined and shaped. Hence he seeks to display the working of intelligence in its historical process and to show why certain results were necessary and why they took just the form they did in the course of history. Now the decisive force in the whole intellectual product of the Enlightenment is thought, understanding, in which the period shows its unlimited confidence. The essential fact is not the philosophy of the Enlightenment, but rather a fundamental statement of the omnipotence of understanding and belief in it. Its deepest and most unshakable conviction is the faith that reality is through and through intelligible and that understanding overlaps and includes the whole field of historic reality. In this conception, according to Cassirer, lies the truly creative significance of its thought. No other period of human history was so absolutely in earnest in its use of the understanding. It regarded understanding as the key to all true human behavior and it proceeded with entire confidence to construe the world of history in these terms. And since this construction, if it is to have scientific and philosophical value, can be undertaken and carried through only by means of understanding, to the Enlightenment must be conceded also the merit of having led the way in "the conquest of the world of history". The contribution of the Enlightenment to historical knowledge has for a long time been wholly misunderstood. This was the fault of German Romanticism, which denied to the Enlightenment any importance for history or understanding of it—an extraordinary injustice, as Cassirer shows. One of the first to recognize the contribution of the Enlightenment to an understanding of history was no less a thinker than Wilhelm Dilthey, who showed in this respect also his splendid sagacity in understanding the nature of an epoch. The conquest of the world of history was led especially by Pierre Bayle; he was one of the earliest critics of historical sources and always stressed the fact that historical truth is not to be grasped merely by sincerity and faith. His work was continued by the talented Italian, Giambattista Vico, together with the Frenchmen,

Montesquieu and Voltaire, and the German, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. The Enlightenment produced also the first attempt at a critical history of philosophy, undertaken in Germany by Brucker and in France by Deslandes. In Germany today the spirit of rationalism is held in no very high estimation, but Cassirer's book is a convincing proof of the magnitude of its achievement, of its indispensability, and of the necessity of doing justice to the Enlightenment, which represents the rationalist temperament in its classic form.

Cassirer's work is done purely in a scientific spirit and with a scientific purpose. There is, however, a whole series of books which present historical subject-matter partly in the spirit of science and partly in the spirit of art. In this way there has come into being a new literary form, differing from the older historical novel in its more careful adherence to historical truth. In England Lytton Strachey, for example, has had a hand in its creation, in France André Maurois, and in Germany Ricarda Huch. To this group belongs Rudolf Kayser with his work on *Spinoza, Bildnis eines geistigen Helden*.¹⁶ For Kayser the life and philosophy of Spinoza, his suffering and his struggles, his purposes and ideals, are something sacred, but still his portrayal is no easy idealization of the philosopher. To an exposition of Spinoza's life, character, and work, Kayser joins a penetrating characterization of the general intellectual tendencies of his age in politics, law, and religion; he pictures the frightful clashes and struggles of the creeds, and treats very fully Spinoza's complicated relation to Judaism. Spinoza's philosophy is dependent upon Galileo and Descartes, but not less upon Jewish mysticism in the Middle Ages and the Kabbala; it takes up into itself the most widely different tendencies of thought and fuses them by a universal synthesis into a new and unified system. For the present day the interest in Spinoza has its philosophical reason. We are living through a revival of ontology and of a kind of philosophy often called existentialism. Spinoza is an aid and a guarantor of this revival and for this reason Kayser's book has a timely significance that is unmistakable.

Scientific interest in the Renaissance and in history in general has taken of recent years still another form. The youngest of the

¹⁶ Vienna and Leipzig, Phaidon Verlag.

sciences, sociology, has developed in Germany in such a way that at present its characteristic method has a special application to the problems of historical research. An instructive example of this is to be found in a book by Alfred von Martin, professor of sociology in the University of Göttingen, *Soziologie der Renaissance, zur Physiognomik und Rhythmik bürgerlicher Kultur*.¹⁷ His treatment of the Renaissance is a valuable supplement to that given by the history of art and culture, to which otherwise the treatment of the Renaissance is too narrowly restricted. Alfred von Martin shows that Florence is the true birthplace of what is called the bourgeois spirit in Europe. This type of mind is inseparably bound up with the city and the nature of the city, and it is characterized by a sober, calculating realism. Thus the older relationships of the Middle Ages were superseded and a new type of individualist entrepreneur came into being. It is no accident that at the same time there grew up a mathematical interpretation of nature and a conception of the world built upon reason and calculation. The chief producers and spokesmen of the change belong to the type that we describe as the man of the middle class. But precisely because the old ties fall away and an intense individualism makes its appearance, there is a demand for strong centralization under strong political control, in order to preserve the unity and existence of the community. In this way political absolutism arises, coming to a head in absolute monarchy with dictatorial power. But the court of the sovereign was influential not only in political but also in social matters. From this followed the paradoxical, even the grotesque, result that the man of the middle class had scarcely come into being before he adopted the etiquette of court-circles and the nobility. Hence, it was reserved to a later period to create the man of the middle class a second time, so to speak, to set him apart and explain him in terms of his own bourgeois temper.

But, it may be asked, do all these sociological and historical generalizations suffice to give a genuine understanding of a great historical personality and his work? This question has a special pertinence in the year of the Goethe Centennial when it is asked with reference to our knowledge of a genius so highly individual-

¹⁷ Stuttgart, Verlag Ferdinand Enke.

ized as Goethe. The effort has been made to see the greatest of the German poets from the most various points of view and in the most diverse relationships. I may perhaps be permitted to refer here to my own study of *Goethes Platonismus*.¹⁸ In this I tried to evaluate Goethe as a phenomenon by treating him not from an historical, but from a metaphysical point of view. For this purpose I made use of categories from the Platonic theory of ideas and the dialectic. As the Platonic idea is the most highly unified form of dialectic and the most dialectical form of unity, so from my point of view Goethe is the mostly highly unified figure in an altogether universal dialectical harmony of life; the unique miracle of his character and his work consists in combining the most manifold activities and traits in a unified form, without losing the multiplicity and concreteness of the separate traits.

In my effort to understand Goethe, I concur in a certain sense with Eugen Kühnemann who, in his great two-volume work on *Goethe*,¹⁹ has also attempted to interpret the creator of Faust by a purely philosophical and transcendental method. Without overlooking the human and the personal, the author strives to interpret these through the eternal and the absolutely meaningful which is their creator and bearer. In this way Kühnemann's *Goethe* is a stone in the structure of literary history, which signifies more than a merely historical discipline, pursued by historical methods, and which takes on the character of a philosophical discipline. The transcendental method is thus carried over into the field of the social sciences. By the aid of this method Kühnemann analyses Goethe's life and character, showing that these can best be understood from the Faust, while reciprocally Faust can be understood only by means of Goethe's life and character. According to Kühnemann's interpretation, Goethe's nature and activity appear as the personification and objectification of Faust's eternally creative impulse and as the manifestation of the deepest and most secret forces in life. Possibly he goes somewhat too far in his idealization of Goethe when he asserts that poetry is the supreme manifestation of man's spiritual powers; music and philosophy, for example, stand beside it as its equals. But it is certainly true that

¹⁸ Berlin, Pan-Verlagsgesellschaft.

¹⁹ Leipzig, Insel-Verlag.

the character of Goethe and his Faust put before us the whole tremendous body of problems that we call the nature of the German spirit. Both are enigmatic like the secrets of life in general, and just as no exposition can exhaust the secret of Goethe's life, so the nature of German life will forever remain a problem. It is the merit of Kühnemann's profound work to show that the chief value in Goethe's life and work lies in the inexhaustible problem that they pose.

The Hegel Centennial (1931) has brought us a large series of valuable works on Hegel. These were in part biographical and historical, but in part systematic as well. Since we are reviewing this year chiefly historical works, we shall mention here of the systematic works on Hegel only the extraordinarily acute essay of Professor Caspar Nink, S. J., *Kommentar zu den grundlegenden Abschnitten von Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*.²⁰ The unusual difficulty of the *Phänomenologie* makes such a commentary especially desirable. From a neutral standpoint Nink examines the first two sections of Hegel's work, entitled respectively "Bewusstsein" and "Selbstbewusstsein". Great service in penetrating into the teaching of Hegel has been rendered by the well-known Hegel-scholar, Richard Kroner, professor in the University of Kiel, whose two-volume work, *Von Kant bis Hegel*,²¹ was recognized when it appeared as an addition of unusual value to the literature of the history of philosophy. This year Kroner produced a significant centennial address entitled *Hegel zum 100. Todestage*.²² He interprets Hegel as the last stage in a development of European metaphysics beginning with Greek philosophy and especially with Aristotle. According to Kroner two qualities are typical of Hegel's thought, its intimacy with reality, in which Hegel surpasses all so-called empiricists, and its religious and theological respect for the power of the spirit. In general we conceive Hegel as the consummation of all the forces that operate in speculative idealism. In a certain sense he brought to completion speculative logic and speculative metaphysics. His importance for aesthetics is treated in a book by Dr. Helmut Kuhn, who is an instructor in the University of Berlin, *Die Vollendung der klassischen deutschen Aesthetik durch*

²⁰ Regensburg, Verlag von Josef Hubbel.

²¹ Tübingen, Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr.

²² Tübingen, Verlag J. C. B. Mohr.

Hegel.²³ Kuhn shows that numerous artistic and aesthetic tendencies and movements of thought which had developed in earlier thinking are so treated by Hegel that they may be said, in the terminology which he uses, to have been transcended (*aufgehoben*) in and through his aesthetics. His discriminating exposition takes as its motto Hegel's general definition: "The Beautiful is the sensuous manifestation of the Idea." This essay also shows that Hegel marks an end, though he is not without significance for the aesthetics of the present time. Kuhn's essay shows that Hegel's dialectic gives us a convincing answer to the question whether art occupies an independent realm of its own or is derivative from and based upon the relationship of historical culture in general.

Side by side with Richard Kroner stands Theodor L. Haering as a representative of the soundest scholarship with respect to Hegel. Even before the Hegel Centennial he had produced the very extensive first volume of his *Hegel, sein Wollen und sein Werk*.²⁴ Haering regards Hegel's interest in religion as the starting-point of his philosophy. On this important point he coincides with the conclusions of Dilthey and Georg Lasson. Accordingly the stimulus to Hegel's philosophy came not from the outside, not from the influence of Kant, but from the depths of his own inner life. External influences remained external, and Hegel worked out his philosophy by continuous examination of ethical and religious problems and the difficult paradoxes of reality. It was particularly his penetration into the tragedy of the life of Jesus that produced in him a comprehension of the significance of the dialectic for universal history. It is the great and convincing contribution of Haering to have shown the religious origin of Hegel's dialectic. At the same time, however, he makes the peculiar form of this Hegelian dialectic intelligible. It is not absolutely tragic in the ancient sense but in principle is tempered in the direction of the Christian doctrine of the atonement, by the reconciliation of all oppositions and contradictions in the saving unity of divine omnipotence and the divine spirit. Spirit overcomes the irrational, so that the latter cannot run its full course. In this respect, as Haering excellently shows, lies the fundamental difference between

²³ Berlin, Verlag von Junker und Dünhaupt.

²⁴ Leipzig and Berlin, Verlag B. G. Teubner.

Hegel and Romanticism, which conceded far more independent force to the irrational. The philosophy of Romanticism, therefore, leans toward irrationalism, that of Hegel toward rationalism and panlogism. In this respect Hegel approximates somewhat the spirit of the Enlightenment. Haering's work is a model of thoroughness and care. It is a special advantage that he supplies not only an account of the development of Hegel's thought but also a welcome interpretation of his terminology. The characteristics of this terminology very often open the way to an understanding of serious difficulties.

However self-sufficient Hegel's system may have been, it is obvious that it could not have been developed without a fruitful analysis of other philosophers. Of these the most important are Aristotle, Leibniz, and Kant. On the relation of Hegel to Kant we have now an informing essay by Herbert Wacker, *Das Verhältnis des jungen Hegel zu Kant*.²⁵ Hegel's development is marked by a variety of relationships with Kant. In his earliest period, during his student days at Tübingen and the beginning of his residence at Bern, he stood apart from Kant. Then came his frankly Kantian period, which includes also the time when he was in opposition to Kant. But this opposition is to be interpreted as the dialectical inclusion of Kant in an inclusive philosophy of spirit, which Hegel had by that time developed in its most universal form. He was held back from complete discipleship toward Kant by the tendency of his thought to conciliate, a tendency which is incompatible with Kant's thoroughgoing ethical dualism. As Wacker shows, it was particularly his belief in the ultimacy of love—in the sense of the Christian atonement—which prevented Hegel from accepting Kant's tragic dualism. This conception of reconciliation and the transcendence of opposites separates Hegel from Plato, just as it draws him closer to Aristotle. From Wacker's philologically meticulous study, as from Haering's great work, one gets the impression that Hegel was truly the *philosophus Christianissimus* of modern times.

One of the most interesting chapters in the history of European culture relates to the question of Hegel's influence, its extent and direction. Frequently it is asserted that at his death his philoso-

²⁵ Berlin, Verlag Junker und Dünhaupt.

phy collapsed and its influence ceased, but this assertion is false. In the field of historical research Hegel's work had an incalculable influence. Until late in the 19th century the majority of great German historians were dependent upon him, and what he himself contributed to the progress of historical research can hardly be exaggerated. What he did for the history of philosophy was epoch-making. His *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* were a performance of world-wide importance in the history of culture. They have now been republished in a centennial edition by Hermann Glockner, in three stately volumes.²⁶ Hegel's lectures were the basis of Johann Eduard Erdmann's fine production, *Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Darstellung der Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*,²⁶ which also has just been reprinted from the original edition by Hermann Glockner. It is a matter for gratitude that we have so fine an edition of J. E. Erdmann's classic work. Glockner has contributed an accurate account of Erdmann's character and activity, which has been separately published under the title *Johann Eduard Erdmann* in Frommann's excellent Classical Philosophers. Glockner is quite right in representing Erdmann as the one of all Hegel's students who grasped most completely the spirit of Hegelianism and expressed it most fully. For Erdmann the history of philosophy is no mere unorganized collection of miscellaneous opinions but a system, having internal unity and developing with logical necessity. Like philosophy itself, the history of philosophy is a rational unity because in it, too, the philosophic understanding is operative. For this reason he stresses particularly the great rationalists such as Descartes and Leibniz. Glockner's exposition of Erdmann shows his significance as the transmitter of Hegel's ideas and his resulting importance in the philosophical and historical tradition. In some degree Hegel's permanence depended upon Johann Eduard Erdmann.

Erdmann represents one phase of the persistence of Hegelianism, but there is also a succession of significant figures in the history of philosophy and culture in the 19th century who were sharply opposed to Hegel but who, nevertheless, by their very opposition, bear witness to his continuing influence. Among these we may mention Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, and not least Bruno

²⁶ Stuttgart, Verlag von Friedrich Frommann.

Bauer. The last is remembered, among other reasons, because the excessive sharpness of his Biblical criticism caused him to lose his professorship at Bonn in 1842. Bauer's criticism was issued originally in a controversial tract, *Das entdeckte Christentum*, which was lost for a long time. It has been the service of Ernst Barnikol, professor in the University of Halle, to search for and after long labor to recover this tract. He has told of his search and has discussed the notable figure of Bauer and his position in Germany during the Period of Reaction in a book well worth reading, *Das entdeckte Christentum im Vormärz. Bruno Bauers Kampf gegen Religion und Christentum und Erstausgabe seiner Kampfschrift*.²⁷ In the case of Bauer's tractate there is no question of an analysis of Christianity in terms of a philosophy or psychology of religion pursued in a spirit of objectivity. It is controversial and is written in a tone of radical unbelief. It represents an out-and-out atheism which sees in religion, and especially in the Christian Church, nothing but instruments of obscurantism. The book is interesting because of its psychological possibilities; it offers an object for the study of hatred, particularly hatred in religion. Bauer rejects likewise the idealization of culture, so dear to Hegel and the Hegelian panlogism, and the attempt to reconcile civilization and Christianity.

The terrible tension between civilization and Christianity and the impossibility of giving a logical explanation, in Hegelian terms, of the metaphysical and demonic nature of Christianity is set starkly forth by the Danish theologian and philosopher of religion, Sören Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard is still a very considerable figure in Germany, both in theology and philosophy, though he died in 1855 (aged forty-two) after a life filled with violent controversy. There is a long series of valuable books on him, amounting to a whole literature. Of the older works I shall mention only Harald Höffding's *Sören Kierkegaard als Philosoph*,²⁸ which was a kind of pioneer work on the author's fellow-countryman. Walter Ruttenbeck has now produced a detailed biography, *Sören Kierkegaard, der christliche Denker und sein Werk*.²⁹ The book

²⁷ Jena, Verlag Eugen Diederichs.

²⁸ Stuttgart, Friedrich Frommanns Verlag.

²⁹ Berlin, Trowitzsch und Sohn.

includes thorough discussions of Kierkegaard as a thinker, his work, and finally his relations with German theology. The last chapter is especially instructive, since the "dialectical theology", which exists in a very influential form in Germany—for example, as it is represented by Karl Barth or Friedrich Gogarten—is derived in large part from Kierkegaard. A still more detailed treatment of Kierkegaard is given by his compatriot, Eduard Geismar, in a work translated into German under the title, *Sören Kierkegaard; seine Lebensentwicklung und seine Wirksamkeit als Schriftsteller*.³⁰ Geismar presents the whole depth and breadth of Kierkegaard's activity as a reformer. His work reflects the overpowering tragedy of a man who attacks every aspect of life with the most relentless seriousness, who never allows himself to compromise, and stands for the truth even to the point of self-effacement. The focus of his struggle is the problem of Christianity. He denies the possibility and the justification of combining the Christian religion with a religion of humanity. How is Christianity to be conceived in its real essence? It is neither an expression of aesthetic experience nor a precipitation of thought. In particular Kierkegaard dissents emphatically from the reduction of Christianity to logic which is represented by Hegel. In general he contests the intellectualizing of Being, and he brings to light the demonic forces which operate in the depths of reality and from which religion springs, especially Christianity. Such a religion is rooted in the emotions of one who shudders before the greatness of God, in fear and trembling, and in a profound terror of human wickedness and the uncertainty of redemption. From this conviction arises Kierkegaard's tragic and pessimistic valuation of life; in this respect he has a point of contact with the philosophy of Schopenhauer and the art of Richard Wagner. For human beings there is no course open except to venture a "leap in the dark", to escape from the deification of culture, and to attain a consciousness of the misery of our existence. Kierkegaard's chief characteristic is the martyr's forthrightness, and Eduard Geismar's book gives us an insight into this forceful nature; it is the result of a penetrating study. It is the conception not only of an eminent

³⁰ Göttingen, Verlag Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.

scholar and specialist but also of a man who looks with profound respect upon Kierkegaard's purposes and character, and who derives from the integrity of his own religious experience a genuine understanding and regard for the relentlessly honest struggles of his hero. He follows Kierkegaard's life and works, as we may say, line by line, in a biography planned upon the lines of perfect philological adequacy.

Less biographical is a work by Martin Thust, *Sören Kierkegaard der Dichter des Religiösen*.³¹ This book also professes to give an account of Kierkegaard's development but it aims to conceive his history from the inside, without reference to the outward facts and events of the man himself. According to Thust the focus of Kierkegaard's life was religion and his unique significance consists in the fact that he embodies in poetic form the pure experience of religion, with incomparable spirituality and as the outgrowth of a profoundly religious temperament. Thust compares him in this respect to Dante, and considers it wholly proper to see in Kierkegaard's life-work a phenomenon parallel with the Divine Comedy. For this reason Kierkegaard's books are not psychological texts dealing with religious ideas and facts but are rather documents of the religious struggle itself in which a relentlessly honest man brings to confession his torment and his misery. Thust's portraiture is excellent; it shows that Kierkegaard does not write *about* religion but gives form to the thing itself in his books. Thust has been interested in Kierkegaard for twenty years and has so directly identified himself with this warrior of religion that his book is no dry philological statement of problems and their history but the symbol of a life in common with its subject. What interests me particularly in Thust's book is the possibility of becoming acquainted through his mode of presentation with the characteristics of other scientific methods of investigation. Though it is not documented very thoroughly from a philological or historical point of view, it pictures somewhat subjectively a philosopher and poet of subjectivism and raises the life and work of Kierkegaard to the level of a legend typical of all human life. What this book loses perhaps in objectivity it gains in emotional warmth and in

³¹ Munich, C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung.

intimacy with Kierkegaard's essential nature. It makes us understand why our own age is so closely akin to Kierkegaard. For him and for the present generation religion has again become the central problem and the central reality of life. This fact is a convincing proof of Kierkegaard's present-day significance.

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CONTEMPORARY GERMAN PHILOSOPHY¹

FOR a number of years, or even for decades, it has been said of German philosophy that it was not merely undergoing a process of active renovation but was even in a decisive state of transformation. This change, which becomes more manifest with time, was toward the development of a realistic metaphysics. The problem of reality was more and more emphasized and continually attracted more and more attention from the leading philosophers. The renewed interest in ontology and the rise of a properly defined realism were not motivated by the special interests of a group of thinkers personally inclined toward realism but arose rather from forces inherent in the nature of the case, that is to say, from philosophy and its problems.

In general, philosophy includes three broad classes of problems: the epistemological and logical field, or the theory of *truth*; the axiological field, or the theory of *value*; and the ontological field, or the theory of *being*. In the past theory of knowledge was intensively cultivated by the labors of the so-called Neo-Kantian schools, especially that of Marburg (Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, Ernst Cassirer, and others), and the theory of value by what was known as the Southwest German School (Heinrich Rickert, Hugo Münsterberg), but ontology was for several decades somewhat neglected. Thus the criticism which Martin Heidegger leveled against contemporary philosophy in his well-known work, *Sein und Zeit*,² was not without justification: "The problem of Being has been forgotten nowadays, although the present time plumes itself on cultivating 'metaphysics' again." And though some spoke of a "renaissance of metaphysics" in Germany, as for example Peter Wust in his suggestive book of that title,³ or Paul Menzer in his *Deutsche Metaphysik der Gegenwart*,⁴ still no real progress toward metaphysics occurred. So much may be frankly admitted without injustice to the energetic efforts of Rudolf Eucken, a serious and careful metaphysician. The problem of reality, however, the question about the essence of Being as such, the pursuit

¹ Translated from the German by George H. Sabine.

² Halle a. S., Verlag Max Niemeyer, 1927.

³ *Die Renaissance der Metaphysik*, Leipzig, Verlag Felix Meiner, 1910.

⁴ Berlin, Verlag Mittler und Sohn, 1931.

of real phenomena in their concrete reality, was not seriously taken in hand, and so long as this did not happen, there could be no talk of a revival of metaphysics and ontology in the full sense of the word. In so far as metaphysics was cultivated, this was done essentially from an idealist point of view, as is evident from the case of Rudolf Eucken himself. But from a purely idealist point of view it is scarcely possible to do justice to the problem of concrete reality.

If a question be raised about the historical antecedents of this tendency toward realism and the particular philosopher who both could and did stand sponsor for it, the answer is not far to seek. The revival of realism depends upon a renewed interest in Aristotle, and there is no doubt that the revival of ontology in Germany was greatly aided by a more thorough study of that philosopher. In general it may be said that interest in Aristotle again appeared in the philosophical lecture-rooms of Germany and that his philosophy became frequently the subject of academic exercises. Perhaps I may be pardoned for mentioning that in the winter semester of 1932-33 at the University of Berlin I offered a well-attended course on the *Metaphysics*. Such studies were greatly aided by the excellent translations⁵ of all Aristotle's writings, chiefly by Eugen Rolfes, who has added to them valuable notes and commentary. Another significant aid to the study of Aristotle came from the pioneer work of Werner Jaeger, Professor of Classical Philology at Berlin, *Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung*.⁶ This book properly received much attention when it was published, for it threw light upon the development of Aristotle's philosophy and showed that the conditions of historical evolution underlay his thought also. It greatly clarified the important question of the relations between Aristotle and his great teacher Plato. Jaeger shows that it is a mere sign of ignorance and misunderstanding to speak of antagonism between Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle is a disciple of Plato, and the greatest and most gifted of his disciples, for he developed his own philosophy from the principles of Platonic idealism. With unexampled keenness and with fabulous erudition Jaeger has arranged Aristotle's writings in a

⁵ Published in "Die philosophische Bibliothek", Verlag Felix Meiner, Leipzig.

⁶ Berlin, Verlag der Weidmannschen Buchhandlung, 1923.

process of organic development, showing the interrelations of these writings with one another. As a philologist he is naturally more concerned with philological and historical interpretation than with philosophical and systematic. It may be confidently asserted that, in the interests of the history of philosophy, there is almost no greater desideratum than a comprehensive treatment of the philosophy of Aristotle undertaken in a philosophical spirit, a continuation, so to speak, of the work of Heinrich Maier, formerly professor at the University of Berlin and unhappily too soon deceased, on *Socrates, sein Werk und seine geschichtliche Stellung*,⁷ or of Julius Stenzel's investigations in his *Studien zur Entwicklung der Platonischen Dialektik von Socrates zu Aristoteles*.⁸ Heinrich Maier in particular—whose career as a scholar, a philosopher, and a teacher reached an untimely end in October 1933—might well have grown to the difficult task of producing a definitive exposition of Aristotle. Besides his book on Socrates, he had brilliantly prepared the way in his earlier three-volume work on *Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles*.⁹

As the tendency toward realism was produced by a closer approach to Aristotle, so in turn it reacted upon the interpretation and criticism of Plato's philosophy. A history is needed of conceptions of Plato and of the interpretation of his philosophy, as these have been affected by general tendencies in the history of civilization. At present Plato is regarded in a way quite different from that which prevailed a few decades ago. Then he was esteemed as the great speculative theorist, the creator of the theory of ideas, and the student of the nature of truth as a pure abstraction. From the Marburg School came Paul Natorp's work on *Platons Ideenlehre*¹⁰ to arouse a storm of discussion. In it the theory of Ideas was presented as essentially a theory of the categories of objective scientific knowledge. Plato was represented as an almost immediate forerunner of Kant, and his philosophy as a preparation for Kant's critical idealism. Despite its relative validity, such an interpretation could not stand. It limited too sharply the universality of Plato's thought and left out of account in particular his ethical theories and

⁷ Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1913.

⁸ Leipzig, Verlag B. G. Teubner, 1913.

⁹ Tübingen, Verlag J. C. B. Mohr, 1896-1900.

¹⁰ Second edition, Leipzig, Verlag Felix Meiner, 1922.

his practical and reformatory purposes. It was Friedrich Nietzsche who very early perceived the pedagogical and political tendency in Plato. In a course of lectures delivered in 1869 he suggested that Plato might be construed as "a political agitator who wanted to turn the world upside down". From this point of view a highly influential interpretation of Plato has now developed. For obvious reasons this has received its support largely from the literary-aesthetic movement, which owes so much of its philosophy to Nietzsche, the so-called Circle of Stefan George, which has played so important a part in the culture of Germany during the last twenty-five years.

From this movement has proceeded a whole series of books on Plato which picture him as primarily the architect of moral conduct, the great political educator. Three works may be mentioned here: Heinrich Friedemann's *Platon, seine Gestalt*,¹¹ Kurt Singer's *Platon, der Gründer*,¹² and Kurt Hildebrandt's *Platon: der Kampf des Geistes um die Macht*.¹³ In a wonderfully practiced style—Stefan George was one of our greatest stylists—these books picture Plato as the thinker in whom the spiritual forces of European education have their source. They conceive him as active life-force, and therefore not at all as a "blessed spirit" who lost himself in remote speculation, as Goethe thought of him. Plato was born in an age which, in politics, religion, morals, and philosophy, seemed to have fallen into chaos. To put bounds to this chaos, to set up corrective, morally elevating standards for saving and ennobling life, to be the judge and the priest of his time and of mankind in general—this Plato set before him as his real task. For Singer and Hildebrandt, therefore, the Dialogues are not dateless conversations but the sublimest of controversial tracts, political and educational works in the highest sense, and they analyse and interpret the particular dialogues from this point of view. The leading thought in this interpretation is the conviction that Socrates-Plato is before everything the instructor of mankind in morals and virtue. Consequently Plato's most important dialogue, *The Republic*, is not to be conceived as an imaginary political romance or as a utopia not seriously intended. On the contrary it is meant to

¹¹ Berlin, Verlag Georg Bondi, 1931.

¹² München, C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1927.

¹³ Berlin, Verlag Georg Bondi, 1933.

further the founding of the real state, not of course on the basis of force but on that of "justice". In such a dialogue as the *Timaeus* also, which has often been conceived as the exposition of a purely speculative natural philosophy, the same pedagogical tendency appears. "Plato in fact conceived it to be his mission", says Hildebrandt, "to bring divine measure back to a world confused." But in this interpretation also—the trifling criticism should not be overstressed—the whole Plato, in his limitless universality, does not appear. What he did for the theory of truth and what the theory of Ideas meant for the founding of science receives no recognition. It should not be forgotten that Plato's Academy in Athens was also an institution of pure research from which powerful scientific influences emerged.

This conscious concern with education, however, was characteristic not only of Plato but of the whole Greek people and their civilization. This proposition is the thesis of another extraordinary book by Werner Jaeger, whose pioneer work on Aristotle was just referred to—his *Paideia, die Formung des griechischen Menschen*.¹⁴ This more recent work is a continuation and development of his excellent *Platons Stellung im Aufbau der griechischen Bildung*¹⁵ and is closely related to the distinguished journal, *Die Antike*,¹⁶ which is devoted to the lasting influence of classical antiquity upon all modern civilization. In his *Paideia* Jaeger asserts that "what we call civilization as an object consciously sought did not exist before the Greeks". He describes Greek education as the conscious modelling of the Greek into a particular type of manhood, the unique significance of this ideal, and its continued historical unfolding. In fact, as Jaeger shows, it was no cloistered ideal of education which the Greeks consciously set before themselves and pursued. For to them the capacity of laying hold upon human nature was expressly a power in nature itself.

The intellectual and ideal center of all their cultural and educational activities was the Platonic conception of the Idea, and by virtue of this the Greek became the philosophical pedagogue and the pedagogical philosopher for all the peoples of later times. It is amazing to follow Jaeger's description of the realization of

¹⁴ Berlin and Leipzig, Verlag Walter de Gruyter and Company, 1934.

¹⁵ Berlin and Leipzig, Verlag Walter de Gruyter und Co., 1928.

¹⁶ Also published by De Gruyter und Co.

this Greek pedagogical faculty through the chief epochs and the chief contributions of Greek life. Whether it be ancient nobility or Homer, Hesiod or the Spartans, lawgivers like Solon or poets like Pindar, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes, or the orators and sophists and philosophers—all these incomparable works depend upon a pedagogical purpose. For this reason man himself becomes in the end the chief problem and the chief object of all thought. Even the lyric belongs in this educational milieu quite as much as rhetoric. It was the Sophists who first transformed this conscious preoccupation with education into a theory, and gave it a rational foundation, and thus became the founders of a science of education. They were, however, only its founders. Jaeger shows how, from the Sophists, a normative idea of man was obliged to develop, and in fact did develop, through the Attic tragedy and comedy, through Attic philosophy down to Pericles and Thucydides, whom Jaeger regards not as primarily an historian but as a powerful political thinker and educator. Thus in the end the Athenian ideal and its achievement were justified, even after her political eclipse, through the idea of Education, in which the Attic spirit attained the consciousness of its undying permanence.

II

We shall now pass in review some of the more prominent works produced by the realist metaphysics of the present. The whole movement was introduced by what is known as the philosophy of life, which in Germany was represented particularly by Friedrich Nietzsche and Wilhelm Dilthey. This philosophy is marked in the main by two characteristics. First, it is not content with mere epistemological research and so is opposed to the Neo-Kantian, which devoted itself chiefly to the theory of knowledge; second, it tries to grasp and express the essence of reality not abstractly, but so far as possible, concretely. It seeks to know phenomena according to their real natures and values and not to veil them in hypotheses or in an artificial theory. The whole movement might be typified by a requirement stated by Edmund Husserl—though its validity was admitted long before Husserl stated it—that philosophy must again seek and find the way to phenomena. Thus contemporary philosophy acquired a bent which necessarily

urged it toward the production of an explicit theory of reality or actuality.

A primary and a powerful stimulus in this direction was given long since by Oswald Külpe in his great work, *Die Realisierung, ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Realwissenschaft*. Of this "realistic metaphysics" Külpe himself was able to publish only the first volume,¹⁷ the second and third being edited by August Messer from his posthumous papers.¹⁸ In this book Külpe undertook to answer three questions: Is it possible to posit the real? How is it possible? Is definition of the real permissible? His suggestions were followed by his pupil Eugen Dürr, who died early, in his book, *Grundzüge einer realistischen Weltordnung*.¹⁹ Thus there has existed for many years in Germany a tradition tending toward the development of realism which contributed not a little to the crisis in which idealism now finds itself. A thorough investigation and criticism of the forces which have brought idealism to its present critical pass would form an important and desirable contribution to a knowledge of the intellectual tendencies which have dominated Germany for the last several years. For there is today, as in all earlier periods, an intimate relation between philosophy and the age. It is especially characteristic of German realism that it seeks, before everything else, an alliance with positive science as a foundation for philosophical construction. Idealism was based upon speculation and deduction, but realism has its basis in the concrete special sciences. Hence it naturally starts with an analysis of the nature and principles of either the natural or the social sciences.

A standard example of this procedure is to be found in the admirable works of Heinrich Maier, who has already been mentioned. I refer now to his *Philosophie der Wirklichkeit*.²⁰ The first volume is devoted to a discussion of the general principles of a metaphysics which aims to be, not idealist speculation, but knowledge of reality. In this first volume Maier argues that the discrimination of physical and mental realities is of decisive importance for all human knowledge. The next question is to discover the forms

¹⁷ Leipzig, Verlag S. Hirzel, 1912.

¹⁸ Leipzig, Verlag S. Hirzel, 1920.

¹⁹ Leipzig, Verlag Dürr, 1907.

²⁰ Tübingen, Verlag J. C. B. Mohr. Vol. I, 1927; vol. II, 1933.

of thought appropriate to a knowledge of both types of reality. But how can this be done? Maier uses an interesting contrast—of great importance for an understanding of the present intellectual situation in Germany—between an “emotional interpretation of things” and an objective “cognition of things”. The first of these is in full swing in Germany today. In general it is held that the search for truth is essentially conditioned and determined by point of view, that there is no philosophy without a powerful human element. Hence a subjectivism colored by the personality of the philosopher is expressly demanded and encouraged, a subjectivism depending upon such inescapable factors as, for example, soil, race, specific historical tradition, and state of mind. Against tendencies of this kind Maier brings the objection that they lead inevitably to the death of all knowledge and all philosophy. For there would no longer be a single, universal truth, but as many truths as there are individuals. The dangerous foundation of this notion, according to him, is a morbid confusion of emotional certainty with pure knowledge based on objective, rational principles. Anyone capable of real scientific thought would have a desire for objective truth strong enough to oppose successfully influences arising from the emotional zone. For all thought which deserves the name is logical and is supported by the laws of logic. This holds good even for what is called irrational thought. Hence arises the philosophical problem of formulating the categories or forms of reality, and in the first place, the forms of physical reality. This is the problem of Maier’s second volume, which has the subtitle, “Physical Reality”. Prior to Maier’s death the first division of this volume had appeared, on “The Reality of the Physical World”; the second division, “Knowledge of the Physical World”, was fortunately prepared for the press by the author and so will be able to appear shortly. The categories of physical reality depend primarily on the truth of the functions of judgment, and it is meaningless to speak of the reality of physical phenomena except upon the basis of the truth of these functions. If this truth is accurately ascertained, then we have a firm foundation for a metaphysics of nature.

In point of fact, therefore, Heinrich Maier’s system is not a philosophy of reality in the sense that it attempts to conceive phe-

nomena in such a way as to afford a knowledge of their nature. Rather it develops the presumptions of such knowledge. It might be described as a theory of the categories of natural knowledge, and in this sense it provides an epistemological introduction to a realistic metaphysics. Thus Maier discusses with keenness the question what, in general, the concept of reality means and the justification for imputing reality to natural phenomena. His historical analysis of the problem of reality is highly instructive. His excellent exposition and criticism of the various theories of reality contributes in the highest degree to an understanding and an objective treatment of the problem. He examines the nature and value of positivism, idealism, and realism, arriving finally at a point of view which he calls "transcendental phenomenalism" and which sets aside these one-sided ways of conceiving the matter. This transcendental phenomenalism—an excellent name for the dialectic of his whole conception—depends upon a "universal thought", which Maier submits to detailed examination. It has, we may say, at least two sides, one which has to do with the categories or forms of all judgment, the other seeking to do justice to the fact that phenomena are given. The unquestionable dialectic of universal thought is clearly shown in its mode of judgment. The nature of this universal dialectical judgment is defined by Maier as follows, in many well supported passages in the first part of his work: A real judgment has, first, the property of logical necessity, else it is not a judgment. To this conclusion Maier is committed by his rationalism, by his advocacy of the overwhelming power of "cognitive thought". But this necessity is not merely formal; there is an immediate reference of logical necessity to "requirement by the transcendently given". Without this immanent reference thought falls into subjectivism. Awareness of truth includes not merely the assurance of its own logical forms and its own certainty but also an immediate assurance that the objects of perception really exist. It is directly an awareness of reality, but the latter, precisely because it is awareness, is firmly founded on the certainty of the logical conditions of knowledge. In this way Maier refutes mere absolutist formalism and also positivism and empiricism. The question then becomes, what are these forms required for a knowledge of reality which have at once, so to speak,

both logical and ontological reality? The position expressly asserts a "dialectical" interpretation of the categories, a view which I undertook to develop in my *Erkenntnistheorie*.²¹ I am firmly convinced that such a theory of the nature and validity of the categories definitely refutes all one-sided theories, which seek to interpret our fundamental concepts either as merely formal and logical or as merely empirical and relative. There is no doubt, either, that Kant himself represented such a dialectical conception of the categories. His famous "Criticism" appears to me to be only another form of dialecticism, as I tried to show in the first and second volumes of the work just mentioned.

It is scarcely necessary to say that such a theory of the categories implies a dialectical conception of reality; the dialectic of reality runs parallel to the dialectic of truth. By this conception both absolute rationalism and absolute empiricism are superseded, and thus another contradiction and another exaggeration are set aside. If it be asked how such a philosophy regards the nature of reality, it cannot be said to be, in its structure, either logical and rational, or nonlogical and irrational. Thus it would exclude an opposition such as appears, for example, between a "panlogist" like Hegel and a romanticist like Schopenhauer; a dialectical theory of reality would do away with this contrast also. On the other hand an element of one-sidedness still remains in the type of realism now most impressively represented by the *Sein und Zeit*²² of Martin Heidegger, Professor at the University of Freiburg. This book deservedly raised great interest in Germany. It embodies the tendency toward realism with perfect clearness and at the same time it moves in a sphere of thought corresponding to those philosophical efforts that arise from a revival of St. Thomas's ontology. The reasons for this revival need not detain us, though an analysis of them would form an exceptionally instructive contribution to an understanding of the existing intellectual situation. This situation is marked particularly by a poignant feeling of dread for reality; both external and internal causes have united in Germany to heighten a sense of the uncanny and demonic character of reality.

Because Heidegger expresses this obscure and terrifying back-

²¹ Berlin, Verlag E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1932.

²² Halle a. S., Verlag von Max Niemeyer, 1927.

ground of reality, his work has aroused much attention as the outgrowth of an actually existing state of mind. It is an important part of Heidegger's philosophy that he attributes to reality a precedence over thought. Whenever we begin reflecting about reality, we already have our station in reality, especially in our peculiar mode of existence as men. This primary reality, moreover, is always given as primarily temporal reality. If, then, the first problem of ontology has to do with the nature of reality, the first answer to that question consists in recognizing the ontological immediacy of time. If a philosopher arrives at an understanding of the problem of time, he has given a first approximation to a concrete answer to the question about the meaning of reality. Hence all reality, including that of mankind, is infected with the character of "historicity" and shares the fate of history. There is no reality which stands outside time. Consequently it is always threatened with two dreadful convulsions, that of death and transitoriness and the fear or the dread of death. "Temporality", says Heidegger, "discloses itself as the meaning of real dread" (*Sorge*). He next proceeds to a magnificent analysis of the ontological nature of time and of all the consequences that follow from it for human existence. We have our station always in reality and under the burden of dread which reality entails. Is it possible, then, that time, despite its ontological nature, should offer us a ground for our existence and a certainty that will permit us to gain tranquillity? How is this primitive phenomenon of time to be conceived? What does it mean when we not only speak of past, present, and future, but when we ourselves are ranged in them? Is it not inevitable that we should be the victims of convulsing emotions of fear, dread, agitation, and unsatisfied curiosity? In presenting these ontological principles Heidegger often allies himself with Søren Kierkegaard, whose irrationalist theology and philosophy of religion have now attained considerable esteem in Germany through the equally irrationalist ontology of Heidegger, and whose penetrating descriptions of primitive human emotions have been carried over into philosophy by Heidegger. A metaphysics results which is in many respects reminiscent of Neo-Platonism, of the Catholic mysticism of the Middle Ages, and of the greatest of the romantic philosophers, namely Schelling. (Surprisingly, however, the relation to Schell-

ing is not recognized.) Heidegger's philosophy, which asserts the irrational presuppositions of all reality so openly, seems to me to be not unrelated to the present age in Germany which has opened up a terrifying vision of the oppressive insecurity of all the foundations of our national existence, and reopens this vision from day to day. The actual state of our affairs seems to us really to give us every reason for a deep-seated dread.

The ontological problems involved in the concept of time have been discussed in a truly philosophical work by Heinrich Barth, Professor at Basel, *Das Sein in der Zeit*.²³ The distinguishing feature of the book is the relentless seriousness with which it points out the disconcerting dialectic of a reality thoroughly subordinated to time. To conceive a reality of this sort really means a descent into the cave of the Furies, and requires the heroic mood in which one is ready to take on oneself all the risks and terrors of transitoriness and ontological uncertainty. It means to take seriously all the dilemmas which a reality of this kind entails for humanity, to accept the consequences of absolutely abandoning everything eternal and unconditioned. It is easy to see that this involves a philosophical treatment of the same problems that form the object of what is called "dialectical theology", as represented by Karl Barth, Friedrich Gogarten, and others. Such a philosophy and theology depict human life in such terms that a solution mediated by religion becomes the only intelligible and indeed the necessary remedy for the hopelessness of our situation.

The study of this whole ontology, however, though it likes to represent itself as a description of facts, produces in me the impression that it is subject to extra-scientific influences, influences derived from temperament or religious faith. This partly explains the high repute which it has gained so rapidly. For the present age seeks in philosophy and demands from it the satisfaction of its emotions and irrational desires. Generally speaking, it is not at all moved by an interest in pure science. On the other hand, philosophy itself has observed this subjective element in Heidegger's ontology and has not always accepted it. He is, in a sense, a disciple of Edmund Husserl, as well as his successor in the chair at Freiburg i. B. But Husserl demands a "pure" and objective perception and

²³ Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1933.

knowledge of phenomena, a requirement not met by Heidegger in so far as his statement of facts is colored by mystical and religious speculation. While the influence on Heidegger comes more from the side of Catholic dogmatics, Barth and his students seem to me to show an influence descending through Calvinism. For these reasons more attention must be given to securing a really pure statement of the facts, uncolored by prejudice and presuppositions, in order to exclude, so to speak, the human element and everything traceable to a particular point of view and body of dogma.

This need is met by a recent book of Nicolai Hartmann, the successor of Ernst Troeltsch in the chair of the philosophy of history at Berlin, *Das Problem des geistigen Seins: Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der Geschichtsphilosophie und der Geisteswissenschaften*,²⁴ which has already occasioned a lively discussion. This book is related to Hartmann's earlier work, entitled *Zum Problem der Realitätsgegebenheit*, to which I referred in my last article.²⁵ The description of mental reality requires more than anything else an entirely impartial statement, which is much easier to attain in description of physical reality. Natural philosophy is easier to free from such prejudices than the philosophy of history, but just for this reason the description of mental reality is a most pressing and important problem. Hartmann rightly holds that almost every attempt to conceive mental being has been vitiated by one-sidedness, by the prejudice of tradition, or by speculative constructions. In a polemic obviously directed against Heidegger he remarks that the new theories of reality repeat the old prejudices. In opposition to them Hartmann proposes to adhere strictly to the phenomena of the mental life as these are manifested in our historical experience and as they are scientifically formulated by the so-called social sciences. To one of his predecessors, however, he acknowledges a debt of piety, to Wilhelm Dilthey, who also accepted the obligation of taking social and historical reality as it was and of impartially "describing" it. We shall return shortly to Dilthey's pioneer achievement in this respect. But how does the case stand with Hegel, the philosopher whose attention was

²⁴ Berlin, Verlag Walter de Gruyter und Co., 1933.

²⁵ This *Review* XLII (1933) 44 f.

directed primarily to social and historical reality and to whom we owe what, up to the present time, is probably the most significant philosophy of history? Hartmann acknowledges Hegel's greatness as an observer, who really attained his insight into the nature of social reality by a study of history. Unfortunately, however, he combined this fruitful description with a one-sided metaphysics and a dialectical interpretation of the world-process. A speculative metaphysics such as idealism, however, is no more contrary to a scientifically objective statement of the facts than is a materialism which exaggerates the importance of matter and consequently issues in a philosophy as incapable of objectivity as speculative idealism itself. But if one wants to reach an unbiased analysis of social phenomena, he must, according to Hartmann, go a long way back in eradicating prejudice, he must settle accounts with himself in order to attain a "dispassionate respect for the facts".

But in what forms or patterns does social reality express itself, that it is accessible to a conception of this sort? Hartmann distinguishes three such patterns or stages: "personal mind", "objective mind", and "objectified mind". His earlier works, for example, his *Metaphysik des Erkennens* and his *Ethik*, have shown the subtlety and the precision with which he can describe the relevant phenomena, and his latest work is a brilliant continuation of this branch of philosophical writing. These stages of mental and social reality are illuminated on all sides. "Personal mind", naturally, manifests itself mainly in "the person" and in "personality", which are elucidated especially in their aspects as "self-consciousness" and as "moral nature". "Objective mind", on the other hand, is the form of mentality with which the social sciences are especially concerned. Hence investigation is here directed first toward mind as "community", and next toward "the life and spirit of language", mind as "knowledge and science", mind as "art and manners", and the like. Much attention is given to considering the importance which mind as objectified in history has in comparison with the individual and how the relation between "mind in the individual" and "mind in the community" should be formulated. Especially instructive is the study of what is "genuine" and what is "false" in objective mind, for instance, the public's need for sensations, conventional morality, self-deception, the mo-

als of "good repute", and the like. This discussion deals throughout with real historical phenomena. But mind operates in historical phenomena not only in the form of "objective mind"; it acts also in the form of universal "objectifications" which persist beyond individual operations. This is universal mind crystallized in overlapping institutions, which has surrendered its creative life to produce synthetizing and organizing forms of undefined duration. Examples of such forms of mental organization are space in the plastic arts, harmony or melody in music, concepts or the logical dependence of concepts in science, or time in history. Hartmann gives a survey, both broadly conceived and carried through on a large scale, of the structure of mental reality in its factual aspects and of the facts of mental reality in relation to its structure. Together with the works of Max Scheler, which challenge comparison but are more fragmentary, his book presents a philosophy of history undertaken in a spirit of accurate description, which will certainly form the starting-point for a series of new investigations. It may be questioned, however, whether his philosophy is really so free from all influence by a point of view, or so completely "beyond idealism and realism", as the author claims. Is it in fact possible to have a philosophy if idealism be altogether laid aside? Hartmann's philosophy has at least one connection with idealism, viz., that formed by phenomena and by the exclusive reference to them. But must there not be other influential connections between the two points of view? Is it possible to speak in a philosophical sense of history without assuming a meaningful relationship or a teleological bond? And what is the significance for description of this assumption? Even to suggest an intelligible answer to these questions means opening up the tremendous problem of the assumptions of a phenomenology.

The way was prepared for this realistic phenomenology and in important respects it was introduced by the pioneer contributions of Wilhelm Dilthey. Nicolai Hartmann himself, as was remarked above, has recognized Dilthey's share in the development, and how great, or even decisive, this share was, is now generally perceived. I have myself attempted to set forth Dilthey's importance in the reaction against idealism and in the tendency to keep description as closely as possible in touch with phenomena, in a work published

a few months ago entitled, *Wilhelm Dilthey, zum hundertsten Geburtstag des Philosophen*.²⁶ This book undertakes for the first time not only to represent Dilthey as the foremost historian of civilization—which he has always been acknowledged to be—but to take account of his general significance as a philosopher, as the founder of a critique of the social sciences and as the creator of the “interpretative” psychology which has now attained so much repute. Thanks especially to the publication of his *Gesammelte Schriften* and the volume on *Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung*,²⁷ even the general public now knows how preëminent his position was in the philosophy and psychology of the nineteenth century. I have referred frequently in this *Review* to his works and to the science and philosophy which they contain, and I can now content myself with a reference to my book. I may merely mention that in writing it I had chiefly in mind to stress the unique sense of realities which Dilthey’s work discloses. This quality made him an opponent of idealism, but also of the naturalistic and mechanical psychology which, as he shows convincingly, does not represent real mental phenomena and processes adequately but quite misrepresents their actual nature by injecting concepts and speculations foreign to them. Such a psychology pretends to be empirical, but Dilthey objects that this is just what it is not. He himself, on the contrary, laid the foundation for a psychology which represents the real constitution of our inner life and offers an accurate factual “description” of it.

An unbiased conception of reality and the impartial devotion to it were characteristic of Dilthey even as a young man and as a student. In June, 1855, at the age of twenty-two, while still a student at Berlin, he writes to his father: “Life and its meaning are limitless, and a man would have to multiply every hour tenfold to include everything”. This correspondence is contained in an interesting book by Dilthey’s daughter, Clara Misch, *Der junge Dilthey: Ein Lebensbild in Briefen und Tagebüchern, 1852-1870*.²⁸ With almost superhuman industry he labored at nearly every branch of history and he thus attained a very unusual fund of ideas and information. His work on the historical sciences began

²⁶ Berlin, Verlag von E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1933.

²⁷ Leipzig, Verlag B. G. Teubner.

²⁸ Leipzig, Verlag B. G. Teubner, 1933.

early. Already in 1867 his brother-in-law, Karl Usener, in the draft of an estimate of Dilthey prepared in connection with proposals of the Faculty for filling the philosophical professorship at Bonn, showed that a union of philosophy and the social sciences such as Dilthey represented would have the greatest advantages for both fields. How great this advantage might be, and in fact became, is shown by his epoch-making *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*,²⁹ which had the illuminating subtitle: "An attempt to lay a foundation for the study of society and history".

III

The realist tendency is now in evidence in nearly every branch of philosophy, with the result that there is almost complete liberation from idealist speculation on the one hand and from the mechanistic and analytic point of view on the other. We may consider first the field of psychology, upon which Dilthey's work had a pioneer influence. Many representatives of this new psychology believe their real forerunner to be Friedrich Nietzsche, whose importance in founding a new psychology, a real "psychology of life", can hardly be overestimated. It is the merit of one of the ablest and the most important representatives of this new psychology, Ludwig Klages, to have perceived Nietzsche's importance in this respect and to have developed the point, in a substantial article in Emil Utitz's *Jahrbuch für Characterologie*.³⁰ More and more, however, the preëminence of Dilthey's share in this movement is perceived. I myself, in the book on Dilthey mentioned above, pointed out the many intimate relationships in which Dilthey and Nietzsche stand both to the founding of the "philosophy of life" and also to the creation of the new "psychology of life".

This new psychology has many characteristics. Its chief peculiarity consists in the fact that it refuses to regard mind as composed of "elements" or to explain its processes by cause or association, as was done by the naturalistic psychology which it rejects, but regards it as a unity and as the expression of human character—hence the name "characterology" by which it is often described. It applies itself to the clearest and most manifest, and

²⁹ The first volume was published in 1883; reprinted now in the *Gesammelte Schriften*.

³⁰ Berlin, Verlag der Pan-Gesellschaft, 1925.

hence the most informative expressions of mentality, especially such as appear in a man's writing. One of its most highly developed subdivisions is therefore graphology, treated not after the fashion of an amateur or by intuition and divination, but in a strictly scientific way. In this connection Ludwig Klages should be mentioned especially, and of his works on the subject his *Handschrift und Character*³¹ is the most important. This book is a simplified sketch of graphological technique. His *Graphologisches Lesebuch*³² reports a hundred cases from practice, selected with the coöperation of experts in the field, and contains not less than one hundred and seventeen tests of handwriting. It includes therefore a considerable body of material and so makes it possible for a person to check his own conclusions by those of experienced graphologists. Another book, also, may be mentioned, *Die Grundlagen der Charakterkunde*.³³

From these more specialized researches, Klages has gone on to develop a general psychology and a philosophy and metaphysics. Of his psychological works we may mention *Vom Wesen des Bewusstseins*.³⁴ The leading conception of his realistic psychology may be stated in his own words: "Not things but images are animated; this is the key to all biology. This key no natural science can hold, because the realities of natural science belong not to the primitive world of perceptual images but to the merely derived world of imputed things." Images are not objects but the creatures of mind. We deal especially with such mental images and interpret things and other persons through our own images. Klages cites a vast number of examples, especially from language, that most important source of knowledge to us men, often remarking with great emphasis that what seems substantial to us is really a psychical phenomenon, in fact, soul. He always adds that this way of interpreting of reality would be intelligible to the naïve and primitive, but not to the sophisticated, who by civilization and intellectualization have become hopelessly estranged from any natural or unwarped conceptions of reality.

³¹ Fourteenth and fifteenth editions, Leipzig, Verlag Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1932.

³² Second edition, Leipzig, Verlag Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1933.

³³ Fifth and sixth editions, Leipzig, Verlag Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1928.

³⁴ Third edition, Leipzig, Verlag Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1933.

Intellectualism and rationalism have in general removed us from the natural and direct and immediate knowledge of phenomena and also from a natural and direct and immediate philosophy. For this Klages holds philosophy chiefly responsible, because from the time of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle it has given the Logos more weight and a higher value than the Bios—which has put it on the wrong track. Klages proposes to substitute for this vicious and untenable “logocentrism” a “biocentrism”, and his forerunners in this he finds not in the classical philosophers, who as rationalists are repugnant to him, but in Goethe and Nietzsche, the real philosophers of life. This conception he has developed in a powerful work, *Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele*,³⁵ which consists of no less than three large volumes of almost fifteen hundred pages. Like so many before him Klages fights the battle of life, experience, and feeling against the understanding, against a cloistered enlightenment, and against a chilling abstraction which weakens or destroys contact with phenomena. In the exaggerated estimation of his followers this constitutes a philosophy which does not despise the solid ground of reality but keeps its feet firmly planted on mother earth, in which there moves not the thin breath of understanding but the hot fervor of the blood, and which is destined to produce a total realignment in the history of occidental civilization and indeed has already partly done so. A clear though slightly superficial summary of this biocentric philosophy has been published by one of Klages’s followers, Conrad Wandrey, in his *Ludwig Klages und seine Lebensphilosophie*.³⁶ An expert will quickly perceive what is new and valuable in this doctrine, and the historian of civilization will readily understand its bearing on the political revolution in Germany. At the same time it is not hard to grasp the relation of expressionism and characterology to the behaviorism of Watson. A moderate criticism of Klages has appeared in Hermann Wollnik’s *Grundfragen der Graphologie: Zur Kritik der Ausdruckskunde von Ludwig Klages*.³⁷ Wollnik stands on Klages’s own ground but develops the principles of graphology with stand-

³⁵ Leipzig, Verlag Johann Ambrosius Barth, Vols. I and II, 1929; Vol. III, 1932.

³⁶ Leipzig, Verlag Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1933.

³⁷ Leipzig, Verlag Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1933.

ards derived from Eduard Spranger's psychology, which looks toward the social sciences.

The psychology of Dilthey and his school, being related to the social sciences, is somewhat opposed to natural science and experiment, while Klages and his followers, several of whom were recruited from the ranks of the natural scientists, make a limited and supplementary use of experiment. That psychological investigation may be conducted by experimental methods and results reached which are allied to the conclusions of these other psychological tendencies, and which therefore are almost without any relation to those of the older mechanistic causal psychology, seems to be proved by the highly regarded studies of Erich Jaensch, Director of the Institute for Psychological Anthropology at the University of Marburg a. L., and his colleagues. At the very start they set themselves apart fundamentally from the older psychology and agreed with Dilthey's conception and method in approaching the mind as a totality or unity, and in seeking to build up from this point of view a knowledge of its real structure and the types of its characteristic functions and of personality. Of Jaensch's works which are relevant here I should mention in the first instance his two-volume book, *Über den Aufbau der Wahrnehmungswelt und die Grundlagen der menschlichen Erkenntnis*³⁸ and second, *Eidetische Anlage und kindliches Seelenleben*.³⁹ In the latter work especially the increasing inclination of Jaensch and his school toward pedagogy is evident. He has declared expressly that "It is the purpose of our movement to be the physician of civilization". Hence he and his colleagues center their attention more and more on children and their development, stressing in this development certain general stages, levels, and types. They are interested especially in questions important for all teachers and educators—how the child grasps the external world, how he adjusts himself to it, how he comes to a realization not only of existence but of values. An example of such an investigation from Jaensch's school is Hann Ruppert's *Aufbau der Welt des Jugendlichen: Ein Beitrag zur Frage nach der Bildung und Entwicklung des Werterle-*

³⁸ Leipzig, Verlag Johann Ambrosius Barth, Vol. I, 1927; Vol. II, 1931.

³⁹ Leipzig, Verlag Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1934.

bens und Wertbewusstseins in der Reifezeit.⁴⁰ In all this work, which is closely related to the investigations of Wilhelm Stern on the one hand and of Charlotte Bühler on the other, it is easy to perceive the psychological and experimental documentation of the value-theory of Heinrich Rickert's school of Southwest Germany.

Other scientific disciplines and lines of investigation also have fallen under the influence of the new synthetic anthropological psychology, which no longer aims to construct man from discrete elements or to explain his mentality in causal and mechanical terms, but begins from a philosophical conception of unity. Among other sciences even biology may be mentioned in this connection. In this field, besides Ludwig von Bertalanffy's *Kritische Theorie der Formbildung*,⁴¹ special importance attaches to the whole line of investigation under the leadership of the biologist, Julius Schaxel, Professor at the University of Jena. The same synthetic tendency in biology has produced the penetrating book of Armin Müller, *Struktur und Aufbau der biologischen Ganzheiten*.⁴² Müller criticizes not only a mechanistic theory of evolution—which is quite natural—but the pragmatic point of view which grows out of ethical utilitarianism—which is very interesting—as if it were the law of biological and organic processes to preserve and renew themselves. He rightly holds that such a rationalized teleology is too narrow. The problem of life is rather a problem of the immanent teleological urge toward "unified forms", so that animals and plants, or even cells, cannot be conceived as machines put together out of separate parts.⁴³ We must imagine a new morphology coming into being, or more properly, the revival of a morphology is being completed which was pushed into the background by mechanistic biology. According to it the conviction is conceivable that the dynamic, vitalistic conception of *Gestalt* is admirably suited to representing organic reality and consequently—by a reasonable extension and transference to anthropology—is admirably suited to understanding man. We have now in Germany a long

⁴⁰ Leipzig, Verlag Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1931.

⁴¹ Berlin, Verlag Börnträger, 1928.

⁴² Leipzig, Verlag Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1933.

⁴³ Cf. the instructive article by Müller on "Die Überwindung des Utilitarismus in der Biologie der Gegenwart", *Kant-Studien*, XXXVIII (1933) 384 ff.

series of works belonging to morphological anthropology. It should be observed, however, that in these works the concept of *Gestalt* is no longer taken in a merely critical sense as a methodological or heuristic principle but is accepted as a genuine form of reality. Consequently in this biology and anthropology there appears the same tendency toward a realism tinged with Aristotelianism which is so characteristic of the contemporary philosophical movement in Germany. Of this development we have offered here merely a few noteworthy examples. The account might be, indeed should be, extended, especially by enumerating works from the *Gestalt* psychology, so fruitfully developed by Wolfgang Köhler and Max Wertheimer. With justice, this psychology is widely known and highly valued in the United States.

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CONTEMPORARY GERMAN PHILOSOPHY¹

I

NO other study, no other sphere of culture, strives so continuously to apprehend its own nature and its position within the history of the intellect as is the case with philosophy. Every philosophical work, no matter what particular problem it may be devoted to, really serves the purpose of determining the conception and nature of philosophy. This peculiar problem is the reason why new books are always necessarily appearing which present themselves as introductions to philosophy, whether they expressly describe themselves as such or not. And in the present new review of important and interesting publications in contemporary German philosophy we shall begin by describing some of these attempts to clarify the conception and nature of philosophy.

If we wish to understand the conception and nature of philosophy our first task must be to simplify the bewildering multiplicity of the historical facts, in order to grasp the unity of the subject. Such a simplification is undertaken by Othmar Spann, professor of sociology at the University of Vienna, in his *Philosophenspiegel, Die Hauptlehren der Philosophie begrifflich und lehrgeschichtlich dargestellt*.² He finds it necessary to distinguish only two main camps, the empiricist and the idealist. They differ both in the experiences on which they are based and in their conceptual developments. The beginning is a primitive feeling that seizes only the surface of things and consists merely of a simple impression of sense; it is thus nothing but a simple experience and leads thence towards the mystic depths of the mind's self-knowledge. He means, briefly, the road from sensationalism and empiricism (sophists, sceptics, positivists, Locke, Hume, Avenarius) to epistemological and ethical idealism (Socrates, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, etc.) and finally to the maturest and highest form of philosophy, which he finds in ontological idealism (Plato, Aristotle, Schelling—who is here valued gratifyingly highly—and Hegel) and in German mysticism. In depicting this process he also takes note of mixed and abortive forms; such are, in the case of

¹ Translated from the German by Richard Robinson.

² Leipzig, Quelle und Meyer, 1933.

idealism, Descartes, Spinoza, Berkeley, Schleiermacher, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. His main idea is attractive and worthy of consideration; it seems convincing and serves as a good heuristic principle. The exposition reveals a grasp of the field and a keen head. It is sometimes overloaded, however, with unnecessary facts that are not always formulated in sufficiently definite conceptions; and for this reason the general line of the development of philosophy, as Spann conceives it, does not appear as distinctly as one might wish. The exposition does not always follow as it should the principle, laid down by the author himself, of simplifying the superabundant material. On merely pedagogical grounds the unimportant parts should have been omitted.

What Theodor Litt, the outstanding philosopher and educationist of the University of Leipzig, has given us in his *Einleitung in die Philosophie*³ is not a book *about* philosophers and philosophical systems and the history of philosophy but his own largely independent reflections. This is the work of a real and independent thinker. The danger that such a work should be less an introduction to philosophy, to the ideal essence of philosophy, than to its author's own particular conception of the nature of philosophy, has been happily averted by a resolute effort to attain a systematic concatenation of ideas. The notion of system is in fact the safest insurance against subjectivity. But how does Litt reach his fundamental systematic position? Not by developing his ideas in a purely abstract vacuum, entirely independently of contemporary philosophy. Here as in his earlier and well-known works, Litt is a dialectician. By that fact alone he would prove himself a philosopher. He works out his own point of view by way of a dialectical examination of other views. The movements that he is most concerned with are Neo-Kantianism, phenomenology, the philosophy of life, and the philosophy of culture, that is to say, the points of view represented by Natorp and Ernst Cassirer (Marburg Neo-Kantianism) or by Rickert and Bauch (Southwest-German Neo-Kantianism) or by Jonas Cohn and Kroner (Neo-Hegelianism) or by Husserl and Scheler and Heidegger (phenomenology) or by Bergson and Driesch (the philosophy of life) or by Dilthey, Simmel and Troeltsch (the philosophy of culture).

³ Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1933.

But what is his own point of view? The first thing we discover is that he holds to the fundamental conviction that there is no such contradiction between "strict" and "intuitive" philosophy as is often supposed. We do not have to choose between the two. Thus Litt's thought is dialectical in that he has adopted, in his sort of philosophizing, both "rationalism" and "vision". But this means that philosophical thinking is universal and reflexive thinking in one and the same breath. The clarification of this idea, and the description, in exemplary logical formulation, of the selfrealization of this thinking independently of all forces but itself, make up the content of this truly philosophical "introduction to philosophy". The selfrealization of philosophical thought has three stages. Philosophy grasps itself and achieves objective validity first as knowledge, in the structure of the sphere of knowledge; it realizes itself next in the world of experience and as a world of experience, that is to say, in the world of the ego or subject; finally, it achieves its highest objectification in the world and as a world of values, that is, in the historical world.

This account of the autonomous and creative movement of philosophical thought, ever being renewed, reminds one in many respects of Hegel's phenomenology of the spirit. Litt is and knows that he is dependent on Hegel, and he recognizes him as the greatest philosopher. He has given expression to this disposition in a work which, like the lecture on which it is based, has not been without effect on his personal fortunes. The work bears the title *Philosophie und Zeitgeist*.⁴ It pronounces definitely for pure and free philosophizing, obedient only to the *Ethos* of the philosophical *Logos* and conceding to no political party or movement the right to interfere with the independence of its thought. It pronounces secondly for the rights and the importance of German idealism, whose eternal validity is now again being denied by those same forces that are attacking free philosophy. The fight against idealism in general has become fashionable at the moment, but the manner in which it is being conducted is not exactly a glorious spectacle. Litt does not allow such attacks to lead him astray. Like the large work previously mentioned, this book reveals the indispensable outlines of idealistic thought, outlines which, while they apply

⁴Leipzig, Felix Meiner, 1934.

primarily to Hegel and are certainly influenced by historical events and particular historical times, are not thereby compelled nor even permitted to abandon their freedom and independence. They are not outside that "Particularity" which appears as history and *Zeitgeist*; but nor are they subordinate to it; that is to say, philosophy is not the handmaid of the reigning historical forces. As free and sincere thought philosophy raises the particular to the heights of the universal, and in so doing helps it to reveal its own real core and meaning. That is a truly Hegelian thought. We may recognize in Litt one of the most outstanding representatives of Neo-Hegelianism.

The literary background and foundation of this Neo-Hegelianism lies partly in the admirable edition of Hegel⁵ that we owe to the unique knowledge, the incomparable industry, and the unsurpassable philosophical conscientiousness of Georg Lasson, who died a few years ago. Of this complete critical edition, expected to make 26 volumes, the greater part has already appeared, and thanks to the energy of the publisher and the conscientiousness of some young Neo-Hegelians we may definitely expect the conclusion of this great enterprise. The young Johannes Hoffmeister deserves special mention among these continuators of the magnificent activity of Georg Lasson, the gifted son of the memorable Adolf Lasson, who preserved the knowledge of Hegel's philosophy to the present. This edition provides the groundwork for a neatly chosen selection of Hegel's political opinions, made by the publishing house itself and bearing the title *Hegel heute*.⁶

As in Litt, so in Paul Haeberlin there works the power and the strictness of free and inwardly independent philosophizing, a philosophizing that arises out of the power of the Logos. Haeberlin, who is Ordinarius for philosophy in the University of Basel, has recently published an introduction to philosophy under the title *Das Wesen der Philosophie*.⁷ He also is seeking to solve the problem what philosophy "really" is, that is to say, what the pure *Idea* of philosophy would be. Not merely in our efforts to find the answer, but even in order to achieve an inward comprehension of the sense of the question, we must avoid all external approaches

⁵ Leipzig, Felix Meiner.

⁷ Munich, Ernst Reinhardt, 1934.

⁶ Leipzig, Felix Meiner.

such as a purely historical knowledge, and place ourselves within the philosophical situation. There is a whole series of such philosophical situations, for example the "practical", the "aesthetic", the "ethical", the "religious" and above all the "theoretical" situation. Haeberlin gives a splendid characterization of their outlines. At every step one remarks in him an excellent psychological and characterological training. The attitude and position that is decisive for philosophizing in the most proper sense is the theoretical. "Theory" is the feeling and the activity by which we grasp Being, or the Essential, in its unity. Thus he revives the ancient Greek Platonic conception of theory. In this purely theoretical attitude we are also able to recognize the real being and essence of philosophy, independent of all its particular contents and historical realizations. And what determination of the nature of philosophy are we then enabled to give? It is above all an attitude towards life, in and through which we become certain and are certain of the unity of Being as something selfevident and unshakable. This fundamental experience of unity overcomes and destroys all dependence on any external objectivity as well as all speculative and subjective interpretation of Being. In particular, no place is left for the attempt to exert a reforming ethical influence or to educate and transform reality or to evaluate Being. The theoretical attitude and situation renders the philosopher certain of the imperishable perfection of reality, in face of which all evaluations are nothing but unstable caprice. To understand reality is to affirm it. And what, in view of this, is the function of philosophy according to Haeberlin? The function of philosophy is to be philosophy, that is, to philosophize. In so doing it does not simply serve knowledge; it is knowledge. And its subject is the unity and totality of life, so far as it can be experienced at all. This theoretical attitude attains psychological realization in the love of wisdom, an absolutely unsentimental and absolutely free love, in which every temporal and human bond disappears.

Possibly Haeberlin oversimplifies the multiplicity of motives and attitudes that are combined into a dialectical unity in philosophy. Possibly also he underestimates the personal, subjective and historical moments that are evermore active in the foundations and structure of philosophy. But in any case his work deserves to be

recognized as the product of a thinker who is standing upon a genuinely philosophical look-out and philosophizing purely out of philosophy itself and for the sake of philosophy itself, free from all external and unphilosophical dependencies. And so long as men continue to philosophize with this attitude and in this spirit, philosophy will remain alive and preserve its validity even in Europe. Rationalism of this stamp remains essential for the development and future of our culture. The part of "reason" is by no means played out and must not be played out, as I have declared repeatedly and at length in my new work *Philosophie des Unterrichts*.⁸

II

It is certain that the nature and growth of culture does not depend exclusively on the power of reason. In the relation between reason and the vital forces there reign a severe tension and a profound struggle for superiority. The distinguished philosophical author Jakob Klatzkin undertakes to examine the relation of culture and the consciousness of culture to the passions and desires, and to throw light on the latter's position with regard to knowledge, in his unusually impressive and often positively exciting book *Der Erkenntnistrieb als Lebens- und Todesprinzip*.⁹ I should say that the outstanding attractiveness and worth of this book lies primarily in its thoroughly human character. It reflects our own experience directly and without preconceptions, and is for that reason philosophical in the true sense of the word. There is—and this is one of its chief good points—nothing affected about it, nothing artificial, nothing invented. It depicts—and that in a splendidly cultivated style which consciously avoids all obscurities—the fierce and continuous and apparently endless struggle between life, experience, instinct, desire and the like, on the one hand, and knowledge on the other. Klatzkin's analyses of the instincts, such as the instinct of selfpreservation, and of simple desire in its relation to satisfaction and dissatisfaction, are masterly achievements both of a careful scientific method that evinces the finest psychological penetration and of penetrating and magnificent speculative evaluation and interpretation of the subject

⁸ Berlin and Zurich, Verlag für Recht und Gesellschaft, 1935.

⁹ Zurich, Verlag Rascher & Cie, A. G., 1935.

in hand. He entirely redeems his promise to give us a "metaphysics of the instincts". His biophilosophical doctrine of the instincts culminates in a disturbing assertion that demands critical judgment, namely the assertion that, as the urge towards knowledge grows stronger, in spite of all its efficiency as an "awakener of life" it at the same time causes an "exhaustion of the vital force"; or, to apply it directly to life, that the progressive rise in the general intelligence is bound up with a decrease in the general vitality, and that this process tends towards a maximum. Thus then the urge towards knowledge exercises a typically dialectical function: it furthers life, but it also contributes to the weakening and finally to the dying off of life. Klatzkin's metaphysics, built up by energetic thinking and by a thinker's energy, sometimes recalls the books of Ludwig Klages, mentioned in my previous report,¹⁰ for example his *Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele*. Klatzkin excels, however, according to my impression, in having greater knowledge in the field of philosophy and in having the gift of pointed exposition free from all obscurities and metaphors. He links up very fruitfully with Spinoza's celebrated doctrine of the passions. Nietzsche also seems to me to have had a not unimportant influence on Klatzkin, although there are only two places in which he directly refers to him. It is to be hoped that the book will have the result of enlivening discussion about the value of the powers of reason and those of the irrational. And since this discussion will necessarily endure, we may assume and expect that Klatzkin's very interesting position in the dispute will also, because of its definiteness, if for no other reason, be continually referred to and discussed. His book deserves this enduring consideration. And in this discussion his view that the vital forces are dangerously threatened by the urge for knowledge will perhaps undergo a certain alteration. I am convinced that the energy of these vital forces is too great, and their capacity for selfrenewal too strong, for them to be in any serious danger in the long run from the power of reflection and consciousness, even if this power be in a process of uninterrupted increase. In the long run there will be no onesided victory here. The dialectic and tension existing between them will probably remain standing in its rational-irra-

¹⁰ This *Review* XLIV (1935) 42 ff.

tional dynamic. But precisely when the reasons and the value of this tension are being considered anew, it will be suitable and helpful to go back to Klatzkin's fruitful position and decision.

As Heinrich Rickert himself admits, his latest book, *Grundprobleme der Philosophie: Methodologie, Ontologie, Anthropologie*,¹¹ does not contain any great surprises for the reader who knows Rickert's earlier writings. Although, however, it offers nothing really new, its appearance is to be welcomed for several reasons. In the first place Rickert, who a few years ago attained to the age of the patriarchs, here sums up the rich yield of his life-work with exemplary simplicity and clearness. His achievement represents an important stage in the history of philosophy. About that no more need be said in the pages of this journal. The present book affords the best basis for the realization of this achievement. Furthermore, it is in all cases instructive to see and to be able to determine how a thinker of Rickert's rank, whose philosophy has its roots in the Neo-Kantianism of the nineties, reacts to certain tendencies and directions of contemporary philosophy. He had already, in his *Die Philosophie des Lebens*,¹² undertaken to criticize very sharply and to reject the philosophy of life that was flourishing at the time; he now criticizes and rejects the so-called "philosophy of existence". But in making the same objection as he formerly made to the philosophy of life (for example, Max Scheler's), namely that it is all too prone to operate by means of catchphrases, he shows himself a not entirely impartial judge. In order to understand and evaluate the appearance and spread of new attempts and new directions in philosophy, not the least necessary thing is to take account of the general historical situation and the concrete efforts and desires of the age, changes in which always affect the development and form of philosophy. In Rickert's book there is no trace of the new problems of the philosophy of existence, as they appear for example in Heidegger and Jaspers. This is indeed perfectly comprehensible. His book is grouped round the three fundamental problems of knowledge, reality, and man, and hence his three chapters treat the problems of methodology (or theory of knowledge), ontology and an-

¹¹ Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1934.

¹² Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, first edition, 1920.

thropology. One follows his illuminating expositions with pleasure and is enriched thereby, because, although they offer no new or overwhelming information, they derive from a systematically established point of view. Rickert describes this point of view as an activist idealism of freedom. Thus he acknowledges his kinship with Fichte and Schiller; his Neo-Kantianism is in fact an interesting and illuminating deviation from true Kantianism towards Fichte and Schiller. It was a Fichtean idea, and perhaps also a sign of the influence of the events that are now filling Germany, to emphasize more strongly than before the dependence of man on historical conditions and the value of the national element. One has a feeling of resistance in reading such sentences as the following:

As soon, however, as we examine culture as a whole, in which knowledge is only a part, we have to consider that culture as a whole is a product of history, and that hence its "meaning" cannot be understood at all completely unless we take into account its historical conditions and its national character. There are no "men in general" in the historical life and culture; there are only members of peoples and nations. If a person does not see this, or thinks it philosophically unimportant, he has not yet passed out of the "Enlightenment" of the eighteenth century.

Apart from the fact that Rickert considers man to be also a "piece of nature", which qualifies his assertion about man's historical conditionedness, he should recognize that tremendous paradox which consists in the fact that no historical existence and action is possible unless history mysteriously transcends itself and attains its true reality. The realm of values, among whose discoverers and main interpreters is Rickert himself, can never be grasped or explained in a purely historical way, because it is not purely historical in its essence. His "heterology", which is discussed in this book, too, is only an incipient dialectic; it leads necessarily towards dialectic, that is, towards a line of development in contemporary philosophy that has in Rickert, notwithstanding his remarkably unfavorable attitude towards it, a forerunner whom it is eager to recognize.

The philosophy of existence mentioned above, a flourishing species of realism, has produced two new works. I mention first

Else Freund's book, *Die Existenzphilosophie Franz Rosenzweigs*.¹³ Together with Heidegger and Jaspers and his friend Martin Buber Rosenzweig is among the most gifted and productive and profound representatives of this realistic development. His indubitable philosophical importance rests mainly on his large work, *Der Stern der Erlösung*, which appeared in 1921. The beginning and middle and end of this whole philosophy of existence lies in the problem of human existence. As soon as this problem has been stated the foundation has been laid for the philosophy of existence. But only for the philosophy of existence? Is this not also the foundation for philosophy in general? The foundation for idealism too? The supporters of the philosophy of existence contradict the facts when they bring against idealism the objection or even the reproach that it has not attacked either the problem of existence in its universality or that of specifically human existence. But, however that may be, let us be thankful that this eternal and inexhaustible problem is now being attacked from the viewpoint and with the means of the realistic philosophy of existence. And doubly and trebly thankful when the attack is conducted by such a capable thinker as Franz Rosenzweig, who was snatched away by a fatal illness long before his time and in the fullness of his creative powers.¹⁴

The authoress of the present book gives us a sensitive and penetrating analysis of Rosenzweig's above-mentioned main work, *Der Stern der Erlösung*. From the point of view of the history of philosophy it is noteworthy in the first place that he links up with Schelling, and especially with the latter's late period, with his so-called positive philosophy, that is to say, with the romantic philosophy of religion. This is thoroughly comprehensible and indeed necessary. For when the problem of man is raised with all earnestness and all emphasis, religious moments, religious experiences, religious questions are always present in decisive force. Thinking cannot grasp even simple existence without remainder, and formal rationalism fails even more greatly when the problem of our existence is concentrated upon religious phenomena, upon our

¹³ Leipzig, Felix Meiner, 1933.

¹⁴ He died in December 1929. See Martin Buber's obituary notice in *Kant-Studien* 1930 pp. 517 ff.

finitude and temporality and not least upon death, that overwhelming phenomenon that is yet given with our existence and therefore really commonplace. But just in and because of his finitude and temporality there rises before man the eternity and omnipotence of God. Because we are forfeit to death we long for redemption; we gaze around for the call of God. Through God's infinitude we become aware of our finitude. Thus, and in these perfectly concrete experiences and relationships, does our existence unfold itself. The philosophy of existence objects that idealism passes too lightly over all the concrete cares and needs of life; it retires too quickly into conceptual generalities and hence reduces existence too quickly to abstractions. This is shown also in its excessively mathematical way of grasping all appearances.

It is easy to see that and how the philosophy of existence inaugurates a retreat from Platonism and an advance towards the more concrete point of view of Aristotle. As I have already stated in my previous review, the trend towards philosophy of existence, ontology, and realism, means a revival of Aristotelianism, whose concrete mode of thinking stands in opposition to that of Plato. Contemporary philosophers of existence, however, mix strong mystical and romantic traits with this very rationalistically toned Aristotelianism. That is how they make a connection with Schelling. In the case of Jewish thinkers such as Rosenzweig and Buber this mysticism and romanticism takes on a strongly Chassidic flavor. The Chassidim are of course the Jewish mystics and romanticists, and in the Jewish intellectual life at present, and especially in that of Germany and the eastern parts of Europe, they are experiencing an interesting resurrection. Possibly this resurrection is connected with the political fate of the Jews in those places, which makes natural a movement towards religious mysticism.

Johannes Pfeiffer's little book, *Existenzphilosophie, Eine Einführung in Heidegger und Jaspers*,¹⁵ can be thoroughly recommended as an illuminating introduction to the outlines of the philosophy of existence. This philosophy, in discussing Being in all its concrete reality, in its absolutely concrete "Being there", is concerned with the Being-there of man. What is the meaning

¹⁵ Leipzig, Felix Meiner, 1933.

of this Being-there? Pfeiffer illuminates very clearly the existential, the in no way ideal or abstract, meaning of this human Being-there. Man becomes aware of his Being in the exciting moods of fear, in the devastating experience of being "thrown" into this time and place. No scientific or biological derivation can explain these secrets. Rather we are here standing on the obscure ground of a mysterious and yet very positive Nothing, which is far more than a mere mathematical zero. When we experience this Nothing in all its existential weight, there arises in us a feeling of profound unrest, profound care, profound guilt. Conscience within us sounds the question why we are "there" and the accusation that we are "there". Immediately there arise before us the problems of "birth" and "death" in all their overwhelming impenetrability. And connected with "birth" and "death" are a hundred no less uneasy questions and experiences, of which we will here mention only the problem of "time". Among the inspirers of this philosophy of existence that goes in so strongly and profoundly for romanticism and mysticism are Nietzsche, and in a certain sense also Schopenhauer, and—what is easy to comprehend—the old mystics back to the mysticism of antiquity. This explains the violent opposition that this philosophy sometimes meets with from thinkers of a more rationalist temper. But the opposition cannot take away its rights, even when it puts on theological and mystico-religious dress.

One of the strangest paradoxes of our life is that we become most strongly aware of the actuality of life precisely at the moment and in the situation in which it is disappearing or seeming to disappear. This is the moment of death. Hence the philosophy of existence must concern itself with this unique experience. With what presuppositions and in what way it does so is developed in an exceedingly acute little brochure by Joachim Wach, up to now professor of the philosophy of religion at the University of Leipzig: *Das Problem des Todes in der Philosophie unserer Zeit*.¹⁶ He examines in four sections Schopenhauer's doctrine of negation, Nietzsche's doctrine of world-affirmation, Simmel's metaphysics of death, and Heidegger's romantic analysis of the experience and the phenomenon of death. It is to be hoped that we may receive more monographs of this nature on the metamorphoses

¹⁶ Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1934.

of particular fundamental conceptions in contemporary philosophy. I will here suggest only such a special study of the conception of time and its transformations.

III

Schopenhauer occupies the transitional position between idealism and realism and plays the part of intermediary between rationalism and irrationalism or romanticism. This determines his place in the history of the philosophy of the nineteenth century and explains his supremacy. His thought is much regarded by the modern philosophy of existence, and the *Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft* devotes itself tirelessly to its service. In spite of grave hindrances, both external and internal, which have been overcome mainly by the devoted zeal of its president Dr. Hans Zint for his subject, the society has succeeded in publishing a new and very magnificent *Jahrbuch*, number 22 in the whole series.¹⁷ The volume contains a solid memorial article on Hans Vaihinger, who was sympathetic with Schopenhauer's philosophy, from the pen of Professor Kowalewki of Königsberg; a penetrating examination by Carl Wagner of "Goethe's Doctrine of Color and Schopenhauer's Theory of Color"; an instructive discussion by Helmuth von Glasenapp on "Affirming and Denying Life among the Indian Thinkers", which is intended to be at the same time a criticism of Albert Schweitzer's new book, *Die Weltanschauung der indischen Denker*,¹⁸ an informative biographico-historical section, to which Franz Mockrauer above all has contributed a large and interesting article on "Schopenhauer and Denmark"; reviews and attractive illustrations; all in all a monumental tribute worthy of Schopenhauer's greatness and a substantial addition to Schopenhauerian research.

In the historically and systematically important reaction from idealism to realism and ontology and the philosophy of existence, of which we spoke in our report of the previous year, Franz Brentano was most decidedly concerned. Hence it is thoroughly comprehensible that in view of this development Brentano's philosophy is enjoying steadily increasing consideration. This consideration is admirably supported by the excellent edition of his

¹⁷ Heidelberg, Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1935.

¹⁸ Munich, C. H. Beck, 1935.

writings, of which eleven volumes have so far appeared.¹⁹ The publication is in the experienced hands of the outstanding students of Brentano, namely, Oskar Kraus and Alfred Kastil. The edition has an important support in the Brentano Society at the University at Prague, which owes its foundation partly to the initiative and the practical aid of the president of Czecho-Slovakia, Masaryk, an enthusiastic admirer of Brentano. The edition naturally includes Brentano's epochmaking *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (two volumes so far), but I will expressly mention and notice in some detail the *Kategorienlehre*, edited by Alfred Kastil, and *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis*, edited by Oskar Kraus. Brentano does not understand the conception of category in the epistemological sense of Kant, whom he often and energetically combats, but rather ontologically, in the sense of Aristotle, to whom he consciously attaches himself as all ontologists naturally do. In this marvellously acute inquiry the author's eye is naturally directed mainly to the central category of being, of substance and to the categories of accident and relation; that is to say, to the fundamental categories of every doctrine of being. Although he gives us no fully worked out system of the categories, his book provides the fundamental presuppositions and the main outlines for such a system and so for an ontologically-minded philosophy. To ascertain and clarify the ontological and realistic meaning and value of the categories he employs that criticism of language and usage of which he is one of the creators. In this field his main achievement was to reveal the dangerous ambiguity of "is" and to make illuminating distinctions in the conception and word "Being". The emotional reality of words, and the powerful impressions they make upon us, often betray us, as Brentano points out both in his *Kategorienlehre* and in his *Psychologie* and elsewhere, into assuming the existence of a thing or reality where there is nothing but words which merely serve "to indicate the manifold ways in which we have things as objects".²⁰ Brentano has a highly gifted continuator of his criticism of language in Anton Marty.

The work *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis* is very appropri-

¹⁹ Leipzig, Felix Meiner.

²⁰ Kastil, in his introduction to the *Kategorienlehre*, p. v.

ately described by its editor Oskar Kraus as an ethical theory of knowledge. It has had the greatest influence upon the modern theory of value. The achievements of Edmund Husserl and Alexius Meinong would have been just as impossible without it as Max Scheler's *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* or Nicolai Hartmann's *Ethik*. In this work Brentano seeks for the spiritual activities in which lies the standard of the rightness of our feeling and willing. And he finds them in the acts of evaluation and preference, which are directly characterized as right and experienced as evident. The ethical consciousness that is alive in all of us is active in the spiritual functions of evaluating and preferring. These functions are justified through and in themselves; they arise in us with a definite force and conviction. Brentano believes that with this conclusion he overcomes both the psychological subjectivism and relativism of the ancient sophists and their modern followers the utilitarians and pragmatists, and also the rationalistic formalism of extreme idealists, which makes the "Good" dependent on the possibility of universalizing an action into a universal law. He does not connect the Good with an absolute and transcendent world of metaphysical values. In such a world he, as a determined opponent of metaphysics, sees nothing but an untenable fiction, invented by idealism and hypostatized into an absolute reality through misapprehension of its fictitious character. According to him the reality of the ethical is guaranteed by the selfevidence of the acts of evaluation and preference.

The Brentano Society has undertaken to disseminate and develop Brentano's ideas. It has arranged for the publication of lectures and speeches delivered by its members on the occasion of the eighth international congress of philosophers at Prague, September 1934; and they have recently appeared under the title *Zur Philosophie der Gegenwart*.²¹ We may mention the impressive lectures of Alfred Kastil on "The Ontological and the gnoseological Conception of Truth", of Oskar Kraus on "The Peculiarity and the Task of German Philosophy in Bohemia", and of Emil Utitz on "The Selfrealization of Philosophy". If it be true that every tree is known by his own fruit, the high value of Brentano's philosophy can be most surely measured by his pupils, all of whom,

²¹ Published by the Brentano-Gesellschaft itself, 1934.

brought up with his outstanding mental training, have produced important accomplishments and thereby made themselves a sounding name in scientific philosophy. Among these pupils Oskar Kraus, whom we have already mentioned several times, has published a collection of important lectures and articles under the title *Wege und Abwege der Philosophie*.²² This is an excellent introduction to Brentano's thought. With an incomparable grasp of the material Kraus combines the gift of masterly clearness. What is the fundamental principle of being? What is the measure of all things? Kraus answers with Brentano: it is the man who judges with insight. Selfevident judgments are not merely the measure of scientific and logical truth, they are also the ultimate measure of what is emotionally right. Hence the criterion of right and wrong evaluation and preference can be found only in ourselves. This "evidence" is also the root of all necessity, of the notion of the *a priori*, and of law in general. To hypostasize such evidences into essences existing in and for themselves, as for example Plato did with his "Ideas" or Aristotle with his "entelechies" and "forms" and "matter", as almost all thinkers including Husserl do over and over again, simply shows that they have all succumbed to the insinuations of language and are entangled in the belief "that there must be an independent significance attached to these and innumerable other words of the language". The surest way of removing all such deceptions is the criticism of language, as Brentano laid it down in his *Psychologie* or in his *Wahrheit und Evidenz*²³ among other places. Kraus finds it "a profound disgrace to the philosophical spirit of our time that these epochal studies in the criticism of language have remained almost without effect!" Insight into the validity of "evidence" will complete the famous "Copernican revolution" that Kant introduced but did not carry through to the end. This revolution is concerned, of course, with the critical philosopher's demand for the abandonment of the old correspondence-theory, according to which truth and the consciousness of truth rest upon a comparison or agreement between our judgment and the facts. This contains an insoluble contradiction, which completely annihilates the whole theory. For the facts

²² Prague, J. G. Calve'sche Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1934.

²³ Also published by Felix Meiner at Leipzig in the abovementioned edition.

would have to be previously known, in order to be compared with our knowledge of them. Truth lies in the "evidence" of the man himself who judges with insight. This disposes of the correspondence-theory, and its dismissal is Brentano's great epistemological achievement. "We call a judgment correct", thus Oskar Kraus formulates this unusual gnoseological conclusion, "not because it conforms to any things or facts or the like, nor yet because the latter conform to our thinking, but because a judgment that is clear and evident could not possibly impart a different quality to the object from that which the valid (or asserted) judgment does impart, that is, could not possibly contradict it." How fruitful and capable of development is this doctrine of evidence often appears best in the works represented by Carl Stumpf in psychology and Edmund Husserl in logic.

IV

If Brentano's school agrees with the modern relativity-doctrine in decisively rejecting speculative idealism and its speculative metaphysics, it disagrees equally decisively with that doctrine in retaining and recognizing the notion of the *a priori*, which it will not allow to degenerate into a convention or into a result of induction and statistics. But the recognition of the *a priori* is precisely what the relativity-doctrine directs its arrows against. This is perfectly clear in Hans Reichenbach's *Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre*,²⁴ a very large, copious and penetrating work of splendid acuteness and outstanding knowledge of the subject. Reichenbach, who is now professor of natural philosophy at the university at Istanbul, gives his book the subtitle: *An Inquiry into the Logical and Mathematical Foundations of the Calculation of Probability*. There are many reasons for undertaking a strictly scientific examination of the conception of probability. The main one is presumably the realization, which affects us not merely scientifically but also humanly, spiritually and morally in every way, that we "do not make a single assertion about reality that does not already contain the conception of probability". Hence we cannot estimate the meaning and validity of any of our knowledge unless we clear up the notion of probability. In very detailed discussions, which

²⁴ Leyden, A. W. Sijhoff's Uitgeversmaatschappij, 1935.

indicate a decade of successful work at the subject, Reichenbach develops the important idea that in applying natural laws to reality we never have statements of unconditional certainty but always statements with the character of probability. But from what quarter can we come at this conception of probability, whose indispensability has been convincingly shown in, for example, the modern theory of gases? For this theory has arrived at the conclusion that certain laws of natural science are only statistical, that is, probable in character. By means of a mathematical calculus the author offers us an explanation of the conception of probability that satisfies all scientific requirements. The main content of the work is the analysis and statement of this criticism of probability from the mathematical side. In connection with this analysis, in which Reichenbach shows himself a thoroughly trained mathematician, he also attains a noteworthy extension of logic. He comes to a so-called "logic of probability", which shows that judgments of probability are not to be regarded as propositions in the sense of classical logic. This significantly widens the range and validity of his studies. The mathematical analysis advances to an epistemological analysis, so that "we are not concerned here merely with problems of mathematics and mathematical physics, we are concerned with our ultimate knowledge of nature in general, we are concerned with the question what our statements about reality really mean".

Reichenbach does not infer from the results of his inquiries any conclusions affecting our *Weltanschauung* in the proper sense of that word, because he is anxious not to desert the sphere of strictly demonstrable decisions. He is an energetic representative and supporter of that logistic which the Viennese and Prague Circle, to which he belongs along with Schlick, Carnap, Ph. Franck and others, regards as the only justifiable basis for scientific philosophy. If we abandon this basis, whose relativity and merely inductive character they recognize and do not attempt to conceal, we thereby not merely abandon all scientific procedure in philosophy, but philosophy sinks, according to the logisticians, into an unverifiable and unstable chatter, a baseless fanaticism. By philosophy based on logistic they propose to put an end to the period of metaphysical constructions in philosophy. And Reichenbach holds that in gene-

ral the belief in the value of speculative philosophy is already sufficiently shattered. With this assertion we cannot agree, although we do not doubt the relative value of this scientific relativism and this relativistic science, especially when the point of view is so conscientiously represented as it is by Reichenbach. The writer of this report believes that speculative idealism is not merely permanently indispensable but also necessary and actually being revived at the present time. Certain books that we shall discuss below are signs of this revival. My book on *Die Krisis des Idealismus*, which is now in the press, is also intended to be a sign of it. Since, however, this idealism possesses to a large degree the characteristics of "dialectic", it will, as a dialectical idealism, have certain relations with this relativity-doctrine and make use of it in establishing its own scientific foundation. In the relativity-theorists we dialecticians perceive and welcome fellow-workers and kindred spirits in a certain sense, although we depart widely from them in recognizing the necessity and possibility of metaphysics.

This Viennese and Prague Circle was formed as a definite community of philosophical workers, to pursue upon a logistical and mathematical basis a strict and purely "scientific" philosophy far removed from all speculation, and, as their organ *Erkenntnis* shows, they do actually pursue it. They strove and strive to clarify the conception and the essence of knowledge, and they do this in the closest possible connection with mathematics and mathematical physics. Has this attempt succeeded? That this is not the case is shown in a newly published and very helpful work by the Swedish philosopher Åke Petzäll of the University of Göteborg: *Zum Methodenproblem der Erkenntnisforschung*.²⁵ He begins by exposing the confusion and anarchy that reigns in the treatment of the conception of knowledge: epistemology has no unified, generally recognized method. Even the point of view from which the treatment is to proceed has not yet been explained in a way valid for all purposes. Or does this assertion go too far? Is the "Viennese Circle" at any rate in such a state of unity? Even this is not the case, as is shown by the polemic between Schlick on the one hand and Carnap and Neurath on the other. But how, according to

²⁵ Göteborg, Erlanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1935.

Petzäll, are we to proceed in order to master the problem of method in the sphere of epistemology? Historical, logical, epistemological and psychological considerations lead him to this remarkable formula, which is intended to express the starting-point and the viewpoint for such a unification: "What is the meaning of the claim to validity?" This formula includes the tension that exists in the relation between logical form and empirical content, and smoothes the way for an understanding of the dynamic (may one perhaps say "dialectic"?) within the problem of knowledge. In his illuminating conclusion the author explains and proves its heuristic value and actual usefulness. The Kantian and the critical philosopher, especially the critical philosopher who thinks dialectically, will be glad to see in this formula a tenable basis for discussion of the problem of knowledge and of the possibility of reconciling the various forms of epistemology. Obvious is its connection with critical philosophy dialectically understood, as I have represented it in my *Erkenntnistheorie*, which also discusses the question of the method of epistemology. I am glad to welcome Åke Petzäll to this community of "dialectical" workers.

V

Although these movements—the philosophy of existence, ontology, positivistic relativism, and realism in general—occupy a relatively large place in contemporary German philosophy and are being diligently pursued, they are by no means in sole control. Their obvious onesidedness would by itself prevent that. A far more comprehensive view of reality than they can show is to be observed in the imposing lifework connected with the name of Heinrich Maier, who was snatched away in November 1933 in the middle of a most vigorous productivity. In our preceding report we discussed some of Maier's works, especially the first two volumes of his important *Philosophie der Wirklichkeit*.²⁶ We now have a no less important continuation of his philosophy in the third volume, which gives us *The Structure of the Physical World* and is so entitled. I indicated in the abovementioned report that its appearance was expected, and it has now become a fact. Here we have an astonishing learning combined with a powerful intel-

²⁶ This *Review* XLIV 30 ff.

lectual force that avoids no difficulties and penetrates to the utmost depths of problems. Heinrich Maier had an amazing command of the history of philosophy. He had a great gift for attacking philosophical questions with a perfectly open mind and following them up to their furthest ramifications and refinements. Indeed, he was often the first to discover these ramifications and refinements and develop them in keen inquiries. His colleague and friend Eduard Spranger has given a worthy portrait of this great scholar and philosopher and magnificent man in a *Gedächtnisrede auf Heinrich Maier*.²⁷ The scientific construction of the physical world is accomplished in a system of categories. Hence the present volume gives us a system of these categorial forms of physical reality. Not merely is the account very detailed, but the essence and value of the categories are examined and developed on all sides with outstanding circumspection. At the head of the undertaking, of course, stands the decision—taken over from the previous volumes—about the validity of the categories and their connection with reality. In opposition to relativism Maier ascribes to them an unconditional logical necessity. This necessity, however, is not based upon itself; it is not anchored in an ideal world existing absolutely for itself and created by pure reason in unconditional autonomy. The validity of the categories is based rather on the fact that they are required by the empirically given, which stands in a transcendental relation to them. Their scientific justification is that they shape the transcendently given. This power to form things reveals their ideality, while their connection with the empirically given reveals their empirical nature, or better, since this empirically given is the reality of the world of appearance, their phenomenalism. This twosidedness of the categories gives rise to an epistemological point of view that Maier calls transcendental phenomenalism. Their aprioriness, which he recognizes, does not however amount according to him to logical absoluteness but remains in a permanent relation to the transcendently given and is justified thereby. And in this way they appear as forms of objective thinking, but forms in the logical and functional sense. This gives the fundamental viewpoints for the elaboration of a system of

²⁷ Berlin, Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften (Walter de Gruyter & Co., agents), 1934.

categories more acute and complete than any we have had for many years. One must go back perhaps as far as Eduard von Hartmann's celebrated *Kategorienlehre*, which appeared in 1897, to find a companion to Maier's theory. Influenced to some extent by Kant's table of the categories, although he often argues energetically against him, Maier starts from the categories that signify the forms of sensible impressions. From these forms of sensation or apprehension (Quality and Intensity) the inquiry proceeds to the categories of intuition, Spatiality and Temporality, and then to the "noetic formal categories" of Comparison and Quantity, then to Individuality, Type, Finality, Substantiality, Causality, etc., to issue in a copious chapter on the categories of the Antinomies, which also deals with the question of the character of physical reality and its position in reality as a whole. Such an infinite continuity of being is attainable only by a "universal thought", to whose permanent actuality we must refer the constitution of the physical world, just as our human thought is a moment in the universal thought. In the unity of this universal thought all antinomies are reconciled. On the basis of these conceptions Maier constructs a unified picture of the world and tends significantly towards a metaphysics that reveals a certain kinship with the ideas of classical and speculative idealism. One inevitably thinks of the institution to which Heinrich Maier owes an important part of his development—of the so-called Tübingen Foundation, which Schelling and Hegel made a starting-point for that constructive form of idealism. We do not mean by this to make Maier an unconditional adherent of idealism. His frequent critical examinations of the theory would forbid any such wholesale attribution. On the other hand, there is no denying the strong influence that idealism has had upon him.

VI

As in this work, so in many others we can detect a renewal of connection with classical idealism. The connection appears not merely in the subject, but also in the manner of regarding it and interpreting it, in a powerful book on the poet *Schiller*²⁸ from the pen of Herbert Cysarz, historian of literature and professor

²⁸ Halle a. S., Max Niemeyer, 1934.

at the University of Prague. This is not exactly a biography but a philosophical interpretation from a lofty point of view, glowing with the idealistic and passionate and stormy spirit of Schiller himself. The reader detects from the very beginning a certain moral and emotional congeniality of the poet to the author. Schiller appears as the poetic companion-temperament to Fichte. For as Fichte was concerned not merely with philosophy, so Schiller according to Cysarz was not concerned merely with poetry as poetry. What distinguishes him from all his predecessors—when Schiller is in question one almost inevitably thinks of Shakespeare as his extreme opposite—is the peculiar meaning and purpose that he gives to his poems and plays. There is a practical purpose at work here. For Schiller as for Fichte life is not reflection and knowledge, not form and idea, but deed and action. His poems arise out of the force of a heroic pragmatism, an idealistic theory of education, a pedagogical activism; and Fichte's philosophy arises out of the same spirit. Hence it is a mistake to evaluate him primarily or mainly as a poet, as we do and must evaluate Shakespeare. Cysarz expresses this activistic and pedagogical spirit in Schiller's works very well when he says that his verse is for the most part as weak in imagery as it is strong as a call or summons. That is why his plays are quite unsuitable for filming. They proceed not from imagination or the love of the spectacular but from a sense of noble devotion. The theater was always a "moral institution" to him. He himself said so in a very illuminating article. Now how did this pedagogical activism develop? Here again the resemblance to Fichte leaps to the eye, although Cysarz does not go into it. Schiller divorced poetry from the sphere of artistic intuition and intuitive art. He wanted in and through poetry to obtain influence upon reality, and it was to be political influence. Cysarz counts him one of the founders of the "political age" in Germany; he calls him "*the* political poet of Germany". This heroic and activistic spirit found it unnatural to experience and represent the beauty of an object, natural or human, purely as beauty. Hence his humanism is not related either to the ancient or to the Christian or to the sentimental kind of the eighteenth century. It is a flaming sermon to arouse the fighting spirit; it is a heroic humanism, as his tragedies are pedagogical glorifications

of the heroes. This account of the main ideas of Cysarz' book on Schiller will have made it clear that his impressive interpretation of the great poet is by way of a revival of activistic idealism. Undoubtedly Cysarz has grasped the profoundest elements in Schiller's nature. And the impression made by the work is all the stronger because he expresses his insight with an irresistible weight and rhetoric that also reminds one of Schiller.

This Schillerian sort of humanism, less scientific and aesthetic, more activistic and political, has been adopted as a new banner, both in Germany and in other countries, by a great many of the representatives of the younger generation, so far as this generation has not sold itself out and out to nationalism. The movement has found a striking expression and a rallying-point in Lothar Helbing's book *Der dritte Humanismus*.²⁹ An important and timely book. So much is clear from the many echoes it has roused and the delight with which it has been received, all of which has given it a large circulation. If the first humanism, *i.e.*, that of the Renaissance, was essentially scientific, *i.e.*, aimed at the foundation and development of the modern natural sciences; if the second, *i.e.*, that beginning with Winckelmann and Herder, was essentially artistic and based on Greek and Hellenistic art, the third humanism, that of the present, shows a different face. It recognizes the power of nation and state in their incontrovertible actuality, but it tries to bring them into connection with humanity. It is not clear to me whether the representatives of this attempt are aware of the tremendous difficulties in its way, and of the sharp dialectic that composes the problematical foundation for such a connection. Anyhow the new humanism is "preponderantly political" as Helbing says. "The third humanism aims simply and solely at realizing the man who includes in himself the tradition of the past and the strongest tensions of the present, the man of richest memory and fairest expectation, that is to say, the perfectly political man." And he finds the pattern of this in the re-discovery and revival of Plato, the genuine Plato of the genuine Greece, not a Christian Plato. Platonism and humanism, thus politically understood, are to become the basis for the education of a new aristocracy, a new class of leaders. Helbing's book is filled

²⁹ Berlin, Verlag Die Runde, 1935.

with a devoted and adventurous idealism, and everything in it suggests a connection with the spirit of Stefan George and his circle. We called attention to some of the works of this circle in our previous report. This humanism has given rise to a new ideology. We need now the intervention of powerful forces, in order to test and realize the conceptual and historical value of this ideology. Everyone who shares in present-day intellectual life with an unprejudiced and open mind feels and knows that this is one of its most serious problems and most pressing demands.

Out of his objective understanding of this problem and his often painful experience of it and sufferings from it, Max Brod has written a solid brochure on *Rassentheorie und Judentum*, with a beginning on "national humanism" by Felix Weltsch.³⁰ Both authors, important and respected writers, are Zionists and therefore nationalists. Contemporary nationalism, especially in its national-socialist form, employs the conception of race in order to establish and justify itself. A Zionist necessarily understands this conception, since for him too it is an ideal and real presupposition. Hence Max Brod discusses the value of the theories of race with much weight, but he opposes himself decidedly to exaggerations and distortions of them, and especially to the judgments inferred therefrom and their consequences for the destiny of particular men and groups of men. Felix Weltsch sketches in a series of thoughtful opinions how a synthesis of nationalism and humanism would look, and how we could attain such a synthesis of these two poles of culture, both of which are necessary for historical human life. The widest possible circulation is to be desired for this brochure. It is written by keen and responsible personalities who have an open eye for the realities.

The idea of a heroic humanism, an antique humanism borrowed from the pattern of the classics, found its first great intellectual and artistic embodiment in the person and poetry of Stefan George. A large number of works are devoted to the interpretation of his nature and of the meaning of his unusual poems, which sound Platonic in many respects; for his aims and achievements are by no means easy to grasp. An attractive attempt at such an

³⁰ Prague, Judisch-Akademisch-Technischer Verband "Barissia", 1934.

interpretation is the work of Willi Koch, *Stefan George, Weltbild, Naturbild, Menschenbild*.³¹ Koch well sees that George's thought and poetry are concerned with the heroic man, that is to say, the man who overcomes everything chaotic in sharp strife, who fights his way through to noble form, to shapes pure and clear. That is why George condemns the tendency towards romanticism, mysticism, and music with great definiteness. On the other hand the works of Holbein and Böcklin, of Goethe and Hölderlin, seem to him the highest creations of art because they are "gestalthaft". Stefan George will certainly play a decisive part in the inevitable renaissance of humanism. The justification for this immeasurably important influence on the history of the mind can be clearly seen in Willi Koch's sensitive and penetrating work, and therefore it deserves our thanks and recognition.

Humanism has many sides and trends. So much is obvious from what we have already said. It is also shown with illuminating clearness in an excellent work by the young and gifted scholar Kurt Grube: *Die Idee und Struktur einer reinmenschlichen Bildung. Ein Beitrag zum Philanthropinismus und Neuhumanismus*.³² With this book the author, who has just become Privatdozent in pedagogy at the University of Prague, has introduced himself to scholarship in a most advantageous manner. He sketches the origin of the idea of humanism and its results in Rousseau, and then in a series of instructive chapters evincing solid historical knowledge he describes the various forms of "humanity", the various forms of the education based upon it and its relation to the great fields of moral and aesthetic and general values. The notions of humanity in Herder, in Wilhelm von Humboldt, Goethe, Schleiermacher, Schiller, in the theologians, philosophers and educationists of the Enlightenment, of pietism and of philanthropinism, receive detailed and trustworthy discussion. And he who adopts the side of humanism today may confidently make use of Grube's book as an excellent account of the original material, and draw his historical armor therefrom.

We have a valuable parallel to Grube's work in René König's fine book *Vom Wesen der deutschen Universität*.³³ This starts

³¹ Halle a. S., Max Niemeyer, 1933. ³³ Berlin, Verlag Die Runde, 1935.

³² Halle a. S., Akademischer Verlag, 1934.

from the evident assertion, which is also supported by the contents of the book, that in the German universities the German spirit has found an eternally significant expression of itself. The intermediary that binds the German spirit and the German universities together is German idealism, especially as it is embodied in the philosophy of German idealism. The author uses this idealism as a normative frame by means of which to depict both the inner essence of the university and also its historical development since the middle of the seventeenth century. Why does he choose just this date as starting-point? Because that time saw the beginning of the formation of the ideas that later found their highest conceptual statement and confirmation in the system of philosophical idealism. In this idealism, with its doctrine of the freedom of the creative and spontaneous reason, and in the humanism that is so closely bound up herewith, the idea of culture and knowledge and hence the idea of a university has its standard and norm. The high points of the attempt to build the university into conformity with this standard are the schemes suggested by Fichte and Schelling. It is a great pleasure to trace in König's account, which is excellent also from a literary point of view, how the philosophical ideas of those thinkers provide the assumptions for their proposals about the formation and reformation of universities. At the same time he makes clear that there arises a very profound and unavoidable tension between university and state. The essence and activity of the state involves a tendency towards compulsion, command, obedience, coördination and subordination; but philosophy and the sciences are based, especially in the idealistic theory, on the freedom of the spontaneous reason, responsible only to itself. The state needs officials, and it calls upon the universities to educate them in harmony with the state's nature; but the university trains men who have learnt to see the essence of the intellectual life in the right to criticize and in unmolested freedom to inquire and to think. The tension necessarily becomes greater the more dictatorial and universal the state becomes. Men are now aiming at the "total" state, as is shown by contemporary events in some states. At the end of his useful account, the interest of which is not merely historical, König indicates the growth of the difficulties that must arise and

already have arisen out of the essence and spirit of the German universities on the one hand and the development of the German state on the other. Thus his book gives vent to serious and solemn thoughts that are something beyond historical instruction; and this result is not the least of the advantages of this clever work, which carries, perhaps unintentionally, the stamp and value of a highminded and indirect polemic.

There can be no doubt that idealism is somewhat threatened at the moment. Strange attacks are being made upon it, often resting entirely on political feelings. The time has come for it to defend itself. It must do so for the sake of its tradition and in order to support those attempts, which are now fortunately re-appearing, to advance philosophy upon the basis and from the points of view of idealism. We therefore welcome the valuable and necessary idea of supporting these efforts by the publication of a periodical, a yearbook and collection of writings. The organizer and stimulator of this venture is Dr. Ernst Harms, and the well-known and respected firm of Rascher & Co. in Zürich has undertaken the publication. The first volume of the *Jahrbuch für idealistische Philosophie* has already appeared, and so we can form a judgment on the manner in which this desirable scheme is being realized. The first section contains articles in English and German, for, as will readily be understood, the yearbook is to be polyglot. The authors include Hans Driesch ("Das Ich"), Nikolai Losskij ("Das menschliche Ich als Gegenstand mystischer Intuition"), Edgar Sheffield Brightman ("Immediacy"), Edgar Dacqué ("Mechanismus und inneres Wesen"), Jean Wahl ("Sur l'Absolu"), Arthur Liebert ("Wilhelm Dilthey"), John H. Muirhead ("F. H. Bradley"). It also contains excellent bibliographies of the history of idealistic philosophy, such as a magnificent historical review of the Schelling-literature by Manfred Schröter. It offers finally a large number of book-reviews. One can but wish the undertaking permanence and success. In these difficult times it requires a heightened spirit of sacrifice in all concerned, to be prepared to work hard with hopeful trust in support of such a fundamentally ideal project. Since this yearbook intends to serve free philosophizing, independent of all influences outside learning itself, and since politics and economics, state and religion, are only

subject-matter to it, however important, and not the guiding ideas of the inquiry, it can become, as we hope it will become, a meeting-ground for all writings whose authors do not submit their thought to any political or economic or religious dogma, but allow it to be guided solely by the Ethos of the Logos and the Logos of the Ethos, who, that is to say, philosophize in the idealist and humanist manner. The first volume is such as to allow us to believe that this hope will be fulfilled. May the undertaking help the philosophy of the present to survive the impartial judgment of the future.

The attacks on idealism include attacks on Plato and Platonism. Nevertheless, work on Plato has not come to a standstill. For some time there has been a good book on Plato almost every year. Nor has the desire to study his original writings lessened. Against the adequate scholarly satisfaction of this desire, however, there stands unfortunately a constantly decreasing knowledge of the Greek language. Besides this there is the fact that the character of the dialogues themselves is not suitable for hasty reading. To get a real picture of them one needs not merely the philosophical desire but also a fairly liberal amount of time. This leisure many persons profess not to have, and that is another difficulty in the study of Plato. To overcome these difficulties, relatively speaking, or at least to lessen them, is the object of the shortened German *Wiedergabe der meisten platonischen Dialoge*, which Carl Vering has published in three volumes. Only the *Republic* and the *Laws* are translated without abbreviation in two additional volumes.³⁴ The translator has done a great deal of telescoping and simplifying. The dialogues are given in the form of a free paraphrase, although keeping closely to Plato's own language. Carl Vering knows the objections that can be made to his procedure—they are indeed obvious—and therefore I will not mention them here. His free rendering can give at the most only a first acquaintance with the originals. For many reasons it is nowhere near an adequate substitute. There are infinitely many things in the dialogues that do not appear even in a literal translation. And he who knows only the subjects discussed and the "course of the discussion" knows very, very little about them. However, Vering's paraphrase, which is tastefully carried out and enriched with explanatory remarks,

³⁴ All five are published by Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin, 1929-1935.

will perhaps sow some seeds of love for Plato and make them germinate a little. Such a result would justify his labor and trouble.

VII

In closing this review with some important books of a historical character I can go to work without any reservations, for I am going to call attention to one of the most important achievements in the sphere of our knowledge of the history not merely of philosophy but of the intellectual life in general. We may thank the favor of destiny that Karl Joël, who died in 1934 after having been for many years a worthy successor of Nietzsche in the chair of philosophy at Basel, was permitted to finish his work, *Wandlungen der Weltanschauungen: Eine Philosophiegeschichte als Geschichtsphilosophie*. It has now appeared in two very large volumes.⁸⁵ The first describes in 735 pages the history of men's views of the world and of the *Zeitgeist* from the eighth century before Christ to the eighteenth after, to the age of Enlightenment. The second volume of 960 pages is the continuation, and parades before our eyes with unusual fullness and yet in a unified survey man's intellectual development, especially in the nineteenth century, down to the present. One does not know what to admire most, the immense wealth of his knowledge or the fineness and sureness of his analyses or his power of philosophical synthesis. This huge work comes from a personality that was equally great as scholar and specialist and as psychologist and philosopher. It reminds one chapter by chapter of the imperishable achievement of Wilhelm Windelband, but it seems to me superior even to that work in the comprehensive range of its vision, its gift of artistic feeling for events, and its warm sympathy for the fate of peoples and times and thinkers. Since it is written by a philosopher it is constructed on a unified and rational principle, a law that connects all the parts. The gigantic changes in men's views of the world are unified by the polar and dialectical opposition of union and separation or dissolution, of concentration and differentiation. This is the point of view from which Joël looks into the actualities of history, and by means of it he strives for and attains a knowledge of the philosophy of history that is considerably richer and

⁸⁵ Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1933-1935.

nearer to reality than Hegel's. For the dialectical law of history does not rest merely on the power of reason; it is not merely a connection of thought, in which or as which history unfolds itself. All the forces of life and man work together and against each other in the rhythmic flux of becoming. This rhythm, to the proof of whose existence a large part of these splendid inquiries is devoted, is so divided in time that a particular movement works itself out in about a hundred years; by that time it has become intensified to a deadening degree, and the untiringly creative spirit of life leads the new century in an opposite direction. Joël thinks that he can speak now of the "Ideas" and the "leading tendencies" of the centuries more definitely than once Ranke did. At the same time the famous problems of dividing history into periods, the controversies about the length of the Middle Ages, the character of the Renaissance, etc., can be advanced, precisely by keeping an eye constantly on the actual events, through a sharper differentiation of time. Joël actually speaks of a "spirit of the century" and of "spirits of the century", as the Romantics for example spoke of a "spirit of the people" and of "popular Spirits". His description of the various forms and stages of the spirit of the century in its flux of culture and union or dissolution and separation awakens a magically impressive picture of the march of history. The moving force of history is here not merely described and written down, but experienced. Certain simplifications naturally have to be allowed; they are inevitable if we are to attain constructive guiding ideas. Apart from the scientific and philosophical importance of this achievement we must also say this of it: it could arise only out of the mind and heart of a great man, a great personality.

Rudolf Metz, professor at Heidelberg, deals with an important chapter of the history of philosophy in his two fine volumes on *Die philosophischen Strömungen der Gegenwart in Grossbritannien*.³⁶ His superior monographs on Berkeley and Hume have already proved him an outstanding student of English philosophy. The good report in which his qualifications and quality as a scholar are held will be significantly increased by this new achievement. The work begins about the middle of the previous century and characterizes the Scottish philosophy, Utilitarianism, Newman's

³⁶ Leipzig, Felix Meiner, 1935.

philosophy of religion, Martineau and others. The main part of the book breaks new ground with its discussion of more recent and contemporary tendencies. We become acquainted with a long series of interesting thinkers, who perhaps have not yet obtained the honor they deserve even in their own country. The chief subject of the inquiry is the neo-idealist movement, which divides into a great wealth of branches: Hegelians, absolute idealists, McTaggart's pluralism, personal idealists and so on. Justice is also done, however, to modern realism and to the representatives of mathematical logic, the philosophy of the sciences, contemporary theism and so on. The account is based throughout upon the original sources, of which Metz is a thorough master. He has been aided by the good fortune of having had personal intercourse with a large number of British philosophers, especially with such as he discusses in his book. The trustworthiness of his account is in perfect accord with the copiousness of his material and the clearness and lucidity with which he has reproduced the thoughts of all these numerous personalities. All in all, it is an imposing work, and gives us a solid basis for the study of those tendencies and philosophers. The specialist will often consult it, and the layman will learn from it the variety and energy of philosophy in Great Britain.

There is another book that also breaks new ground. Strange and improbable as it may sound, it is nevertheless the truth that the personality of Kant, that Kant as a man, is still almost a book with seven seals. That book is opened at last in a sensitive work by Rudolf Kayser: *Kant*.³⁷ The author possesses not merely an outstanding acquaintance with his subject but also an artistic nature highly cultivated along literary lines. That is why he succeeds in obtaining illuminating insights into Kant's extraordinarily complicated personality; he is, in fact, the first to show that Kant's personality *was* extraordinarily complicated. His monograph, full of mature understanding and profound reverence for the immortal creator of the critical philosophy, follows Kant's life and works in all their dimensions and ramifications. He succeeds in putting an end to the inappropriate notion that Kant was a typical nationalist and a thorough philistine. On the contrary, Kant's

³⁷ Vienna, Phaidon-Verlag, 1935.

being was filled with profound antinomies and an enduring unrest. These peculiar human traits agree very well with the permanently restless spirit of the critical philosopher; and the discovery of this parallelism between the man and the work, between the personality and the achievement, is one of the main services of Kayser's book. His description of the correspondence is a masterpiece of sympathetic clear-sightedness. He gives an effective liveliness to the work by his frequent pictures of the personality and destiny of Hamann, a terribly disintegrated man, who unlike his friend Kant could not come to terms with life. As contrasting figures he also introduces Herder, and in another connection the men of the Prussian reaction, with which Kant came into conflict. In general we are made to see the mind and mood of all that culture from the middle to the end of the eighteenth century in which Kant had his roots, although both as a man and as a thinker he rises infinitely above it. Kayser preserves the greatness and fineness of Kant's personality because he looks at it from a high point of view, because he judges Kant by a standard adequate to his human and philosophic greatness.

Kant's immeasurable importance appears not only in the weightiness of his philosophy but also in its vast historical influence. There are evident and powerful traces of this influence in contemporary philosophy, although nowadays there is so much talk of getting beyond Kant. The main problems and directions of this modern continuation are described in a thoroughly informed and penetrating work by Professor Dr. Ernst von Aster, formerly professor at the university at Giessen and now in Sweden. The title is *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart*,³⁸ but the work does not deal with the whole of contemporary philosophy. In five long chapters it discusses (a) Neo-Kantianism, (b) phenomenology in its various branches, (c) the logistic neo-positivism of the Viennese and Prague Circle, which we mentioned above in our notice of Åke Petzäll's book, (d) vitalism (Driesch, Bergson) and the philosophy of *Gestalt* (Wolfgang Koehler, Wertheimer, Koffka), (e) the influence of Nietzsche and the Nietzsche-renaissance (Klages, Spengler and others). One looks in vain for an account of the new dialectic. However, what is given us will satisfy the severest

³⁸ Leyden, A. E. Sijhoff's Uitgeversmaatschappij, 1935.

demands for clarity and sharpness in description, for emphasis on essentials, for arrangement and division of the material. It is the work of a man thoroughly trained in pedagogy and teaching, of a man who in his decades of activity as a professor has learnt how to put things so that they can be really understood. Ernst von Aster can do this because he does not give a merely external account but himself philosophizes, and thus himself helps to create the problems and movements that he discusses. I noticed this productive way of describing the philosophers especially in his account of the so-called existential philosophy (Heidegger, Jaspers), which is rightly treated as a subgroup of phenomenology. May the book meet with recognition and success, and may this to some extent compensate the author, so hard hit by misfortune, for what he has lost.

In closing this review I am happily able to call attention to a work on the mission of philosophy in our time. *Die Sendung der Philosophie in unserer Zeit*³⁹ is a timely and noteworthy book from the skillful pen of Emil Utitz, now professor of philosophy at the University of Prague. It arises out of a threefold anxiety: anxiety for contemporary life, whose nobility is vanishing under the destructive attitudes of illiberal party-spirit; anxiety for philosophy, which is in danger of abandoning its orientation on the eternal power of the Logos out of compliance with non-philosophical movements; anxiety for the leadership of philosophy in life, which must be preserved. Utitz begins by showing, in a series of short historical chapters, that all true philosophers have been conscious of their moral responsibility to life and to their age, whether we consider Socrates or Plato, Bacon of Verulam or Fichte. They all strive to make philosophical thinking become moral action. But this thinking and acting never degenerates into dependence on the contemporary powers and movements of historical life. "Philosophy is always life in the Logos, and this life has its own standard." The selfdevelopment and autonomy of the Logos is the selfdevelopment and autonomy of philosophy. If philosophy abandons its basis in the Logos it not merely cancels itself but comes into serious conflict and collisions with religion; if it loses its pure and strict scientific character it works towards the dis-

³⁹ Leyden, A. W. Sijhoff's Uitgeversmaatschappij, 1935.

appearance of culture. For this reason Utitz feels that he must keep away from all philosophy that is founded on myth or the irrational. But to base philosophy on the Logos and to realize it in the Logos helps not only to realize its nature, but above all to develop a truly philosophical, a great and redeeming humanity. A tone of almost imploring warning sounds in the pages of this book. Utitz knows the wounds of our time; he knows too the dangers threatening philosophy. How valuable and wholesome it would be for philosophy, and for ordinary life as well, if it would lend its ear to this warning and take it to heart.

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I

THE trend toward realism, ontology, philosophy of being, philosophy of existence, is still characteristic of contemporary German philosophy. Frequent reference has already been made to this in our previous reports. It is not at all surprising that in conjunction with this trend and under its influence there should have been an increased preoccupation with St. Thomas, one of the classical ontologists. Out of this preoccupation has come an exceptional and very thorough work in two volumes by Professor Joseph Gredt, *Die aristotelisch-thomistische Philosophie*.² The first volume treats of logic and natural philosophy; the second of metaphysics and ethics. This sterling work is in reality a comprehensive textbook of Thomism. Moreover, every chapter gives evidence of the remarkable schooling of thought with which the Catholic Church equips its priests and teachers before sending them into the world. Every proposition has perfect, logical clarity. Every definition is precisely and distinctly formed. And the reader of this Catholic philosopher is again and again impressed by the inward, scholastic assurance with which this philosophy is set forth—a sign that Thomism is not the superficial knowledge but the fixed intellectual possession of those who expound it. Joseph Gredt's work is a sort of free repetition of his Latin masterpiece, *Elementa philosophiae aristotelico-thomisticae*,³ which has already run through numerous editions, being widely used as an authoritative text by students of Catholic philosophy. None of the problems belonging to the above-mentioned fields is left out of account. The problems are handled in a scholarly and objective manner, so calm and matter-of-fact that the personality of the author nearly disappears behind it. These works thus evince a purely scholarly method.

To the witty Gilbert K. Chesterton, who died within the past year, we owe a more popular and entertaining short account of St. Thomas and his teaching. We mention this book but briefly,

¹ Translated from the German by J. S. Fulton.

² Freiburg im Breisgau, Herder & Co.

³ Freiburg im Breisgau, Herder & Co.

as it belongs to contemporary English philosophy. But it is a further sign of the sympathy which exists for Thomism in Germany that Chesterton's book has been cordially received upon appearing in an excellent German translation by Dr. Elizabeth Kaufmann under the title, *Der Heilige Thomas von Aquin, der stumme Ochse von Sizilien*.⁴

That interest receives further noteworthy confirmation through the appearance of the theology and ethics of St. Thomas's *Summa Theologiae* in two volumes of selections in German, prepared by Father Joseph Bernhart, one of the foremost specialists in this field. He has added excellent introductions to both volumes. This work also has aroused lively interest. This fact is significant and instructive with reference to the philosophical and general spiritual development of Germany.

The revival of the realistic way of thinking creates the expectation that at last we shall receive a study of Aristotle that satisfies all scientific and philosophical requirements. It is almost astonishing that such a work has not already appeared. The problem is, surely, most enticing and important for the historian of philosophy. And it, naturally, could not be properly handled without reference to Warner Jaeger's fruitful researches, on which we have previously reported.

Every genuine and profound ontology will always be, in a certain sense, theology. For truly first being is invariably Divine Being. Thus the trend toward realism has also aroused interest in another medieval thinker of classical stature, the Jewish philosopher, Moses Ben Maimon. A few years ago his chief work, *Führer der Unschlüssigen*, appeared in faultless translation with an exhaustive, profoundly penetrating introduction by Adolph Weiss.⁵ This introduction constitutes actually an independent book on Maimonides, as it comprises more than 300 pages. Weiss regards the *Guide of the Perplexed* as a classical discussion of the relation between faith based on revelation and philosophy. For in Maimonides's opinion the doctrines of Judaism completely coincide with the results of speculative philosophy; both have the same starting point and the same goal. The title of the famous work is explained, according to Maimonides's own account, as

⁴ Salzburg-Leipzig, Anton Pustet.

⁵ Leipzig, Felix Meiner.

follows: It is to be a guide for him who wavers between the literal and traditional exegesis of the scriptures on the one hand and the rational exegesis on the other.

Most of the civilized nations of the world joined in commemorating the eight hundredth anniversary of the birth of Moses Ben Maimon in a series of exercises, March 30, 1935, at Cordova, which put into words the grateful reverence in which this great thinker is held, and acknowledged the abiding influence of his thought.

The interest in systematic philosophy is in general more pronounced than that in historical research. The decline of historical investigation is assuredly connected with the decline of historicism in almost every field of culture. We can, therefore, report on but few works in the history of philosophy.

We owe an uncommonly acute and effective Platonic study to the professor of philosophy at the University of Berlin, Nicolai Hartmann: *Das Problem des Apriorismus in der Platonischen Philosophie*.⁶ This historical study is obviously connected with Nicolai Hartmann's own systematic position, with his ontology or philosophy of existence. It is a sort of historical proof for an interpretation of Plato that is partly new, yet partly runs along older lines of Platonic interpretation. The analysis of Platonic knowledge, *i.e.*, the predominantly epistemological treatment of Plato, especially since the rise of Neo-Kantianism, had obscured the insight that Plato, understood in the light of his whole philosophy, had developed not only, indeed not primarily, a theory of knowledge, but above all a philosophy of being, of the truly existent, in short, an ontology. Yet if there is such a general theory of being, the question arises whether it also—that is, not merely the theory of knowledge but also the ontology—rests upon *a priori* presuppositions. If that were not the case, then it would have to give up its claim and its right to present a philosophical view of being. At the very outset of his work Hartmann criticizes the modern limitation of the concept of the *a priori*, which is conceived, understood, and criticized, only as the basis of 'synthetic judgments'. It is important, on the contrary, to emphasize the fact that in *all* knowledge, even in the most naïve and,

⁶ Berlin, Walter de Gruyter & Co.

so to say, altogether empirical knowledge, there is an *a priori* aspect. Thus we have to do, in a certain degree, with a universal *a priori*, not merely an *a priori* of pure judgments. "The *a priori* is nothing less than an essential element in each and every cognition." It is never entirely lacking. For Plato it is involved in the various modes of 'vision' and 'prescience', which signify a sort of immediate and almost naïve intuition. The content of the *a priori*, according to Nicolai Hartmann, is not limited to the 'form' of knowledge; it is also not to be understood as merely functional, as certain modern directions of Platonic interpretation assert. Our author contradicts all these modern interpretations of Plato. The content of the *a priori* is, according to him, primarily of objective significance; *i.e.*, it is related not to the constitution of knowledge but to that of being. To indicate the passages justifying his contention, Nicolai Hartmann now runs through the series of Platonic dialogues in a manner which, though achieving brevity through the use of catchwords, is yet extremely penetrating. He does not fail to recognize the magnitude of the difficulty confronting him. For Plato seems first of all to find all certainty of knowledge in the depths of the human soul. And essential portions of his philosophy are just a constructive psychology, which discovers absolute values, the ideas, in the soul and draws them up out of it. The question, however, now arises, "How can that which the soul finds in its own depths and draws up from them instruct the soul concerning the being of things? What it meets with in its communion with itself is its own, is thus not something beheld in things. Nevertheless it is to serve as a valid criterion determining what in truth belongs to them and what does not." Plato does not merely strive to discover the absolute forms of knowledge; his passionate fight against the relativism of the sophists is revealed in its true strength in his search after absolute principles of being. And the "ideas" are not simply forms of reason, as with Kant; they are rather principles of the essence of objects, even if they are grasped first of all in intuition. A question thus arises, however, which contains a great difficulty. How must principles be constituted, which, on the one hand, can be immediately grasped in internal inspection and yet, at the same time, form the essence of objects which are given to us

through external, sensible intuition? Nicolai Hartmann characterizes Plato's solution of this problem as a philosophical discovery of the first magnitude. The solution is this: Between being and knowledge there exists no opposition, such that a way would first have to be made from the one sphere to the other. This way exists, and the only thing of importance is to find and characterize it. At least from the concluding portions of the *Parmenides* and from the end of the sixth book of the *Republic* onward, the conception of the common nature, the identity, of the origin of being and the origin of knowledge becomes more and more evident.

Having established this point for Plato, Nicolai Hartmann reviews, in a concise survey, the historical development of the conception of the identity of the two domains, the realm of ideas and the realm of reality. The old Platonic insight he finds even Kant upholding quite literally in the section on "The Highest Principle of All Synthetic Judgments". He thus recognizes a very close relation between Plato and Kant. But he thinks this community of opinion holds less for pure epistemology, as the Neo-Kantians claim, than, so to say, for ontology. Hegel's stand also depends upon this conception of identity. "The essence of the dialectic, as Hegel understands it, lies in the identity of the course which thought traverses in its progress and the development of the Absolute in the construction of the world. This explains why the science of logic takes upon itself the task of presenting the categories of the Absolute."

In this hypothesis of identity, there are involved an enormous problem and, at the same time, the germs of one of the classical forms of its solution. All thinkers of the first rank have struggled with this problem; they have all offered solutions akin to the Platonic notion of identity. Hartmann thinks, however, that Plato is the first to appreciate and comprehend the puzzling nature of this problem, and to grasp consciously the principle of its solution. In this interpretation of Plato, this interpretation of a central problem not only of the Platonic philosophy but of philosophy in general, we have one of the most interesting and fruitful philosophical contributions of recent years to the Platonic problem. In this report we shall naturally not consider whether this hypothesis of identity is really able to solve conclusively the

problem of the relation between knowledge and being, idea and reality. Nicolai Hartmann himself, in so far as the account in question permits a judgment, appears not to be entirely convinced of the effectiveness of that hypothesis. In any case, he has thrown light upon the innermost presuppositions of Platonic philosophy and has contributed toward the destruction of the usual interpretation, according to which Plato upholds a dualistic position with reference to the relation of idea to reality. I myself have also combatted this interpretation. Plato's "dialectic" seems to me to have in view an adjustment of the relation between idea and being. And this has nothing to do with the dualistic view imputed to Plato, but is directly opposed to it.

Now we shall report on another work, which is likewise concerned with Plato and with the abiding influence of Platonic concepts and points of view. Hans Willms has published a painstaking half philosophical and half philological work on the concept *εἶκόν*. It elucidates the development of Platonism down to Philo of Alexandria in a remarkable special case.⁷ That this concept in particular was used is noteworthy, because it is alluded to primarily in the religious sphere and employed in the philosophy of religion. Through it, the attempt is made to grasp objectively the absolute reality of eternal being and, thus, to know absolute being. The truth-value of this concept decides what we can know of absolute being, and, hence, of the absolute being of God.

Must we not retract our assertion about a decline in the investigation of the history of philosophy in the face of so amazing and unique a work as that which Stanislaus von Dunin Borkowski has given us on Spinoza?⁸ Or are significant results no longer to be attained in the domain of the history of philosophy? Has research already reached a termination? It is almost touching to read Dunin's own confession in the Preface of his huge work, "I was unable to offer revolutionary discoveries." And that remark refers to a work of three fat volumes with large pages. It is worth while setting down the contents and the number of pages of each. The first volume, *Der junge Spinoza*, comprises 520 of text and about 100 pages of notes. The second volume, *Aus den Tagen Spinozas. Das Entscheidungsjahr 1657*, contains 394 pages

⁷ Münster im Westfalen, Aschendorff.

⁸ Münster, Aschendorff.

of text and, again, nearly 100 pages of notes. The third volume, *Aus den Tagen Spinozas. Das neue Leben*, comprises 328 pages and more than 100 pages of citations and supplements. One stands astounded and full of admiration before this scholarly diligence, this absolute exactness and care in establishing even small traits, in so far as one can speak at all of such traits in connection with so great a man as Spinoza. Dunin accompanies our philosopher not merely, so to say, from year to year, as he states, but from hour to hour. Every moment, every step, every turn in the life and in the spiritual growth of Spinoza, is worked out, elucidated, and exhaustively examined, in its historical, literary, and human backgrounds. None of the numerous controversial questions is passed over about Spinoza's development and the influences which affected him; and no discussion is omitted of the various sources of his doctrine, of his reading, of the cabbala, of the tradition and environment, in which he stood. Many and varied sources influenced Spinoza. Yet Dunin contradicts the not infrequently expressed opinion that Spinoza was an eclectic in the bad sense of the word. Despite frequent points of agreement with the old Jewish philosophy of religion, with the Arabians, the scholastics, Descartes, the Renaissance and Baroque philosophers, we encounter in Spinoza, Dunin says, something wholly new and original in his manner of thinking and in the structure of his philosophy. He calls him a great collector of rare systematic penetration. And he justifies the extremely exhaustive analysis of sources in a twofold manner. First, the psychological development of Spinoza would remain unintelligible without that analysis. Secondly, without that investigation we should remain altogether cut off from the understanding of the uninterrupted flow and the eternal laws of philosophical thought in general. In fact, something of the universality of philosophical thought in general appears in Spinoza's individual development. And I confess that not the least of the pleasures derived from reading Dunin's studies, that penetrate to every last detail, was due to my reading an eternal meaning and a universal process and destiny between the lines of the very concrete accounts, which even depict many of the philosopher's walks, step by step and from house to house. In Dunin we possess a master of historical perspective. The

application of his gifts and his method to Spinoza in particular has special interest, because our author, a Jesuit, was not a follower of Spinoza. Nevertheless, he treats this philosophy and the noble personality of its creator with exemplary justice. Even the finest lines in the picture of this philosophy and this personality he views and assesses with a keen and lofty eye and with large and truly historical understanding. With all his devotion to the smallest details, Dunin never for a moment loses that breadth of vision which places detail in relation to the whole and in this way understands and appreciates it.

Otto Friedrich Bollnow has devoted a monograph, *Dilthey, eine Einführung in seine Philosophie*,⁹ to that master of the history of philosophy and of civilization, one of the most important recent historians. This work is a continuation of the distinguished studies which Georg Misch has made for the individual volumes of Dilthey's collected works, as well as a kind of extension of my work on Dilthey, which I published in 1933 on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of his birth.¹⁰ Bollnow, quite correctly, tries not to regard Dilthey merely as a historian of civilization and philosophy but as a leading representative of the so-called *Lebensphilosophie* and a collaborator in the necessary reconstruction of philosophy in general. He believes that in Dilthey's philosophical works essential foundations are laid for such a coherent reconstruction. The foundation and center of this reconstruction he discovers, of course, in Dilthey's conception of life. The best feature of this work is the frequent insertion of quotations, long and short, from Dilthey's writings. Moreover, the work makes a welcome appearance, because it can contribute to the enlargement of the circle of those acquainted with Dilthey. For during his lifetime (1833-1911) he did not receive the recognition which he should have had. No less a figure than the most important contemporary Spanish philosopher, José Ortega y Gasset, calls him "the greatest thinker which the second half of the nineteenth century has to show".

Dietrich Bischoff likewise devotes a work to Dilthey under the title, *Wilhelm Diltheys geschichtliche Lebensphilosophie*.¹¹ The ac-

⁹ Leipzig, B. & G. Teubner.

¹⁰ Berlin, E. S. Mittler & Sohn.

¹¹ Leipzig, B. & G. Teubner.

count given in this book, too, reveals the extraordinary attraction which Dilthey's fresh and vigorous style has begun to exert on an increasing number of people. Bischoff's work is also of interest because it throws light on the remarkable, shifting relation of Dilthey to Kant. The present writer had occasion to observe the characteristic variations in the estimate which Dilthey formed of Kant. In fact we encounter here two entirely different philosophical types. Kant roots philosophy in the creative independence of pure reason, which, on his view, is wholly neutral towards the vacillations of historical process. Dilthey, on the other hand, thinks so much in terms of history that for him even philosophy and philosophical reason are creations of the omnipotence of the life of history. We have not yet reached a convincing decision concerning the rights of either type, concerning their independence of each other, or concerning the possibility of their combination. Such a combination is certainly outlined in the dialectic method of speculative philosophy, especially in that of Hegel, through which the one-sidedness both of pure criticism of Kantian stamp and of *Lebensphilosophie* might be overcome.

Dilthey with his *Lebensphilosophie* and historical psychology belongs to the 'realistic' trend in philosophy, which, as everyone knows, goes back to Aristotle and Thomas. With the growth of realism in the last decades idealism faces a crisis. There is even talk of 'the collapse of idealism'. The well-known popular philosopher, Paul Ernst, who has also made a name for himself as dramatist and novelist, has published a series of essays under that title.¹² That collapse, according to Ernst, is due to the fact that German idealism was incapable of developing its own, independent, creative forms, *i.e.*, forms which really make a comprehensive construction of reality as a whole possible. Instead, idealism constructs essentially abstract, attenuated rational forms. It sets up bare concepts and places these concepts in formal relations to each other; and it believes it has thereby already accomplished the task of a comprehensive construction of the world, which, however, goes beyond all these flimsy abstractions. Ernst holds that all the higher spiritual life of Germany is built upon a false foundation. It "ought to have been built upon that feeling

¹² *Zusammenbruch des Idealismus*, München; Albert Langen und Georg Müller.

for life which is the basis of tragedy, and not on that from which the categorical imperative grew". The classical age of Germany was lacking both in an appropriate understanding of the nature of tragedy and in the ability to construct one. Kant is thus set up as one of the chief representatives of empty abstraction and empty formalism. Paul Ernst thinks "that Kant is a second-rate man". He even calls him "a profoundly immoral thinker". "He is profoundly immoral as every thinker must be, who cannot soar to the heights of religion upon which the tragic poet, as well as the creative man of piety, stands." Kant has contributed not inconsiderably to the deadening of spiritual life which has brought Germany to the edge of the abyss. Paul Ernst has continued his thoughts in the book, *Verfall und Neuordnung*.¹³ In these essays he participates in the work, which many have undertaken, of interpreting the present age. He constantly has the feeling that we are living in a time of change. He combats capitalism, and sees in the Marxist system a phenomenon of decay characteristic of a collapsing epoch. More than anything else his fight is again directed against rationalism, which disintegrates life and the individual forces of life. He is a powerful opponent of Parliamentarianism and democracy, and demands a fundamental alteration of our way of thinking and our view of the world. Our view of the world as well as our economic and political organization should, in his opinion, have its roots in the heart of the people and in a religion peculiar to the people. Many regard Paul Ernst as a champion and pioneer of the Third Reich, and, in fact, many of his demands recur in the program of National Socialism. He was no profound, no great thinker, but a man of a pure and decent mind. He is, moreover, characteristic of a definite stage of development of the German spiritual life.

Both from the direction of general culture and poetry and from that of philosophy new attacks have been continually forming against idealism. Not only the supporters of *Lebensphilosophie* and the more historically oriented thinkers, like Dilthey, but also those philosophers who come from biology and sociology, participated in these attacks. For a philosophy erected on a biological or sociological foundation finds itself supporting a realism, which necessarily makes it an opponent of idealism. Wilhelm

¹³ Munich, Albert Langen and Georg Müller.

Jerusalem is especially to be numbered among the spokesmen of that type of philosophy. Walther Eckstein has published an attractive and instructive work about him, with the title, *Wilhelm Jerusalem, Sein Leben und Wirken*.¹⁴ Jerusalem's realistic position was formed first under the influence of Wilhelm Wundt's physiological psychology and then under that of Herbert Spencer's synthetic empiricism. Subsequently, his position approximated more and more closely to the positivism and pragmatism which he met with in William James and F. C. S. Schiller. It consequently became distinctly remote from idealism in every form, while it approached ever closer to *Lebensphilosophie* and to experienced reality, as it is given to us first and foremost in the force of immediate feeling. Especially in his well-known *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, which has passed through a large number of editions, Wilhelm Jerusalem has formed his empirical, psychological, biological, and sociological philosophy into an impressive unity.¹⁵

II

It is being claimed on all sides and on every possible ground that idealism is really dead and done with. But one should not place his trust too unconditionally in these claims, nor take them too seriously. Idealism continued after the death of Hegel (1831) to exert a decided influence. This is shown particularly by his very strong influence on Russia. Boris Jakowenko reports on this influence in an uncommonly illuminating and conscientious work, *Zur Geschichte des Hegelianismus in Russland. Hegel und die Anfänge des Slawophilentums* (1839-1849).¹⁶ We are told of a whole series of interesting Russian thinkers, who are usually grouped together under the common name of Slavophiles, and who, like their westward-facing opponents, occupied themselves earnestly with Hegel. This group of thinkers is noteworthy and interesting for two reasons. First, it is with them that modern Russian philosophy in general may almost be said to originate. Secondly, these thinkers set themselves the agitating question: Is German philosophy possible in Russia and can it take root there? And what changes would it undergo, have to undergo, in being

¹⁴ Wien, Carl Gerold's Sohn.

¹⁵ Wien, Wilhelm Braumüller.

¹⁶ Prag, Verlag der Internationalen Bibliothek der Philosophie.

transplanted to Russia? Jakowenko's work is one of those valuable and important studies which give us a coherent picture of a whole philosophical movement in the light of its chief representatives.

We now wish to adduce yet another example warning us that great caution is necessary in asserting or prophesying the end of a philosophical movement. In the great Anglo-German historian and philosopher of history, John Dalberg-Acton (1834-1902), we have an important and highly esteemed supporter of the idealistic view, especially in its German form. Lord Acton applied the idealistic view to the knowledge of the historical world. We welcome with joy a monograph on this distinguished mind, which is scholarly and authoritative and does full justice to the importance of Lord Acton: Ulrich Noack's *Geschichtswissenschaft und Wahrheit nach den Schriften von John Dalberg-Acton, dem Historiker der Freiheit*.¹⁷ The influence of idealism on the thought of Lord Acton, Regius Professor of History at Cambridge, is apparent in two respects: in his method and in his view of history, which has an almost religious character. His interpretation of history is apparent in his gigantic, though incomplete, work, *History of Liberty*. Lord Acton is known far beyond the borders of England as the man who proposed the great *Cambridge Modern History*, inaugurated it, and enlisted the aid of a large group of distinguished scholars of every nationality in carrying out the work. Of a deeply religious nature, Lord Acton claims for history an unbroken moral continuity, indeed, an irresistible moral progress. This moral progress, he thinks, is already involved in the remarkable circumstance that modern men and modern scholars feel themselves obligated to carry out their historical studies in the spirit of scientific clarity and objective certainty, for these, in his opinion, are moral motives. Furthermore, we are striving more and more to derive from history incentives to moral action and to obtain from it the answer to the eternal question, what ought we to do? It is unscientific and immoral to occupy oneself with history for political reasons and for political purposes. Lord Acton himself once beautifully characterized his ethical, idealistic view and interpretation of history, in terms characteristic of a high, moral creed, by saying that for him the stubborn integrity

¹⁷ Frankfurt A. M., Gerhard Schulte-Bulmke.

of moral law is the secret of the authority, dignity, and utility of history. He holds that the profoundest cause of every historical action assumes the shape of right and wrong. It is his conviction that divine wisdom guides history and fate, and leads the world on towards perfection. Lord Acton's declaration that constant progress in the direction of organized and secure liberty is the characteristic fact of modern history sounds like an utterance of Hegel. His faith in God determines his faith in historical progress; and so he regards history as the true demonstration of religion.

J. Hessing's outstanding work, *Das Selbstbewusstwerden des Geistes*¹⁸ is written in the spirit of the highest form of idealism, speculative idealism. This work testifies to an exceptional philosophical talent. It does not discuss philosophy and special philosophical problems; but, quite in the spirit of Hegel, it depicts the selfdevelopment of spirit in exactly the way in which spirit itself is present and actual in its selfrealization. Besides being reminiscent of Hegel, Hessing's method reminds one chiefly of Bolland, Hessing's predecessor at the University of Leyden. Bolland belonged to the post-Hegelian movement, which he defended with a sharpness and energy of which eyewitnesses still tell most remarkable and amusing tales. Whoever was not an admirer of Hegel and a partisan of Bolland was not regarded by him as a philosopher at all, but was rejected as a dunce, often in so many words. He had an extremely strong influence on the philosophy and spiritual life of Holland. Hessing's book exemplifies this influence. His discussion must be acknowledged to be at present the best introduction to the nature of absolute thought. We see here how thought, when it is really philosophical thought, deals with nothing but itself. The absoluteness of this thought creates and produces even its own truth. Truly philosophical thought is not dependent on any sort of experience, on sensations, or on any external reality, as empiricism claims, which in all its forms is subjected to most trenchant criticism. Thought is the lord and master of itself. So-called life, too, has no power over thought, as modern *Lebensphilosophie* asserts. By developing itself thought tests itself. When we speak of a critique of consciousness or carry out such a critique, we are in

¹⁸ Translated from the Dutch by C. Sypkens Kylstra and Dr. Käte Nadler. Stuttgart, Fr. Fromann.

the presence of nothing other than the selfrealization and self-examination of philosophical thought. Life may be mentioned in connection with thought only in so far as the logical development of the dialectic of the concept stands in question. And consequently a portion of Hessing's book is devoted to the presentation of this selfdevelopment of the concept. The autonomy of thought and of philosophy is revealed also in the fact that philosophy finds neither its justification nor its purpose in any sort of moral or social utility. It does not want to improve, to edify, men; it wants only to possess and to develop itself. It is, therefore, simply the eternal creation of truth. From this brief report on Hessing's book one sees how strongly active in him is not only the spirit of Hegel but the power of pure, creative thought. Thus the study of this book is a high logical delight. Thought is not looked upon here as if from a box in the theatre, but it lives in the author of the book. For he does not play a subordinate part, but realizes the dynamic of the concept in his own thought in an excellent, autonomous methodology.

As in Holland, Belgium, Italy, and Russia, there occurred in Germany also an Hegelian renaissance a few years ago. Its progress, of course, depends essentially upon the understanding which one has of Hegel. For various reasons this understanding is difficult to acquire. Therefore, Richard Kroner, one of the leaders in bringing about that renaissance, asserted the need for a commentary on Hegel's famed *Phaenomenologie des Geistes* in his distinguished, two-volume work, *Von Kant bis Hegel*¹⁹ which appeared in 1924. This need is fulfilled in the "*Kommentar zu den grundlegenden Abschnitten von Hegels Phaenomenologie des Geistes*" by Professor Caspar Nink.²⁰ Hegel's entire *Phenomenology* is not commented upon; the comments refer in the main to the two principal chapters and points of view, which bear the titles, "Consciousness" and "Selfconsciousness". The comments are models of clarity, for there are commentaries enough that themselves need a commentary. Naturally, Father Nink's commentary cannot remove and does not pretend to remove all difficulties. I should like to recommend its use most heartily and to call attention not only to the actual comments but also to the brief

¹⁹ Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr.

²⁰ Regensburg, Josef Habbel.

criticisms that are inserted here and there. Nink's comments form a very useful supplement to the commentary which Kuno Fischer gives in his celebrated work on Hegel.

But do all these historical defenses and justifications of idealism suffice? We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that the attacks on it require some other refutation than a reference to its continued historical influence. For it has really got into a distressing situation. That is one side of the matter. The other side is that we certainly cannot abandon idealism. Otherwise, we should have both to abandon the philosophical tradition, in which idealism plays a decisive rôle, and to renounce the real and supreme philosophical attitude of mind, for which idealism is indispensable. The abandonment of idealism would in the end involve the abandonment of Platonism. In fact it becomes more and more evident that attacks on idealism are at the same time attacks on the spirit of Plato. The doctrine of eternal and absolute ideas is rejected, because there is seen in it an untenable formalism, and a manipulation of concepts which have no relation to reality and are inadequate for the construction of living reality. Platonism is criticized as expressing, and emanating from, a purely formal speculation, in which the only triumph celebrated is that of logical construction. It conforms to reason and understanding, from which it springs likewise, but it does not correspond to the full essence of man. And it does not suffice for a universal interpretation of reality, which is fed by a thousand streams and is possessed by millions of individual existences and millions of individual nuances. Without doubt, these objections have placed Platonism and, along with it, idealism in a critical position.

The task of subjecting "the crisis of idealism" to a general and fundamental investigation followed from this situation and its recognition. The author of the present report devoted a recently published book to this task under the title, *Die Krise des Idealismus*.²¹ If it is permitted, a few words will be said about this book as a sort of notice by the author. In order to be able to evaluate and to refute the attacks to which idealism has been exposed in the past and in the present, it is necessary, in the interests of objectivity and fairness, to acquire an unprejudiced acquaintance

²¹ Zürich, Rascher & Co.

with the enemy, *i.e.*, realism and its objections to idealism. The main objection is, of course, that idealism remains out of touch with reality, does not do justice to it, even spiritualizes it in an inadmissible manner, and deprives it of its real content. And then there are further particular objections raised against idealism from the point of view of realism. First, the objection from the viewpoint of value, the ethico-axiological objection: Reality has for us an objective value, which is revealed in our desire for it, our wish to master and possess it. The purely spiritual relation to it that idealism sets up satisfies this desire by no means. Realism next raises an objection in the name of the idea of form—the aesthetico-morphological objection. Idealism respects and acknowledges actually but a single form, the classical. It does not, however, heed and know the real wealth and variety of creative forms and the wealth of real forms and structures. Idealism, even from the formal point of view, makes reality much too uniform. And, finally, the objection in the name of experience—the emotional objection. The experience of reality is oversimplified by idealism, is rendered too coherent, and is spiritualized. Reality appears, however, in a thousand forms and in a thousand gradations, which cannot be sublimated, as idealism wishes them to be. Further, there have developed in all the modern sciences tendencies that contradict and run counter to idealism. Modern psychology, modern theology, modern theory of education, modern historical science, modern natural science—these are filled with a realistic spirit and are endeavoring to grasp their respective portions of actuality in their full reality.

But this realistic criticism has its limitations. Certainly it possesses an advantage, inasmuch as it takes knowledge of the real world seriously. But this turning towards appearances involves a philosophically doubtful liaison with the appearances. And thus a new positivism arises. It is quite correct for one to demand that philosophy take the special sciences into consideration. But this should not be carried too far, or else philosophy will lose its freedom and independence of the special sciences. This freedom and independence of philosophy is an intellectual and moral necessity. And it is precisely idealism that maintains this intellectual and moral freedom of philosophy against both the world of the given

and the special sciences. It solves its problem by going beyond the given to synthesis and system; by possessing the moral and intellectual courage needful for coherent construction, for a universal articulation of the given, and for its coherent interpretation and evaluation. Through all these devices we transcend the limits of the given. But without this transcendence there can be no philosophy, no freedom, and ultimately no spiritual life. What is left, then, of the oft asserted crisis of idealism? I do not deny this crisis at all. But I understand by it something quite different from what is ordinarily meant. The crisis is always present in idealism and for idealism. For idealism is the philosophical and human expression of an attitude of constant conflict. It, therefore, finds itself in an uninterrupted crisis. It faces a crisis, not because of attacks from without, but because of the indefatigable activity of its nature. It strives to systematize what is given, to derive reality from a supreme unity, to give a coherent evaluation and interpretation of being, to construct a supreme, metaphysical idea of value; but its exertions are, so to say, too heroic and too grand. They involve its crisis, make this crisis necessary and explicable.

The necessity and the grandeur of this crisis is illuminated particularly by the relation of idealism to the historical world. With its moral demands and commandments it advances against the world. But the force of history does not yield to these demands; it defends its rights and its independence. Thus an eternal struggle ensues between these two powers, these two empires. For idealism, this conflict itself, and not an ultimate victory, is the meaning and goal of its nature and its struggle. And it does not shun the crisis into which it is plunged by the conflict. Idealism teaches the creative freedom of the spirit. But it teaches at the same time the necessity of the crisis. As a witness for spirit it is a witness for the creative power of the crisis. And the crisis is no less eternal than spirit. It does not signify the end or collapse of idealism, but every stage of this crisis signifies a stage in the eternal development of militant spirit and so of militant idealism. Nothing more beautiful and appropriate can be said of idealism than that it is in a crisis. Were idealism to carry its object entirely, were it to prove itself the only possible and the only

justified philosophical and spiritual attitude, then it would go to ruin on the completeness of its own victory. Its crisis belongs to its conditions; its crisis is its life, and certifies its rights. Through these discussions I believe justice has been done to the nature of idealism, its position in historical reality, and its relation to realism, its opponent which is necessary to it, though subordinate.

III

We have repeatedly had occasion in the above lines to refer to books by Catholic philosophers. They were, however, mostly historical writings or introductions to other philosophical works or commentaries. Catholic philosophy, however, has revealed for some time a noteworthy development on the systematic side. One can almost speak of a revival of Catholic thought—a revival which undoubtedly is connected with the revival of the 'realist' way of thinking and with the rise of the philosophy of existence, as this is represented by Heidegger, Jaspers, Nicolai Hartmann. It can also be shown easily that certain Catholic views make their influence felt in this philosophy of existence. Catholic philosophers and religiously oriented philosophers in general gladly refer to the philosophy of existence and make use of it in supporting and elucidating their thoughts. The philosophy of existence is concerned with the problem of being—Catholic philosophy likewise. For its thought is directed upon the highest being, upon absolute being, the being of God; and it has its foundation in this being. The treatment of the problem of being in the real sense belongs among the problems of the philosophy of religion. First-rate work is being done in this field by Professor Bernhard Rosenmöller, a distinguished Catholic philosopher, who first won scholarly recognition through his study of St. Bonaventure. His new book is called simply *Religions-Philosophie*.²² Rosenmöller stands within the tradition of Aristotle and Thomas, which he regards as having philosophically a perfect guarantee. His philosophy of religion, moreover, finds its support in his own Catholic creed; since he claims, perhaps correctly, that philosophy of religion is impossible without the support of a definite religious creed. How is comprehension of unconditional being to be secured? Rosenmöller replies,

²² Münster im Westfalen, Aschendorff.

"The recognition of the existence of unconditional being is a freely assumed attitude towards unconditional being. The assumption of this attitude is a supreme metaphysical act. It is really and concretely consummated in every personal act." He elucidates the nature of personal acts, as follows: "Personal acts overcome the impulsive tendencies, which run their course according to the dictates of nature. They are in a state of free motion toward objects which are valued for their own sake." We cannot win our way to the eternal being by a gradual, inductive ascent, but by an act of inspiration or illumination. Rosenmöller repeatedly refers to the significance of the doctrine of illumination. That peculiar certainty which is the property of our higher spiritual life depends on illumination. In it one apprehends and experiences unconditionally the reality of absolute being. The essence of the 'vera religio' is revealed in this inspiration. And the philosophy of religion is concerned with no other religion but this, while the systematic investigation, for example, of spirit cults, the worship of the dead, the worship of heroes, and natural mysticism, falls to the share of other philosophical disciplines. One of the chief values of this stimulating book consists in its bringing the problem of the apprehension of the absolute once more into the focus of discussion. Its arguments are almost a direct invitation to investigate ourselves the recommended way of illumination and the significance which personal acts are supposed to have for knowledge of the unconditioned.

The representatives of Catholic philosophy quite naturally take the stand that their doctrine has the character of absolute certainty and truth. And every one of their books is supposed to contribute towards the justification of this conviction. Out of this there springs quite naturally and spontaneously the twofold question, (*a*) how, in contrast to this unconditionally true doctrine, error is at all possible, and (*b*) what treatment the problem of error has already received at the hands of other philosophers. The problem involved is, indeed, an extraordinarily interesting one. The more a science is concerned with the discovery of truth, as is universally the case with philosophy, the more must it fix its eye also upon the problem of error. An attractive and learned

book, *Der Irrtum in der Philosophie*,²³ is devoted to this obvious and urgent problem by the Catholic philosopher, Balduin Schwarz. He takes as his point of departure the fact that contemporary philosophy has fortunately and rightly returned after long years of wandering to its old, yet ever new, employment, to the simple investigation of the nature of reality. By doing so, philosophy has found its way back to itself. Balduin Schwarz refers to a session of the *Kant-Gesellschaft*, at which, through the instigation of the present writer in his capacity as president of the *Kant-Gesellschaft* at that time, the trend of philosophy towards ontology and realism was made the subject and central topic of discussion. When the endeavors and results of human knowledge were once more considered from the point of view of truth and knowledge of reality, the question arose as to how philosophy can arrive at negative results. And thereby the problem of error was set. The philosophy of the recent past did not feel this to be a pressing problem. It had reached a settlement with relativism and capitulated to the ostensibly irremediable arbitrariness, narrowness, and subjectivity, of the knowing subject. Now, however, Schwarz argues, we have again acquired respect for the given. We perceive that there are fixed arrangements of things, from which one cannot in truth escape. Schwarz speaks of "dictation by the given". With St. Thomas and all other realists, we can speak of the preëminent power of being, the primacy of which has long been forgotten or disregarded by philosophy. Thus error ultimately comes down to a lack of adequacy of subject to object. How this lack arises and how it is to be understood are questions which Schwarz acutely investigates. In the first place, lack of adequacy (and hence, error) depends on inadequate logical forms; it is thus the result of imperfect thought. Schwarz makes a contribution to the "logic of error" by following out these logical fallacies. And his account of the problem of error in the history of occidental philosophy is not less fruitful than those logical investigations. We share the author's regret that external causes prevented his carrying this solid and instructive historical study beyond Kant. In the second place, error depends on factors de-

²³ Münster im Westfalen, Aschendorff.

rived from our "personal structure" or, as Balduin Schwarz also says, from "man as a creature". These sources of error receive treatment in the psychologico-anthropological part of this substantial work.

On the basis of assumptions essentially different from those of Catholic philosophy and of the philosophy of existence, which is akin to it, Heinrich Maier discusses the fundamental problem of truth and error, of idea and reality, in his great *Philosophie der Wirklichkeit*. Maier worked out his system in a series of highly important works with unflagging energy and impressive consistency. We have been able in our past reports to refer frequently to the individual works, in each of which he carried the construction of his system a step farther. When in November, 1934, death snatched the pen from his more than assiduous hand, the concluding volume had fortunately been finished. His daughter Anneliese Maier conscientiously prepared it for publication. It is concerned with *Psychisch-Geistige Wirklichkeit*.²⁴ Maier's philosophy, therefore, can now be studied and criticized as a whole. It is highly desirable in the interests of philosophy that intensive work be devoted to this project in the near future. For Heinrich Maier—ultimately Professor of Philosophy at the University of Berlin—was one of those thinkers who during their productive periods do not receive adequate notice and recognition. His importance may be seen anew in his last work. It testifies to his towering philosophical strength, his exceptional systematic gifts, and his equally exceptional mastery of the entire historical development of philosophy. The first task of the work consists in the demonstration of the existence of psycho-spiritual reality and in the determination of its characteristic features. The basis for this is afforded by the activity of a "universal consciousness". Maier says: "To be real does not mean to appear real to an individual consciousness but to a universal consciousness." Universal consciousness is the factor which constitutes spiritual reality. Maier then exhaustively develops the categories and those systematic forms which condition and guarantee the structure of spiritual reality. A major portion of these excellent investigations is devoted to the "antinomies", in which he quite correctly per-

²⁴ Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr.

ceives the essential forms of the psychic, subjective sphere. The problem of the antinomies that presents itself here may be formulated in the following manner: How does the intuitive wealth of psychic reality fit into the unity or unities of the subject? In the realm of psychic reality we run into antinomies in every direction. Just think of the enigmatical relations of this reality (the subject) to space. Think of the opposition, inside of this realm, between the intuitive and the conceptual side of the mental world, of the opposition between psychic necessity and freedom, of the problem of the various types and forms of freedom; for example, metaphysical and moral freedom. Think of the opposition between individual experiencing, willing, desiring, etc., and, on the other hand, universal consciousness and regard for universality. Think of the mysterious discrepancy between what is purely personal and all the experience, knowledge, and volition, that transcend this personal sphere. Think also, in connection with this, of the opposition between finite and infinite consciousness, etc. All these problems are analysed with remarkable exactness and acuteness and with a rigorous objectivity which does not shrink even from selfcriticism. Maier at no point tries to hoodwink the reader with a solution or with the discovery of a unity, which is, as a matter of fact, unattainable philosophically. And it is not attainable, because it is just "subjective reality, as given in human knowledge, that is entangled in an antinomical antagonism, which we cannot overcome". The psycho-subjective antagonism is, of course, a very different thing from the physical one.

I know of no work in contemporary philosophy which sketches so clear a picture of the formal structure of psychic reality as does Heinrich Maier's book. Inasmuch as his *Philosophie der Wirklichkeit* lies before us as a whole, the question can now be raised whether it does justice to every phase of the problem of reality. And just because I admire Maier's accomplishment, I should like to point out here that he restricts himself too exclusively to the characterization of the formal conditions upon which reality depends. He also does not penetrate sufficiently into the thousands upon thousands of meaningful situations, conflicts, experiences, etc., which give the essence and image of reality its richness and variegation. To be sure, one detects that Maier's

keen eye recognizes all those meaningful details and complications and conflicts, which are active behind the pure structural forms and categories of being. However that may be, his *Philosophie der Wirklichkeit* is the most significant work of contemporary philosophy with respect to the problem and the dialectic of truth and reality. Maier's "transcendental phenomenalism" strikes a middle course between idealism and realism. And the most valuable and promising aspect of this position is its dialectical character, by which the onesidedness of both idealism and realism is overcome and sublated in a higher unity.

In his *Psychologie des emotionalen Denkens* Heinrich Maier was among the first to reflect on the problem of value and to study the various types of psychic relations in which values are realized. In recent years the idea of value has become more fully understood in its fundamental meaning and systematic import. We need not here go into the reasons why the idea of value has become prominent. We must only observe that we are concerned not merely with value as an object to be investigated philosophically and psychologically, but with the question whether, and how, a system of philosophy is to be constructed on the idea of value. It is above all needful in this connection to achieve a philosophical or synthetic understanding of the concept of value. Every special science also is concerned with a value. But "philosophy seeks knowledge of the most inclusive whole", as Jonas Cohn says, the well-known author of the extraordinarily important and fundamental work, *Wertwissenschaft*.²⁵ The first thing to be emphasized in justification of taking this externally well-appointed work into consideration is the fact of its necessity. There are reasons, extrinsic and intrinsic, why such a book had to be written some day. This circumstance serves to emphasize its universal significance. Both philosophy and the special sciences have felt an increasing need for clarity about the principal values and about the meaning and value not only of their special work but also of the entire cultural life. This is all the more justified, since progressive specialization has resulted in a lessening of the feeling for life as a whole and, thereby, in the questioning of every special norm, political, scientific, artistic, or religious. Thus the

²⁵ Stuttgart, Fr. Fromann.

knowledge and certification of the fundamental values of our intellectual and practical activity is unconditionally demanded of philosophy. The title *Wertwissenschaft* has for Jonas Cohn also a polemical significance. "I am opposed to all who, following Nietzsche, deny a science of values." Inasmuch as it is subject to the supreme norm of truth, it is a serious science, however widely it may deviate in other respects from the objectivity of natural science and mathematics. This science has philosophical validity, if for no other reason, because 'value' is an essential condition of knowledge of the world as a whole.

How, then, does Cohn construct his "science of value"? He describes the whole realm of value; or, otherwise expressed, he describes the absolute whole from the point of view of value. Hence, first of all, the fundamental general meaning of the idea of value as such must be worked out. This investigation is carried out in the first part of the work, the *Axiomatik* or general theory of value. The second part is concerned with the multitude of different values which we encounter in scientific judgments, in experience, in the ego, in the person, in the community, etc. Since, however, this description is carried out coherently, Jonas Cohn appropriately calls it *Systematik*. Value is, moreover, not merely a theoretical category, but has practical significance, since "everything valuable demands its own realization". This realization is effected by human endeavor. "Realization by men is the only kind we can know, just because we ourselves carry it out." Jonas Cohn makes the point excellently that the science of value ultimately merges with the philosophy of civilization, since civilization is brought about through the creation of values. The forms and meaning of this realization of values by civilization and by labor are discussed in the third section, the *Energetik* or theory of the realization of values. This book is the final accomplishment of Jonas Cohn's long and influential philosophical life. Breadth and depth of vision, prudence, and sagacity, are here combined in one of the most significant works on the philosophy of value that have come from the "southwest German school", to which Cohn belongs. In reading his work I was frequently reminded of the *Philosophie der Werte* of Hugo Münsterberg, who has not yet been forgotten in Germany and the United States.

We pointed out that the renaissance of realism has led to a revival of Aristotelianism. But this revival of Aristotle is not connected with, and limited to, merely his general ontology. It is connected much more closely with his interpretation of nature, his celebrated teleological and dynamic natural science. This natural science was revived by modern neo-vitalism. Neo-vitalism is just as decisively opposed to materialism and mechanism as Aristotle was to the mechanism of Democritus. No less a figure than Hans Driesch has once more appointed himself counsel for the opposition in his popular and fast-moving little book, *Die Überwindung des Materialismus*.²⁶ He does not directly criticize and refute the economic or dialectical materialism which in Marxism has assumed such an important position even in the practical affairs of the world. What is attacked is so-called theoretical materialism, which appears in the most varied guises. We are familiar with it, for example, in the form of atomism or in the modern form in which electrons, energy-quanta, or some other units of force, are assumed to be the ultimate elements of the world. In the refutation of this scientific materialism Driesch employs almost all those ideas which he has previously expounded with great success in his celebrated neo-vitalistic writings, especially, for example, in his *Philosophie des Organischen*. All these works are known in the United States. Driesch, in refuting materialism, makes use of the modern theories of genetics and embryology. He also enlists the aid of modern psychology with its theory of the 'unconscious mind'. What is especially noteworthy is that he further appeals to modern parapsychology, on which he has written a separate book. Parapsychology is still the subject of lively dispute. While it has secured recognition as a science in England, France, and the United States, this is not the case in Germany, as Driesch remarks with regret. All those sciences use the idea of purposive, active forces and lines of force. Forces and lines of force are nothing material. They are psychic and cannot be computed and measured mechanically. They are, therefore, the scientific instances which vanquish materialism. The new science of parapsychology in particular, Driesch emphatically declares, will destroy the very foundations of materialism. This little book is

²⁶ Zürich, Rascher & Cie.

valuable and important as a clear and instructive compilation of all the objections which show materialism to be impossible and untenable. Although it contains no really new ideas, one would like to see it in the hands of those persons who, even today, pay homage to materialism, which, nevertheless, is continually losing ground and prestige in exact research.

IV

Two questions arise in connection with the problem of value. First, is this a purely 'theoretical' or a 'practical' concept? That is, does this concept spring purely from the understanding and is its validity limited to the sphere of knowledge? Or are normative tendencies at work in it? Does it make a demand and insist on the fulfillment of the demand? Secondly, does philosophy itself, by relying on and appealing to the concept of value, go beyond the purely theoretical attitude and assume the attitude of a normative science? It makes no difference how these questions are answered. For, in any case, philosophy through the mediation of the concept of value is turned into ethics and theory of education. Some modern books on ethics and education never leave the field of pure theoretical description. Others make use of ethics and education to erect demands; they are ruled by a dictatorial disposition. It is clear that, since they depend on an idea of value conceived as a demand, these books also contain a criticism of the present times. And, what is more, this criticism is usually carried out from a religious point of view. This is easy to understand, since the highest idea of value, the religious idea, is expressed in this point of view. Where criticism is not based upon such a religious point of view, upon such a supreme idea of value, it easily takes on the character of merely personal discontent. It then appears to spring from personal dissatisfaction with the present moment and thus to possess neither philosophical necessity nor persuasive power. Naturally, the criticism is made in the majority of cases from the point of view of Christianity. It seems to be the only thing that can save us from the present distress and chaos. As critic of the times, Christianity is enjoying a sort of renaissance in our day.

Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, the celebrated moralist and educa-

tionist, comes out for a purification of civilization through the redeeming elevation of man to the Christian level, in his book of denunciation and exhortation, *Ewiges Licht und menschliche Finsternis. Überzeitliches für unsere Zeit*.²⁷ He preaches forcefully on behalf of the improvement of morals and of the spirit. He insists that not only the individual soul, the home, and the school, but also all the sciences (even psychology, sociology, and, indeed, even neurology) lack support "without the science of Gethsemane and Golgotha. Of what use is biology without the theory of the highest life that has ever appeared on earth?" In this book there speaks a person with the resolution and courage to tell our times bitter truths with perfect candor. "Every manner of storm-warning in East and West shows that we are facing a disintegration of moral ties, a mob rule, a dictatorship of hatred, of the ultimate outcome of which we to-day have a slight presentiment. The time may come when men will rush into other men's houses to throttle them, and will afterwards speak of it as if they had been to tea." Foerster's Christianity is a passionate exhortation to selfexamination and conversion. In his Christianity itself there breathes a spirit of passionate ardor, mingled with the spirit of redeeming and liberating love. Again and again he refers to the exemplary life of St. Francis. "Either the spiritual power which animated Francis will appear among us anew, or all the devils of hell will call the tune for our dance—there is no third course!" Foerster does not deliver his critique and exhortation in an academic tone. But just as these have their roots in a deep emotion and in an intimate, personal experience, he utters his grievances and denunciations, his precepts and beliefs, with manifest reference to that experience that overwhelmed him, for example, in the Strassburg Cathedral or on viewing an old religious painting. His is not the diction of a theorist; rather there pulses in it the warm blood of a preacher, conscious of his mission. The gospel is for him an instrument of salvation, and he considers it neither the expression of some religious view of the world nor the sediment of a sociological theory. His demands for mental and political cleansing are of rousing force; his book has the effect of a mighty, religious exorcism.

Nikolai Berdiajew, one of the boldest and liveliest of thinkers,

²⁷ Lucerne, Vita Nova.

is closely akin in spirit to Foerster. The first of his works which we shall consider is *Das Schicksal des Menschen in unserer Zeit*.²⁸ This book also passes sentence on our time. Dehumanizing tendencies have made huge strides. Bluntly speaking, madness, having assumed a politically organized form, rages far and wide. Berdiajew is a firmly convinced Christian. But he does not for a moment hesitate to insist that historical Christianity is itself largely responsible for the brutalization of man and the decline of civilization. For the Christians have neglected to realize the idea of righteousness. They have too often proved themselves enemies of social progress, and consent to social reforms has had to be wrung laboriously from them. The chief reason for the conflict and misfortune of our time, however, lies, according to Berdiajew, in the frightful opposition between "the absolute and totalitarian state", on the one hand, and Christianity, on the other. We can, in his opinion, be saved from this misfortune and ruin only through revival of Christianity and belief in Christ. The message of love must replace the message of hate, or else we shall continue on the road toward brutalization and the soulless rule of technology and the machine.

The view developed in the foregoing book is continued in a deeper vein in Berdiajew's most recent book, *Von der Bestimmung des Menschen, Versuch einer paradoxalen Ethik*.²⁹ Berdiajew is included in this survey for several reasons. His position is based on the philosophy of existence. Furthermore, he stands close to *Lebensphilosophie*. For, on his view, true being is primordial life, and primordial life is true being. Then he finds in man his philosophical point of departure, for an existential, not a psychological, anthropology stands in question. Finally, he is a philosopher of pronounced religious character. He asserts that a man's religious faith and his religious life must inevitably be reflected in his philosophizing; he cannot renounce them as factors in his knowledge. For this reason Berdiajew is convinced also that primordial being is disclosed to the philosopher in religious revelation. On the basis of these assumptions he undertakes the construction of his ethics. This he treats in three long chapters. The first deals with questions of ethical principles, the second

²⁸ Lucerne, Verlag Vita Nova.

²⁹ Bern, Gotthelf.

with concrete problems of ethics, and the third with eschatological problems. Berdiajew's philosophical method has already exerted a considerable influence in Germany. This method has two characteristics. In the first place he often pushes on to the thoroughly concrete problems of the moral life, which he takes up with great acuteness and with fanatical regard for truth. He acquaints us with an emotional type of philosophy. There is no long and patient weighing of pros and cons, no theoretical and demonstrative investigation, but a decided position is at once taken up, which has its roots in the force of moral determination. Being filled with lofty moral energy, Berdiajew defines the 'good' in terms of energy and not in terms of formal laws. He is decisively opposed to any ethics in which this is attempted. "The good must be conceived in terms of energy. . . . The most important thing about it is selfrealizing, creative energy. . . . Man does not realize the good because he sets himself the goal of realizing the good, but because he bears in himself the creative energy of good. . . . The start and the finish of the course of moral life and of the good coincide. They are a radiant, creative energy." Moral freedom also rests on this creative energy. And so Berdiajew's ethics of energy is a proclamation of freedom. The creative force of moral freedom overcomes also the old and evil antithesis of master and slave, which Nietzsche held to constitute the origin of morality. The triumph over this antithesis in the moral life is a great moral achievement. Where God's spirit dwells, there is no more such subjugation or such domination, but there freedom dwells. And where freedom dwells, the grace and spirit of God prevail.

The second basic character of his philosophy, as the foregoing exposition of his thought shows, is its religious, in particular its Christian, nature. We should not, as Nietzsche did, fail to recognize the power and grandeur of Christianity because of the depravity, unworthiness, and worthlessness, of many Christians. "Christian morality is an acquisition of spiritual power in every sphere of life. Christian virtue is neither obligation nor norm; it is power and might. . . . In reality Christian morality is antithetical to Kant's. Normative idealism is powerless. It does not know whence it can derive the power to realize the norm and law of

the good. Norm and law are impotent, because they are without mercy. Christianity, however, traces good back to God, the source of all power." Even though Berdiajew repeatedly disputes the rights and the fruitfulness of Kant's categorical imperative, his penetrating and arousing discussions culminate in a comprehensive demand which he designates as the "fundamental principle of ethics". He formulates it as follows: "Act as if you heard the voice of God and were summoned to participate by a free and creative act in God's deed. Uncover the pure and original conscience in yourself; discipline your personality; strive against the evil in yourself and in the world around you, not, however, in order to cast these evils and evil itself back into hell and to establish the kingdom of hell, but in order to win the real victory over evil, to cooperate in the transfiguration and creative transmutation of evil." Every line of this book rivets one's interest. It is a burning appeal and an infinitely earnest exhortation to conscience. For several reasons we shall follow with close attention the effect of this book. It is not a matter merely of the future and the destiny of the book but of the problem of the revival of Christian ethics and of the revival of life in the spirit of Christianity.

Another uncommonly impressive critique of the spirit of the times is the book by J. Huizinga, *Im Schatten von Morgen*.³⁰ This book also has aroused considerable notice, though it does not penetrate so deeply into contemporary problems and conflicts as do the books of Foerster and Berdiajew. Huizinga undertakes his criticism, which, likewise, is very severe, from a point of view which we cannot mistake if we regard it as that natural and healthy rationalism which was dominant in the second half of the nineteenth century and partially so in the first fifteen years of the present century. But Huizinga is not in sympathy with existential philosophy and *Lebensphilosophie*. Indeed, he fears cultural decline may result from the alliance with existence. The forces of irrationality are fighting a battle that endangers reason. A monstrous cult has dedicated itself to life, and "reason, which once fought against faith and believed it to be slain, must now seek refuge in

³⁰ Bern, Gotthelf.

faith in order to avoid destruction". Huizinga everywhere perceives the increase of unwholesome delusion and the tyranny of phrases and false ideas. The trend towards irrationalism is revealed, he thinks, in the attempt of myth to supplant reason. To a person who believes in the sovereignty and value of reason, the new theory of life, with its glorification of existence above knowledge, is the road to barbarism. When existence is exalted above knowledge, the possibility disappears of setting up clear and tenable norms of judgment, so that the universal moral principles of humanity have come to ruin. We humble ourselves in a disastrous manner before political power and prestige. But the sovereignty of political power can result only in a kingdom of immorality. Political immorality and immoral politics are not found only among Fascists. We even find them in the point of view of certain historians. The renunciation of the sovereignty of reason and the abandonment of a clear and superior ideal of knowledge have led to a general weakening of the power of judgment, to the decline of critical consciousness, to the rise of an unrestrained superstition, to the withdrawal of art from reason and nature, and to a general deficiency of style.

Huizinga, obviously, stands up for the revival or maintenance of just those attitudes of mind and forms of life upon which the other critics heaped blame for the spiritual and moral decline of the times. The latter are advocates of the alliance of man with the being whose great laws humanity must again learn to observe, instead of trusting in their own subjective principles of reason. They advocate the rise of new mythology and are unfriendly towards rationalism and the social and political organizations connected with it. But the results of Huizinga's cultural criticism agree with theirs in the pointed, too pointed, rejection of nearly all features of contemporary life. He agrees with them further in being unable to view change for the better as the result of anything but a purification, which has its roots in the depths of religion and the revival of a moral internationalism. He thinks merely social reforms hold little promise. Will the churches, he asks, bring the new spirit? And he answers, "It is probable that they will emerge, strengthened and purified, from the persecutions which they have

to suffer now. It is conceivable that, in a future age, Latin, German, Anglo-Saxon, and Slavic, religious opinions will meet and intermingle on the rocky foundation of Christianity, in a world which also comprehends the purity of Islam and the profundities of the East. But the churches can triumph as organizations, only insofar as they have purged the hearts of their supporters." And this purification must go hand in hand with the awakening and strengthening of appreciation for the value of internationalism. Internationalism can become the vehicle of the new ethics, in which the opposition of collectivism and individualism will be canceled. "Wherever even the tenderest plant of true internationalism comes up, protect and water it." Huizinga accordingly lends his support to the League of Nations. The discussions contained in this book do not give expression to absolute despair. Huizinga admits that he is an optimist. He believes that the current of healthy life flows more strongly in the great body of mankind than may generally appear, so that we can let the disease run its course without special anxiety and fear.

How different the interpretations are of contemporary cultural phenomena and their motives; how one thinker criticizes and wishes to do away with what another praises and appreciates; how one views the predominance of political power as a misfortune, while another makes the exactly opposite demand for a strengthening of it and for an understanding of its rights and its value—this we may see in the brilliantly written book of Hans Freyer, professor of philosophy and sociology at the University of Leipzig: *Pallas Athene, Ethik des politischen Volkes*.³¹ This is another book which does not have so much the character of unruffled scholarship and systematic development of thought as the marks of a goading, arousing, driving will. It is similar in style and rhythm of thought to the books of Foerster, Berdiajew, and Huizinga. But while their books combat the propensity of our times for politics and the glorification of the state, and regard this propensity as a dangerous threat to morality, Hans Freyer demands an energetic continuation of the advance along the new lines. For political conscience and political will are, according

³¹ Jena, Eugen Diederich.

to him, absolutely necessary presuppositions of and incentives to a serene and healthy historical life. Politics is not horse-trading by party leaders, not a battleground of the classes, but the formal power of mankind and the motive force of history. It is the condition of all progress, and strife and war are its necessary organs. It is senseless and unreal to want to gauge and evaluate the political life of the state by conventional criteria of morality and criteria of conventional morality. Huizinga is decidedly opposed to the alleged autonomy of political power and has, therefore, taken up the cudgels against the well-known German teacher of constitutional law, Carl Schmitt, who defended this autonomy in several works. Freyer's train of thought is similar to Carl Schmitt's. He names his book after the goddess Pallas Athene, who, to him, is not simply the guardian of science and philosophy, but who, helmeted, steps into the fight for culture with a warlike spirit and with warlike courage. As frequently happens in Germany now, Freyer interprets Greek culture not from the humanistic but from the political point of view. And he is, as our exposition shows, in close agreement with many political and cultural developments of the present day. He demands their continuation and reinforcement, things which the other critics of civilization rejected and combatted as the factors most prejudicial to the recovery and purification of civilization. Now the possibilities and modes of interpreting and criticizing historical life are as multiform as that life itself. And it seems to me that for this critique less depends upon the conviction underlying it than upon the point of view from which it is undertaken and upon the method by which it is carried out. The certainty of this point of view and the certainty of this method are, then, the rational foundations for the certainty and validity, of that critique. If I may speak quite candidly, I am not completely in agreement with any of these critiques, because the foundations and method of observation and evaluation seem to me not to be entirely free from a certain dogmatic one-sidedness and from dogmatism in general, and not to be free, moreover, from a certain feeling of resentment, which is the expression of personal moods and, perhaps, of attitudes influenced by personal vicissitudes.

V

From books belonging to the realm of militant ethics and theory of education we pass, in conclusion, to some important publications, which, in contrast, do not depart from the scientific, theoretic attitude. I mention first the instructive book by Hermann Nohl, professor of education at the University of Göttingen, *Die pädagogische Bewegung in Deutschland und ihre Theorie*.³² The aim of this work is to achieve scientifically accurate knowledge of the chief tendencies operative in the particular educational movements. Hermann Nohl seeks to judge these tendencies justly on the basis of historical as well as systematic considerations. And his purpose is gained with splendid success. What he had to do above all else was to learn the nature of the two great elementary movements and to criticize them. These are the youth-movement and the national-education movement, which were of fundamental importance for the origin of contemporary educational theory in Germany. An interesting and, in a sense, typical characteristic of both movements is that they arose out of the dissatisfaction with the general condition of German culture and with the developments in the field of education and training. In opposition to the custom of cramping a man in the unhealthy and impractical life of the specialist, the movements wish to refresh the natural man, to whom no attention was paid in the education of the past decades. Nohl calls the entire reform the "German Movement". According to his interpretation it combines a nationalistic spirit with a humanistic goal. It is thus concerned with a kind of renewal of the attitude from which classical German literature and philosophy sprang. And that is the very attitude which, as we saw, Paul Ernst opposed and held responsible for the evidences of decay in German civilization. We see in such a case as this what very different estimates are formed even of particular movements in the history of a nation. But even if such a synthesis as Nohl has in mind should succeed, the antitheses will not be overcome. Nohl discusses these antitheses in a candid and fascinating manner. Only one of them will be mentioned here, the irremovable opposition be-

³² Frankfurt A. M., G. Schulte-Bulmke.

tween the inevitable striving for individual development and for acquisition of an individual worth and a valuable individuality, on the one hand, and comprehensive historical powers and organizations, which require the regimentation of the individual, on the other hand. But regard for reality does not hinder Nohl from applying lofty, idealistic norms to this reality. And, in fact, in the theory of education we must reach some sort of combination of realistic and idealistic points of view. We must respect the real life and actual nature and inclinations of the child, just as, at the same time, we have to make of this reality demands which we must derive from an educational ideal.

Among the German people a definite educational ideal has not been achieved as clearly and distinctly, as, for example, is peculiarly and conspicuously the case with the English people. What is the English educational ideal? The answer to this is especially interesting, as the historical position of England rests on the realization of that ideal. We shall, accordingly, devote our attention to a book which is occupied with the discussion of that question. Its author is August Hoyler, and its title is *Gentleman-Ideal und Gentleman-Erziehung*.³³ In a very instructive discussion he shows how innate capacities and well-planned education coöperate in producing the English gentleman. That ideal originated at the time of the Renaissance, which in general possesses a commanding importance for the origin and development of modern civilization as a whole. Hoyler also describes accurately those institutions which have had charge of the education of gentlemen—above all, the public schools, which have been as respected and admired as they have been vigorously opposed. This education placed emphasis not so much on the cultivation of the intellect as upon the energetic development of character and will-power. Hoyler also touches upon the nature and advantages of boarding-school education and training by means of sport. And we become acquainted in this book, not only with the interesting development of a special type of education, but also with interesting aspects of the character of the English people as a whole. And, through this, many of England's great historical accomplishments become intelligible to us.

³³ Leipzig, Felix Meiner.

A purely scientific and objective method is in evidence also in the extremely important *Handbuch der Erziehungswissenschaft*. It is being brought out at the request of the German Institute for Scientific Pedagogy at Münster in Westphalia by a group of respected and experienced theoretical and practical workers in the field of education. Thus far, ten elegantly appointed volumes have appeared.³⁴ The authors of the several volumes and articles are outstanding representatives of their fields. And the circumstance that they all write from the Catholic point of view detracts not at all from the objective value and scientific significance of what is offered. I shall mention only a few works in this series of volumes. Professor Siegfried Behn makes an excellent attempt to supply the theory of education with a philosophical foundation in his book, *Philosophie der Werte*. Here once more we have a contribution to the problem of value, so much discussed recently. Knowledge of values, according to Behn's pertinent remarks, is the indispensable propaedeutic and introduction to the theory of education. Carefully and thoroughly he explains the origin of values and the way in which we come to apprehend them. He characterizes, further, the relation of dependence in which particular educational systems stand to particular views of the world and to particular views of value. His account of the whole question of value rests on a deep and confident optimism, without which, indeed, successful, educational activity is impossible. Behn's optimism grows out of his Christian faith and Christian philosophy. He shares the convictions, previously alluded to, of Foerster and Berdiajew, and is thus filled with the certainty that the ideals of education and instruction can be realized only in the name of the Christian doctrine of faith and salvation. His theory of education based on religious and Christian foundations is doubly noteworthy just because of the frequent recent attempts to develop purely non-religious or even atheistic and anti-religious systems of education.

The practical application of Christian educational theory in the realm of Catholic religious instruction is delineated by Linus Bopp in *Katechetik, Geist und Form des Katholischen Religionsunter-*

³⁴ München, Josef Kösel und Friedrich Pustet.

richt. His discussion covers the general principles as well as all particular stages and details of religious instruction. And the book presents a clear picture of the shape which Catholic religious instruction takes—or has taken—when it wishes to comply with the demands of the Christian religion and Christian ethics.

Die Paedagogik der nichtchristlichen Kulturvölker comprises a series of brilliant articles treating *Die Erziehung bei den Naturvölkern, Erziehung im alten Indien, in China, im alten Korea und Japan, Das Erziehungswesen im Alten Testament und im antiken Orient, Altgermanische Erziehung, Erziehung im Kulturbereich des Islam*, and finally *Paedagogik des griechischen und römischen Altertums*. Two volumes of the *Handbuch* are devoted to the *Paedagogik der Gegenwart in den grossen Kulturländern*. The editor, Josef Schröteler, who is justly renowned and distinguished in the field of scholarship and education, has taken all civilized nations into account with prudent and scrupulous care. I shall here enumerate but a few of the essays: for example, *Holländische Paedagogik der letzten dreissig Jahre, Die englische Paedagogik seit 1900* (which also takes the dominions into consideration), *Die russische Paedagogik im 20. Jahrhundert, Die Paedagogik der Slawen im 20. Jahrhundert*. Scholarship, authenticity, and clarity of exposition, combine in making this a series of brilliant achievements. It may be taken for granted that, as is highly desirable, this *Handbuch* will be acknowledged more and more to be a simply indispensable aid to the study of the whole field and the whole development of education, and that as such it will be increasingly used. It is also eminently suitable for practical educational use.

We shall complete the circle of our present survey by referring back to the beginning, where we spoke of the trend towards realism, which is characteristic, we may say, of all contemporary philosophy. As philosophy in general has one of its roots and one of its justifications in the services rendered to practical life, the present trend will have to find not the least significant of its justifications in and through its meaning for practical life. That is to say, just as the value of philosophy in general must, so must also the present trend test and prove itself in educational theory and ethics. The good old saying is true here too: "By their fruits ye

shall know them." Philosophy of existence, ontology, modern realism, must give us convincing systems of ethics and educational theory, if we are to be persuaded of their truth and value. And so we can only entreat and implore realistic moralists and educationists to apply themselves to the work. We hope that before long we shall be able to report on such systems of ethical and educational theory.

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CONTEMPORARY GERMAN PHILOSOPHY*

I

ONE of the principal peculiarities of philosophy is that it ever and anon requires 'introductions'. Some day a comprehensive investigation ought to be made into the motives from which this need arises. In any case, a notable number of introductions to philosophy appear each year; and so in the present survey we have to report once more on a whole series of such books. The character and value of these introductions naturally depends on whether they are written from a definite and assured point of view or whether their authors adopt no special point of view. In the first case, such introductions to philosophy have, as far as method is concerned, a clear, definite, and systematic character. In the second case, these books have a somewhat freer, looser nature, but they are, all the more for that reason, simple reports on the nature of philosophy, its disciplines, its systematic and historical evolution.

A book of the first sort we have in the work by Hans Meyer, *Das Wesen der Philosophie und die Philosophischen Probleme*.¹ Hans Meyer's philosophy rests on the foundation of the *Philosophia Perennis*. He imputes to philosophy the power to secure universally valid cognitions in the form of eternal truths. As *Philosophia Perennis* philosophy has at its disposal a fixed and inwardly coherent store of knowledge, so that the philosophical investigator is not ever compelled, as it were, to begin anew with the creation of philosophy. According to this well-known, well-tried, and fruitful, systematic conception of the nature of philosophy, in which Catholic thinkers especially are at home, past and present and future constitute an incontestable unity. The peaks of this development are found in Plato and Aristotle and, during the middle ages, in Bonaventure, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas. In three major chapters (The Nature and Task of Philosophy, The Philosophical Problems and Disciplines, Psychology and its Relation to Philosophy) Hans Meyer's discussion touches upon almost all important questions and almost all the various treatments of them. It is an excellent textbook. Nevertheless, for the sake of

* Translated from the German by J. S. Fulton.

¹ Bonn, Peter Hanstein, 1936.

beginners and students, for whom after all such an introduction is primarily intended, a stricter choice of questions to be discussed would have been appropriate. The superfluity of material presented can under certain circumstances confuse the student, especially since the exposition is extremely condensed. One further criticism may be made of the work of this exceptionally well-informed author. Neither the systematic nor the historical development of philosophy shows the complete unity of a closed system. Philosophy has grown up around profound problems, and the continuity of its evolution is not infrequently interrupted by revolution. For our author, one proof of persistent continuity is the revival of ontology in recent years. But in recent ontology the dispute is once more about the relation of thought and object, of logical laws and laws of being. And it is not yet agreed whether we can accept the old ontology in the traditional form, which asserts that logical laws have their foundation not in thought but in being.

A book of an entirely different sort is the *Einleitung in die Philosophie* by Max Dessoir,² who has now retired after forty-four years of teaching and after a rich and fruitful activity as professor of philosophy at the University of Berlin. He is no believer in authority. He demands and cultivates independence of thought; he also has no hesitation in leaving room for personal creeds. From the wealth of cognitions and truths at hand he offers an interesting and persuasive selection, which is especially valuable in its treatment of contemporary philosophy. Throughout the whole book a tone of strong, inward enthusiasm is perceptible and lends impressive warmth to the imperturbable composure of his formally perfect writing. Dessoir himself says: "The philosopher is one who is enthralled by existence, who by reflection masters the facts of existence and his own emotions." This attitude of mind, with the noteworthy touch of scepticism accompanying it, gives Dessoir's philosophy, in which much quite personal experience is at work, many features in common with art. In this book no ultimate position and no final decision are reached. Dessoir even regards many views as possible; and so in reading his brilliantly and elegantly written discussion one rejoices in the wealth of possible positions and views.

² Stuttgart, Ferdinand Enke, 1936.

Nor in depicting contemporary philosophy does he attempt to reach a definitive decision. According to him the two great movements, anthropocentrism and ontocentrism, run through the whole of present-day philosophy despite all contrasts in details. According to the anthropocentric conception, knowledge of being and of the meaning of being is dependent upon the knowledge of the individual man, his existence, and his social aspects. Among philosophers of this type (otherwise usually called philosophers of Life) Dessoir names Wilhelm Dilthey, Ernst Troeltsch, Søren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, and others. Dessoir develops a considerable number of objections to anthropocentrism, which it may be interesting to follow. He says it exaggerates the rôle and worth of man, while at the same time overestimating the significance of human society at the expense of individual personality. Actuality is lost, furthermore, in the fullness of its reality, when philosophical reflection begins with man and confines itself in the main to the analysis of man and the merely human. Even the philosophy of existence, which has been highly regarded in recent years in Germany, is, according to Dessoir, but a branch of anthropocentrism. On this point he is certainly right; and we should also in large measure agree with his criticism of existential philosophy. Existential philosophy tries to convince us that the meaning of human existence constitutes the meaning of being in general. Dessoir replies that the object has violence done to it and the way to objective knowledge is barred, when it is understood only in relation to the subject. Finally, he says, existential philosophy in general leads to renunciation of objective being and of universally valid knowledge of being. For to know, according to Dessoir, means to apprehend something which is independent of man. Without a being that subsists by itself (*an sich*), knowledge cannot be mentioned at all. These convictions are the basis of a genuine philosophy of being, that is, of ontocentrism.

Among the representatives of this trend Dessoir characterizes in brief and telling sentences the following: Rudolf Eucken, Georg Simmel, Henri Bergson, Wilhelm Wundt, Ernst Mach, the so-called Viennese Circle (Moritz Schlick and Rudolf Carnap), the neo-Kantians (Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp), and finally the school of Windeband and Rickert, etc. To be sure, the thread is not

clear on which Dessoir attempts to unite these ontocentrists. Both in this and in other chapters a striking indifference is revealed toward systematic contexts. Particular doctrines are often placed side by side in isolation without their inner connection with a whole being either sought or found. In this way a certain relativistic and sceptical spirit attaches to this suggestive and thoughtful book. Against Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, to which a brief but uncommonly instructive discussion is devoted and whose towering importance Dessoir expressly acknowledges, the objection is brought "that it is not related to the whole of culture and that the educational force of the great systems is lacking to it". Also the immediate present is looked at briefly, and it is pointed out that the purely scientific character of philosophy stands before a crisis. Support is now being demanded of philosophy in the training of heroic men of action and in the development of forms of political life. One requires of philosophy that it divorce itself from universality and become national. One discards the usual concepts of worth and of life, because they do not clarify the relation of the individual to the race and to the nation, to the state and its history, and to political actuality surrounding the individual; and—what is to be considered an especially grave error—because these concepts are not derived from those elements. Max Dessoir gives no information concerning what he himself thinks of these new demands. He does not abandon the attitude of an observer, probably because he regards such partizanship as inconsistent with the nature of philosophy. Nevertheless, the taking up of a distinct and firm position must be considered a duty which especially the philosophy of the present and for the present has to fulfill.

Hermann Nohl, until recently professor of philosophy and education at the University of Göttingen, has published an *Einführung in die Philosophie*,³ which reflects his educational zeal. He successfully strives to speak really for beginners and to be as simple and clear as possible. There is here also no system of philosophy, but only an elementary introduction to the basic and decisive questions which, as Nohl correctly believes, are brought before us less by abstract speculation than by the force of life itself. From this point of view, philosophy appears, not as a business for specialists shut off from reality, but as a universal force. Philosophizing is

³ Frankfurt am Main, Gerhard Schulte-Bulmke, 1935.

not an activity which one can exercise or not, but an intellectual, a moral, an aesthetic necessity. Consequently, Nohl launches in forceful language a polemic against rationalism. For he shares the views of the philosophers of Life, that is, those thinkers for whom life constitutes the object and problem of their investigations and who are concerned in general to see in life the sources of philosophy, and who accordingly wish to draw their philosophy from life, and who also believe it possible to do so. On this attitude Nohl shows himself to be a disciple and pupil of Wilhelm Dilthey, just as he, therefore, is an opponent of Kant, who was too much entangled in the logical aspects of thought. Thus in Nohl's book one finds an ontologism. The categories of knowledge are not pure forms of thought but are determined as to content by, and have their basis in, a definite realm of fact. The original sin of philosophy, from which it could not release itself almost up to the present day, and from which it was first freed by thinkers like Dilthey, consists in the dangerous and unfortunate attempt to construe the beneficent multiplicity of the real with the aid of but a single principle. The new philosophical attitude of mind consists above all "in the devotion to facts (*Sachverhalte*). It is not necessary to have a system in order to have truth, but in the particular intuition we are certain of the particular truth, for example, love or justice." Different things in reality have various origins, and it is impossible without an insupportable act of violence to unite them in a fixed unity or to derive them from a supreme principle. In contradiction to Kant, Nohl asserts that even among the categories themselves there subsists no necessary connection for thought. And no philosopher has ever succeeded in the consistent derivation of the particular categories from a logically primitive unity, a highest and last idea. Willing is not derivable from thinking; aesthetic categories not from logical or ethical categories; biological not from mechanical; psychological not from biological. What unites them is not a rational bond, but the power of life, which unites, and yet places every absolute unity in question. It is not mind, it is not reason which creates for us the great forms; but life itself forms itself—it forms itself into a unity also in morality and as morality, in art and as art. Consequently we cannot abstractly and theoretically erect an ultimate, systematic hierarchy of ethical and aesthetic

values. To take an example from the realm of morality, no unobjectionable and ultimately valid decision can be reached as to whether the value of justice is higher and is more to be esteemed than that of love, whether the family or the nation represents a higher value. "Man always stands in the midst of various moral demands, yet can do but one thing at a time. Thus arises the conflict of duties. In achieving one value, I impair the other; and even though I act in conformity with duty the right of the other value remains as it was, and life is impaired by me without my being at fault." Thus in Nohl, too, is found a noble openness to real life, to its rights and demands.

But here again the question must be raised whether life can get along by itself, or whether it does not for its own sake need a principle, superior to it, that is absolute. And in connection with this the representatives of relativistic *Lebensphilosophie* can be asked the further question, whether it is at all possible to reach not merely a unity of life and a unity in life but also a coherent conception of life, that is to say, a philosophy, if one seeks to derive all forms and values, the conceptual and logical, the ethical and the aesthetic, from life; or if one brings them into too close a relation with life. For philosophy no characteristic is more typical and more important than its intellectual and moral independence and freedom, including freedom from life. That is the idealistic attitude of Plato and Kant, which Nohl opposes, because he conceives it to be in conflict with life. On the contrary, I should agree with idealism for that very reason; for through its contradiction to life it gives expression to that idealistic attitude of freedom, without which there can be no philosophy and probably not even any life.

From Hermann Nohl's pen has also come an *Einleitung in die Aesthetische Wirklichkeit*.⁴ This is a book of exceptional worth. It is my belief that in the past ten years scarcely a book on aesthetics or the historical development of aesthetic theories is of equal value. Nohl's work takes its place by the side of the classical works of Wölfflin, Dilthey, Gottfried Semper, Friedrich Theodor Vischer, Hippolyte Taine, Nietzsche, and so on. As in his *Introduction to Philosophy*, Nohl eschews in his aesthetics a systematic

⁴ Frankfurt am Main, Gerhard Schulte-Bulmke, 1935.

and deductive treatment of the subject. On his view, systematic aesthetics is especially lacking in inner life; it lacks the necessary and natural relation to productive aesthetic work; it is lacking, above all, in regard for a quite decisive feature, which Nohl calls the "complexity of art" and repeatedly discusses. He considers the basic error of almost every systematic aesthetics and of most histories of art to be the fact that the work of art is approached with the presupposition that it has a single meaning. Following, in part, the simply revolutionary discoveries of Wilhelm Dilthey concerning the nature of art, the relation of art and the particular artistic work to the age, and the development of theories of art, Nohl shows both that every true work of art includes in itself three very different aspects, and that every sound aesthetics must follow three methods. The three aspects of a work of art are: the energy of the creative artist; the intention of producing a definite effect and, in conjunction with this, the aesthetic style of the work; and, finally, the autonomy of the form. To these three creative factors there correspond three aesthetic methods: the historico-genetic, which chiefly has to do with the personality and power of the creative artist; the analytico-psychological, which investigates the impression and the factors calling it forth; and, finally, the objective method, which deals with the form of the work. Dilthey was the first to recognize that these three methods in fact occur in every aesthetics. But what he did not see was the systematic connection of these three methods, which are distributed over three different epochs of modern culture, with the living activity of artistic powers and factors themselves. A particular method has reference only to a particular artistic factor. But as the most various factors always condition the origin of a work of art, aesthetic reality must be investigated from three quite different sides. The work of art possesses its own, independent form and reveals a definite and independent lawfulness; furthermore, it is the result of a definite, complicated process, and it has a certain effect on the spectator. How these three factors are inwardly connected is an unfathomable secret of artistic genius. It is at the same time one of the most difficult tasks of philosophy to find the law of this connection.

Nohl also depicts the principal epochs of the modern theoretical study of art. This account is no less than masterly, and is far

superior to the most highly esteemed accounts of the history of aesthetics. On every line of every page we detect Nohl's astonishing erudition. This perfect, scholarly mastery of an enormous wealth of material is equalled by an extremely vivacious and charming style. Although Nohl makes a great number of historical references, his study is never wooden or tiresome. For he always keeps the large, general features in view. Also the relation of a particular aesthetic theory to its age is always preserved. The reader is often simply fascinated by his account and is always instructed.

What are the main stages of the development of modern aesthetics, if we keep our eye on those basic factors out of the coöperation of which a work of art arises? (a) The aesthetics of the Renaissance starts with the work itself and looks for the objective law in the phenomenon. It employs, therefore, the objective method. Its special advantages are instructive. They consist in the fact that the work is kept firmly and clearly in view. Nohl, however, points out the limitations of this method: it is too rationalistic, too exclusively concerned with external form, too indifferent to personal and general historical circumstances. (b) Then the so-called aesthetics of taste, which developed first in England. It goes into the origin of the sense of beauty in the mind of the artist and of the observer, that is, of one who appreciates a work of art. The prototype of this special form of aesthetics is afforded by Locke, who applied the analytico-psychological method to the investigation of the subjective processes in which our human knowledge comes into being. (c) Connected with this is the aesthetics of creation, which was originated in the early works of Herder and Goethe. Its purpose is to understand the work of art in terms of the creative power of the artistic imagination and personality of genius. (d) The highest and greatest comprehension of the previously developed methods is found in Kant's transcendental method, to which Nohl devotes a condensed but penetrating discussion. There follow then (e) the aesthetics of perfection (Goethe and, especially, Schiller and Wilhelm von Humboldt), (f) the romantic aesthetics, which reached its highest development in Wilhelm Schlegel's *Vorlesungen über die schöne Literatur und Kunst* and in Hegel's *Philosophie der schönen Kunst*. But however highly we prize, especially, Hegel's aesthetics, Nohl shows the necessity of (g) the

disintegration of metaphysical aesthetics. For it had kept itself, even in the hands of Goethe and Schiller, too aloof from real life and the facts of artistic creation. Remarkably enough, these men, who in the truest sense possessed artistic natures and gave artistic form to life—as is particularly true of Goethe—withdrew themselves all too much from concrete, specific, artistic reality, as soon as they began to theorize. Even they were victims of formalism and of a predilection for the abstract and the excessively general. Thus Schopenhauer's irrationalistic aesthetics and Nietzsche's famed analysis of Greek tragedy meant a return to the particular work of art. This development received essential support from (h) the so-called aesthetics from below, that is to say, experimental aesthetics, and from the type of aesthetics which considers the factors and laws of production to be dependent on race, milieu, and a definite cultural level. The outcome of this development Nohl sees in that stage of aesthetics which he designates (i) the aesthetic attitude towards life. According to this conception, identified with Dilthey on the one hand and Nietzsche on the other, art is to be understood in terms of the immediate forces of life. Beauty does not merely exist in the work of art, but is contained in life itself. "The aesthetic attitude is thus not something which in the form of art is a late addition to life and which could have been lacking, but is a formative force of our life itself ; and art is but the highest form of this primitive phenomenon of our existence, which permeates, clarifies, and spiritualizes our whole being, since it everywhere seeks a unity of feeling, to which it gives form and meaning." Life itself, then, is the greatest artist and the greatest work of art, and its aesthetic power is manifested in its satisfaction of the aesthetic need of man, the need for harmony. In this *credo* we have before us, in a certain sense, the metaphysical confession of faith of this significant philosophy of life, which, nevertheless, prefers to regard itself as being hostile to metaphysics. For Dilthey himself in noted studies tried to prove that traditional metaphysics had without doubt received its death blow from the scientific and historical developments of modern times and from the growth of modern *Lebensphilosophie*. We are not obliged in this place to examine the validity of this proof.

II

Not less than three new volumes of Wilhelm Dilthey's collected works are at hand: *Paedagogik, Vom Aufgang des geschichtlichen Bewusstseins*, and *Zur Preussischen Geschichte*.⁵ New treatises keep coming to light from the apparently immeasurable depths of his literary remains. None even of his own pupils knew the vast scope of the activity of their honored and beloved teacher. We knew his tireless creation well. Even in the course of simple conversations or recreational values we saw him in the process of ceaseless work. But what he wrote in his long lifetime even we are just discovering. The historical, psychological method, which he developed to the highest point, was characteristic of his philosophical work. He had an outspoken antipathy for system-building, which he regarded as an unbearable violation of history and life. One can thus not expect any genuine systematic achievement in the work on education. Even though the subtitle, *Geschichte und Grundlinien des Systems*, refers to a 'system', we find nothing of it in the work itself. Precisely the opposite is the case. A certain universality of knowledge is bound up with the concept of system. But Dilthey regards such universality as impossible. Man cannot find out what he is except through the course of his development throughout tens of centuries. But this development cannot be expressed in universally valid concepts. Therefore, the aim of education cannot be reduced to a universal formula. Just as little is a universally valid system of ethics possible. Belief in a universally valid theory of education belongs, according to Dilthey, to the outlived modes of thought of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which thought it possible to interpret the whole life of human society by means of universally valid principles. But both the great educators and the great forms of education arise from determinate historical and national situations. This knowledge is one fruit of the so-called "historical school", to which Dilthey belonged by innermost conviction. Consequently, it follows that the methods to be used in treating educational problems are the methods of historical and psychological observation. Just as particular educational doctrines are historically and psychologically limited and

⁵ Leipzig, B. G. Teubner.

conditioned, so also the educational ideal does not float in midair. "The ideal of education depends on the ideal of life of that generation which does the educating. At the same time the system of means by which the education is accomplished is conditioned by the circumstances of this generation." Even the greatest individuals can exert creative influence only when and where they can build on the firm foundation of a growing racial life. From this point of view, Dilthey has pictured truly magnificent scenes from the history of education. I know hardly anything as delightful as the reading of these historical sketches. Everything is bathed in the light of perfect clearness and obvious distinctness. The levels of culture which he discusses are brought, as it were, in three dimensions before the eye of the reader. One often feels oneself in an immediate, almost bodily contact with the personalities discussed. One has the feeling of meeting them, person after person, as if they lay their inmost natures bare to us in frank and friendly statements.

And side by side with the wonderfully fascinating historical presentation of the development of education goes the analysis of human mental life, in order to determine the motives, purposes, forms, ideas, needs, which induce us to undertake the labor of education. For the only real educator is the man who really knows the life of the human soul. All great educationists were "men who read the child-mind daily, hourly, for many years, and who could not and would not lose the living reality through analysis and abstraction." Their feeling for life, their perception of the child-mind—"these are what make them superior to any theorist." However, a psychology has to be produced which will really enable us to read the souls of men. Experimental psychology does not grant us this power. Wilhelm Dilthey has led a strenuous fight against it. In express opposition to it, he developed his famed "*geisteswissenschaftliche*" psychology, the chief instrument of which was "understanding". It is unfortunate that Dilthey did not get beyond the level of quite general psychological observations in the realm of education. The work in question is extremely rich in suggestions, which would have doubtless yielded wonderfully illuminating insights, comparable to those which he gave us in the realm of poetry and with reference to imagination and the soul of

the poet. He was, however, so full of various scholarly interests, and the vision of the limitless historical world so absorbed him, that he did not further pursue and work out his promising suggestions for a psychology (not, as he claims, a system) of education.

The two other volumes referred to above furnish impressive, new proof of the exceptional quantity and quality of his historical work. It will suffice here to mention briefly a few themes which he treats. His historical attitude caused him to take particular interest in historians. He wrote more or less comprehensive treatises on Johannes von Müller, Niebuhr, Schlosser, Dahlmann, Ranke, Treitschke, and others. He wrote these, however, not merely out of interest in the historians involved but because of the light which these personalities threw on the spirit of their times. For he always united the history and psychology of the individual with the history and psychology of his culture, and his exceptional gift of sympathetic understanding and power of description combined to produce works of keenest penetration and captivating charm. Even when his subject is the very driest stuff, it becomes life and movement in his hands. For example, Frederick the Great creates the civil code. As Dilthey explores the motives for the origin and chief provisions of this highly important administrative and political act, the material assumes an almost dramatic character. The eye glances from the central object in all directions. The spirit of the times is resurrected. One hears men speak. One watches the machine of state work. One becomes acquainted with the vast problems lying behind the particular reforms. The judgment is everywhere confirmed, which Jacob Burckhardt passed upon young Wilhelm Dilthey, his colleague at the University of Basel: that the young scholar would develop into one of the greatest historians of culture. Dilthey means to cultural history in the broadest sense, what Burckhardt himself means to the history of art, and Ranke to political history.

In other respects, we can repeat an assertion which we made in former reports: namely, that purely historical studies are not especially cultivated at the present time, however necessary comprehensive and thorough historical studies may be, particularly with reference to the historical development of philosophy. Stanislaus

von Dunin Borkowski's *Spinoza* constitutes a certain exception to this. The first three volumes were discussed in a previous report. The fourth and last volume has now appeared. It deals with the most important letters of the philosopher, his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, and those portions of the *Ethics* in which Spinoza presents his theory of "affects". What follows that in the *Ethics* had already been dealt with in the previous volumes. This work is a unique achievement. Von Dunin was one of the most learned of the students of the history of philosophy. With unlimited care and devotion he went into every detail of the life and development of Spinoza. He followed the work of the philosopher almost word by word. He enquired into every literary source with untiring patience. All possible evidence was gathered; his philological exactitude knows no limits. An enormous number of more or less important personages of Spinoza's time make their appearance. One often wonders how it could be possible for our author to find all these men and their books. He spared neither time nor effort in familiarizing himself even with the most remote details. The thirty-five years spent by von Dunin on these Spinoza studies seem almost too few, even though one takes into account the fact that he wastes not a single hour in making Spinoza's times live again for us. In recent years this form of philological critique and critical philology has not been looked upon with favor; nevertheless, an account that throws so much light on former ages undoubtedly has its place. Though the method of research employed by von Dunin confronts us with innumerable details, it succeeds in reviving the spirit of that past time in its totality and universality. For our author does not drown himself in details; he was granted within certain limits the gift of intuition. But we also learn from von Dunin that that age is not past even with respect to its content. He is quite correct in the assertion that an undiminished actuality resides in Spinoza's philosophy and that it forms a bridge between the present and the most ancient past. It was, consequently, "worth the effort to write in so much detail about the days of Spinoza". The four volumes of this colossal work contain the yield of a rich harvest.

The development of the European mind has been and is still to a large extent under the influence of Spinoza. But other powers

also control this development. In this connection reference should be made first to the vast influence of Hegel. How strong, deep, and comprehensive this influence was and remains becomes clear in the work, *Hegel bei den Slaven*,⁶ edited by D. Cyzevskyj. The editor is himself responsible for the largest contribution, *Hegel in Russia*. Even during his lifetime Hegel began to exert an influence on the Russians and on many Poles, as appears from W. Kühne's contribution, *The Poles and Hegel's Philosophy*. From 1820 to 1830 Berlin, where Hegel taught, was virtually the center of all philosophical life. And Hegel's philosophy played a most important part in the transformation of the old Russia and the creation of the new. In Russia whole philosophical circles arose in which Hegel's philosophy was discussed. All the young people studied the difficult, original works of the great philosopher with touching devotion. Philosophical salons sprang up, and Kühne transmits to us vivid descriptions of these disputes and discussions with which people passionately occupied themselves in this or that house. These conversations grew into formal debates, in which the young people liked to participate all the more because the Russian censorship of that time permitted only an insignificant part of the ideas expressed on such occasions to reach the press. Not only students of philosophy studied Hegel with enthusiasm, but also writers and artists, officials and physicians, landowners and society women. With the aid of the categories of Hegel's logic the experience of love was analyzed. Novels were full of reflections about reality in which the Hegelian method was employed. Obviously, dialectical thought is specially congenial to the Slav. And he shows an outspoken preference for the abstract form of the Hegelian concepts. Russian revolutionaries were filled with enthusiasm for Hegel, as the example of Michael Bakunin shows. One of the greatest critics of nineteenth century Russia was Belinskij. Even in his critical writings Belinskij follows Hegel's doctrine step for step. The great Russian writer, Turgenev, belonged to the Berlin circle of Russian Hegelians, and became after his return to Russia one of the most active participants in the discussions of the Muscovite disciples of Hegel. Also the wittiest Russian author, Alexander Herzen, whom his friends called the Russian Voltaire, was

⁶ Reichenberg, Gebrüder Stiepel.

for a long time a disciple of the German philosopher. One naturally reads with special interest of Hegel's influence on Bakunin and Lenin, and on the form of national life in the Soviet state. Hegel's spirit has also exercised a powerful influence on Czechoslovakia and the Balkans. Hegel has adherents among the Jugoslavs and Bulgarians.

All these well-informed studies show the historical potency of Hegel's spirit and, thus, of philosophy in general. From my own experience of many years I can speak for the strength of this influence on the Slavic mind. It is especially noticeable in the growth of an extensive Marxist view of the world. In so far as Hegel supplies the foundation for economic and historical materialism, he is a philosopher of effective force in Slavic lands. This we learn distinctly from the book at hand. Thus the book illuminates some important features of the mental life of the Slavic peoples, who more and more are attracting the attention of the rest of the world. Because this book affords so much enlightenment in a reliable and thorough manner, it is of value not only for the history of philosophy but also for the knowledge of culture and its history.

With the same high approval we can speak of the splendid book which Gustav E. Müller, professor of philosophy at the University of Oklahoma, has published under the title *Amerikanische Philosophie*.⁷ The author reports that the book was written from necessity, not because he wished to or because it was demanded of him or was professionally desirable. And this inner motivation is evident in every line. The book is written with deep delight in a splendidly vivacious and attractive style. It rests on a foundation of masterly familiarity with its great and rich subject-matter. It does not give a dry, pedantic account of American philosophy but approaches its subject with fresh and refreshing appreciation. Müller's account covers three hundred years of American thought and discusses the philosophical bearing of the various stages of political, economic, social, artistic, and religious development. The book begins with a description of the arrival of the Puritans and with an account of their picture of the world. We learn that Puritanism, in the person of Jonathan Edwards, produced a philo-

⁷ Stuttgart, Fr. Frommann's Verlag, 1936.

sophical system. A wonderfully clear picture is given of American deism, of the American enlightenment, and of pantheism and idealism. An important chapter is devoted to finitism. The book concludes with an account of the origin of the "New Humanism", as represented especially by Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More. The European reader learns much from this book. It brilliantly contrives to destroy the common legend that the modern American has neither understanding nor capacity for philosophy and that there is no original philosophy in the United States. After numerous recommendations, I have learned by happy personal experience how effectively Müller's highly profitable and instructive book enlarges and deepens our knowledge of the American mind, of American philosophy, and of American philosophers. It is sincerely to be desired that it should have the broadest possible influence. It is a true ornament to the series of *Frommanns Klassiker der Philosophie*, in which many other excellent works have appeared.

The revival of Hegel's philosophy—that Hegel-Renaissance of which one may speak with a certain amount of justification—began some years ago and has led to a kind of Hegel-Philosophy. One proof of this is rendered by Johannes Hoffmeister's book, *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung*.⁸ Important documents and quite insignificant ones as well have been carefully collected. These are supposed to make Hegel's mental and philosophical development plain from the time of his connection with the gymnasium at Stuttgart to the close of his activity as instructor at Jena. All this excavation is a strange thing. Whether it is really necessary to carry it so far need not be considered. It is ultimately a matter of individual taste how far one goes in digging up old letters, casual notes on chance ideas, and fragments. To me the aphorisms written during the Jena period are the most pleasing. They give utterance to keen but not always good-natured satire. As an act of piety Hoffmeister's collection deserves a certain commendation. Yet the question remains whether such works amount to an advance that is worth mentioning, in the understanding of a great man.

The model of the newer philological studies of certain modern philosophers (*e.g.*, Spinoza or Kant) is provided by Aristotelian

⁸ Stuttgart, Fr. Frommanns Verlag, 1936.

philology. One of the leaders in this field is Joseph Gredt, O.S.B., who significantly enlarged his studies of Aristotelian Thomistic philosophy by the publication of a new edition of his *Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae*.⁹ This is a Latin commentary on Aristotle's logic and natural philosophy. It reveals a thorough philological care and capacity for interpretation. The fact that this book is now in its seventh edition sufficiently attests its high value, and also makes clear how zealously and widely the study of Aristotle and Thomas is being prosecuted. Gredt possesses great acuteness and learning, and one must admire the enormous industry and astonishing conscientiousness with which he accomplishes an extremely difficult task. That there is no critical discussion of the two philosophers need not be especially emphasized. Aristotle and Thomas are regarded as absolute and inviolable.

Ernst Moritz Manassee introduces himself to the scholarly world with an excellent study in Plato's philosophy. The title of his book is *Platons Sophistes und Politikos. Das Problem der Wahrheit*.¹⁰ In reading this capable work, which rightly conceives the two dialogues as a unity, one becomes aware of Plato's earnest struggle to master the problem of truth. Manassee shows that, unlike dogmatists, Plato does not set up a hard and fast concept of truth but gradually apprehends and discloses the particular aspects of truth in the dialectical development of the dialogues. Furthermore, he impressively shows how we are ourselves again and again compelled to strive after the meaning of Plato's incomparable conceptual construction.

The decline of historical interest is revealed in the decreasing number of new editions and translations of the philosophical classics. Nevertheless, it is possible to mention a new edition and translation of the works of Plotinus by Richard Harder.¹¹ In all, fifty-four works of Plotinus have been preserved. In Harder's three volumes thirty-eight of these are translated in chronological order. No word need be wasted on the significance of Plotinus. That he is of profound importance for the present day follows from the relation in which idealistic philosophy stands to him. How

⁹ Freiburg i.B., Herder & Co., 1937.

¹⁰ Berlin-Schöneberg, Siegfried Scholem, 1937.

¹¹ *Plotins Schriften*, Leipzig, F. Meiner, 3 vols., 1936.

many of his ideas have been adopted (*e.g.*, by Schelling), and have passed into the modern philosophy of religion! If it is the case that the philosophy of religion is enjoying a very understandable vogue to-day, then the writings of Plotinus will not be the last to which men will willingly and necessarily turn. Harder's translation is, therefore, to be eagerly welcomed.

Another translation of the works of a great figure in the history of philosophy is found in Rudolf Allers' astonishing book, *Anselm von Canterbury, Leben, Lehre, Werke*.¹² Allers is highly regarded as an educationalist, a philosopher, and a historian of philosophy. His new work reveals most thorough knowledge of the medieval spirit and philosophy. Proof of this is afforded by his nearly 250 pages of *Introduction* to the translations. It makes an understanding of the towering significance of that great thinker, who is rightly regarded as the father of scholasticism, accessible to us once more. Objective investigation of medieval philosophy was begun not too long ago. It has rescued undreamed-of treasures of knowledge and general spiritual culture from forgottenness and quite unmerited contempt. What the Middle Ages has to say to us about the deepest questions of epistemology, metaphysics, ethics; in what a profound way it tried to solve the ultimate problem of the relation of truth and reality; how it conceived the necessity of events and moral acts, on the one hand, and human freedom, on the other hand; in what form it contended with the dialectic of determinism and indeterminism—all this is made evident by Anselm's life-work. And in a masterfully clear and, therefore, instructive manner, in his *Introduction*, the learned translator and editor goes into all these problems and Anselm's treatment of them.

A new edition of Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*¹³ seems to have been undertaken not without an eye to certain contemporary circumstances. The editor, J. P. Meyer, has done his work competently. This volume contains the first two parts of *Leviathan*, that is, those dealing with the matter, form, and power of ecclesiastical and civil states. These are systematically the most important parts. In certain countries today, Hobbes is being made into the most important defender of the 'totalitarian state'. As

¹² Vienna, Thomas-Verlag Jacob Hegner, 1936.

¹³ Zürich, Rascher & Co., 1936.

energetically as he contended for the unconditional and unlimited power of the state, his classical work on political philosophy places a restriction upon the arbitrary power of the absolute state, a restriction following from a tie with the Christian conscience. Today, when the relation between church and state has for serious reasons become once more a matter of discussion, one takes special interest in Hobbes' discussion of the omnipotence of the state.

Another achievement in the field of the history of philosophy is the *Philosophen-Lexikon*¹⁴ prepared by Eugen Hauer, Werner Ziegenfuss, and Gertrud Jung. Of the fifteen volumes which this work will comprise, five have appeared. The authors and editors have been quite right in considering not all philosophers, in particular not those of the more distant past. For the necessary information about them is found in many other historical accounts. A great part of the space is devoted to the second half of the nineteenth century and the twentieth century; more than half being given over to the time since Hegel. We have all too few unconditionally objective accounts of just this epoch, which reaches into the immediate present. For it is inevitable that discussions devoted to recent and contemporary philosophy should often show a strongly subjective character. In this work objectivity was obtained by sending questionnaires to about seven hundred philosophers in order to secure precise information about the most important biographical facts and to learn from the authors themselves how they present their own philosophies. As over six hundred responses were received, the lexicon provides reliable information concerning the biographies, published works, and, in most cases, the basic philosophical views of the most recent German philosophers. The philosophers of other lands were, of course, not ignored. Since absolute completeness was naturally not sought after and could never be attained, only those foreign authors were included who had been influential in the world of German thought. An examination of individual articles showed them to be carefully and conscientiously prepared. A certain unevenness is unmistakable. Many articles are without doubt too short; many others are too long. Discipleship, personal knowledge, and, perhaps, personal relationships may have played a certain rôle. Like

¹⁴ Berlin, E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1937.

the same publisher's famous *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe* by Rudolph Eisler, the *Philosophen-Lexikon* will become an indispensable reference book. Not only the specialist in philosophy and the student of philosophy will turn to it, but every one who wishes information concerning the great philosophers, who have influenced the general spiritual life. It is praiseworthy that bibliographies have been appended to many of the articles for the benefit of those who wish to penetrate more deeply into the thought of a particular philosopher. Additional references to the literature are also very convenient. A lexicon is not a book to be read through. And as the spirit of accuracy rules this lexicon, it satisfies most of the requirements which can be made of such a gigantic undertaking.

III

We shall now turn from considering a number of works on the history of philosophy to those on the philosophy of history. And within the limits of this comprehensive discipline the chief place is occupied by works falling under the philosophy of religion—a noteworthy sign of the times. For in the spiritual crisis of the present there has often been seen a crisis of our religious life. And it is believed that a movement to a new spiritual level will come about through the renewal of religious life. This is why scientific and philosophical attention is focused with such great intensity on the field of religion. It is, further, no wonder that this whole significant trend is in a large measure dependent upon Sören Kierkegaard and influenced by him. Hence, the publication of his *Religiöse Reden*¹⁵ is quite understandable and, in a certain sense, necessary. The German translation was made by Theodor Haecker, who has himself also published a significant work in the philosophy of religion, on which we shall presently report. The great Danish religious philosopher and theologian considered these addresses to be by far the most notable part of his work. In order at all to understand Kierkegaard as a whole and his eminent importance for the culture of the past century and his powerful effect on its spiritual life, it must be observed that Kierkegaard was, at bottom, less a philosopher and theologian than a true and deeply sincere Christian. To avoid the danger of intellectualization and spirituali-

¹⁵ Leipzig, Jakob Hegner, 1936.

zation of our relation to God, a danger which seemed to threaten the idealistic philosophy of Hegel especially, Kierkegaard sought after and achieved complete realism in that relation. Aside from their object, the *Religiöse Reden* are born of and filled with the spirit of religion because they are not concerned with the concept but with the reality of God, and because they bear emphatic witness to this reality. These addresses do not talk more or less cleverly and eruditely *about* religion; in their very substance they *are* religion. And Kierkegaard has also brought theology and the philosophy of religion to a new level of truth by giving them back their substance, the religious life. Whether he speaks of love or of sin, of faith or of confession, of life or of death, it is never a matter merely of sermons, of addresses, and still less is it a matter of learned studies. In every line of his writings we have before us a deeply moved man, who is really and quite truly and honestly wrestling with his God and for his God. There are, as he says in one of his addresses, many human struggles. There are numberless different subjects of conversation. But there is ultimately only a single struggle and a single conversation, the struggle and the conversation with God. And only thus do we obtain an absolute ground under our feet; only thus do we win real life, while all other speech and activities imprison us in a trivial world of appearances. One must take these addresses into one's heart, and through them one will know and comprehend what religious life really is.

The book, *Der Christ und die Geschichte*,¹⁶ by Kierkegaard's admirer, Theodor Haecker, is sustained by the same powerful sense of reality. Here too is shown the reality which constitutes the foundation of religious faith. When Haecker says that the Christian lives in his faith, he does not mean the psychological and subjective process of belief, which is essentially an expression of the personal experience of the man. But faith is a supernatural reality, and it is made real for us men in dogma. And the relation of the religious man to the dogma is expressed in the creed. Christian existence is grounded, according to Haecker, on faith, on dogma, on creed. It is not grounded on feeling, or on tolerance

¹⁶ Leipzig, Jakob Hegner, 1935.

and piety. Lessing's Nathan is, for him, not wise but a sentimental sophist. For there is an absolutely genuine ring, else there would be none false. "Certainly, with respect to what is relative there can be an indefinite number of false rings, but only because in the Absolute there is a genuine one. It is astonishing that an intellect as great and sober as Lessing undoubtedly was should fall simply into absurdity, as the sacrifice of two catastrophes, one theological and one philosophical." The reality of faith, dogma, and creed is nothing but real history and history in its full and weighty reality. Haecker also believes—and in this he is in agreement with Kierkegaard and his followers such as Friedrich Gogarten—that idealistic philosophy is guilty of error in tending to thin the real process of history down to a process of pure ideas. But how can history be such a system of abstract ideas, when it is, above all, the real expression of man, his will and destiny? That Christ hung on the cross is not simply a philosophical thought, an idea, a concept, but supreme reality. He hung on the cross as a man but also as the eternal and only begotten son of the Almighty Father. And God Himself is no thought or concept but, in His omnipotence, absolute reality. In very deep meditations Haecker then goes into the forces that translate history into real progress. But if one, as a philosopher and especially as an epistemologist, studies this deeply impressive book, the wish is felt again and again that this special kind of theological abstraction might be subjected to an exact epistemological analysis. Gnoseologists have investigated abstraction in mathematics, natural science, and the historical sciences. In view of the enhanced interest in the philosophy of religion and theology, what we greatly need is a "Critique of Theological Reason". And Haecker's book would provide excellent material for such a study.

Martin Buber's books occupy a high position in contemporary philosophy of religion. Of his works in this field I shall consider the two exceptionally important books: *Die Frage an den Einzelnen* and *Ich und Du*.¹⁷ Three things are characteristics of Martin Buber's philosophy of religion; (a) his capacity for real, inward apprehension of the reality of religion as the highest and truest

¹⁷ Berlin, Schocken-Verlag, 1936.

reality in general, (b) his extraordinary familiarity with religious sources, especially the New Testament, (c) Sören Kierkegaard's influence on him. We men of the present live in a hundred unessential relationships, political, economic, social, etc. But this relationship is "essential" in the rarest cases. Hence the thin unreal character of our lives. Where is there a really essential, existential relationship? In marriage? It all depends. In political and civil life? That question is not settled either. Such an essential relationship is present or achieved only where I affirm the existence of the other, where I affirm a Being with deep fervor, in all candor and truth, where I really say Thou to him. I must in all devoutness call to the Other, just as I call to God in prayer, or as I should like to take possession of God and be safe, when I bring Him an offering. We modern men, for whom religion has become a subject of psychological and historical research, have lost our understanding not only of the reality of religion but even of the religious "Word". The religious word is, however, not merely a scientific concept, it is not simply a symbol of thought, it is creative force and deed—it is "essential". The "Word", when understood in the full religious sense, contains in itself the power of revelation and salvation. And the actual thus effects the relation between the I and the Thou. It is not merely a formal address. But when I fervently say Thou to a man, I realize not him alone, but I experience and affirm my own existence also.

In his wonderful set of *Chassidische Bücher*,¹⁸ Martin Buber has illustrated the power of the word with characteristic examples from the religious life of those strange East European sects which call themselves the "Chassidim", the "pious". He tells charming stories, many of which make a point of the saving, revealing, releasing, eternal "Word". The Chassidim mystically brood on the mysterious Word, the apprehension of which not only discloses to them all the secrets of heaven and earth but places them directly in relation with God Himself. This significant view of the reality of the Word belongs among the greatest achievements of the new realistic, existentialistic philosophy of religion and theology, which themselves constitute a chapter of general contemporary philosophy

¹⁸ Berlin, Schocken-Verlag.

of existence. Almost every year we have reported in this *Review* on noteworthy books in this field. It is no accident that this philosophical movement has scored its most impressive successes in this very field of theology and philosophy of religion. For in this field the concept of reality plays a rôle of overwhelming importance; the highest content and form of reality, the reality of God, is at stake. And all is lost, if this concept of reality is misconstrued or intellectually emasculated. The relation to this reality is, however, produced by holy words. And the most important of them is the word 'Thou'. With it we speak to God. With it we place ourselves beyond the reach of death. The nature and destiny of our existence depend upon this meaning of 'Thou'. The great historical, political, and civil institutions do not suffice to make our existence secure. Also mere feelings yield no personal life. They do not enable us to escape the unreality of everyday life and our despair on account of it. Buber's discussion of the nature of the fateful relation between I and Thou is one of the profoundest ever written on the fundamental principles of our spiritual and moral existence and on the fateful relation in which we stand to ultimate reality, that is, to God. Buber's books are slight in size but massive in content. They go to the very heart of the religious life and so to the heart of our existence. They could be written only by a man who stood at the center of religious life, and who has won that deepest knowledge, that all questions about our existence are questions which we put to God, questions in which we are wrestling with the Lord.

Buber, naturally, views the Old Testament in the same light, and traces in it the development of the various stages of the Israelite's conception of God. The result is a brilliant book, *Königtum Gottes*.¹⁹ It contains a study of the evolution of the messianic belief. The first volume of this work undertakes to prove that in the early history of Israel the sole King of the Israelites was not an earthly prince but Jahveh. The messianic belief of the Jewish people rests on this certainty. God Himself and not some historical king brings the children of Israel to this conviction; God Himself determines the entire history of His people, and He

¹⁹ Berlin, Schocken-Verlag, 1936.

Himself will guide his people to salvation, when the time of exile has passed. Buber's book, however, very clearly instructs us to view this guidance not as metaphorical or ideal but as a real historical occurrence. And when it is a question of a belief, it is to be regarded not as something subjective but as of historically real significance, as a belief of historical power.

Heinrich Graetz, the great historian of the Jewish people, treats the history of the Jews less realistically than philosophically and constructively in his work, *Die Konstruktion der jüdischen Geschichte*.²⁰ This sketch is a further proof of the unique influence of Hegel on scientific and intellectual life, several examples of which were given above. Graetz construes Jewish history with the aid of Hegel's dialectical method. In this way he succeeds in getting clear, logical order into, or in showing such an order in, the almost overwhelming variety in the history of this race. Since Heinrich Graetz, who outlined this sketch when he was a youthful scholar in the middle of the past century, thinks along Hegelian lines, it was natural for him to conceive the life of the Jewish people as the development of a fundamental antithesis, the antithesis of the religious and the political. Inasmuch as the nature of Judaism includes in itself the antithesis of religious truth and political interest, its history is composed of two principal divisions, the politico-social development prior to the exile, and the religious development after the exile. This construction is carried out admirably, for the young scholar combined a splendid historical training with his philosophical talent. This historical talent and concrete historical study led him to recognize that a new period of suffering in Jewish history sets in with the *diaspora*, the scattering of the children of Israel after the Roman Conquest and destruction of Jerusalem. For the Jewish spirit has not only political and religious but also theoretical and speculative interests. This side of its nature comes out in the third division of Jewish history, which is distinguished by the dominance of Talmudism. Of course, this talmudic period cannot be interpreted as the synthesis of the two previous stages of development. Even though an interpretation of history as strictly methodical as Hegel and his followers had in

²⁰ Berlin, Schocken-Verlag, 1936.

view is not possible, Graetz's undertaking is, nevertheless, to be welcomed as an uncommonly astute and pleasing attempt to conceive and present the course of history as an orderly, rational unity. The profoundest antinomies obtain between philosophical construction, on the one hand, and the actual course of history, on the other. How strong these contrasts are appears from the very attempt at construction which Graetz's little book boldly and charmingly makes.

There is a contradiction between thought and history. We have just been speaking of this in connection with an instructive example. But what about the relation between religion and morality, on the one hand, and the unyielding might of historical process on the other? We human beings have in us a deep longing for harmony. And so we should like to establish or prove a harmony or, at least, an endurable connection between the two sides just named. The great Catholic historian and philosopher, John Dalbert Acton (1843-1902) devoted himself to this task and to the satisfaction of this desire in a highly significant manner which makes one pause to reflect. In our last report in this journal, I was able warmly to recommend an excellent book by Ulrich Noack on Lord Acton's ideas. Noack has now published another book on Lord Acton under the title, *Katholizität und Geistesfreiheit*.²¹ This second work impresses me as being considerably more important than the first, and it will be well worth our while to consider it in some detail. Lord Acton can be best understood from a personal confession he has included in a kind of autobiographical sketch. Here he speaks of himself as a man who began by thinking of himself as an upright Catholic and liberal, and who, therefore, renounced everything in Catholicism that was inconsistent with liberty, and everything in politics that was inconsistent with Catholicism. The endeavor to bring about an enlightening and rational unity between Catholic and liberal ideas runs through Lord Acton's whole life work. And this work is well contrived to destroy the current prejudices about Catholicism and liberalism. In the following words Noack gives an excellent formulation of this work of enlightenment, which was in the service of righteousness: "He who

²¹ Frankfurt, A. M., Gerhard Schulte-Bulmke, 1936.

rejects Catholicism as having a closed mind finds here an open-minded scholar and thinker. He who hates liberalism for its egoism and rationalism finds here a religious Christian. . . . In the end, Catholicism here means, not a so-called confessional limitation of outlook, but universal breadth and comprehension of the eternal in the change of things." Lord Acton certainly is not a member of the small group of historians who are bathed in the light of genius. Yet he was a great man, a great scholar, and a deep thinker, who has his "glory in the slow, continual growth of an objective system of knowledge and thought through the co-operation of many generations". With real excitement one follows Noack's account of Lord Acton's spiritual schooling. One meets him as a pupil of the great historian, Döllinger, and of Ranke. One sees him contend for truth and freedom in catholic science. One sees him form a connection with Newman, the greatest, profoundest Catholic mind in England during the middle of the past century. One learns of his participation in the dispute about the infallibility of the pope. One sees him grow into the historian of liberty, and form a friendship with Gladstone. He does not regard history purely and exclusively with the critical eye of the objective historian. He says of himself that he is one of those people who think less about what is, than about what ought to be, who sacrifice the real to the ideal, interest to duty, authority to morality. And in view of the might of history, man should not give up his liberty and independence. Lord Acton may be regarded as a representative of ethical activism, who looks upon civil, political, and historical development as material for the verification and confirmation of religious and moral liberty. Actual morality can live and flourish only in the atmosphere of liberty. And it is the business of the church to hinder encroachments of the state on religious and moral freedom. The unified state runs the danger of state despotism, and he sees this danger constantly growing in the development of the modern European state. Lord Acton, the Catholic, is no dogmatist. Lord Acton, the liberal, is no relativist. And so he considers it one of his principle tasks to establish a convincing connection between the principle of authority and the principle of liberty. The chapters which made the deepest impression on me were those in

which Noack is following Lord Acton's defense of both principles. And although he defends the external rights of authority, Lord Acton is worlds removed from making a sacrifice of the intellect. Courageously he attacks the infallibility of the pope, for he draws a significant distinction between the religious reality of true Catholicism and ultramontaniam's desire and struggle for power. What a great, pure, free, noble, righteous personality this Lord Acton was. Matters of principle, historical circumstances, and moral, spiritual, scholarly, philosophical motives condition and explain our offering Ulrich Noack hearty-felt thanks for acquainting us with the nature, intellectual attitude, and life's work of this man, who was a truly great figure at Cambridge University. Not only in his scholarly investigations but in his humane attitude there is a compelling grandeur that demands respect. Noack's book can but bring the reader to form a high regard for Lord Acton as an historian, and a warm affection for him as a man.

*Gott in der Geschichte*²² by Anton Schütz, S.P., follows the channel of Catholic dogmatics and historical interpretation. The author wishes to present an absolute metaphysics of history. At the center of this philosophical absolutism is the conviction that in Jesus Christ the eternal Logos entered, in personal form, into history. And on the basis of this conviction all historical and metaphysical questions are to be solved. Schütz is severely critical of historicism, as this appears in Dilthey and such liberal, protestant theologians as Harnack and Troelsch. Historicism has run into a *cul-de-sac*, for it is incapable of finding any fixed support or eternal significance within the ceaseless movement of history. History appears in a totally different guise, if we understand it as God's will. God's power alone makes it possible for anything really new to arise in this development. Everything 'new' points to God's power, which is superior to historicism. Without it, the three most significant historical occurrences are simply a riddle: the Holy Scripture and its people, Jesus Christ and his work, the church. Human life also gains security and meaning only through its irrevocable relation to eternal, divine omnipotence. Only because the eternal spirit of God is fulfilling itself in history, does history

²² Salzburg, Anton Pustet, 1936.

display an inner, rational plan. And the end of this plan is the final judgment. This metaphysics of history gives clear-cut expression to the Catholic, theistic point of view. Even a person who disagrees with this interpretation is compelled to approve of it highly. We receive a coherent, self-contained picture of historical process; the total view possesses a certain grandeur. Yet we should not silently pass over the fact that a great many problems are not solved, but merely assumed to be solved, by theological dogmatics. Their solution is not convincing to those who share the point of view of the present writer.

A metaphysics of history in a universal sense is likewise offered us by Leopold Ziegler in his comprehensive and thoughtful work, *Ueberlieferung*.²³ The basic idea of this book is that historical development represents the self-development of man. But the concept of man must not be taken in an empirical or sociological sense. The 'eternal man' is involved. This eternal man has the roots of his being in God. If we reflect on the famous Platonic doctrine of Reminiscence, we know that we have the foundations of our existence in the absolute. In one respect, true human development is the ceaseless act of our return to God; in another respect, it is the mysterious self-realization of God in man. The absolute peak of this process was reached when God became man in His Son. Therefore, Christianity occupies a unique position in the whole course of history. The deepest meaning of this process expresses itself in "belief in the cross" and "love for the cross". Obviously, we have in Ziegler a notable renewal of ancient 'gnostic' thoughts. And one finds in this renewal a noteworthy sign of the trend of contemporary religious philosophy. There is no question of strictly rational thought. Logical, mystical, and dogmatic lines are so combined in it, that the ordinary, empirical reality of history is built up into a legendary picture. And, perhaps, we apprehend history and our own lives most deeply and truly when we do not look upon it with trivial, empirical eyes, but regard it as legend and myth. And Ziegler's work affords an almost classic example of such a conception of history.

History is the realization and fulfillment of a meaning. Conse-

²³ Leipzig, Jakob Hegner, 1936.

quently, whoever wants to study and understand history and our own human life must reach a decision about the problem of 'meaning' and its nature. Paul Hofmann, who until quite recently was a professor at the University of Berlin, does this in an unusually comprehensive and substantial work. He devotes nearly seven hundred pages to the theme, *Sinn und Geschichte*.²⁴ Hofmann's philosophy begins with the most everyday and certain, and yet most mysterious, fact that a 'meaning' is given or combined with every datum with which we deal. This meaning shows itself first in elementary correlation of subject and object, form and content, consciousness and object. This correlation has innumerable sides and levels. It can be studied along two lines, the objectivistic and the subjectivistic. And the question always arises whether more is gained for knowledge and our intellectual life in general when it is developed more towards the objectivistic side or more towards the subjectivistic side. Paul Hofmann shows that our occidental culture, originated by the Greeks, is essentially objectivistic in tendency. Subjectivistic motives and elements are contained in this development and have an accelerating effect on it. But they cannot be freely and independently developed, and their advocates do not determine the basic character of occidental culture and history. The result and effect of this development may be distinctly shown to be a loss of meaning or, as one may also say, a loss of liberty. And the study of this loss of meaning is supremely significant for the present age. For our cultural life has been emptied. The deepest cause of this phenomenon Hofmann finds in the one-sided development and advocacy of objectivism. And even the conception of the nature and value of 'symbols', with which we express an inner content, is frightfully objectified. We have reached the point where even symbols are conceived only in a naturalistic sense. A change for the better can only come about through a new understanding of life itself. This new understanding must partake of the nature of a penetration into the depths of animating consciousness and the veracity of our own life. We must again get down to the roots of our existence. Hofmann's discussions are intended to show in the light of philosophical

²⁴ München, Ernst Reinhardt, 1937.

principles what sort of change ought to take place; and, further, to show what any study of 'meaning' signifies. He traverses the whole expanse of the field of meaning, which is involved even in the origin of occidental science. Meaning manifests and objectifies itself, in the first instance, in 'theory', in science. It is extremely stimulating to follow our author as he traces the objectification of meaning in the development of occidental knowledge and philosophy. But, according to Hofmann's conception, rational development involves a loss of meaning. He traces all phases of the post-Kantian development, in which he distinguishes four stages and shows in every case an increased loss of meaning. Irrationalism seems to represent an opposition to this dreadful development, the irrationalism which we encounter in the various types of romanticism. The true and decisive way to the recovery of a rich meaning in life and, hence, to the fulfillment of its meaning, in Hofmann's opinion, is the realization of man, in love, in relation to his neighbor, to child, man, and woman, and in the community. In the discussion of this filling-out of meaning we have the second, the positive part of Hofmann's work before us. The sections dealing with the experience and activity of love penetrate deeply into its meaning. Sexual love appears as a symbolic realization of love in general, if it flows from the deepest affirmation of the other. The I needs the thou, and *vice versa*. In the beautiful passages devoted to explaining this relation, thoughts again and again appear which remind us of Martin Buber. Quite aside from its theoretical content, which is highly estimable, this elegant and profoundly penetrating work can also contribute towards diminishing or compensating the loss of meaning. There is in this book a heartening Ethos, and it thereby fulfills not simply the theoretical but also the practical duty imposed upon philosophy. Sincerity, love, and faith are the presuppositions of again bringing a deeper meaning into our lives and human society. A peak in this renewal would be reached by a corresponding renewal of the religious, especially the Christian, idea of love and community. In these discussions Hofmann's work itself reaches its highest point. The work is the accomplishment of a personality in which the power of thought is beautifully and persuasively combined with a truly ethical temperament.

IV

In all our reports, including the present one, we have been able to show repeatedly that there are many reasons for the revival of ontology and realism and that they are quite naturally advocated and supported by those thinkers who take their stand on the philosophy of Aristotle and St. Thomas. We encounter types of this mode of thought in the previously mentioned authors of introductions to philosophy and of philosophies of history. In the present section we also have to report on books displaying this realistic tendency. They are books which, on the basis of Aristotelianism and Thomism, undertake to develop realistic systems of philosophy. Their authors are thinkers of Catholic persuasion; in most cases they are members of religious orders. This is true, in the first instance, of the distinguished work of Daniel Feuling, O.S.B., *Hauptfragen der Metaphysik*.²⁵ The book includes more than its title indicates. For it not only considers questions in the realm of metaphysics but contains really a comprehensive metaphysical system. It goes without saying that the concept of metaphysics is not to be taken in the idealistic sense. For the supporters of realism are of the—remarkable—opinion that a metaphysics cannot be constructed on an idealistic basis. Father Feuling, also, embraces this strange opinion and asserts that idealistic thinkers who have, nevertheless, turned towards metaphysics, have unconsciously taken up realistic features into their thought. Idealistic thought is attacked in epistemology as well as in metaphysics, without new points of view being secured for the attack. Father Feuling's book shows all the peculiarities and advantages of dogmatic philosophizing. Logical precision and outstanding familiarity with philosophy are combined with a capacity for perfectly clear exposition. The representatives of this catholic trend of thought have a distaste for rhetorical ornament and verbal finery. This is also the case with Feuling's work. One recognizes indeed, that he is a pupil of an old philosophical school, of which the chief concern was training in logical discipline. A certain one-sidedness is inevitably bound up with this training. But Father Feuling has accomplished in a supremely fine manner everything possible within the limits indicated.

²⁵ Salzburg, Anton Pustet, 1936.

The work of Joseph de Vries, S.J., *Denken und Sein*,²⁶ is closely akin to the one last discussed in spirit, standpoint, and method. It pretends to be only an outline of epistemology, but, in fact, this work presents at least the outlines of a realistic metaphysics. Here also, every thought is eminently clear and well-formed, and it would be not only understandable but commendable if many young people who are studying philosophy used this book as a text. The emphasis of the discussion falls on the attempt to establish the possibility of transcendent knowledge. Both relativism and epistemological idealism are shipwrecked, according to deVries, on facts. He answers in an emphatic affirmative the question whether our understanding is at all capable of true and certain knowledge; knowledge which is true and certain, not simply in the formal sense, but which adequately reflects the real state of affairs. The realistic meaning of judgment follows from the nature of the understanding. It is open to all being; and the mark of self-evidence is also, according to deVries, the criterion of the realistic validity of knowledge. His epistemological realism is, then, the foundation of his realistic metaphysics, the possibility of which he tries to disclose in circumspect and acute discussions. Even if this work does not afford any imposing new insights into the nature of knowledge and into the structure of being, it is, nevertheless, a distinguished work because of the purity of its logical technique, its acute grasp of problems, and its earnest and circumspect treatment of them. Father deVries is a fine example of the objective teacher. And, though he moves along lines dictated by tradition and by his acceptance of *Philosophia Perennis*, his teaching bespeaks outstanding, scholarly learning.

The absolute, realistic, and systematic spirit of Catholic metaphysics, with which we have already become acquainted through a number of important thinkers, expresses itself again in the attractive and earnest book by Dr. Amadeo Silva Tarouca, *Totale Philosophie und Wirklichkeit*.²⁷ We are in complete agreement with the author when he answers the question as to why man philosophizes with these words: "Because he is afraid of his fate." And he believes that a trend towards a total philosophy has again sprung from our care about our fate. A total philosophy is

²⁶ Freiburg, Herder & Co., 1937.

²⁷ Freiburg, Herder & Co., 1937.

one that comprehends the nature of the whole man, demands all his powers, gives meaning to all his deeds. This rightly recognizes that philosophy ought and must assume the rôle of ethical leadership. Tarouca strives after a philosophy that is both theoretical and practical at once. Philosophy can, he thinks, accomplish this task only if reality as a whole constitutes a real unity, and if we possess the capacity for a total experience of the total unity. The modern period has more and more lost both the idea of absolute unity and the capacity for such a total experience. There came at last a collapse of total philosophy, which originated historically and systematically in the dualism of Descartes. The place of the idea of synthesis and unity was gradually taken by the thought of dialectical division, which expressed itself in the sundering of being into two halves, the phenomenal and the transcendent spheres. And modern philosophy could no longer find a bridge between them. Kant's philosophy and Hegel's, Tarouca says, go to pieces on their internal and external bifurcation.

Whence comes salvation? From a philosophy which with absolute conviction and absolute power of persuasion defends the idea of a coherent and comprehensive order. And man's deepest desire is to gain such a coherent order. He also desires a philosophy which will supply him with proof of the actual existence of such a coherent order. St. Thomas, according to Tarouca's view, satisfies all these desires and needs. And he satisfies them by means of his hierarchical metaphysics in such a way as to satisfy perfectly all theoretical requirements and all religious and Christian desires and needs. His systematic metaphysics is, of course, to be most carefully distinguished from every type of naturalistic and mechanistic metaphysics. The unity of which St. Thomas speaks is "absolute unity in God". Tarouca commends this theocentric metaphysics especially because of the fact that it epistemologically establishes our practical, moral dependence on the absolute unity. "Seven hundred years separate us from the idiom, the style, the classifications, and other externals of the Thomistic works. But time does not separate us from the living philosophical content. Today, as in the past, total philosophy, about the re-birth of which the modern spiritual conflict rages, can be none other than a theocentric hierarchical metaphysics. And for this reason, if for no other, the

philosophy of St. Thomas lives on today in the indications of a return to undiminished reality. In the last seven hundred years reality has not changed its deepest essence." Hence, the chief task, not only of contemporary philosophy, but also of a sane, spiritual life, is to return to the theocentric-Christian conception of the medieval hierarchical spirit and its total orderly unity. Even contemporary philosophy of totality can really attain success only if it clings to the Christian revelation of the absolute unity of reality. We must recover the form of totality in our thought and experience. The philosophers too—indeed, especially the philosophers—must again mount to that totality. "There can be division in method and content, but not in the life of the spirit." What prevents the return to the natural and sound totality? Tarouca refers repeatedly in a tone of reproof to human pride, which is unwilling to be a member of the divine, hierarchical order. "Man prefers to gall himself inwardly in estrangement from reality, in distraught and sullen sorrow, rather than to renounce his pride. This renunciation, however, is unavoidably demanded for the rehabilitation of the whole man." Subordination to the eternal unity is the sign and the first and last word of all human wisdom. Whoever attains this wisdom has reached the standpoint of the philosophy of totality. Tarouca's book is captivating in the coherence of its argument; it really presents a philosophy of totality in the truest sense, which has its foundation less in scientific or historical studies than in the vision and experience of totality. At times it reminded me of Giordano Bruno, although I suspect that Tarouca has little sympathy for Bruno's philosophy. As for myself, I should regard this relation as rather an advantage than a disadvantage to Tarouca's work.

In what different ways the structure of metaphysics can be conceived is shown by the very briefest survey of a small number of metaphysical books. Aloys Wenzl, professor at the University of Munich, constructs a metaphysics in the closest possible union with the positive sciences in his solid work, *Wissenschaft und Weltanschauung*.²⁸ Wenzl also defends a realistic theory of knowledge, which he derives from his connection with the concrete, positive sciences. The modern world pictures of physics, biology, and psychology supply him with the material foundations of his

²⁸ Leipzig, F. Meiner, 1936.

metaphysics. He constructs a metaphysics with the material which they offer. Not only the positive sciences but also a quite immediate experience yield conviction of reality. This reality first confronts us in intuition. On the basis of this intuition we form an intuitive picture of the world. From this point on, the intellectual interpretation of reality is carried out by the creation of a non-intuitive world-picture—modern relativity and quantum theories—then by the creation of an organic picture of the world until, at last, the highest level is reached in psychic reality. Every section of this work bespeaks the author's mastery of his material. No new solutions of the cosmic secret are offered. But the whole work is a solid example of scientific and philosophical achievement. Synthesis is not overlooked in the analysis of the particular world-pictures. The world of history as such does not quite come into its own. But what Wenzl, with his foundation of natural science and psychology, contributes to the structure of metaphysics is all clearly and instructively developed, and it shows that this is the work of a distinguished scholar and thinker.

Without passing too severe a judgment, one may say that all the works of modern realistic metaphysics and existence-philosophy taken together have yielded no large amount of new knowledge. It seems to me that the really creative metaphysician has not yet appeared in the field of contemporary ontology. Let us hope that I shall be in a position to report on such a metaphysical genius in one of my next articles.

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DISCUSSION

POLITICAL MORALITY?

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translated by

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EVERY social conflict in the history of civilization is in reality the result of moral uncertainty and unsteadiness, growing out of confusion in regard to the sources and laws of our morality. If we do not come to the heart of the moral life, if we do not take hold of its vital issues, and endeavor to bring about its restoration, all attempts at social reform, whether political, economic, or legal, will be fruitless.

Recognizing this pertinent fact, we must give whole-hearted allegiance to this conviction in order to find a clear and firm position in regard to the aggressions to which the development of our present age is exposed, or to reach an objective judgment in regard to the values and the transformations which are now being brought about in this old world of ours. Our planet has had to suffer, to be sure, many methods of healing, and has outlived them all. We may therefore entertain hopes that it may survive all the doubtful and violent cures to which it is now being submitted in many parts.

Thus, one endeavors, as it is commonly known in many countries, to stop or to prevent the threatening dissolution of the transmitted order of cultural development by surrendering all power to the state. Hand in hand with the more protective function of the state in preventing disasters should go a constructive performance. People seem to believe confidently that the state possesses the necessary force, not only by its inherent power to defend human culture against destruction, but also to create a new culture, more sane, more apt to bring happiness, and more worthy of human dignity. This belief in the power of the state is nothing new. It is usually brought about when, on the one hand, the general development of conditions has led to a perilous endangering of cultural assets and when, on the other hand, there is a widespread demand for an especially strong rule to ward off all these menacing influences. Confronted by such situations, people do not believe that one particular party

would have sufficient power for salvation or the restoration of historical traditions and the preservation of cultural assets. One will search, and one will examine not too minutely the methods by which the state has come to its position of power and might, and also the methods by which it has succeeded in establishing authority and safeguarding the same. In the face of a distressing situation the sensitiveness of judgment and of moral considerations seldom prove to be acute. People are, after all, glad and rather grateful if a power has been established and an organization has emerged out of it that seems to be strong enough to control all the storms of the time and to direct the course of events into more orderly currents. The transfer of all hopes and expectations, as well as all vital social functions, to the state is purely an act of self-defense. And such a procedure is also very often for political and economic reasons comprehensible and justifiable.

Does it, however, possess any claim to moral right or does it present a moral necessity? And can the state claim as such any cultural creative ability in the real—namely, the moral—sense of the term? The very greatest of the philosophers, as Plato and Kant for example, anchored the true creative legal origins regarding our existence in the force of our moral volition, while they assigned to the external physical power only the position of a servant offering help toward the realizations of moral demands and tasks. What will become of our life if the state is to assume all power and claim the right to bring about all decisions, and enforces all these claims through its instruments and organizations? The main characteristic of the state is always power, and to this it is entitled. Moreover, this is a quite natural right—namely, that kind of a right which is inherent in its very existence, and which increases in the measure that the existence with which it is linked may increase and grow stronger. Thus, the greater states were always dominated by a conviction of greater rights in their dealings with smaller states. In the mere fact of their greatness they would be inclined to perceive the degree of their power and the strength of their rights. History teaches us this serious and stern lesson. The principal tools of the state for its striving for power are politics. And they also demand as the principal support of the state the prerogative to determine that which should be considered as right or wrong, or in the final analysis as good or bad.

But, contrary to this viewpoint, two questions arise: (1) whether right can ever be derived from politics and (2) whether this manner of derivation will create in us the anxious concern that this omnipotence of the state—however well, historically, economically, or politically it may be

established—will not present a horrible danger for human ethics. No matter how close and how natural our connections with the state may be, and no matter how necessary our membership and association with it may become, if we subordinate ourselves to the national viewpoint, the entire surrender to it amounts in reality to a complete abandonment of our ethical personality, and with that to an abandonment of the really human qualities of moral living. Nature and history, public and private life, show to us our dependence upon the universal coherence and laws of reality. In spite of that, the desire for self-determination never will be silent in us. Nevertheless, we cannot deny our duty of personal responsibility and we can never renounce it. With a hundred good reasons do we reject scientific naturalism, because it represents the untenable assertion that man is a link without personal determination in universal nature and thus in his thinking and action the result of soulless forces of purely mechanical laws. Such naturalism is contrary to our immediate personal experience, contrary to our sentiment of responsibility, contrary to our right and power of self-determination, in the formation or shaping of our personality; in short—contrary to our will for freedom and to our duty toward freedom.

But the position of man would not be different at all if the political laws would rule over him unrestrictedly and without any possible escape. Viewed from this angle, he would be nothing but an apparatus functioning according to the political laws of the state. And a morality that finds its sources exclusively in political considerations and deferences is lacking the chief reason for a free and independent decision, and with that also the ability to throw the whole personality into the game.

In the kind of work that we accomplish in the interest of the public, and in the interest of the historical connections to which we belong, lies without any doubt a high moral value. Social work is moral work. But private work may also be moral work. Whether conduct is for the common good or for one's own life, this is not the decisive criterion through which any activity receives its moral character. One should be mindful of the fact that a certain connection may also be a dishonorable association, an association of morally inferior people. No association bears as such the stamp of nobility and morality; no social relationship is in itself thereby a moral relationship. A relationship or an association will only rise in the same measure to the level of morality, and will fulfil to that degree an ethical purpose, as its bearers and representatives endue their mutual relations with the spirit of morality.

Thus, everything depends after all on one's way of thinking and on the

bent of will, if the social order and the state are to attain a moral character. States ruled with dictatorial power, as we meet them in the various forms of state absolutism, misunderstand and disown respect for the highest and greatest good of man, for his ability of self-determination in regard to moral issues and his right to decide for himself. And with that they misunderstand and disown in reality mankind as a whole as well as the spirit of humanity and the dignity of man. States guided by dictatorial authority may, perhaps, under quite definite historical, political, or economic conditions, present a necessity—but always only *pro tempore*, so to say, a necessity for the time of transition, which must only last until man and conditions have found their way back to reason. But the act of finding one's self may not take place by following the road of commands and force; it would rather represent deeds and experience of individuals in moral relationships. And such a moral development presupposes on the part of the state and its constitution a certain measure of pliability, a certain measure of liberalism, a certain democratic pattern of social and legal relations. Only such a pattern will permit the individual the required and necessary freedom of action, and only this will make possible (and that is the most important factor) a real moral development and achievement.

For how could man be enabled to develop if all of his acts, to the very private and intimate activities, are subject to a dictatorial power which in the autocratic attitude cannot attain any comprehension of the private life or the right for individual forms of personal development? If states or social orders are concerned with the moral development and with the education of their citizens and fellow-members, then they would have to loosen the severity of their decisions and policies. Otherwise they will remain coercive agencies and penal establishments, and will arouse by necessity the opposing forces of liberation against themselves.

It is a hopeless undertaking—senseless, in the very meaning of the word—to attempt to elevate politics as the arbitrator over the education of human beings, and to lead thereby toward enslavement of education and culture, and with that to enslavement of morality, for according to its very nature such authority appears to be the enemy of conscience.

The state and politics are in a position to command, and, moreover, they are in a position to put their orders into effect by means of force. They are in a position to compel men by coercive measures to unite. But this union resembles very much the one which galley slaves maintain among themselves. And such a union cannot possibly cause natural joy,

nor inner consent and confirmation. The most profound and the most beautiful motive by which men are led to a mutual union is the one of love, for love is based on self-chosen, free, and mutual consent. But the state cannot, out of its own power, force the human beings which it governs to love one another. The state may order, but love that has been ordered is not a genuine and true love, just as an ordered union is not a genuine and healthy union. The spirit of love and of joy stand in most intimate connection with the spirit of personal responsibility, of self-determination, and of freedom. If I arise in defense of my fellow-man—and this is, of course, my duty, according to my convictions and according to my practical conceptions—by word and deed, there exist for such an intercession two irremovable presuppositions: (1) I myself must as a moral being entertain the desire to intercede for him, and (2) I must harbor a feeling of respect for him, and be willing to recognize him as my neighbor, and confirm him as my brother. In order to be able to do that with frankness and honesty, I must not expose myself to any constraint. Here I may and can only obey and follow the voice of my moral conscience. And I can only be obedient to this voice if I do not allow myself to be led by political reasons or those concerning the state, but by the moral sentiment of humanitarian love.

In the deepest sense and in the last analysis, the discussion of the social question is less a matter of economic or political consideration or administrative measures than a question relating to morality, to humanitarian love, and to respect of mankind. A morality that lets itself be directed by political viewpoints is but a mockery of morality and a transgression against the spirit of humanity and the dignity of man. Just as the immense sphere of labor which we commonly designate as social science has its roots in the moral sentiment of mutual responsibilities and duties, a sentiment which we must safeguard against arrogant segregation and keep from foolish conceit. Thus the manner of treatment of all social problems can only be considered as moral, and worthy of human dignity, when it has not been forced and ordered, but is emerging spontaneously out of the spirit of fraternal relations and out of mutual moral responsibilities. The moral law must not be subordinated to politics, but politics must be subordinated to the moral law—an unconditional demand from which no moral being can make any subtraction. If political morality were not in itself a contradiction of thinking, it would quite certainly be a moral misdeed. To establish politics as arbitrator over morality, and on the whole over life itself, means nothing less than to deliver life to force and to the sword, to might and to astuteness, to the hidden paths of imposition, and

to human passions that may change from hour to hour. He who professes to take the point of view of political morality, with all adherents of state absolutism and all defenders of its pretended necessities, acknowledges the brutal right of force, and by his own manner of thinking and according to his own sentiments degrades man to a puppet dancing to the orders of the public authority.

UNIVERSITY OF BEOGRAD

and

MORNINGSIDE COLLEGE

ARTHUR LIEBERT IN MEMORIAM

Nicht eben viele Philosophen der Gegenwart haben ihrer Heimatstadt eine solche Verbundenheit und Anhänglichkeit bewahrt wie Arthur Liebert, welcher, am 10. November 1878 in Berlin geboren, bis zur Mitte seines sechsten Lebensjahrzehnts daselbst weilt und nach 13 Jahren der Emigration im Sommer 1946 heimkehrt — glücklich und leuchtenden Auges, heiter und in der hinreißenden Liebenswürdigkeit seiner Natur. Nur wenige Monate war es ihm vergönnt, als ordentlicher Professor der Philosophie an der Berliner Universität und erster Dekan ihrer Pädagogischen Fakultät zu wirken. Am 5. November 1946 schloß er seine Augen für immer.

Der junge Arthur Levy, Sohn eines Kaufmanns, schließt seine Schulzeit Ostern 1895 mit dem sogenannten „Einjährigen“ an der III. Realschule ab, nachdem er vorher das Französische und Wilhelms-Gymnasium besucht hatte. Er arbeitet 6 Jahre als Kaufmann, doch dann zieht es ihn mit Ungestüm zur Philosophie. Von Ostern 1901 bis zum Herbst 1906 widmet er elf Semester ihrem Studium. Er kommt in eine der großen Zeiten der Berliner alma mater hinein und hört nicht nur die Philosophen Dilthey, Menzer, Paulsen, Riehl, Simmel und Stumpf, sondern auch Vorlesungen aus anderen Wissensgebieten, unter anderem bei Breysig, Diels, Frey, Lasson, Pfleiderer, Roethe, Schmoller, Vierkandt, von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, Wölfflin. Besonderen Dank weiß er Paulsen, Frey und Menzer. 1905 veröffentlicht unser junger Gelehrter unter dem Namen Arthur Liebert, welchen er nach dem Übertritt zum protestantischen Christentum annimmt, seine Erstlingsarbeit bei Diederichs in Jena; es ist eine Übersetzung und Erläuterung ausgewählter Schriften des italienischen Renaissancephilosophen und Platonikers Pico von Mirandola (1)¹. Bereits in der Wahl dieses Denkers zeigt sich Lieberts Interesse für Platon und den Humanismus, Strebungen, denen er zeit seines Lebens treu bleiben sollte. Nachdem im Februar 1907 die Reifeprüfung nachgeholt worden war, promoviert Liebert im gleichen Jahre bei Paulsen und Riehl über Pico von Mirandola als Philosophen der Frührenaissance (2).

Entscheidend für Lieberts fernerer Leben wird die Mitwirkung in der Kant-Gesellschaft², welche von Vaihinger in Halle/S. 1904 aus Anlaß des Kant-Jubiläums und zur Unterstützung der 1896 von ihm begründeten philosophischen Zeitschrift „Kant-Studien“ ins Leben gerufen

¹ Die Nummern beziehen sich auf das Schriftenverzeichnis am Schluß des Nachrufs.

² Auch der Goethe-Gesellschaft und der Kgl. Akademie der Wissenschaften in Neapel gehörte Liebert an.

worden war. Liebert war ja durch seine Lehrer Riehl, Paulsen und Menzer zum Jünger des Königsberger Philosophen geworden; er neigte der durch die sogenannte „Marburger Schule“ des Neukantianismus vertretenen Richtung zu, wenngleich nicht verkannt werden darf, daß Liebert unter dem Einfluß von Dilthey und Simmel von der Eigenesetglichkeit und Einmaligkeit des Historischen (auch seines Relativismus) lebhaft angesprochen wurde und insofern auch Hegel ein Maß von Verständnis und Wertschätzung entgegenbrachte, welches den „Marburgern“ zu jener Zeit im allgemeinen fernlag. 1910 wird Liebert neben Vaihinger stellvertretender Geschäftsführer der Kant-Gesellschaft und referiert laufend in den Kant-Studien; seit 1912 gibt er unter Mitwirkung von Cassirer und Frischeisen-Köhler die von der Kant-Gesellschaft veröffentlichten Philosophischen Vorträge (38) heraus (33 Hefte bis 1933) sowie zusammen mit Vaihinger und Bauch die Ergänzungshefte der Kant-Studien (39) ab Heft 25, nachdem er sich im Rahmen der „Neudrucke seltener philosophischer Werke“ durch die Herausgabe von G. E. Schulzes „Änesidemus“ (3) in die Kantphilologie eingeführt hatte. Von Band XXII (1918) an wird Liebert dann Mitherausgeber der Kant-Studien (40), zunächst gemeinsam mit Vaihinger und Frischeisen-Köhler, dann (von 1924—1933) zusammen mit Paul Menzer. Zum Kriegsdienst wird Liebert nicht eingezogen; er leistet als Lehrer der alten Sprachen vaterländischen Hilfsdienst am Mommsen-Gymnasium in Berlin-Charlottenburg und übernimmt 1915 einen Lehrauftrag für Philosophie an der Handelshochschule Berlin. Dieser Lehrstätte, deren Bedürfnissen er zufolge seiner väterlichen und eigenen kaufmännischen Berufsausbildung besonderes Verständnis entgegenbringen konnte, ist er zeitlebens treu geblieben: Hier wurde er 1930 Extraordinarius; Studenten der Handelshochschule widersetzten sich seiner Entlassung 1933; auch 1946 erklärte Liebert sich bereit, einen Teil seiner Zeit und Kraft dieser Hochschule zu widmen. Viele Generationen von Diplom-Handelslehrern sind so durch Lieberts Hände gegangen. Im Jahre 1925 habilitiert sich Liebert an der Universität Berlin und wird 1928 Extraordinarius, seit 1931 mit Ordinariatsrechten. Die Entlassung erfolgt am 5. September 1933. Dank der Vorarbeit eines serbischen Doktoranden kann Liebert bereits wenige Wochen darauf eine Professur für Philosophie und Pädagogik an der Universität Belgrad antreten. Hier entstehen die „Philosophie des Unterrichts“ (23) sowie vor allem die Gesellschaft und Zeitschrift PHILOSOPHIA (44), denen Liebert — auf den langjährigen Erfahrungen der Kant-Gesellschaft und deren Publikationen fußend — die Züge seiner eigenen Persönlichkeit einzuprägen in der Lage ist. Besonders ist in dieser Hinsicht die Angliederung einer Abteilung „Humanismus“ ab Band 2 (1937) der PHILOSOPHIA von Interesse³. Im Frühjahr 1939 sieht sich Liebert zufolge der Zuspitzung der politischen Verhältnisse veranlaßt, Jugoslawien zu verlassen. Treue Freunde, besonders Stefan Zweig, bewirken die Einreiseerlaubnis nach England, wo Liebert in Birmingham Aufenthalt nimmt. Neben einigen Vorträgen mit religions- und geschichtsphilosophischer Themenstellung arbeitet er sein letztes ver-

³ Eine Besprechung der drei erschienenen Jahrgänge der PHILOSOPHIA findet der Leser in dieser Zeitschrift, Bd. II, S. 403 ff.

öffentliches großes Werk mit dem Titel „Der universale Humanismus“ (26) aus; hier finden die bereits in der PHILOSOPHIA vorbereiteten Bestrebungen für einen „Weltbund des Humanismus“ grundsätzliche philosophische Untermauerung und organisatorische Planung. — Wenn ich eingangs die Anhänglichkeit Lieberts an seine Heimatstadt Berlin erwähnte, so sollte sie nach Beendigung des verfloßenen Krieges sogleich in Erscheinung treten: Liebert folgt dem ersten durch den Berliner Rundfunk an ihn ergangenen Ruf zur Rückkehr und trifft nach Erledigung der notwendigen Formalitäten im August 1946 in Berlin ein, wo er bei seinem (inzwischen auch verschiedenen) Kollegen Paul Hofmann gastliche Aufnahme findet und sich der Obsorge treuer Freunde, insbesondere von Frau Gertrud Eulenburg, erfreuen darf. Am 12. September 1946 konstituiert sich die Pädagogische Fakultät der Universität Berlin und wählt Liebert zu ihrem ersten Dekan. Knappe vier Wochen kann er dem Aufbau dieser Fakultät widmen, dann lähmt eine Gehirnblutung das rastlose Schaffen. Im Martin-Luther-Krankenhaus in Berlin-Grünwald findet er Aufnahme und Erlösung von seinem Leiden. Die Universität ehrt den Entschlafenen durch eine Trauerfeier in einem Hörsaal der Charité; die Beisetzung erfolgt dann auf dem Französischen Friedhof in der Chaussee.

Wenn wir uns nach diesem Lebensabriß nunmehr anschicken, das Werk Lieberts zu würdigen, so sollen

I. die eigentlich wissenschaftlichen von

II. den organisatorischen Leistungen

geschieden werden.

Ia. Unter Lieberts Veröffentlichungen treffen wir zunächst philosophiehistorische an; hierher gehören die Arbeiten über Pico della Mirandola [(1) und (2)], die Herausgabe von Schulzes Änesidemus (3) und Fichtes Reden an die deutsche Nation (4), das Spinoza-Brevier (5) mit der ausführlichen Einleitung zur 3. Auflage (22), die Schrift über August Strindberg (10), eine Darstellung der Kantischen Ethik (18), die Aufweisung des „Platonismus“ bei Goethe (19) — eine Abhandlung, die Liebert selbst sehr ans Herz gewachsen war — und schließlich der Jubiläumsaufsatz zu Diltheys 100. Geburtstag (21).

Ib. Seine systematische Position bezieht Liebert in den Schriften über das Geltungsproblem (6) und (7), die Möglichkeit einer kritischen Philosophie überhaupt (8), Geist und Welt der Dialektik (16) und in der „Erkenntnistheorie“ (20). Im „Problem der Geltung“ weist Liebert sich als Anhänger des neukantischen Idealismus aus. Er setzt die theoretische Geltung der ethischen und ästhetischen voran: „Das, was man gemeinhin Philosophie des Guten und des Schönen nennt, ruht auf dem Grunde der systematischen Geltungsbestimmung, geht zurück auf theoretische, auf ideale Gesetzmäßigkeiten, die nicht innerhalb jener Philosophie, sondern nur im Rahmen der reinen Theorie zur Erörterung gelangen können“ (S. 2). Liebert entwickelt A) „Die psychologische Geltungsreihe“, in deren Aspekt die Metaphysik als verdinglichende Psychologie erscheint, wobei in systematischer Hinsicht das Erlebnis in seiner Beziehung zur Metaphysik dargestellt wird, während historisch der Pragmatismus bei Vaihinger und im er-

weiterten Sinne auch bei Bergson und Dilthey nachgewiesen wird. Es folgt B) „Die Geltungsreihe der Erkenntnis“, innerhalb derer zunächst Sinn und Begriff des logischen Geltungszusammenhanges entwickelt werden, woraus Systembegriff und Systemidee sich ergeben. Dieser systematische Abschnitt schließt mit einer Kritik der „moralisch-dogmatischen Deduktion“ der Systemidee bei Fichte, Lotze und Münsterberg, wogegen der historische Teil die Herausarbeitung der autonomen logischen Geltungssphäre in der Philosophie der Gegenwart bringt; abgehandelt werden: Bolzano, Husserl, Lotze, Rickert, Lask, Bauch, Cohen, Riehl.

Wenige Jahre später hat Liebert dem bislang psychologisch begründeten Urbedürfnis des Menschen nach Metaphysik auch objektive Berechtigung zuerkannt und insofern den Schritt von Kant zu Hegel vollzogen, um eine gern gebrauchte historische Parallele anzuführen. Die Frage: „Wie ist kritische Philosophie überhaupt möglich?“ beantwortet Liebert 1919 mit dem Hinweis auf die systematische Selbsterkenntnis der kritischen Philosophie und ihrer Ableitung aus dem sie begründenden Bildungsgesetz. Es bestehe eine gegenseitige Bedingtheit von Kritizismus und Spekulation, wie sie im sogenannten deutschen Idealismus zu Tage tritt; so gewiß Hegel ohne Kant undenkbar ist, müsse doch auch Kants kritische Philosophie ihre Einordnung in das Gesamtsystem der Philosophie erfahren. Der Kritizismus ist insofern selbst Repräsentant einer Metaphysik. In Vollzug solchen Programms entwickelt Liebert 1929 seine Grundlegung der Dialektik. Hier behandelt er Voraussetzung, Wesen, Grund und Aufbauformen der Metaphysik. Leitende Idee ihrer Struktur ist die „dialektische Einheit aller gedanklichen Gegensätze“. Den Typen dogmatischer und kritizistischer Metaphysik entsprechen zwei Formen der Religiosität. (Gott ein reales Sein und andererseits ein Aufgegebensein; im ersten Falle trägt die Religion den Akzent des Glücks, im zweiten enthüllt sie tragisches Ringen.) Als klassisches Vorbild der philosophischen Methode gilt Platon, bei dem Dialektik und Metaphysik nach Liebert zusammenfallen. In der „Erkenntnistheorie“ von 1932 schließlich sieht Liebert diese und die Metaphysik (Ontologie) als die beiden Hauptgebiete der Philosophie an. Nach einem geschichtlichen Abriß der Erkenntnistheorie von den Eleaten bis auf Kant geht Liebert von der Grundvoraussetzung aus, daß der erkenntnistheoretische Wahrheitstypus dem logischen und dem psychologischen übergeordnet sei und diesen beiden insofern voranstehe. Nun wird die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit und Wissenschaft im Sinne eines dialektischen Kritizismus beantwortet. Es folgt die Erörterung der Quellen, Gesetze, Grenzen und des Wertes der Wissenschaft und die Aufweisung der Haupttypen von Wissenschaft und Weltanschauung. Diese Darlegung findet in Weiterführung Diltheyscher Typisierung ihre Krönung in dem Nachweis, daß der Kritizismus „dialektischer Idealismus“ sei: „indem die Philosophie ... die Aufgabe hat, ein Verständnis vom Wesen des Geistes zu ermitteln, wird sie seine Spontaneität gerade in seiner Dialektik und als Dialektik erfassen und begreiflich machen. Danach wäre alles in allem die Erkenntnistheorie die Lehre von der schöpferischen Dialektik des Geistes.“ (II, S. 160.)

Ic. Gerade zufolge des dialektischen Charakters solchen Philosophierens

bringt Liebert auch der kulturphilosophischen Deutung der Zeit lebhaftes Interesse entgegen; es macht sich neben D i l t h e y von allein der Einfluß S i m m e l s geltend. Hierher gehören die Schriften: Vom Geist der Revolutionen (9), Die geistige Krisis der Gegenwart (11), Mythos und Kultur (13), Zur Kritik der Gegenwart (15), die neun Jahre später in PHILOSOPHIA I (1936) veröffentlichte Arbeit: „Das Problem der Kulturkritik und die Kulturkritik unserer Zeit“⁴, sowie schließlich die Studie über den Liberalismus (24) und die Pflicht der Philosophie in unserer Zeit (25). Liebert will — jenseits aller politischen oder gar parteipolitischen Bewertung — den Geist aller Revolutionen erfassen, indem er die zugrunde liegenden Urbedingungen aufdeckt und das Verhältnis zu den geschichtlichen Zusammenhängen bloßlegt; auch auf das Schicksal und die Krisis jeder Revolution wird hingewiesen. Die Krisis der Gegenwart liegt nicht nur auf politischem, sondern ebenso sehr auf religiösem, künstlerischem und wissenschaftlichem Gebiet. Es ist mit anderen Worten eine geistige Krisis schlechthin, letztlich veranlaßt durch das Umschlagen des normativen Denkens von K a n t bis H e g e l in Relativismus und Historismus, wie sie bei F e u e r b a c h, N i e t z s c h e und D i l t h e y zutage treten. In „Mythos und Kultur“ will Liebert „den metaphysischen Sinn und die eigentümliche, oft entscheidungsvolle, stets ungemein charakteristische Stellung des Mythos innerhalb der geschichtlich gesellschaftlichen Kultur zum mindesten andeuten“ (S. 12). Er erblickt in der Ausgestaltung eines neuen Mythos „einen Weg der Befreiung von der furchtbaren Pein des seelischen Chaos und von der grausamen und grauenvollen geistigen Zerfetztheit“ der Zeit (S. 13).

I d. Die kulturpolitischen Erwägungen Lieberts führen zwangsläufig zur P ä d a g o g i k. Hier ist es neben den schon unter I a erwähnten Werken über S p i n o z a und K a n t und der auch als Lehrbuch gedachten „Erkenntnistheorie“ (20) zunächst die „Ethik“ (12), wie überhaupt die „Quellenhandbücherei der Philosophie“ (41), welche Beachtung verdienen. Dem philosophischen Unterricht, einem besonderen Anliegen Lieberts, in welchem er sich eins wußte mit dem damaligen preußischen Kultusminister Adolf Grimme und der Ministerialrat Hans Richert (beides Männer eigener philosophischer Prägung und treue Förderer der Kant-Gesellschaft), dienen die Schriften: „Die Philosophie in der Schule (14), Die „Bestimmung“ des philosophischen Unterrichts (17) und die Jahrgänge der zugehörigen Zeitschrift (42). Die fünf erschienenen Bände der von Liebert herausgegebenen Sammlung: „Die philosophischen Hauptgebiete in Grundrissen“ (v o n A s t e r: Naturphilosophie, B u r k a m p: Logik, L i e b e r t: Erkenntnistheorie (siehe oben), M e n z e r: Metaphysik, P e t e r s e n: Pädagogik) stellen gut lesbare, moderne und gehaltvolle Einführungen in die genannten Disziplinen dar (43). Eine beachtliche systematische Leistung ist dann die „Philosophie des Unterrichts“ (23) sowie Lieberts letztes Werk: Der universale Humanismus (26)⁵. In und mit dem letztgenannten Buch zieht Liebert gewissermaßen das Fazit seines wissenschaftlichen Lebens und spannt einen Bogen zurück

⁴ Zu dem letztgenannten Aufsatz vgl. meine Besprechung³.

⁵ Diese beiden umfangreichen Werke sollen zu gegebener Zeit besonders gewürdigt werden.

zu seinen ersten Arbeiten. Aus dem Erlebnis politischer Wirren heraus und in klarer Erkenntnis des wesenhaft Menschlichen in allen Bezügen und Verkettungen des Daseins findet Liebert (wie Platon, der Humanismus, Kant und alle edlen Kantianer) den letzten absoluten Halt in der „praktischen Philosophie“, einer Ethik, welche die Verpflichtung zur universalen Menschlichkeit in sich birgt, und zwar als Aufgabe einer Erziehung nicht nur der Jugend gegenüber, sondern auch der jeweils auf der Bühne des Lebens handelnden Personen gegeneinander.

II. Bei aller Wirkung des Liebertschen schriftstellerischen Schaffens, besonders auf Studierende und breitere Kreise philosophisch Interessierter, muß doch zugegeben werden, daß das Hauptverdienst Lieberts in philosophischer Hinsicht nicht so sehr auf wissenschaftlichem als auf organisatorischem Gebiet liegt. Die Kant-Gesellschaft und ihre Publikationen [(38)—(41), (43)] sind so recht das Betätigungsfeld Lieberts geworden, um das öffentliche wissenschaftliche Leben mit philosophischem Geiste zu durchdringen. Besonders in den zwanziger Jahren hat Liebert das Organisationsnetz der Kant-Gesellschaft über die ganze Welt ausgebreitet. Zeugen dessen waren nicht nur zahlreiche Ortsgruppen in Deutschland selbst, sondern auch im Ausland einschließlich Übersee, wie Amerika und Japan. Kraft der persönlichen Qualitäten des Geschäftsführers konnten auch einflußreiche Persönlichkeiten aus Diplomatie und Wirtschaft des In- und Auslandes als Mitträger gewonnen werden; Mr. Shurman, der Botschafter der USA, ist ein Beispiel für viele. Bei alledem hat aber Liebert streng daran festgehalten, die Parteipolitik aus der Kant-Gesellschaft auszuschließen; jeder war zur Mitarbeit willkommen, der philosophisches Interesse besaß und die Bestrebungen der Gesellschaft fördern wollte. So haben insbesondere die Studierenden lebhaftere Anregungen empfangen, die sie über den Kreis der mehr nach systematischen und didaktischen Rücksichten aufgebauten Vorlesungen hinaustrugen, aber auch Lehrerschaft, Geistliche, Juristen, Künstler, Schriftsteller und andere sind in ihren allgemeinen Interessen gefördert worden.

Aus der Arbeit in Hochschule und Kant-Gesellschaft gewinnt Liebert die Überzeugung, daß die Erneuerung und Wachhaltung philosophischen Geistes auch ein Anliegen der Schulerziehung sei. Deshalb verbindet Liebert die Arbeit in der Kant-Gesellschaft mit der der „Gesellschaft für philosophischen Unterricht“; er wird hier zum beredten Vorkämpfer des philosophischen Unterrichts an den höheren Schulen, freilich — wie auch das preußische Kultusministerium — auf freiwilliger Basis in Form der Arbeitsgemeinschaften auf der Oberstufe. Die Kongresse im Oktober 1929 wie vor allem im Juni 1931 sind Zeugnisse dieser Bestrebungen.

Und als die Ereignisse das Jahres 1933 Liebert den Aufbruch aus Deutschland nahelegen, ist es sein erstes Anliegen, die im besten Sinne völkerverbindende Arbeit der Kant-Gesellschaft, die zufolge der auch geistigen Autarkie Deutschlands bald lahmgelegt wird, in einer neuen, diesmal von vornherein international angelegten philosophischen Gesellschaft aufzufangen und mit neuem Leben zu erfüllen. So kommt es zur Begründung der Gesellschaft und Zeitschrift PHILOSOPHIA (44), um „die Solidarität der Philosophie und der Philosophen auf der ganzen Erde zum Ausdruck zu bringen

und zu vertreten“. 34 Länder sind von vornherein vertreten und der Inhalt der erschienenen drei Jahrgänge der Zeitschrift spiegelt diese internationale Bezogenheit wider.

Aber die Wirren in der Welt nahmen zu. Liebert sieht sich 1939 zu erneutem Wechsel des Gastlandes veranlaßt und betreibt nun von England aus die Organisation eines „Weltbundes des Humanismus“, dessen geistige Grundlegung schon im 2. und besonders im 3. Jahrgang der PHILOSOPHIA erfolgt war. Es ist wieder das Problem der Erziehung, von dem aus sich Liebert eine Neuorientierung der Menschen und ihrer Gesellschaftsformen erhofft. Für Liebert ist eben der Humanismus nicht lediglich eine Angelegenheit altsprachlichen Unterrichts, sondern dieser umgekehrt Verkünder einer Kultur der humanitas und ein wesentliches Mittel, um die neue Generation mit neuem Geiste zu erfüllen. Es handelt sich letztlich um die Würde des Menschen als Person und um die alle Kulturvölker verpflichtende Macht des objektiven Geistes. Der „universale Humanismus“, der Titel des nachgelassenen Buches, ist zugleich das weltanschauliche Vermächtnis Lieberts.

Diejenigen, die Arthur Liebert kannten, werden das Bild dieses klugen, gütigen und welterfahrenen Mannes bewahren. Die Philosophie aber wird ihn ehren als einen Neukantianer eigener Prägung und den von universalem Geiste getragenen Organisator philosophischer Arbeit.

Lebensdaten:

1878, 10. November	geboren in Berlin. Eltern: Kaufmann Franz Levy und Frau Rosa geborene Hirschberg.
1885—1895	Schulbesuch in Berlin: Französisches Gymnasium, Wilhelmsgymnasium, III. Realschule.
1895, Ostern	„Einjähriges“ an der III. Realschule Berlin.
1895—1901	Kaufmann in Berlin.
1901—1906	Studium Universität Berlin.
1907, 26. Februar	Reifeprüfung Luisengymnasium Berlin.
13 Juni	Rigorosum Dr. phil Berlin.
1908, 16. Mai	Promotion Universität Berlin.
22. Dezember	Heirat mit Bertha Behrens.
1910	stellv. Geschäftsführer der Kant-Gesellschaft.
1915	einstündige Abendvorlesung (Einführung in die Philosophie) an der Handels-Hochschule Berlin.
1917, 29. Januar	Sohn Wolfgang geboren.
1918, Juni	einstündiger Lehrauftrag über Pädagogik an der Handels-Hochschule Berlin
1919, Juni	zweistündiger Lehrauftrag über Philosophie an der Handels-Hochschule Berlin.
27. Oktober	Beschluß der Handelshochschul-Verwaltungskommission, „Professor“ ⁶ Liebert zum Dozenten im Nebenamt zu ernennen.
1923, April	Erweiterung des Lehrauftrages auf 5 Stunden.

⁶ Hier taucht der Professor-Titel zum erstenmal amtlich auf. Die genauen Umstände der Verleihung konnten leider nicht ermittelt werden.

1925, 10. März	Ernennung zum Dozenten an der Handels-Hochschule Berlin.
4. Juli	Habilitation als Privatdozent der Philosophie an der Universität Berlin.
1927	alleiniger Geschäftsführer der Kant-Gesellschaft.
1928, August	n. b. a. o. Professor an der Universität Berlin.
1930, 21. Juli	n. b. a. o. Professor an der Handels-Hochschule Berlin.
1933, 5. September	Entziehung der Lehrbefugnis gemäß § 3 des Gesetzes zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums vom 7. 4. 1933.
1933, Oktober—Ostern 1939	o. Professor der Philosophie und Pädagogik an der Universität Belgrad.
1939, Ostern—Juli 1946	Aufenthalt in England (Birmingham).
1946, 12. September	o. Professor der Philosophie und Dekan der Pädagogischen Fakultät der Universität Berlin.
5. November	verstorben in Berlin.

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- (7) Der Geltungswert der Metaphysik (Philosophische Vorträge, veröffentlicht von der Kant-Gesellschaft, Nr. 10). 65 S., Berlin 1915.
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- (15) Zur Kritik der Gegenwart (Friedrich Manns Pädagogisches Magazin, Nr. 1173). 84 S., Langensalza 1927.
- (16) Geist und Welt der Dialektik, Band I. 470 S., Berlin 1929.
- (17) Die „Bestimmung“ des philosophischen Unterrichts (Pan-Bücherei, Gruppe Philosophie, Nr. 5). 32 S., Berlin 1931.

- (18) Kants Ethik (Pan-Bücherei, Gruppe Philosophie, Nr. 7). 56 S., Berlin 1931.
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- (22) Spinoza in den Grundzügen seines Systems. Einleitung zur 3. Auflage des Spinoza-Breviers. 36 S., Leipzig 1933.
- (23) Philosophie des Unterrichts. 372 S., Berlin, Zürich, Leipzig 1935.
- (24) Der Liberalismus als Forderung, Gesinnung und Weltanschauung. Zürich 1938.
- (25) Von der Pflicht der Philosophie in unserer Zeit. Zürich 1938.
- (26) Der universale Humanismus. Zürich 1946.

b) Wichtige Zeitschriftenaufsätze:

- (27) Der Anthropomorphismus der Wissenschaft. Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 136 (1909), 1—22.
 - (28) Johannes Müller, der Physiologe, in seinem Verhältnis zur Philosophie und in seiner Bedeutung für dieselbe. Kant-Studien 20 (1915), 357—75.
 - (29) Zur Psychologie der Metaphysik. Kant-Studien 21 (1916), 42—54.
 - (30) Kants Geisteshaltung unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Antinomik. Kant-Studien 25 (1920), 196—201.
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 - (32) Immanuel Kants geistige Gestalt. Jahrbuch für Charakterologie 1 (1924), 237—69.
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 - (35) Das Problem der Kulturkritik und die Kulturkritik unserer Zeit. PHILOSOPHIA 1 (1936), 243—313.
 - (36) Hat die Philosophie ausgespielt? PHILOSOPHIA 2 (1937), 87—94.
 - (37) Die Pflicht der Philosophie in der Gegenwart, 1938.
- Außerdem mehrere Aufsätze und viele Besprechungen in Zeitschriften und Tageszeitungen.

c) Mitwirkung als Herausgeber:

- (38) Philosophische Vorträge, veröffentlicht von der Kant-Gesellschaft. 33 Nummern, Berlin 1912—1933.
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- (40) Kant-Studien, Band 22—38, Berlin 1918—1933.
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Gerhard Kropp, Berlin